Can They Say That?

Lieutenant Colonel Bob Bateman

I am a 7th Cavalryman. That is to say, within the Army, my personal regimental affiliation is with the 7th Cavalry Regiment. All soldiers are aligned with one regiment, though in this day and age that is largely an ornamental designation. In my case it came about because I commanded within the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry. Because of this, and because of my interest in history, I am effectively the de facto active-duty regimental historian. That is how I know the honorary colonel of my regiment, retired Lt. Gen. Hal Moore. You might know of Moore from the movie We Were Soldiers, itself based on the book We Were Soldiers Once ... And Young. Or you might have read the interview Charlie Pierce did with Mel Gibson (who played Moore in that movie) about his role depicting then-Lt. Col. Moore for Esquire. I assure you, Mel Gibson, even in full Hollywood action hero mode, is a pale shade of the actual man.

It was from Gen. Moore that I picked up my own code of ethics with regard to what I can and cannot (or should not) say in public. Specifically, when writing for the public, or talking to a reporter, I follow his guidance. Moore had a very simple rule for all of his soldiers with regards to the press, and he laid it out for them as they deployed to Vietnam in the summer of '65. It went something like this: "Talk to any reporter you want. Say what you want, but speak the truth. Do not exaggerate, and stay in your lane. Talk about what you know personally, what you have seen, what you have done, and then stand by your words. " These words of wisdom have guided me for the better part of a decade and a half now, and I credit them with keeping me out of trouble.

I was reminded of this when I saw the New York Times op-ed by seven junior enlisted and non-commissioned officers from the 82nd Airborne Division that is currently rocketing around the Internet, especially on the left side of the spectrum. Since the article's publication, a few Altercators have written to me asking what is likely to happen to these men for writing this critique. The questions came to me, I suppose, because I am periodically a wee bit outspoken myself, and yet I have never been censored, or even rebuked, for anything I have ever written. But these soldiers went a little further than I have, and so there has been concern about their potential fate. I will make this brief. The short answer is "nothing."

The long answer is somewhat more complex.

For starters, Altercators have long noted that I myself stay absolutely away from political criticism of any serving politician. That is because, for me, to do so would be a crime. To have the power of giving orders, vested in my by Congress in that commission thing I mentioned last week, means that I give up something in return. What I gave up was a sliver of my First Amendment rights, specifically the right to criticize politicians above the grade of state governor. But enlisted men do not give up that right. The part of the Uniform Code of Military Justice which applies to me, Article 88, applies only to commissioned officers. Enlisted men, so long as they ensure that they explicitly state that they are expressing their own opinion, can say anything they want ... which is exactly what these men did.

On the other hand, I do have some legitimate critiques of their content. They violated Gen. Moore's rule, you see, because they went outside their lane. Not far outside, and with a few caveats their essay would have been much better, but far enough to undercut the power of their thesis.

The strength of their essay comes from their referent authority as men who are at the absolute tip of the spear. However, because of their position out there, they cannot logically simultaneously lay claim to knowledge of a broader nature. So, when they assert, "Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias," they are making statements about something on which they know only a little more than you do, from personal experience. This is because those seven men would have worked with only two or three (of more than 100) Iraqi battalions. Their experience with those specific battalions they worked with is "their lane," and had they phrased it that way -- "In our experience with __ different Iraqi battalion commanders, and battalions here in Iraq ..." -- they would be on solid ground. But as it is, they are asserting that they have knowledge which is way above and beyond their positions. Even if some of them work at the Division Headquarters, they would know of only a dozen Iraqi battalions, from their own direct observations.

A similar flaw affects other parts of their essay, such as the statement that "a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force." That, so far as I know, is a true statement. But the point is that these soldiers do not know that because of their own presence on the ground, they know of it in the same way that you and I know of it, from reading it in the paper or online. It would have better had they said, "Our personal experiences in ___ district of ___ province was that the overwhelming majority of Iraqis we met there on our daily patrols felt ... and this has been supported by national surveys available in the media which say the same thing for the whole country ..." Do you see the difference?

When I was writing from Iraq, I myself took care to speak only about what I personally saw, what I personally did, and (within the limits of operational security) things that happened around me. I was not in a position, even as a major with a top-secret security clearance working directly for one of the higher level headquarters in Iraq, to make as sweeping statements as their essay did.

That is not to say that many of their grander statements on topics such as political reconciliation within Iraq, or American strategy, are wrong. I leave that for all of you to evaluate on your own. It is only to say that their opinions on strategic issues are no more, or less, than any civilian living in, say, San Francisco or the Bowery. The fact that they, like me, wear uniforms should not convey some sort of magic pixie-dust validity to their opinions on events way beyond their personal experience, just as it does not for mine.

In a way, it is a shame that they wrote their essay in the way that they did. They could have been much more powerful, while conveying the same opinion, had they "stayed in their lane."

Lieutenant Colonel Bob Bateman, US Army, recently left Multinational Security Transition Command - Iraq, and now serves in OSD's Office of Net Assessment.

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More on this Issue

Iraq Vets Respond - David Bellavia, Pete Hegseth, Michael Baumann, Carl Hartmann, David Thul, Knox Nunnally and Joe Worley, Weekly Standard

COIN: On "The War as We Saw It" - Grim, Blackfive

Troops Speak Out - Abu Muqawama, Abu Muqawama

Honesty in Media? - Patriot, A Soldier's Perspective

The War as We Saw It - Google Blog Search

The War as We Saw It - Google News Search

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Links

LTC John Nagl on Jon Stewart - John Robb, Global Guerrillas

Learning to Eat Soup with Jon Stewart - Mark Safranski, Zenpundit

Army LTC John Nagl interviewed on The Daily Show - Otto, Excalibur

LTC John Nagl on the Daily Show - Mountainrunner, Mountainrunner

John Nagl on the Daily Show - Abu Muqawama, Abu Muqawama

Here's a Keeper - Bruce McQuain, QandO

Fourth Generation Warfare on the Jon Stewart Show. No, Really... - Alex Evans, Global Dashboard

Lt. Col. John Nagl - Tom Bowler, Libertarian Leanings

Video of Nagl Interview on the Daily Show - DB, The Chicago Blog

A Great Interview in the Most Unlikely of Places - Jeff, Red State Rascals

Counterinsurgency in Hollywood - Robert Avrech, Seraphic Secret

The Short Course in Counterinsurgency - Malone Vandam, New Paltz Journal

Interview: The Daily Show - LTC John Nagl - Chief Ops Officer, Riley Professional Reading Group

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Discuss at Small Wars Council

Update to NIE, Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead

August 2007

Key Judgments

There have been measurable but uneven improvements in Iraq's security situation since our last National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in January 2007. The steep escalation of rates of violence has been checked for now, and overall attack levels across Iraq have fallen during seven of the last nine weeks. Coalition forces, working with Iraqi forces, tribal elements, and some Sunni insurgents, have reduced al-Qa'ida in Iraq's (AQI) capabilities, restricted its freedom of movement, and denied it grassroots support in some areas. However, the level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among civilians, remains high; Iraq's sectarian groups remain unreconciled; AQI retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks; and to date, Iraqi political leaders remain unable to govern effectively. There have been modest improvements in economic output, budget execution, and government finances but fundamental structural problems continue to prevent sustained progress in economic growth and living conditions.

We assess, to the extent that Coalition forces continue to conduct robust counterinsurgency operations and mentor and support the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), that Iraq's security will continue to improve modestly during the next six to 12 months but that levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will remain high and the Iraqi Government will continue to struggle to achieve national-level political reconciliation and improved governance. Broadly accepted political compromises required for sustained security, long-term political progress, and economic development are unlikely to emerge unless there is a fundamental shift in the factors driving Iraqi political and security developments.

