Small Wars Journal

Iraq Index; More on PRTs

Mon, 08/06/2007 - 3:59pm
Richard Fernandez of The Belmont Club has a 'must read' post up concerning the recently released (30 July) Brookings Institution Iraq Index.

The Brookings Institution Iraq Index for July 30, 2007 contains an update of the indicators measured since 2003. The overall summary, based on an examination of the trends is "On balance, Iraq at the end of July is showing significant signs of battlefield momentum in favor of U.S./coalition military forces, but there is nonetheless little good to report on the political front and only modest progress on the economic side of things." However the report itself is much more informative than its summary. The statistics collected by the Brookings Institution describe the shape of combat and politics in Iraq and give us a greater insight into why the the political front is struggling and what the connection is between combat operations and the political arena...

Richard also comments on an earlier Belmont Club post (Half a Loaf) about the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq.

I was just on the blogger round table with Philip Reeker, US Embassy Baghdad, on the subject of PRTs. And it was clear that they were trying to building things from the bottom up in a society where the tradition of local government (as opposed to tribal government) was nonexistent. But it was also clear that the assets necessary to accomplish this are pretty thin. They're still building the doctrine. And there's no enabling bureaucratic structure. One of the things, for example, that Ambassador Crocker had to do was waive the State Department security regs to get people out. To provide any security at all, the PRTs either have to be embedded or escorted, except in places like Kurdistan where they can mostly operate unescorted.

Interestingly, the PRTs found the military's reserve system very useful because it provided a pool of specialists for which State had no analogue. There was some reference to the need for the equivalent of a Goldwater-Nichols for the civilian arms of government to provide an institutional cure. But that's still prospective. The sense you got was that State is trying to field people and is succeeding somewhat, but that many hurdles remain.

To summarize, from what I understand there's a clear recognition now -- and there may have been a former reluctance -- to create the capacity to conduct political work at the grassroots. But there remain questions about whether a) it is still possible, given the time elapsed; b) US Government agencies can mobilze effectively to accomplish this task.

My own sense, without any pejorative reflection on State, is that they are struggling to match the political work with the security gains. And this is due, I think, almost wholly to the circumstance that we are now asking diplomats to do something they never in their wildest dreams thought they would be doing. As Mr. Reeker ran down the list of this or that person voluntarily leaving a post in such and such European capital for duty in some provincial Iraqi dustbowl you got the sense that the State guys were individually making one heck of an effort but that the institutional capacity still isn't there.

The Proverbial Contest

Sun, 08/05/2007 - 8:49pm
The purpose of this posting is to alert the Small Wars Journal community about an excellent new book by Dr. Jeff Record of the Air War College faculty. Professor Record is no dilettante in this arena; he served in Vietnam as a province advisor before embarking on an academic career, which has been distinguished by a steady stream of short but potent books. His Dark Victory about the 2003 invasion into Iraq is a powerful indictment of the Bush Doctrine and the Administration's conduct of the Global War on Terrorism. It is must reading, as is his The Wrong War: Why We Lost in Vietnam which the readership would find fascinating in light of Operation Iraqi Freedom due to the similar delusions in our decision making and weak partners in both wars.

This latest effort, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win explores the nature and components of victories by the weak over stronger states. Professor Record examines a total of eleven insurgencies/small wars from the American Revolution to Iraq. His opening chapter explores three major previous works that have attempted to ascertain the most important variables in David's success in the proverbial David vs. Goliath context. Andrew Mack's notable "Why Big Nations Lost Small War" attributed defeat to the asymmetric levels of political will and interest involved. David usually plays for higher stakes—survival—against a major power. Another key contributor, Dr. Ivan Arrequin-Toft argued that the interaction of opposing strategies was the key. In How the Weak Win Wars, he contended that "strong actors will lose asymmetric conflicts when they use the wrong strategy vis-í -vis their opponent's." This important work sought to explain how major powers employing an inappropriate direct approach would generally lose against a weaker side taking a more Fabian or indirect approach. Finally, Record finds Gil Merom's How Democracies Lose Small Wars persuasive. Merom examined three cases studies of democratic states and found that democracies lose because they "find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can secure victory." Merom's work is controversial and Record deftly points out the weaknesses of the methodology and conclusions, which focuses excessively on the security component of insurgency and overrates "barbarism" for discriminate applications of force.

In the second chapter Dr. Record explores the key variable that he believes the literature to date has not focused—external assistance. He finds that external assistance is material (no pun intended) to David's success and consistently correlates with insurgent victory. Apparently, slingshots and round stones are not enough. I found this to be a detailed and insightful chapter, but wished that the author had explored the importance of modern forms of external support in the form of Diasporas and the internet.

