The term strategy is generally applied to describe an “idea” of a direction, plan, concept, and courses of action in which to proceed. (1) Strategy is fundamentally concerned with the application of instruments or elements of power (diplomatic/political, economic, martial and informational) to achieve political objectives in cooperation or competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives.

The underlying assumption of strategy is that other competitive entities have interests that they pursue to the best of their abilities. Strategy reflects a choice, a preference for a future state or condition. In an attempt to create this condition, strategy confronts adversaries and unforeseen events beyond one’s direct control.

Strategy is about how (way or concept) available power (means or resources) is applied to achieve objectives (end) in support of interests. Experts stress that the strategist must know what is to be accomplished and that only by analyzing and understanding the internal and external environment in which he operates can the strategist develop appropriate objectives leading to the desired end-state. The theory itself highlights the requirement for strategy to ensure an appropriate balance among objectives, methods, and available resources. (The force that balances the objective, methods and available resources is an example of a Center of Gravity and reflects Chinese military thought to first “attack the strategy, then the alliance, and lastly the soldiers themselves”).

Discussion of power should not be limited to only two categories; soft and hard power. Power may also be described as potential power. The power to initiate change; applied force to drastically change the existing sociopolitical condition. Initiating fundamental changes in the present with expected benefits to be realized in the future...

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Version 2.0 of Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare in Tribal Society

The COIN and Irregular Warfare in Tribal Society Pamphlet is designed to assist staff officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers and Marines in conducting COIN and irregular warfare operations in a tribal society.

This pamphlet provides a general overview of tribal society and behavior to gain an appreciation of the cultural operating environment. The pamphlet is based on the premise that the key component of COIN and irregular warfare is to effectively communicate intent within the cultural frame of reference of the target audience.

Recommendations for improvement to this pamphlet are encouraged from commands as well as individuals.

Nothing follows.

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I would like to respond to what appears to be Afghanistanica's (on Abu Muqawama) main premise supporting his critique of my paper titled “Strategic Design Considerations for Operations in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Dust-up along the North-West Frontier.”

His comment follows: “Trying to predict behavior through the lens of traditional community and Pashtunwali requires one to see cultures as static and unchanging. That is a recipe for failure.”

I, of course have to respectfully disagree with a number of implicit assumptions embedded in the comment. Afghanistanica's implicit assumptions are revealed in the following words: “predict” i.e. predict behavior, “traditional” i.e. traditional community and Pashtunwali, “requires” i.e. requires one to see and “static and unchanging” i.e. to see culture as such and finally “failure”...

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“It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovations can rely on themselves or have to depend on others: That is to say, whether to consummate their enterprise, have they to use prayer or can they use force. In the first instance they always succeed badly and never compass anything, but when they can rely on themselves and use force; then they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered and the unarmed ones have been destroyed”.

-- Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince

Background

Ideas as to what constitutes good governance various among individuals, groups and cultures. The current definition of good governance as outlined in a recent report on threats from safe havens and ungoverned areas is a case in point. (1) The report defines governance as the “delivery of security, judicial, legal, regulatory, intelligence, economic, administration, social and political goods and public services, and the institutions through which they are delivered”. The definition implies a social service centric function for government emphasizing “delivery” and distribution of social services. It further implies that only democratic institutions are a safeguard against militancy, extremism and terrorism. Not all cultures view the role and function of government in quite the same way. Tribal society, particularly along the North-West frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan judges the role and function of effective government quite differently...

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The COIN and Irregular Warfare in Tribal Society Pamphlet is designed to assist staff officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers and Marines in conducting counterinsurgency and irregular warfare operations in a tribal society.

This pamphlet provides a general overview of tribal society and behavior to gain an appreciation of the cultural operating environment. The pamphlet is based on the premise that the key component of COIN and irregular warfare is to effectively communicate intent within the cultural frame of reference of the target audience.

Recommendations for improvements to this pamphlet are encouraged from commands as well as individuals.

Continue reading "Pamphlet: COIN and Irregular Warfare in a Tribal Society" »

Authors note: This article was first published in March 2005. The information is as relevant today as it was two years ago. The student of counterinsurgency should read this article within a broader context that includes political mobilization such as is the case with the Sahawa al Anbar Awakening in Iraq.

Anatomy of a Tribal Rebellion

The answers to what motivates and sustains the insurgency in Iraq are not readily found in traditional insurgency literature. Much better answers can be found by reexamining something deemed anachronistic in the information age: the dynamics of traditionally networked tribes and clans. This paper provides such a reexamination, and shows that tribal dynamics are particularly evident among insurgents in Fallujah and other parts of the so–called Sunni triangle...

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By William S. McCallister

Concerning my SWJ Blog post - The MEF Engagement Model and Al Qaeda – Brian H. comments:

I think the analysis is somewhat overblown and abstract. There are other forces at play, now, in particular the existence of a central government which is selected formally by democratic means. The current compromise with sectarian or tribal blocs is unstable and will gradually or quickly erode under the pressure to actually perform. This provides a kind of power base for the Sattars of the world which is distinct from the traditional system; specifically, the ability to bridge the needs and wishes of a populace and the power levers and structures of a formal central government (and/or provincial government, as elections for those proceed.)

So the dynamics of tribal dominance and power-playing will probably fall into a degree of eclipse as it becomes clear they cannot access resources and make enduring agreements with wider communities inside Iraq. It will be telling if Sattar makes a move to become an "independent" player in the democratic mode. This would signal that evolution is proceeding apace.

As my reply is rather long for the comments section at the original site I’ll post it here...

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The MEF Engagement Model and Al Qaeda

William S. McCallister

The London Times story “Al-Qaeda faces rebellion from the ranks” provides me an opportunity to further explain the usefulness of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) engagement model (briefing here) and its application not only when conducting counterinsurgency in a tribal society but in the fight against al-Qaeda. It is also a tool that may explain (in social system terms) the dynamics of the alleged power-struggle within al-Qaeda and its motivating factors (in terms of cultural operating codes and coordinating messages)...

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