Political and security trajectories in Iraq continue to be driven primarily by Shia insecurity about retaining political dominance, widespread Sunni unwillingness to accept a diminished political status, factional rivalries within the sectarian communities resulting in armed conflict, and the actions of extremists such as AQI and elements of the Sadrist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia that try to fuel sectarian violence. Two new drivers have emerged since the January Estimate: expanded Sunni opposition to AQI and Iraqi expectation of a Coalition drawdown. Perceptions that the Coalition is withdrawing probably will encourage factions anticipating a power vacuum to seek local security solutions that could intensify sectarian violence and intra-sectarian competition. At the same time, fearing a Coalition withdrawal, some tribal elements and Sunni groups probably will continue to seek accommodation with the Coalition to strengthen themselves for a post-Coalition security environment.

Sunni Arab resistance to AQI has expanded in the last six to nine months but has not yet translated into broad Sunni Arab support for the Iraqi Government or widespread willingness to work with the Shia. The Iraqi Government's Shia leaders fear these groups will ultimately side with armed opponents of the government, but the Iraqi Government has supported some initiatives to incorporate those rejecting AQI into Interior Ministry and Defense Ministry elements.

Intra-Shia conflict involving factions competing for power and resources probably will intensify as Iraqis assume control of provincial security. In Basrah, violence has escalated with the drawdown of Coalition forces there. Local militias show few signs of reducing their competition for control of valuable oil resources and territory.

The Sunni Arab community remains politically fragmented, and we see no prospective leaders that might engage in meaningful dialogue and deliver on national agreements.

Kurdish leaders remain focused on protecting the autonomy of the Kurdish region and reluctant to compromise on key issues.

The IC assesses that the emergence of "bottom-up" security initiatives, principally among Sunni Arabs and focused on combating AQI, represent the best prospect for improved security over the next six to 12 months, but we judge these initiatives will only translate into widespread political accommodation and enduring stability if the Iraqi Government accepts and supports them. A multi-stage process involving the Iraqi Government providing support and legitimacy for such initiatives could foster over the longer term political reconciliation between the participating Sunni Arabs and the national government. We also assess that under some conditions "bottom-up initiatives" could pose risks to the Iraqi Government.

We judge such initiatives are most likely to succeed in predominantly Sunni Arab areas, where the presence of AQI elements has been significant, tribal networks and identities are strong, the local government is weak, sectarian conflict is low, and the ISF tolerate Sunni initiatives, as illustrated by Al Anbar Province.

Sunni Arab resistance to AQI has expanded, and neighborhood security groups, occasionally consisting of mixed Shia-Sunni units, have proliferated in the past several months. These trends, combined with increased Coalition operations, have eroded AQI's operational presence and capabilities in some areas.

Such initiatives, if not fully exploited by the Iraqi Government, could over time also shift greater power to the regions, undermine efforts to impose central authority, and reinvigorate armed opposition to the Baghdad government.

Coalition military operations focused on improving population security, both in and outside of Baghdad, will remain critical to the success of local and regional efforts until sectarian fears are diminished enough to enable the Shia-led Iraqi Government to fully support the efforts of local Sunni groups.

Iraqi Security Forces involved in combined operations with Coalition forces have performed adequately, and some units have demonstrated increasing professional competence. However, we judge that the ISF have not improved enough to conduct major operations independent of the Coalition on a sustained basis in multiple locations and that the ISF remain reliant on the Coalition for important aspects of logistics and combat support.

The deployment of ISF units from throughout Iraq to Baghdad in support of security operations known as Operation Fardh al-Qanun marks significant progress since last year when large groups of soldiers deserted rather than depart their home areas, but Coalition and Iraqi Government support remains critical.

Recently, the Iraqi military planned and conducted two joint Army and police large-scale security operations in Baghdad, demonstrating an improving capacity for operational command and control.

Militia and insurgent influences continue to undermine the reliability of some ISF units, and political interference in security operations continues to undermine Coalition and ISF efforts.

The Maliki government is implementing plans to expand the Iraqi Army and to increase its overall personnel strength to address critical gaps, but we judge that significant security gains from those programs will take at least six to 12 months, and probably longer, to materialize.

The IC assesses that the Iraqi Government will become more precarious over the next six to 12 months because of criticism by other members of the major Shia coalition (the Unified Iraqi Alliance, UIA), Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and other Sunni and Kurdish parties. Divisions between Maliki and the Sadrists have increased, and Shia factions have explored alternative coalitions aimed at constraining Maliki.

The strains of the security situation and absence of key leaders have stalled internal political debates, slowed national decisionmaking, and increased Maliki's vulnerability to alternative coalitions.

We judge that Maliki will continue to benefit from recognition among Shia leaders that searching for a replacement could paralyze the government.

Population displacement resulting from sectarian violence continues, imposing burdens on provincial governments and some neighboring states and increasing the danger of destabilizing influences spreading across Iraq's borders over the next six to 12 months. The polarization of communities is most evident in Baghdad, where the Shia are a clear majority in more than half of all neighborhoods and Sunni areas have become surrounded by predominately Shia districts. Where population displacements have led to significant sectarian separation, conflict levels have diminished to some extent because warring communities find it more difficult to penetrate communal enclaves.

The IC assesses that Iraq's neighbors will continue to focus on improving their leverage in Iraq in anticipation of a Coalition drawdown. Assistance to armed groups, especially from Iran, exacerbates the violence inside Iraq, and the reluctance of the Sunni states that are generally supportive of US regional goals to offer support to the Iraqi Government probably bolsters Iraqi Sunni Arabs' rejection of the government's legitimacy.

Over the next year Tehran, concerned about a Sunni reemergence in Iraq and US efforts to limit Iranian influence, will continue to provide funding, weaponry, and training to Iraqi Shia militants. Iran has been intensifying aspects of its lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants, particularly the JAM, since at least the beginning of 2006. Explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks have risen dramatically.

Syria has cracked down on some Sunni extremist groups attempting to infiltrate fighters into Iraq through Syria because of threats they pose to Syrian stability, but the IC now assesses that Damascus is providing support to non-AQI groups inside Iraq in a bid to increase Syrian influence.

Turkey probably would use a range of measures to protect what it perceives as its interests in Iraq. The risk of cross-border operations against the People's Congress of Kurdistan (KG) terrorist group based in northern Iraq remains.

We assess that changing the mission of Coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent AQI from establishing a safehaven would erode security gains achieved thus far. The impact of a change in mission on Iraq's political and security environment and throughout the region probably would vary in intensity and suddenness of onset in relation to the rate and scale of a Coalition redeployment. Developments within the Iraqi communities themselves will be decisive in determining political and security trajectories.

Recent security improvements in Iraq, including success against AQI, have depended significantly on the close synchronization of conventional counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. A change of mission that interrupts that synchronization would place security improvements at risk.

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News / Blogs Links

NIE: Iraq 'Unable to Govern' Itself Effectively - Peter Baker, Washington Post

U.S. Sees Stability Expanding in Iraq - Bill Gertz and S.A. Miller, Washington Times

NIE Cites 'Uneven' Security Gains, Faults Iraqi Leaders - Walter Pincus, Washington Post

Iraq Report May Bolster Surge Policy - Pamela Hess, Associated Press

Republican Urges Iraq Troop Cut as Maliki Faulted - Randall Mikkelsen, Reuters

U.S. Report Cites Deep Concerns about Iraq's Government - Greg Miller, Los Angeles Times

Report Cites Grave Concerns on Iraq's Government - Mark Mazzetti and David Cloud, New York Times

Intelligence Calls Iraq's Government Precarious - Farah Stockman, Boston Globe

Nuri Kamal al-Maliki's Slide - Mike Nizza, New York Times

After Maliki, Few Good Alternatives - Bobby Ghosh, Time Magazine

U.S.: Unstable Months Ahead for Iraq - Al Jazeera

Rhetorical Battleground Shifts on Iraq - Greg Bruno, Council on Foreign Relations

What the NIE Really Says - Frederick Kagan, Weekly Standard

Report: Iraqi Leaders 'Unable to Govern' - Eric Weiner, National Public Radio

The Iraq NIE and America's Strategic Gamble - Westhawk, Westhawk

Iraq Prospects: Continued Violence, 'Elusive' Prospects, Lots of 'Ifs' - James Joyner, Outside the Beltway