Having identified the most significant component of David's victory, Record next examines the ongoing contest in Iraq and America's prospects. He uses a comparative assessment of Iraq and the Vietnam War to conduct and frame his analysis. While he is pessimistic about Goliath's chances, he does note that the Iraqi insurgents have no lock on success. Neither their size, appeal nor external support is nearly as impressive as the NVA or Viet Cong. His overall evaluation bears quoting:

The military dimensions of the Iraq War bear little comparison to those of the Vietnam War, which was a much large conflict against a much more powerful enemy. That said, the United States faces in Iraq the same two daunting political challenges it failed to surmount in Vietnam: fostering the creation and survival of a legitimate, indigenous government and sustaining American domestic political support for the war.

He also identifies and assesses the influence of distinctive features of the American way of war on the U.S. forces' performance against the Iraqi insurgency. This section of the book relied extensively upon Colin Gray's recent Strategic Studies Institute monograph, and I suspect that effort was influenced by Professor Gray's strategic realism and emphasis on looming threats in Asia. These two chapters also build upon the perceptive critiques of the distinguished military scholars Tony Echevarria and Fred Kagan. The former is a critic of the American "Way of Battles" with its Jominian linearity and its confusing winning battles with the attainment of strategic and political objectives. Professor Kagan's superb Finding the Target is likewise cited in support Record's devastating critique of American Way of War that too often sees the enemy as a target set that can be destroyed and that equates hitting targets with victory.

Professor Record finishes with six conclusions--all but the last are sound.

• The stronger side usually wins: the best strategy, there is to be strong.

• Weaker side victories are exceptional and almost always rest on some combination of stronger political will, superior strategy, and foreign help.

• External assistance is a common enable of victorious insurgent wars, though certainly no guarantee of success.

• Modern democracies have limited political tolerance for protracted overseas wars against irregular enemies.

• For the United States, the impact of anticipated and incurred casualties on political will is a function primarily of military action's perceived costs, benefits, and chances o success.

• America's political system and Jominian approach to war greatly impede U.S. success in counterinsurgent warfare; accordingly, the United States should avoid direct military involvement in foreign internal wars.

Record's grasp of American strategic culture is sound, and while I agree that strategic culture is important, I also believe it evolves (to quote Dr. Gray) and America has won irregular contests in the past in the Philippines and I believe that it can again as long as initiatives like the new counterinsurgency manual take root. To paraphrase Sir Michael Howard, America's armed forces better get used to this form of war, it's the only war and only form of peace we shall see for a generation.

Blogger's Roundtable: PRTs in Iraq

Sat, 08/04/2007 - 8:32am
The Small Wars Journal / Small Wars Council participated in a Blogger's Roundtable on Friday with Philip Reeker, US Embassy, Baghdad. The subject was Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq.

Participants included Andrew Lubin of On Point, Grim of Blackfive, Dave Dilegge of Small Wars Journal / Small Wars Council, Austin Bay, Richard Fernandez of The Belmont Club, David Axe of Aviation Week, Charlie Quidnunc of Wizbang and Jason Sigger of Armchair Generalist.

As soon as DoD posts the transcript of this roundtable we will place a link here.

SWJ BLUF (On Edit - this is my take-away from the roundtable - opinion on the matter)

The PRTs are a critical component of the population-centric "new strategy" for Iraq to include one of its tactical elements -- "the surge". Criticisms of those executing the grassroots (local level) nature of the PRT program are not only unwarranted, they are detrimental to the success of ongoing operations.

A reality check boils down to reconciliation on a national level is not moving forward -- those "in-country" are painfully aware of the "Washington Clock" and are exploiting the only viable option available - working at the local level to provide at least a solid base in terms of rule of law, infrastructure, economic development, governance, and public diplomacy. National-level reconciliation might very well be enabled by these grassroots efforts.

Hindsight 20 / 20 as it is, maybe a bottom-up approach should have been a lynchpin of OIF from the very beginning.

Mr. Reeker led off the roundtable with an overview of the PRT program. See this earlier SWJ post for PRT background details.

SWJ Blogger Roundtable Notes

Q. Normal makeup of a PRT and specifics on Anbar PRT? (On Point)

A. Constant challenge of security vs. openness. Do what you can, but for the most part PRTs can get out with escorts. DoS security regulations not designed for Iraq, wouldn't even be in Iraq if regulations were adhered to. But, the military can get out and about so State is too per Amb. Crocker -- it is a priority.

Makeup of PRTs differ from one province to another. Based on needs of particular team. PRTs can ask for what they want. Typical / standard -- Civilian leader, Deputy (military), Rule of Law Coordinator, Economic Advisor, Agriculture Advisor, Security, Civil Engineering, Local Governance Team, Public Diplomacy Assistant. Again, each PRT differs depending on location, on-ground sit and whether embedded with BCT or not.