The NIE - Unfiltered - Bruce McQuain, QandO

The Latest NIE on Iraq (Updated) - Lance, A Second Hand Conjecture

New NIE on Iraq - Abu Muqawama

Iraq Intelligence Estimate: No Surprise, it's Bad - Sharon Weinberger, Danger Room

How You Know Maliki is Doing a Good Job... - Paul, Wizbang

What's Missing from the New NIE - Thomas Joscelyn, Weekly Standard

Intelligence Report Details Ups and Downs in Iraq - Klaus Marre, The Hill

NIE: No Real Surprises - Ed Morrissey, Captain's Quarters

Obama on the NIE - Domenico Montanaro, MSNBC

Challenging the Generals by Fred Kaplan

On Aug. 1, Gen. Richard Cody, the United States Army's vice chief of staff, flew to the sprawling base at Fort Knox, Ky., to talk with the officers enrolled in the Captains Career Course. These are the Army's elite junior officers. Of the 127 captains taking the five-week course, 119 had served one or two tours of duty in Iraq or Afghanistan, mainly as lieutenants. Nearly all would soon be going back as company commanders. A captain named Matt Wignall, who recently spent 16 months in Iraq with a Stryker brigade combat team, asked Cody, the Army's second-highest-ranking general, what he thought of a recent article by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling titled "A Failure in Generalship." The article, a scathing indictment that circulated far and wide, including in Iraq, accused the Army's generals of lacking "professional character," "creative intelligence" and "moral courage."

Yingling's article — published in the May issue of Armed Forces Journal — noted that a key role of generals is to advise policy makers and the public on the means necessary to win wars. "If the general remains silent while the statesman commits a nation to war with insufficient means," he wrote, "he shares culpability for the results." Today's generals "failed to envision the conditions of future combat and prepare their forces accordingly," and they failed to advise policy makers on how much force would be necessary to win and stabilize Iraq. These failures, he insisted, stemmed not just from the civilian leaders but also from a military culture that "does little to reward creativity and moral courage." He concluded, "As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war."

General Cody looked around the auditorium, packed with men and women in uniform — most of them in their mid-20s, three decades his junior but far more war-hardened than he or his peers were at the same age — and turned Captain Wignall's question around. "You all have just come from combat, you're young captains," he said, addressing the entire room. "What's your opinion of the general officers corps?"

Over the next 90 minutes, five captains stood up, recited their names and their units and raised several of Yingling's criticisms. One asked why the top generals failed to give political leaders full and frank advice on how many troops would be needed in Iraq. One asked whether any generals "should be held accountable" for the war's failures. One asked if the Army should change the way it selected generals. Another said that general officers were so far removed from the fighting, they wound up "sheltered from the truth" and "don't know what's going on."

Challenges like this are rare in the military, which depends on obedience and hierarchy. Yet the scene at Fort Knox reflected a brewing conflict between the Army's junior and senior officer corps — lieutenants and captains on one hand, generals on the other, with majors and colonels ("field-grade officers") straddling the divide and sometimes taking sides. The cause of this tension is the war in Iraq, but the consequences are broader. They revolve around the obligations of an officer, the nature of future warfare and the future of the Army itself. And these tensions are rising at a time when the war has stretched the Army's resources to the limit, when junior officers are quitting at alarming rates and when political leaders are divided or uncertain about America's — and its military's — role in the world...

Go ahead and subscribe - this article alone is worth the price of admission. Besides, RUMINT has it the Times will be offering up the same soon for free... And you get Tom Friedman and Nicholas Kristof to boot...

SWJ participated in this roundtable today along with Andrew Lubin of US Cav On Point, Grim of Blackfive, David Axe of Aviation Week Group and Bruce McQuain of QandO. Issues discussed included Iraqi Security Forces capabilities to operate "without the Marines", the future integration of local forces with national ISF, other "desired capabilities", fire-support trends in Anbar, Measures of Effectiveness, role and effectiveness of the MRAP, national reconciliation compared with "local trends" and company-level intelligence cells. The roundtable audio recording, transcript and Col. Simcock's biography can be found at DoD's Bloggers Roundtable page.

Grim had special praise for RCT 6's Blog... And Col Simcock had praise for Blackfive's RCT 6 e-mail campaign. Job well done all around.

Let me just say one thing about the e-mails. The response on that was tremendous. It was -- it literally -- it overwhelmed our systems over here. Within about -- I think it was two weeks, we had like 30,000 e-mails that came to us in support, and I would just like to say, we actually had to stop them because they were overwhelming our system, and we had to put them on a -- you know, refer them to our webpage.

If you can, I would appreciate you doing anything to thank the people for all their support that they gave us. The Marines over here really do appreciate that; that's something sometimes that gets lost.

They -- as I said, they watch the news over here, and a lot of times they seem to think that, you know, the people in the United States are not supporting what we're doing over here. Nothing, you know, based on the amount of replies we got back, could be further from the truth. It was obviously an overwhelming response, and I just thank you, because it came from your guys' follow-up on me asking that... I just want to thank you for the support that you all are giving us.

AFPS on the roundtable: Local Government Shows Progress in Iraq's Anbar Province by Fred Baker III.

Local governance is making progress in Iraq's Anbar province, and Iraqis are joining the security forces in record numbers, a top Marine operating in the province said today.

As a result, improvised explosive device attacks and casualties are down in his region, said Marine Col. Richard Simcock, commander of Regimental Combat Team 6, operating in eastern Anbar province.

Simcock answered questions today from Internet reporters and "bloggers" during a conference call from Iraq. His troops recently launched Operation Alljah, which sectioned off Fallujah into small, manageable areas and established security outposts in the communities.

"To say that I feel good would be an understatement. I am continually amazed at ... how much the local Iraqi government is actually doing to better their situation," Simcock said.

"They are working hand in hand, not only with my Marines and soldiers on ground, but also with the provisional reconstruction teams that are out here. I am very, very pleased with the efforts that local governance is putting forth."

Limited support is trickling to the region from the central Iraqi government for Iraqi police salaries and equipment, he said.

"We need more. We need a lot more to come a lot faster. It is working, but it's not working fast enough, and it's not working in sufficient amounts," he added.

Recruiting for the Iraqi police is on the rise in the region, and the security forces continue to grow in the form of the army, the Iraqi police, the provincial security forces and neighborhood watches, Simcock said.

"That has been the key element to allow me to do my mission and work with them so that we're both trying to accomplish the same thing," he said.

He also said that the local citizens are setting aside their sectarian differences to work together as Iraqis to rebuild the region. This has been a critical turning point, as more Sunnis join the Iraqi army.

"We don't see a lot of problems in the army between the Sunni and the Shiia; they work as one," Simcock said. "They downplay the religious aspect of it. They don't identify themselves as Sunni or Shiia. They'll identify themselves as Iraqis and are working for the betterment of Iraq, and I think that's a huge step forward for them."

When questioned whether the Iraq security forces were capable of independent operation, Simcock said he doesn't want his forces operating independent of the Iraqis.

"I can't overstate the importance of having the Iraqis working with us," the commander said. "We get more and more benefit out of their participation in what we're doing over here. We want to stay engaged with them for what they give to us as a combat multiplier here in our (area of operations)."

Simcock said the two forces benefit from a partnership that provides invaluable intelligence to U.S. forces and training to become a more capable force to the Iraqi forces.

He also had high praise for the mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles. Simcock's unit recently had 25 more of the vehicles, which feature V-shaped hulls to deflect explosions, delivered, and he said he expects hundreds more.

"They are especially good being used out on the road networks. As you know, that is the chosen battle space of our enemy. That's where they emplace the improvised explosive devices," he said. "The MRAPs are truly superior, from a defensive nature, in protecting our Marines and soldiers. I can't get enough of them. I am supposed to get over 400 of them, and I will definitely employ every one of them."

Even more on RCT 6 -- See Herschel Smith's Captain's Journal: Operation Alljah and the Marines of 2nd Battalion, 6th Regiment.

Lt. Col. William F. Mullen who commands the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (currently at Forward Operating Base Reaper on the South side of Fallujah), gives us an exclusive look into Operation Alljah and what has been accomplished in Fallujah. His discussion is both informative and interesting, and points to modifications and adjustments to the template used in the Anbar Province. Every city and engagement has been a unique experience, but the adaptability of the United States Marine Corps has proven to be one of the most effective weapons in their arsenal.

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Foreign Service Institute Language Courses

Welcome to fsi-language-courses.com, the home for language courses developed by the Foreign Service Institute. These courses were developed by the United States government and are in the public domain.

This site is dedicated to making these language courses freely available in an electronic format. This site is not affiliated in any way with any government entity; it is an independent, non-profit effort to foster the learning of worldwide languages. Courses here are made available through the private efforts of individuals who are donating their time and resources to provide quality materials for language learning.

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President Bush on National Reconciliation and Prime Minister Maliki

21 August (White House Transcript)

The way I view Iraq is from the security perspective and a political perspective. I made a decision to send more troops into Iraq to provide enough security for reconciliation to have the time to take place. It appears to me -- and I certainly don't want to prejudge General David Petraeus's report back home -- but there is some progress being made. In other words, one aspect of my decision is working.

There are two types of political reconciliation that can take place in a new democracy: One is from the top down, and one is from the bottom up. Clearly, the Iraqi government has got to do more through its parliament to help heal the wounds of years -- having lived years under a tyrant. It's not easy to go from a tyrannical society where the tyrant brutalized his people and created deep suspicions into one in which people are —to work more closely together.

The Iraqi people made a great step toward reconciliation when they passed the most modern constitution in the Middle East, and now their government has got to perform. And I think there's a certain level of frustration with the leadership in general, inability to work -- to come to get, for example, an oil revenue law passed or provincial elections.

On the other hand, I do want to point out that the Iraqi parliament has met and passed 60 different pieces of legislation. They do have a budgeting process that is in the process of distributing a significant amount of money from the central government to the provincial governments, and the money they're distributing is oil revenues. So there may not be an oil revenue distribution law, but there's oil revenues being distributed.

There's bottom-up reconciliation taking place. It's noticeable and tangible and real, where people at the grassroots level are sick and tired of the violence, sick and tired of the radicalism, and they want -- and they want a better life. And they're beginning to reject the extremists that have the desire to have a safe haven, for example, from which to launch further attacks on America. In other words, there's a process taking place. And the fundamental question is, will the government respond to the demands of the people? And if the government doesn't demand -- respond to the demands of the people, they will replace the government. That's up to the Iraqis to make that decision, not American politicians. The Iraqis will decide. They have decided they want a constitution, they have elected members to their parliament, and they will make the decisions, just like democracies do...

22 August (White House Transcript)

... A free Iraq is not going to be perfect. A free Iraq will not make decisions as quickly as the country did under the dictatorship. Many are frustrated by the pace of progress in Baghdad, and I can understand this. As I noted yesterday, the Iraqi government is distributing oil revenues across its provinces despite not having an oil revenue law on its books, that the parliament has passed about 60 pieces of legislation.

Prime Minister Maliki is a good guy, a good man with a difficult job, and I support him. And it's not up to politicians in Washington, D.C. to say whether he will remain in his position -- that is up to the Iraqi people who now live in a democracy, and not a dictatorship. A free Iraq is not going to transform the Middle East overnight. But a free Iraq will be a massive defeat for al Qaeda, it will be an example that provides hope for millions throughout the Middle East, it will be a friend of the United States, and it's going to be an important ally in the ideological struggle of the 21st century...

Hat Tip Phillip Carter at Intel Dump -- for more see The Diem Option

Over the past few days, we've seen a marked shift in statements from American political and military leaders regarding Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki. The shift began last weekend with an op-ed in the Washington Post by former interim prime minister Ayad Allawi, a Shiite strongman who would like to once again run Iraq...

Calling for democratic regime change is healthy for a democracy. But somehow, I don't think that's what Allawi was calling for, particularly given his history of ties to the Baathist state of Iraq.

And, as if on cue, a series of senior U.S. political and military leaders appeared —to give him a green light to launch a coup d'etat. Tuesday's New York Times reported that Sens. Carl Levin and John Warner, the two senior members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, issued a joint statement in Baghdad that Maliki was beyond redemption...

So... what does this have to do with Ngo Dinh Diem? Not much. Except that 44 years ago, a group of America's best and brightest thought they could engineer the situation in Vietnam by removing a corrupt and incompetent regime from power. They were wrong. Allowing a coup to topple the Diem government started that country down a death spiral from which it never recovered. We should exercise a great deal of caution here, both in what we do and what we say...

Just some excerpts -- go to the link for full-effect...

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Ambassador Ryan Crocker (21 August -- MNF-I Transcript)

... The whole premise of course of the surge was to provide, to bring levels of violence down and keep them down so that there would be the time and space for political leadership to get on with the business of national reconciliation. And that first part of it clearly is happening. You still have spectacular car bomb attacks like Sinjar but the overall level of sectarian killing, particularly in Baghdad, has come down.

Now, does that mean that the opportunity is now been presented to leadership and they missed it? Or are missing it. Again, keeping in mind my first point about a sense of frustration here, I would suggest that it's gonna take- before you get meaningful reconciliation that's felt not just among leaders although that's an essentially step but it is really felt down through society, that's going to take time. You know, I've been around these last couple of months in a number of neighborhoods including some that I was in in 2003 like Mansur and up where we were on Saturday in Gazaliah. You know, what's happened over the last couple of years is stunning to me and what's happened to kind of middle class, upper middle class neighborhoods the violence, the population shifts, the displacement, you know tens of thousands of Iraqis that have been killed. You're just not going to overcome that in a few weeks or indeed in a few months. You're not. Uh, I think you can start to build a situation starting again at a national level with security conditions in place that prevent an immediate resurgence of violence but I think it's gonna take a fair amount of time to overcome the damage that's been done to trust in confidence among the Iraqis after what they've been through bearing in mind that the levels of trust and confidence were not exactly extremely high when this started in 2003 based on again the legacy of thirty-five years of how Saddam ran the place and the climate of fear and mistrust that he created. So, it's a long answer but it's a hugely complex issue that to achieve reconciliation that's more than say the passage of a law or a leadership statement but that's felt deeply through the society is going to be a very long-term undertaking.

We have supported the prime minister's government since its inception. We continue to support it as it makes serious efforts to achieve national reconciliation and deliver effective governance to the people of Iraq. It's not just an issue of the prime minister. It's the whole government that has to perform here. We do expect results as do the Iraqi people and our support is not a blank check. We need to see results. At the same time, again just as I was saying you know we know it's not easy. But we do think they've got a national obligation to apply themselves in every way they can and I think that's what they're trying to do now again on these two levels. You have national reconciliation but also just being a government to the people of Iraq. And you see it probably more than I do I mean when you're out around town, there is not a strong sense anywhere really of the central government being present and active in just making conditions of life better. They gotta do more of that too...

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Special Operations Forces Book Seminar at National Defense University, Ft. McNair, Washington D.C. on 20 September at 1300

The authors of United States Special Operations Forces will discuss their recommendations regarding SOF missions, SOF role in the war on terror, and SOF reforms. The event will comprise two panels - one of the authors providing an overview of the book and then a second panel offering a critique/expansion on what the authors proposed. All discussions are unclassified and open to students, faculty, and others who are interested.

This seminar highlights a long-standing but oft-ignored debate about the strategic employment of special operations forces (SOF). Most reviews of special operations focus on the difficult missions; relatively few shed light on how these unique forces could be better organized and employed to make a greater strategic contribution to the war on terrorism or in light of major changes in the security environment. Dr. David Tucker of the Naval Postgraduate School and Dr. Christopher Lamb of the Institute for National Security Studies advance the argument that SOF are not used to their full strategic potential, in part because the leaders do not equally understand and value SOF's indirect approach and capabilities. Tucker and Lamb briefly advanced this thesis in a January 2006 Institute for National Security Studies Strategic Forum, "Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats," and now provide a fuller explanation of their position with the publication of U.S. Special Operations Forces by Columbia University Press. Attendees will hear a brief explanation of the authors' thesis and then commentary by experts from the special operations community...