Q. PRT recruiting process - needs? (Blackfive)

A. Will get back with contact in Washington for PRT recruiting. Mil-Bloggers have an audience with backgrounds / experience that would be good for PRTs.

Q. Are PRTs engaged in any direct political work to influence the grassroots to marry up with the higher level political goals of the United States and Iraq? (Belmont Club)

A. Political process has been much more difficult than anticipated. But on the local level there have been some major positives steps. Anbar -- reconciliation (Tribal Chiefs accommodations -- common interests). Whether local progress can seep into central government efforts is a very good question -- very hard. Result of legacy Baathist rule that destroyed / disrupted social structures. Progress requires time.

Q. PRT training and / or education prior to deployment? (Small Wars Journal)

A. Will follow up with more details. They go through a PRT course at possibly the Foreign Service Institute, security course (s). Trying to add more of culture / regional courses. Specialized members bring their expertise with them. Once they get in Iraq they go through orientation training at the Embassy. When join PRT they enjoy "being on their own" -- setting their own priorities.

Q. Goldwater / Nichols II for Civilian Agencies (Interagency) -- would it be of use now in Iraq? (Austin Bay)

A. Worthy points, initiative to create rapid reaction capability at State (Amb. Pascal's earlier efforts -- Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization). Teams with specialization (like military) and capability to rapidly deploy. Identified as what we need -- but do not give up traditional diplomacy. State does not have the personnel / resources like the military. State stepping up to the challenge. Efforts to integrate USAID, Treasury, Justice, etc. New territory for State, whatever comes out of Iraq we will have learned some new ways of doing things in the Interagency realm.

Q. Do we have the time to be doing the grassroots efforts while learning 3 ½ years into OIF? (Austin Bay)

A. Much harder than many people anticipated -- time is an issue. Hindsight is 20 / 20, we are were we are and we are on it -- do what we can do to help the Iraqis.

Q. Grassroots effort to reform Iraq at the local level is doomed until national reconciliation, how do you react to that assessment that "grassroots" is a wasted effort? (Aviation Week)

A. We've seen progress at the local level. Is it enough? No, but if you only try to reform from the national level outwards that won't work either. So we've gone back to the most basic elements -- tribes, family. No perfect answers but you have to think about it from both ends. PRTs designed to go out to the local level to get things moving. Also working the central level.

Q. How do those in the opinion-writing business who support the surge explain how would things be so much better if we stay around 18-24 months. Do you need a diplomacy surge? (Whizbang)

A. The diplomatic surge, if you want to call it that, was designed for three phases until the end of the year, up to 600 people on staff in the PRTs. That goes on while we try to focus on getting the Iraqis to take advantage of the surge.

Update: Blogger's Roundtables and PRTs in Iraq - MountainRunner

... I want to talk about the loop I didn't even know existed three weeks ago. The loop is DOD's connection to new media, providing information directly to influential bloggers as well as traditional media. It is doing a tremendous job of making resources available to new thought leaders that have either direct or (often deep) indirect connections to traditional media, not to mention John Q. Public in the US and around the world.

DOD's outreach program is smartly run. The Chief of New Media Operations, Charles "Jack" Holt, is an old hand at public affairs and in personal conversations gets the perception problems of the US military with both the domestic US audience and where they are operating. He knows and has seen Americans on deployment in hotspots in the Former Yugoslavia Republic, as it true today and even when things were safer in Iraq, American forces roll up in full battle rattle ready to engage the enemy and not the public. It is the latter that requires the engagement and the attention.

Compare this effort by the DOD by State's. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the topic of the Friday, Aug 4 call, is focused on this engagement with the people, resulting in what Grim at Blackfive.net noted was an unusual appearance of State on the DOD conference call. But where else would the PRTs go to get the word out? State isn't doing outreach. They don't even know how. Karen Hughes' office, the Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, uses "four or five" bloggers to surf the blogosphere, find misleading and wrong statement, and correct them with official US government statements.

Pressured to do the same, DOD's Jack Holt decided to provide access to thought leaders in the blogosphere directly, providing unvarnished, unfiltered information into the debate...