Online registration form.

Earlier this month, Congress passed a bill implementing some of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The legislation, lengthy and complex, includes a provision dealing with the report that CIA's Office of Inspector General prepared on the performance of our agency prior to September 11th. The act gave me 30 days to make available to the public a version of the report's executive summary, declassified to the maximum extent possible. Today, well within deadline, I am releasing that material.

While meeting the dictates of the law, I want to make it clear that this declassification was neither my choice nor my preference. Two Directors of National Intelligence have supported the agency's position against release.

The long, grueling fight against terrorism, which depends in very real part on the quality of our intelligence, demands that we keep our focus on the present and the future. We must draw lessons from our past—and we have—without becoming captive to it. I thought the release of this report would distract officers serving their country on the frontlines of a global conflict. It will, at a minimum, consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed. I also remain deeply concerned about the chilling effect that may follow publication of the previously classified work, findings, and recommendations of the Office of Inspector General. The important work of that unit depends on candor and confidentiality.

In keeping with the letter and spirit of the law, CIA has in its declassification process removed relatively little from the report's executive summary. We focused chiefly on the protection of essential sources and methods. I also thought it unnecessary and unwise to permit identification of officers below the level of Center Chief, even if only by title, and those passages have been deleted, as well.

There is some background that I believe you need to know. In 2002, the Joint Inquiry Committee of Congress instructed our Office of Inspector General to determine if any agency officers should be rewarded for outstanding service in the run-up to 9/11 or held accountable for the unsatisfactory discharge of their duties. In June 2005, the Inspector General presented my predecessor, Porter Goss, with a final report answering that specific mandate. The summary, like the complete report, is a very human document. In it, one group of agency officers—dedicated to their task—looks back to examine and judge the actions of another group of agency officers—dedicated to their task, the task of understanding and combating al-Qai'da.

You should also know that there are very different perspectives on this report. It was important for us to conduct our own review—that is something on which most, if not all of us, can agree. But our colleagues referred to in the document, and others who have read it, took strong exception to its focus, methodology, and conclusions. In October 2005, Director Goss declined to accept its primary recommendation—the creation of an Accountability Board to consider disciplinary action against a handful of individuals at different levels of command. I have re-read the report, carefully evaluated what it says, and have found no reason to revisit his decision.

Director Goss noted at the time that the officers cited include some of our finest. With inadequate resources, they and those they led worked flat out against a tough, secretive foe. As the executive summary points out, there was never a question of misconduct. While they, and our government as a whole, were unable despite their best efforts to shield our nation from attack, their skill, wisdom, energy, and leadership were key elements in the agency's victories over al-Qai'da before and after 9/11. They have made powerful contributions to our national security. They have prevented other acts of terrorism, and they have saved innocent lives, in our country and overseas.

This is not about avoiding responsibility. In fact, the opposite is true. CIA has for years spoken publicly, openly, and explicitly about shortcomings in its counter-terror programs before 9/11. Those shortcomings have been the subject of hearings, studies, panels, press reports, books, and critiques of all kinds, some fair, some not. As you will see, the Inspector General found no "silver bullet" that would have prevented the terror attacks of September 11th. There was, in the words of the summary, "no single point of failure."

Nor did CIA wait for this formal review to begin identifying and correcting the systemic flaws discussed in the report. This is an organization that is self-aware, self-critical, and, to a great degree, self-improving. The Inspector General's report, like others before it, found areas in which CIA could do better, and, in the intervening years, we have worked hard to do just that.

Counter-terrorism is an exceptionally difficult challenge. The risks, and the stakes, are extremely high. The enemy is adaptive, resilient, and determined to strike us again here at home. There are limits to what intelligence can accomplish, and there can be no guarantee of perfect security. But the talented, motivated officers who work against this threat day and night give our nation a strong advantage. Together, we recognize that the finest tribute we can pay to the victims of terrorism is a redoubled effort to rip that scourge out by the roots. We can, and should, be proud of the many great things CIA has done, and will do, to defend the United States in a very dangerous world.

Mike Hayden

Today's edition of The Australian offers up a profile on counterinsurgency expert, and Small Wars Journal contributor, Dr. David Kilcullen -- Strategist Behind War Gains by Rebecca Weisser.

... when the invasion of Iraq was being planned, Kilcullen was one of a handful of senior military advisers in the coalition of the —to voice a dissenting view. "I was one of a bunch of people ... who said 'Iraq is going to be a lot harder than you people seem to think, based on 20 years of experience doing it and studying it. It's going to take a lot more than you seem to be —to commit."

It was a view that then US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld rejected out of hand, saying Kilcullen didn't know what he was talking about.

But now, after more than four years of entrenched conflict with no end in sight, Kilcullen's doctrine of counterinsurgency prevails in Washington and on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, where it provided the foundation for the surge strategy the Bush administration says is beginning to succeed.

His no-nonsense guide to fighting insurgents, The 28 Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency, is used by the US, Australian, British, Canadian, Dutch, Iraqi and Afghan armies as a training document.

The fact that Kilcullen turned out to be right did not initially win him and his supporters any friends in Washington. "Because we said something that turned out to be a little prescient, we were on the nose in Washington for a couple of years there. People didn't want to engage with us because it would be like an admission of failure."

But after Rumsfeld resigned, Kilcullen's friend David Petraeus was appointed commander of the multinational force in Iraq. Petraeus and Kilcullen had shared the same views on Iraq since 2003 and Petraeus asked Kilcullen to be his senior adviser.

Kilcullen's philosophical approach to counterinsurgency overturned the prevailing orthodoxy. The goal was no longer finding and killing the enemy: it became protecting the population that supports the country's government, winning more and more people to that group and pushing the insurgents to the margins. "If you try to kill the enemy, you end up destroying the haystack to kill the needle," Kilcullen tells Inquirer. "But you can drive the insurgents away, like combing fleas out of a dog. And then you hard-wire them out of the environment."

In 2006, Kilcullen started working with Petraeus on a military handbook about a new approach to the war. For reputedly the first time in the US, the military workshopped the handbook with the human rights and legal community, non-government organisations such as aid groups, and diplomats. After six months, in another first, they circulated it among junior officers in the field. The feedback was blunt. Company commanders needed something more practical.

Much more at The Australian...

As a lead-in -- to this much longer than usual SWJ Blog entry -- I thought I'd post some recent news as well as recent and not-so-recent background / reference material on the establishment of our newest Combatant Command -- U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and issues that will impact on AFRICOM's mission.

Regardless of where you might stand on the value of establishing this new command, it is happening and we need to get it right. Getting it right includes ensuring that AFRICOM receives the necessary resources (people and funding) and is enabled to pursue operations utilizing all instruments of national power -- read interagency...

Please post to comments below (or on this thread at Small Wars Council) any additional relevant material (articles, studies, presentations...) for addition to the SWJ Reference Library -- Thanks!

Introduction

On 6 February President Bush directed the creation of U.S. Africa Command. The decision was the culmination of a 10-year thought process within the Department of Defense (DOD) acknowledging the emerging strategic importance of Africa, and recognizing that peace and stability on the continent impacts not only Africans, but the interests of the U.S. and international community as well. Yet, the department's regional command structure did not account for Africa in a comprehensive way, with three different U.S. military headquarters maintaining relationships with African countries. The creation of U.S. Africa Command will enable DOD to better focus its resources to support and enhance existing U.S. initiatives that help African nations, the African Union, and the regional economic communities succeed. It also provides African nations and regional organizations an integrated DOD coordination point to help address security and related needs.

On 10 July Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced that President Bush had nominated Gen. William E. Ward for re-appointment to the rank of general with assignment as commander, U.S. Africa Command

The command will initially report to U.S. European Command, with initial operational capability scheduled to begin in October 2007. The command is scheduled to be fully operational by October 2008. The AFRICOM Transition Team is currently based in Stuttgart, Germany.

Two U.S. congressional committees conducted public hearings 1 and 2 August to discuss concerns related to the creation of the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Those testifying included senior U.S. government officials from the Defense Department, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as independent experts from the United States and Africa.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on African Affairs convened on 1 August to discuss "Exploring the U.S. Africa Command and a New Strategic Relationship with Africa." The committee's Website includes written witness testimony and opening statements by committee leaders, as well as a recording of the hearing.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health convened a 2 August hearing on "Africa Command: Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement or the Militarization of U.S.-Africa Relations?" The committee's Website includes written witness testimony and a video webcast of the hearing.

Special Video Report

Background / Research

Africa Command: Forecast for the Future -- Commander Otto Sieber. U.S. Naval Postgraduate School Center for Contemporary Conflict, January 2007.

The creation of AFRICOM would change a U.S. policy that has relegated Africa to a lower level of importance in comparison to other world regions, changing a prioritization that has existed since at least the end of colonialism in Africa in the 1960s. For instance, until 1983 Sub-Saharan Africa was not included in any of the geographic combatant commands. Once it was finally included in the combatant command system, it simply became a much-ignored component of overstretched commands: United States European Command (USEUCOM) in the 1980s due to the Cold War and United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) in the 1990s and early 2000s due to heightened tensions in the Middle East. Since 9/11, however, the DoD has recognized Africa as a key area for its counterterrorism operations, specifically against al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in various sub-regions within Africa. As a mark of this change, the DoD has stood up the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) in 2002 and 2005, respectively. Africa is becoming increasingly important to U.S. national security as a result of terrorist threats, disease proliferation, and valuable energy sources.

Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa -- Lauren Ploch. Congressional Research Report, July 2007.

As defined by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM's mission will be to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region through improved security capability, military professionalization, and accountable governance. The command's military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises.A transition team has begun establishment of the new command, which is expected to begin as a sub-unified command under EUCOM by October 2007 and achieve full capability as a stand-alone command by October 2008. DOD has signaled its intention to eventually locate AFRICOM on the continent, and U.S officials are consulting with strategic partners in the region to identify a suitable location for the command's headquarters. The transition team and the new command will operate from Stuttgart, Germany until facilities in Africa are secured. The Department of Defense has stressed that there are no plans to have a significant troop presence on the continent.

2 Aug 07 testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Relations on Africa Command - Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement or the Militarization of U.S.-Africa Relations:

Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs

Kurt Shillinger, South African Institute of International Affairs

Wafula Okumu, South Africa Institute for Security Studies

J. Peter Pham, James Madison University

African Command: The Newest Combatant Command -- Paul Cale and the U.S. Army War College Graduating Class of 2005. US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2005.

African Command (AFRICOM) must be established as the newest Combatant Command in the Unified Command System. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) currently divides the Continent of Africa into areas of responsibility served by European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command. This current division of Africa, within the UCP, has led to the creation of "seams" between the current combatant command boundaries. EUCOM's focus is based on their expansion into the newest NATO countries on their Eastern border. CENTCOM's focus for the indefinite future is on OEF, OIF, and the future of U.S. presence in the Middle East. PACOM's focus has been and remains on the Asian continent. For these and other reasons that will be further developed the UCP must establish AFRICOM as its Combatant Command Headquarters on the African continent.

A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan -- Richard Catoire. Parameters article, Winter 2000-01.

Because of the increased U.S. engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa, and because the current regional unified commands are principally focused elsewhere, the time has come to rethink the Unified Command Plan as it regards Africa. The current plan cannot effectively protect America's security interests on that continent. It is unlikely to realize the articulated policy objectives of the United States in the region, and it should be revised to better secure those objectives.

Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: U.S. Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa -- Dr. Donovan Chau. U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, March 2007.

Domestic and international terrorism aside, the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), are vying for influence over African governments and people. Not unlike the Cold War, the primary means of exerting influence in Africa is through the use of nonviolent instruments of grand strategy. The author considers one nonviolent instrument of grand strategy in particular, political warfare. He suggests that the PRC has used political warfare as its leading grand strategic instrument in Africa and offers a concise, detailed overview of U.S. capabilities to conduct political warfare in Africa in four of its nation-states.

Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions - Colonel Thomas A Dempsey. U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, April 2006.

Terrorist groups operating in Sub-Saharan Africa failed states have demonstrated the ability to avoid the scrutiny of Western counterterrorism officials, while supporting and facilitating terrorist attacks on the United States and its partners. The potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists makes terrorist groups operating from failed states especially dangerous. U.S. counterterrorism strategies largely have been unsuccessful in addressing this threat. A new strategy is called for, one that combines both military and law enforcement efforts in a fully integrated counterterrorism effort, supported by a synthesis of foreign intelligence capabilities with intelligence-led policing to identify, locate, and take into custody terrorists operating from failed states before they are able to launch potentially catastrophic attacks.

Refining American Strategy in Africa -- Dr. Steven Metz. U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute book, February 2000.

The author provides a broad overview of the African security environment as a basis for recommendations on the refinement of American strategy in that region. He assesses both the opportunities for positive change which exist today, and the obstacles. While only Africans themselves can determine the future of their region, an American strategy which discourages proxy aggression, encourages private initiatives in the economic and political spheres, and uses the U.S. military, particularly the Army, to engage its African counterparts could pay great dividends. American defense strategy calls for using the military to help shape the global security environment, preempting and deterring conflict and building regional mechanisms for security. This is a particularly wise approach to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Funding Defense: Challenges of Buying Military Capability in Sub-Saharan Africa - Colonel Daniel Henk and Dr. Martin Revayi Rupiya. U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, September 2001.

Martin Rupiya, Director of the University of Zimbabwe's Centre for Defence Studies, and Daniel Henk of the Air War College provide one of the first comprehensive studies of defense budgeting practices in Africa. They assess both the problems with these practices and fruitful avenues of reform. By doing so, they provide a solid roadmap both for African leaders and for Americans concerned with the development of greater security in the region.

Why the United States Should Robustly Support Pan-African Organizations -- Francis Crupi. Parameters article, Winter 2005-06.

This article presents a rationale for why it should be the policy of the United States to robustly support pan-African sub-regional organizations that seek to have Africans help themselves. To do so, it analyzes one sub-regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), using the furtherance of stated American policy for peace in the region as a litmus test. The guiding principles of ECOWAS and its record of accomplishment are highlighted relative to the U.S. goals for Africa as promulgated in the National Security Strategy. The article argues that it is in the United States' interest to support sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS as a viable way to promote a self-sufficient Africa. A stable and prosperous Africa provides the conditions for political and economic growth and counters the incidence of "failed states" which can serve as terrorist breeding grounds such as in the Sudan.

A Prayer for Marie: Creating an Effective African Standby Force -- Mike Denning. Parameters article, Winter 2004-05.

The current U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) addresses the African paradox. The strategy describes Africa as a land of "promise and opportunity," but also as a land beset with "disease, war, and desperate poverty." The NSS goes on to say that the current situation in Africa poses a threat to a core value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and to a strategic priority—combating global terror. As a result, the National Security Strategy makes a bold commitment: The United States "will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity." That said, Africa remains at the bottom of any list of America's vital interests. Does the evidence justify this low priority?

Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda -- Thomas Odom.