Selected PRT Background Links

Provincial Reconstruction Teams - Department of State Fact Sheet

Expanded Provincial Reconstruction Teams Speed the Transition to Self-Reliance - White House Fact Sheet

Provincial Reconstruction Teams - Wikipedia

Initial Benchmark Assessment Report - White House

Reconstruction in Iraq: The Uncertain Way Ahead - Center for Strategic and International Studies

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq - United States Institute of Peace

Military Must Fill Iraq Civilian Jobs - Washington Post

Pentagon to Fill Iraq Reconstruction Jobs Temporarily - New York Times

Negroponte Advises New Diplomats to Seek Challenging Posts - New York Times

Iraq Rebuilding Short on Qualified Civilians - Washington Post

The President's Civil Reserve Corps - MountainRunner

Iraq- PRTs Help Iraqis with Rule of Law and Connecting With Central Government - Civil-Military Relations Blog

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project - PCR Project Blog

Interagency Transformation, Education & AAR - National Defense University

Agency for International Development - Department of State

Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization - Department of State

SWJ Reference Library Interagency Page

Current PRT Job Opportunities - Department of State

Current PRT Job Opportunities - Department of Defense

Talk About It

Discuss at Small Wars Council

OIF Update Brief - 3 August 07

Fri, 08/03/2007 - 7:53pm

AFPS - Jim Garamone: Speaking to Pentagon reporters via teleconference from Ramadi, the capital of Iraq's Anbar province, Army Col. John Charlton, commander of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, said counterinsurgencies are fought and won "neighborhood by neighborhood, with the focus on protecting the population and improving conditions in the community."

The turnaround in Anbar province has been remarkable, the colonel said. Ramadi was the center of the insurgency a few short months ago. When the brigade arrived in the province, insurgents launched an average of between 30 and 35 attacks per day. "Now our average is one attack a day or less," Charlton said. "We have experienced entire weeks with zero attacks in our area and have ... a total of more than 80 days with no attacks in the city."

Charlton attributes this success to the close relationship that has developed between Iraqis and coalition and Iraqi forces. He said Iraqi security forces have been receiving tips from the population and have uncovered hundreds of arms caches.

It was not easy to get to this point, he said. When the brigade arrived eight months ago, soldiers and Marines launched large-scale operations to drive al Qaeda in Iraq and insurgents out of the city. Once that was accomplished, the command moved to holding the areas they had liberated. They established joint security stations to help secure and stabilize communities. At the stations, coalition and Iraqi security forces live side by side. They patrol together and learn from each other.

The population sees this interaction, and this establishes the perception of security in the minds of the population, Charlton explained. "Once they feel safe, the people begin to provide intelligence to the police, and security continues to improve steadily," he said.

Construction and infrastructure improvements also must occur in the areas for the efforts to be successful. "This is done through day-labor programs, small-business development, engagement with the local sheikhs and imams, and information operations focused specifically on that community," the colonel said.

He noted that an embedded provincial reconstruction team in the brigade is helping to build the economy and improve governance efforts in the province.

But al Qaeda has not given up. They have been defeated and driven from the province, but they want to get back, the colonel said. After the unit received intelligence reports that al Qaeda was going to try to infiltrate back into Ramadi, soldiers and Marines increased patrols in the south and found them June 30.

"There were about 60 to 70 well-equipped and well-trained terrorists who were moving towards the city in two large trucks," Charlton said. "They all had new equipment, weapons, and many were wearing suicide belts.

The terrorists' targets were Iraqi police and tribal leaders whose influence and help are crucial to the counterinsurgency effort. "We attacked these terrorists using ground forces and attack helicopters, resulting in the destruction of that force," Charlton said. "If this force had made it into the city, it would have been a tremendous victory for al Qaeda. We successfully defeated their attack, but we know that they will try again in the future."

Charlton said he is impressed with the performance of the Iraqi police and soldiers in his region. "Every day they get better at performing their security operations; most importantly, they are making their presence known and felt in the region," he said.

Police are recruited locally and stay in their cities and towns. Charlton said they are invaluable in identifying who belongs in the region and who is out of place. "A year ago, there were less than 200 police officers operating in two police stations here in Ramadi," he said. "That number has grown to approximately 7,400 officers operating in more than 30 police stations and substations throughout our area."

He said the challenge is ensuring the police are fully equipped, paid and consolidated into police stations. The police rely heavily on coalition logistics and support. "We expect the equipment issues to improve soon, and we are working hard to get their logistics and command-and-control systems in place," he said. "One thing that is not lacking is the courage and the dedication of the Iraqi police and the Iraqi army in al Anbar."

The fight for Iraqi soldiers and police in Anbar is personal, the colonel said. "They know that al Qaeda is targeting them, their families and their tribes," he said.

Charlton also cited support the coalition has received from tribal leaders and sheikhs. "Their support of coalition troops and their distaste for al Qaeda has been incredibly helpful," he said. "If a tribal leader tells members of the tribe to join the security forces, they will join the security forces. Their support has been absolutely phenomenal."