Chapter Five -- Operation Support Hope

SWJ Book Review

Marine officers are taught that the two most important components of any operations order are the commander's intent and mission statement. Above all else, each statement should be clear and concise so as to leave the recipient with no doubt as to what must be accomplished. In 1994, at the height of a humanitarian crisis in Goma, Zaire, US Army LTC Thomas Odom, an Africa Foreign Area Officer, was told by his superiors -- "We must stop the dying," and thus tasked to "stop the dying." Though clear and concise, these provided little true guidance as he tried to assess the needs of over one million Rwandan refugees escaping violent retribution in front of the steadily advancing Rwandan Patriotic Front as it consolidated its victory in the Rwandan Civil War. Did his superiors really want him to provide humanitarian assistance to the former Rwandan Army that had just been defeated, yet was still heavily armed? Was he to provide relief to the Interhamwe or Impuzamugambi militias and their collaborators who had just raped and murdered in excess of 800,000 Rwandans? Was he required to disarm the groups as a precondition to assistance? And finally, how was he to complete his mission without creating the perception of providing aide and comfort to thousands who just committed genocide? In his book Journey Into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda, Thomas Odom provides a first-person account of the planning difficulties and selected courses of actions associated with Operation Support Hope (Goma, Zaire 1994) and follow-on operations associated with the Rwandan Genocide.

Tribal Alliances: Ways, Means, and ends to Successful Strategy -- Richard Taylor. U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute paper, August 2005.

The following conclusions and recommendations are offered to further facilitate national military policy success. Four conclusions, linked to the essential elements of analysis and the thesis at large were found to be of value. First, tribes are not explicitly considered in the National Security Strategy or the National Military Strategy of the United States as a tool of military power. Some implicit linkages can be assumed. Second, tribes offer value in all bands of the spectrum of military operations—from pre-crisis access to conventional warfare. Third, when considering tribal alliances as a tool for success, recognize and evaluate thoroughly the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing tribal resources. Finally, throughout history, both past and present, tribes have delivered functional capability (intelligence, security, combat arms, etc.) to successful military operations. In light of the conclusions offered, three recommendations are provided. First, make tribal partnerships an explicit tool of national security policy. The example of the Northern Alliance during Operation Enduring Freedom provides a historical example of success. Second, use tribes across the full spectrum of military operations. The successes tribes have shown in various bands of the spectrum of military operation indicate further potential for tribes as a force multiplier. Finally, use tribes across the continuum of military campaign phases, from Phase I (Deter and Engage) to Phase IV (Transition). Tendencies are to use tribes in one phase of military campaigns.

U.S. Army Foreign Military Military Studies Office - Africa Page (analytical products)

Global Security - Africa Search Page

News Resources

Africa News -- Africa News Directory

Africa News -- Topix Africa News Directory

Africa Newspapers -- African Newspapers, Magazines and News Sites

All Africa -- Africa News Directory

The Australian -- Africa Page

Australian Broadcasting Corporation -- Africa Search Page

BBC News -- Africa Page

Christian Science Monitor -- Africa Page

Globe and Mail -- Africa / Mideast Page

Google News - Africa Search Page

London Times -- Africa Page

Los Angeles Times -- Africa Page

National Public Radio -- Africa Search Page

National Post -- Africa Search Page

New York Times -- Africa Page

New Zealand Herald - Africa Search Page

South Africa Post

Sudan Tribune

Sydney Morning Herald -- Africa Search Page

Toronto Star -- Africa Search Page

Washington Post -- Africa Page

Yahoo News - Africa Page

General Background Resources

Africa Country Studies -- U.S. Library of Congress

BBC News -- Country Profiles

Bureau of African Affairs -- U.S. Department of State

CIA World Factbook -- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

Country Background Notes -- U.S. Department of State

Flags of the World -- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

U.S. Embassies, Consulates, and Diplomatic Missions - U.S. Department of State

SWJ United Nations - Links

SWJ Non-Governmental Organizations - Links

Reference Imagery -- Google Earth

Reference Maps -- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

Reference Maps -- National Geographic Map Machine

Reference Maps -- Relief Web

Reference Maps -- United Nations

Reference Maps -- University of Texas Perry-Castaí±eda Library

World Clock -- Time Zones

World Gazetteer

Preface

If the post-September 11th world has taught us anything, it is that the tools for conducting serious terrorist attacks are becoming easier to acquire. Therefore intention becomes an increasingly important factor in the formation of terrorist cells. This study is an attempt to look at how that intention forms, hardens and leads to an attack or attempted attack using real world case studies.

While the threat from overseas remains, many of the terrorist attacks or thwarted plots against cities in Europe, Canada, Australia and the United States have been conceptualized and planned by local residents/citizens who sought to attack their country of residence. The majority of these individuals began as "unremarkable" -they had "unremarkable" jobs, had lived "unremarkable" lives and had little, if any criminal history. The recently thwarted plot by homegrown jihadists, in May 2007, against Fort Dix in New Jersey, only underscores the seriousness of this emerging threat.

Understanding this trend and the radicalization process in the West that drives "unremarkable" people to become terrorists is vital for developing effective counter-strategies. This realization has special importance for the NYPD and the City of New York. As one of the country's iconic symbols and the target of numerous terrorist plots since the 1990's, New York City continues to be the one of the top targets of terrorists worldwide. Consequently, the NYPD places a priority on understanding what drives and defines the radicalization process.

The aim of this report is to assist policymakers and law enforcement officials, both in Washington and throughout the country, by providing a thorough understanding of the kind of threat we face domestically. It also seeks to contribute to the debate among intelligence and law enforcement agencies on how best to counter this emerging threat by better understanding what constitutes the radicalization process.

The NYPD's understanding of the threat from Islamic-based terrorism to New York City has evolved since September 11, 2001. While the threat from overseas remains, terrorist attacks or thwarted plots against cities in Europe, Australia and Canada since 2001 fit a different paradigm. Rather than being directed from al-Qaeda abroad, these plots have been conceptualized and planned by "unremarkable" local residents/citizens who sought to attack their country of residence, utilizing al-Qaeda as their inspiration and ideological reference point.

Some of these cases include:

Madrid's March 2004 attack

Amsterdam's Hofstad Group

London's July 2005 attack

Australia's Operation Pendennis (which thwarted an attack(s) in November 2005)

The Toronto 18 Case (which thwarted an attack in June 2006)

Where once we would have defined the initial indicator of the threat at the point where a terrorist or group of terrorists would actually plan an attack, we have now shifted our focus to a much earlier point—a point where we believe the potential terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a process of radicalization. The culmination of this process is a terrorist attack.

Understanding this trend and the radicalization process in the West that drives "unremarkable" people to become terrorists is vital for developing effective counter-strategies and has special importance for the NYPD and the City of New York. As one of the country's iconic symbols and the target of numerous terrorist plots since the 1990's, New York City continues to be among the top targets of terrorists worldwide.

In order to test whether the same framework for understanding radicalization abroad applied within the United States, we analyzed three U.S. homegrown terrorism cases and two New York City based cases:

Lackawana, New York

Portland, Oregon

Northern Virginia

New York City - Herald Square Subway

New York City - The Al Muhajiroun Two

The same radicalization framework was applied to a study of the origins of the Hamburg cluster of individuals, who led the September 11 hijackers. This assessment, almost six years after 2001, provides some new insights, previously not fully-grasped by the law enforcement and intelligence community, into the origins of this devastating attack.

Radicalization

Ideology

Jihadist or jihadi-Salafi ideology is the driver that motivates young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out "autonomous jihad" via acts of terrorism against their host countries. It guides movements, identifies the issues, drives recruitment and is the basis for action.

This ideology has served as the inspiration for numerous homegrown groups including the Madrid March 2004 bombers, Amsterdam's Hofstad Group, London's July 2005 bombers, the Australians arrested as part of Operation Pendennis in late 2005 and the Toronto 18 arrested in June 2006.

Process

An assessment of the various reported models of radicalization leads to the conclusion that the radicalization process is composed of four distinct phases:

Stage 1: Pre-Radicalization

Stage 2: Self-Identification

Stage 3: Indoctrination

Stage 4: Jihadization

Each of these phases is unique and has specific signatures.

All individuals who begin this process do not necessarily pass through all the stages.

Many stop or abandon this process at different points.

Although this model is sequential, individuals do not always follow a perfectly linear progression.

Individuals who do pass through this entire process are quite likely to be involved in the planning or implementation of a terrorist act.

Phases of Radicalization

1. Pre-Radicalization. Pre-Radicalization is the point of origin for individuals before they begin this progression. It is their life situation before they were exposed to and adopted jihadi-Salafi Islam as their own ideology.