Reconstruction and governance are priorities for the command, and progress is being made in these areas, the colonel said. There was no city government before April. In three months, the government has been established and leaders are providing essential services to the population. "In areas that were battlefields only a few months ago, city electrical employees are now repairing transformers and power lines; sanitation workers are fixing sewer leaks caused by the hundreds of buried (improvised explosive devices) that have gone off over the last few years," Charlton said.

Iraqis have repaired most of the electrical grid inside the city, and they have cleared about 50 percent of the rubble from battle damage.

More:

3 August Blogger Roundtable with COL Charlton - Transcript

3 August Blogger Roundtable with COL Charlton - Audio

Organizing for Counterinsurgency at the Company and Platoon Level

Thu, 08/02/2007 - 2:30pm
Captain Jeremy Gwinn, US Army

In today's military, the requirement to conduct tasks far outside traditional specialties is an accepted reality. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught leaders across the services the need for flexibility and creativity both in action and organization. The recently published FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5) Counterinsurgency (COIN) manual provides an excellent framework for leaders to understand the demands of the COIN environment and draw from recent lessons. With regard to organizing for COIN, the manual makes several valuable recommendations such as establishing a company level intelligence section and identifying a political and cultural advisor. My purpose here is to go one step further, providing additional, specific recommendations for company level leaders organizing for counterinsurgency operations. Some of the ideas presented involve actual changes to task organization, while others involve developing skills internally that, by doctrine, only exist in specialized attachments. These steps are by no means prescriptive, but intended as a starting point for discussion among officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) at the company level.

Why Organize for COIN?

The first step to optimizing the platoon or company organization for a COIN mission is an understanding of why reorganization is necessary. Units generally deploy as Brigade Combat Teams or similar task forces with a full complement of support: Civil Affairs (CA) Teams, Tactical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Teams, Tactical Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Teams, as well as organic S2 (intelligence) sections, etc. These assets are task organized to the battalion and sometimes company level so that everyone gets his slice of support. Then why the necessity to develop these capabilities among infantrymen, tank crewmen, military policemen, or anyone else conducting COIN?

1. The special assets will not always be available. Though the attachments are task organized down, they are typically not available to a company commander or platoon leader on-call 24 hours a day. For instance, a company commander can receive CA team support with several days lead time to perform a major assessment or humanitarian distribution. If, however, in the course of a patrol, a platoon leader discovers a small school in serious need of repair or re-supply, he would probably not have a CA officer nearby to help assess the need. If the school sits in a key location of popular support for the insurgency, then a good assessment conducted at the platoon level with rapid follow-through of support may deal a harsher blow to the enemy than any tactical victory. The pace of operations for units in Iraq and Afghanistan is simply too fast to always say, "We'll request CA and get out here next week." If this is the case, the unit will constantly be playing catch-up.

2. The importance of the special roles must be internalized by every counterinsurgency Soldier. When the PSYOP team, HUMINT team, and CA team are the only ones doing PSYOP, HUMINT, and CA, riflemen in the platoons tend not to give these roles much thought. In these cases, our Soldiers, who probably know the area and the people better than anyone else, become reduced to just pulling security for the attachments while they do their jobs. When these capabilities are developed internally, Soldiers and their leaders understand that their jobs are much more than just clearing buildings and engaging targets. They will take ownership of these additional responsibilities. Even the most junior rifleman should understand that the hundreds of interactions he has each day with locals can have more impact on the attitudes of the population than anything the task force PSYOP officer could do. The same is true in many other areas such as intelligence collection, media interaction, CA, and others.

3. An organic unit will perform better than an ad hoc one. For obvious reasons, an organic company or platoon will encounter less friction than one that is cobbled together, often at the last minute. Maneuver units and their habitual attachments still need to train together and be prepared to operate as a team, because there will be times that it is necessary. Still, if a leader can reduce the number of attachments without losing critical capabilities, he can dramatically reduce risk and increase the odds of success. All too often, a platoon or company departs for an operation with so many attachments that the ungainly convoy resembles a battalion. Not only does such an operation create an unnecessarily large signature, it is difficult to control and account for, especially in enemy contact.

Special Operations Forces have long understood the need for multiple roles and special skills at the small-unit level. Due to the decentralized nature and low-level (usually section or platoon) of our operations in the COIN environment, our conventional units are well-advised to follow suit. This does not mean that attachment support is no longer needed at company level and below. Men and women in these units are specially trained and absolutely critical to success. We can, however, do better by developing similar capabilities organically and determining a threshold for how and when to use the attachments.

Civil Affairs

FM 3-24 recommends that platoons and companies create a political and cultural advisor position. This role can be combined with a CA specialist position. At company level, the duty typically falls to the Fire Support Officer (FSO). At the platoon level, however, the CA role breaks down. In some cases, the job may fall to the Forward Observer, but much of the time, this man is ill-suited to the responsibility. Leaders should thoughtfully select a Soldier based on maturity and organizational skills, not just on rank or Military Occupational Specialty. At the platoon level, duties would include:

1. Maintaining a file on key leaders (civil and religious) in the Area of Operations (AO).

2. Note-taking for the platoon leader during interactions.

3. Conducting simple need assessments and compiling for project nomination.

4. Organizing small quick-impact packages.

5. Reporting CA related information to the Company FSO

Regardless of rank, this Soldier should report directly to the platoon leader for operational purposes.

To facilitate downward information flow, the company and platoon CA specialists can give briefings on relevant political or cultural information and fulfill information requests, both tasks which leaders unnecessarily do themselves much of the time. In preparing Soldiers for this duty, the unit's CA team is an invaluable asset, and lateral information flow between the unit and the team should be continuous. Perhaps the most important thing that company and platoon CA specialists should learn from the unit's CAT-A is the project nomination process. Because most projects must be nominated and tracked through traditional CA channels, these Soldiers should understand how to identify potential projects and what information will be required.

Psychological Operations

The role of PSYOP within our companies and platoons will, by their nature, be less well-defined than that of CA. The three critical PSYOP capabilities at this level are:

1. Spread a message through face to face interaction.

2. Exploit an event for information purposes.

3. Prevent the enemy from exploiting an event for his information purposes.

The capability to spread a message is every Soldier's responsibility. The leader's responsibility is ensuring the content and consistency of the message. In COIN operations, information and perception are often more important to achieving success than tactical wins. For this reason, a Soldier should know his unit's information themes before departing on patrol as assuredly as he knows where his ammunition is located. Even though only key leaders generally have interpreters, every Soldier walking the streets can convey a powerful message through his actions and gestures. Arm this man with a few key phrases in the local language and the capability is multiplied.

Exploiting an event, such as a terrorist attack or a coalition operation, is absolutely critical in the counterinsurgency fight. In fact, the information effort that follows an action is often more important that the action itself. This is not license to lie or use excessive spin, which will be seen through and must be avoided, but rather a requirement to tell our side of the story as rapidly and persuasively as possible. US forces should be assured that if they fail to do so, the insurgents will seize the initiative with their own story, unconstrained by the truth.

Company level leaders must not defer this responsibility to the PSYOP team. By preparing and organizing for PSYOP, company commanders and platoon leaders can take advantage of their superior knowledge of the area, people, and events to take the initiative in the information battle. For example, in neighborhoods that experience frequent Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks, the local population undoubtedly pays a price in civilian wounded and property damage. Even though the IEDs are clearly the work of insurgents, the enemy could easily exploit the events to his favor, creating the impression that the US presence degrades neighborhood safety. If US forces respond to IED attacks with undisciplined and indiscriminate force, then the insurgent message is strengthened. The US unit must persuasively disseminate its own message: the insurgents have no regard for the safety and property of the population. Combined with medical assistance to the civilian wounded and presented in a sincere and sympathetic manner, the message can be powerful. While the temptation exists for the platoon leader or company commander to be the primary communicator in these situations because they have interpreters, this is not ideal. The platoon leader must coordinate the activities of the entire platoon. Instead, identify a team or squad to disseminate the message using the platoon leader's interpreter. Depending on the situation, the team may go door to door in the surrounding area or just talk to people gathered in the street. Other duties that should be delegated by the platoon leader are medical aid, crater analysis, and, of course, security. These duties will probably rotate and may not even be identified ahead of time. They key is that the platoon leader and his NCOs understand those actions that must be quickly accomplished after an exploitable event takes place.

Media Affairs

For interacting with members of the media, commanders cannot rely only on themselves and other company senior leaders. On the contrary, every Soldier should be comfortable and trusted in this important role. When embedded journalists are placed with a commander or platoon leader, as is usually the case, they will actively seek out opportunities to talk to the lower ranks. This is due to the common perception among the media that an officer or senior NCO will only regurgitate talking points and not speak honestly or candidly. Likewise, simply giving our junior Soldiers a list of media talking points is insufficient. The more a journalist perceives an attempt by leadership to direct the comments of the lower ranks, the more he will believe the unit has something to hide. The resulting story will reflect this bias. We should encourage (and train) our men to speak candidly to the media within the bounds of operational security, at the same time ensuring they understand that it is not the time to vent frustrations. The vast majority of Soldiers are proud of the work they do in combat, and should use media interactions to focus on their accomplishments and those of their unit, keeping comments within the scope of his duty position.

Intelligence

With few exceptions, collection at company level and below will be HUMINT. Our Soldiers constitute an invaluable collection asset by what they observe on a daily basis. The value of their observations, however, depends on whether they know what to look for. Requirements will constantly change, so leaders should implement a routine of disseminating information requirements and reporting observations during and after the mission.