The majority of the individuals involved in these plots began as "unremarkable" ­they had "ordinary" jobs, had lived "ordinary" lives and had little, if any criminal history.

2. Self-Identification. Self-Identification is the phase where individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam, gradually gravitate away from their old identity and begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals and adopt this ideology as their own. The catalyst for this "religious seeking" is a cognitive opening, or crisis, which shakes one's certitude in previously held beliefs and opens an individual to be receptive to new worldviews.

There can be many types of triggers that can serve as the catalyst including:

Economic (losing a job, blocked mobility)

Social (alienation, discrimination, racism -- real or perceived)

Political (international conflicts involving Muslims)

Personal (death in the close family)

3. Indoctrination. Indoctrination is the phase in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause. That action is militant jihad. This phase is typically facilitated and driven by a "spiritual sanctioner".

While the initial self-identification process may be an individual act, as noted above, association with like-minded people is an important factor as the process deepens. By the indoctrination phase this self-selecting group becomes increasingly important as radical views are encouraged and reinforced.

4. Jihadization. Jihadization is the phase in which members of the cluster accept their individual duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen. Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning for the jihad or a terrorist attack. These "acts in furtherance" will include planning, preparation and execution.

While the other phases of radicalization may take place gradually, over two to three years, this jihadization component can be a very rapid process, taking only a few months, or even weeks to run its course.

Findings

Al-Qaeda has provided the inspiration for homegrown radicalization and terrorism; direct command and control by al-Qaeda has been the exception, rather than the rule among the case studies reviewed in this study.

The four stages of the radicalization process, each with its distinct set of indicators and signatures, are clearly evident in each of the nearly one dozen terrorist-related case studies reviewed in this report.

In spite of the differences in both circumstances and environment in each of the cases, there is a remarkable consistency in the behaviors and trajectory of each of the plots across all the stages.

This consistency provides a tool for predictability.

The transnational phenomenon of radicalization in the West is largely a function of the people and the environment in which they live. Much different from the Israeli-Palestinian equation, the transformation of a Western-based individual to a terrorist is not triggered by oppression, suffering, revenge, or desperation.

Rather, it is a phenomenon that occurs because the individual is looking for an identity and a cause and unfortunately, often finds them in the extremist Islam.

There is no useful profile to assist law enforcement or intelligence to predict who will follow this trajectory of radicalization. Rather, the individuals who take this course begin as "unremarkable" from various walks of life.

Europe's failure to integrate the 2nd and 3rd generation of its immigrants into society, both economically and socially, has left many young Muslims torn between the secular West and their religious heritage. This inner conflict makes them especially vulnerable to extremism—the radical views, philosophy, and rhetoric that is highly advertised and becoming more and more fashionable among young Muslims in the West

Muslims in the U.S. are more resistant, but not immune to the radical message.

Despite the economic opportunities in the United States, the powerful gravitational pull of individuals' religious roots and identity sometimes supersedes the assimilating nature of American society which includes pursuit of a professional career, financial stability and material comforts.

The jihadist ideology combines the extreme and minority interpretation [jihadi-Salafi] of Islam with an activist-like commitment or responsibility to solve global political grievances through violence. Ultimately, the jihadist envisions a world in which jihadi-Salafi Islam is dominant and is the basis of government. This ideology is proliferating in Western democracies at a logarithmic rate. The Internet, certain Salafi-based NGO's (non-governmental organizations), extremist sermons /study groups, Salafi literature, jihadi videotapes, extremist -sponsored trips to radical madrassas and militant training camps abroad have served as "extremist incubators" for young, susceptible Muslims --especially ones living in diaspora communities in the West.

The Internet is a driver and enabler for the process of radicalization.

In the Self-Identification phase, the Internet provides the wandering mind of the conflicted young Muslim or potential convert with direct access to unfiltered radical and extremist ideology.

It also serves as an anonymous virtual meeting place—a place where virtual groups of like-minded and conflicted individuals can meet, form virtual relationships and discuss and share the jihadi-Salafi message they have encountered.

During the Indoctrination phase, when individuals adopt this virulent ideology, they begin interpreting the world from this newly-formed context. Cloaked with a veil of objectivity, the Internet allows the aspiring jihadist to view the world and global conflicts through this extremist lens, further reinforcing the objectives and political arguments of the jihadi-Salafi agenda.

In the Jihadization phase, when an individual commits to jihad, the Internet serves as an enabler—providing broad access to an array of information on targets, their vulnerabilities and the design of weapons.

Individuals generally appear to begin the radicalization process on their own. Invariably, as they progress through the stages of radicalization they seek like-minded individuals. This leads to the creation of groups or clusters. These clusters appear almost essential to progressing to the Jihadization stage—the critical stage that leads to a terrorist act.

"Group think" is one of the most powerful catalysts for leading a group to actually committing a terrorist act. It acts as a force-multiplier for radical thought while creating a competitive environment amongst the group members for being the most radical.

Although there are many groups or clusters of individuals that are on the path of radicalization, each group needs certain archetypes to evolve from just being a "bunch of guys" to an operational terrorist cell. All eleven case studies had:

A "spiritual sanctioner" who provides the justification for jihad—a justification that is especially essential for the suicide terrorist. In some cases the sanctioner was the nucleus around which the cluster formed.

An "operational leader" who is essential as the group decides to conduct a terrorist act--organizing, controlling and keeping the group focused and its motivation high.

The full radicalization of a Western individual, or groups of individuals, does not always result in the committing of a terrorist act in the West. Many fully-radicalized individuals have first looked to conduct jihad by becoming mujahedeen and fighting in conflicts overseas.

The image of the heroic, holy warrior or "mujahedeen" has been widely marketed on the Internet as well as in jihadi tapes and videos. This image continues to resonate among young, especially Muslim, men 15-35 years-old—men who are most vulnerable to visions of honor, bravery and sacrifice for what is perceived as a noble cause.

Among those individuals who travel abroad in search of jihad, some end up as mujahedeen and fight in foreign lands; some are re-directed to commit acts in the West, often in their country of origin, while others give up and return home because they can't endure the training or have a change of heart.

For those groups of homegrown radicalized individuals who do not seek jihad abroad, the dedication and commitment of their leader to jihad is often the main factor in determining whether the group will commit a terrorist act or not.

Although the 9/11 attack, with its overseas origins, is more of an exception in terms of how terrorist plots have been launched since the destruction of the Twin Towers, it has probably been the most important factor in proliferating the process of radicalization, especially in the West. More importantly, 9/11 established the current trend of committing an act in the name of global jihad as a natural culmination of full radicalization and the ultimate responsibility for the fully radicalized jihadist.

Prior to 9/11, the entire radicalization process moved at a much slower rate. There was no direct link to jihad, other than to become a mujahedeen. Aspiring jihadists would travel to Afghanistan without any idea that they could become actual terrorists. Now, there is no longer any illusion as to what the adoption of jihadi-Salafi ideology means.

The radicalization process is accelerating in terms of how long it takes and the individuals are continuing to get younger. Moreover, with the higher risks associated with heading down this pathway, individuals will seek to conceal their actions earlier, making intelligence and law enforcement's job even more difficult.

It is useful to think of the radicalization process in terms of a funnel. Entering the process does not mean one will progress through all four stages and become a terrorist. However, it also does not mean that if one doesn't become a terrorist, he or she is no longer a threat. Individuals who have been radicalized but are not jihadists may serve as mentors and agents of influence to those who might become the terrorists of tomorrow.

The subtle and non-criminal nature of the behaviors involved in the process of radicalization makes it difficult to identify or even monitor from a law enforcement standpoint. Taken in isolation, individual behaviors can be seen as innocuous; however, when seen as part of the continuum of the radicalization process, their significance becomes more important. Considering the sequencing of these behaviors and the need to identify those entering this process at the earliest possible stage makes intelligence the critical tool in helping to thwart an attack or even prevent the planning of future plots.

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Read the entire report here.

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