The most valuable collection asset in the COIN environment is the local population. Leaders should strive to develop relationships with —locals, placing a priority on the safety of the informant and not attempting to rush the process. In places where mobile phone service is available, make maximum use of this resource for communicating with local contacts. The availability of Micro/Small Rewards or similar funds can also be helpful, but in many cases, locals are un—to accept money for assistance, due to feelings of guilt and increased danger if they are officially in the pay of US forces. While non-Tactical HUMINT Team units are generally not authorized to develop source networks, they can still build relationships that glean useful information about the population and the enemy. Leaders should rely on judgment to determine when a relationship reaches the point where the contact should be passed on to the Tactical HUMINT Team as a potential source, and the Tactical HUMINT Team can help determine this threshold.

Effective intelligence analysis at the company and platoon level means maintaining a current understanding of the situation in the unit's AO. The goal is to paint a nuanced picture of attitudes, intentions, and how the enemy operates with relation to the population and terrain. The picture should be a composite of all available information, including, most importantly, the knowledge contained within the company. When done properly, this product will surpass any Situation Template (SITEMP) created by the battalion S2. For this reason, SITEMPs at all levels should be driven from the bottom-up and company commanders should feed their own analysis to the S2. Some steps to help achieve the desired result are:

1. Regular debriefs at squad and platoon level.

2. Open discussions among company key leaders (at least platoon sergeant and above). A less formal setting will tend to illicit more thoughtful analysis and debate about the enemy situation.

3. Maintain a company graphic SITEMP as an evolving product. Avoid focusing on historical events. Strive to interpret enemy logistics and attack patterns, as well as attitudes and intentions of both the enemy and the population.

Intelligence analysis is one area that is so critical, the company commander may choose not to delegate, provided he has received sufficient input from below. The FSO will likely assist, as he is heavily involved in the battalion targeting process, but it is ultimately a commander responsibility. Good analysis at the company level will naturally lead to bottom-up target nomination, so the FSO should be prepared to build target packets for input to battalion. Additionally, the FSO can be helpful in tracking local contacts and building profiles on potential targets.

Outside of the company, information and intelligence flow is equally critical. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants should be comfortable not only interacting with counterparts from other companies, but also with members of the battalion S2 section. The company commander need not be an information bottleneck, so he should not be the only member of the company permitted to ask the S2 or his staff a question.

Advising Local Military and Police Forces

Even if the unit is not specifically tasked with a MiTT (Military Transition Team) mission, they will likely have occasion to conduct combined operations with local forces. These operations can be highly effective and preferable to US-pure operations due to the local knowledge of the indigenous forces and greater likelihood of acceptance by the local population. At the same time, many of the local military and police forces in Iraq and Afghanistan still require mentorship and supervision to behave professionally, lest combined operations create a worsened impression of both indigenous and US forces.

The issue of command structure in combined operations can be sensitive. As a general rule, US company commanders will not have direct command over the local force, but should seek a partnered relationship with the indigenous commander. Such a relationship can clearly raise unity of command concerns. As with so much else in COIN, no definitive solution exists. Instead, US commanders must artfully strike a balance between unity of command and the need to respect the authority of the local commander. In organizing and preparing for these operations, commanders should consider some basic tips:

1. Let the local force take the main effort. For actions on the objective (as in a raid or cordon and search), put a small group of US Soldiers (no more than a fire team in any one place) with the locals to advise, but do not undermine the authority of the indigenous leader.

2. Give the local forces the lead on tactical questioning and interrogation, while monitoring the process closely.

3. Take advantage of US vehicles' superior protective capability when determining convoy placement.

4. Keep radio communication with the leader of the local forces during an operation. This sounds obvious, but is often not done. The local forces can usually spare a radio for a US leader's interpreter to monitor.

5. In the planning process with local forces, be very specific regarding level of force to be used and measures to minimize property damage. They will try hard to impress their US partners, but in the absence of guidance tend to err on the side of too much force and too much damage.

6. Conduct prior coordination with the MiTT to avoid redundancy and confusion. These teams are generally small and not sufficiently manned to provide supervision in multiple locations during an operation. If a local military or police unit does not have US advisors, then working to establish a relationship for combined operations is even more critical.

As a guiding principle, US commanders should let the indigenous forces do as much as possible, even though the US tendency is often to try to do it all ourselves. The presence of indigenous forces in an operation should not merely be a superficial attempt to give it a "local face". Mission success for combined operations can be defined as meeting tactical objectives while furthering the capabilities and perception among the populace of the indigenous force.

Conclusion

Our conventional forces have been conducting counterinsurgency operations for over five years and have adapted tremendously well to the unconventional environment. Even units that received no specific COIN training prior to deployment have, in the great tradition of our military, improvised and adapted in the course of ongoing operations.

Our training centers are now providing deploying task forces an incredibly realistic counterinsurgency experience prior to deployment, and the onus is on junior leaders to adapt their organizations before they arrive in combat. The effectiveness of pre-deployment training is multiplied when companies and platoons develop specialized capabilities organically. This is the primary level of activity in counterinsurgency and the level where tactical wins or losses contribute to the strategic outcome.

CPT Gwinn has commanded an infantry company in Afghanistan and Iraq with the Army's 10th Mountain Division, and is currently attending graduate school en route to instruct at West Point.

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Iraq Weekly Briefing: Reconstruction, Economic and Political Update

Wed, 08/01/2007 - 2:28pm

Paul Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, and Philip Reeker, US Embassy, Baghdad, join BG Kevin Bergner, Multi-National Force-Iraq spokesman, in an expansion of the normal weekly Iraq update. Bergner starts off with a security update then turns over to Reeker and Brinkley who discuss reconstruction, economic and political efforts underway to assist the government of Iraq. Of note - Brinkley provides a detailed update on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Q&A follows the formal brief.

SWJ PRT Briefing Notes:

- Unique experience in that the civilian and military sides are working so close together and a perfect example is the PRTs

- PRTs are an important focus of the overall mission in Iraq

- PRTs: Small civilian-military units designed to assist local and provincial governments to govern effectively and deliver essential services

- PRTs designed to bolster moderates, promote reconciliation, support counterinsurgency operations, foster development and build the capacity of local government officials to perform their duties

- Emphasis on shaping the political environment rather than building infrastructure

- Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and PRTs work together as one team receiving guidance from Amb. Crocker and Gen. Petraeus

- BCT commander has lead for security and movement

- PRT leader has responsibility for political, reconstruction and economic issues

- PRTs are joint coalition efforts. Includes civilian and military members from U.K., Italy and Korea

- PRTs help extend reach of Iraqi government in key provinces and help build the stability necessary for full-turnover to Iraqi control

- Empowers the provincial governments

- Iraqis lead process on project funding and implementation

- PRTs act as a "kick-start" for developmental processes

- PRTs support decentralization of government services

- Five PRT thematic areas of focus: rule of law, infrastructure, economic development, governance, and public diplomacy

- "Short-term solutions to long-term development challenges"

- 25 PRTs to-date: 10 original full-sized teams (30-60 personnel), 5 smaller teams (4-14 personnel) and 10 new embedded teams (up to 8 and adding specialists)

- Numbers do not include military movement and support personnel

- Looking at adding additional teams as necessary / requested

Selected PRT Background Links:

Provincial Reconstruction Teams - Department of State Fact Sheet

Expanded Provincial Reconstruction Teams Speed the Transition to Self-Reliance - White House Fact Sheet

Provincial Reconstruction Teams - Wikipedia

Initial Benchmark Assessment Report - White House

Reconstruction in Iraq: The Uncertain Way Ahead - Center for Strategic and International Studies

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq - United States Institute of Peace

Military Must Fill Iraq Civilian Jobs - Washington Post

Pentagon to Fill Iraq Reconstruction Jobs Temporarily - New York Times

Negroponte Advises New Diplomats to Seek Challenging Posts - New York Times

Iraq Rebuilding Short on Qualified Civilians - Washington Post

Iraq- PRTs Help Iraqis with Rule of Law and Connecting With Central Government - Civil-Military Relations Blog

Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle? - Parameters

The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified - United States Institute of Peace

Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan - United States Institute of Peace

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project - PCR Project Blog

Interagency Transformation, Education & AAR - National Defense University

Agency for International Development - Department of State

Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization - Department of State

Humanitarian Information Unit - Department of State

SWJ Reference Library Interagency Page

Current PRT Job Opportunities - Department of State

Current PRT Job Opportunities - Department of Defense

Withdrawal from Iraq

Mon, 07/30/2007 - 9:10pm
Statement of the Honorable Francis J. West, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives

Subject: Withdrawal from Iraq

July 25, 2007

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and Members: It is an honor to appear before this subcommittee. The subject today is "Alternatives for Iraq". The President and the Congress agree about the desirability of a withdrawal of US forces; the issue is under what conditions. It makes a vast difference to our self-esteem as a nation, to our reputation around the world and to the morale of our enemies whether we say we are withdrawing because the Iraqi forces have improved or because we have given up.

That issue towers above any discussion of tactics, logistics diplomacy or even timing. The Iraqi Study Group and former Secretary of State Kissinger have suggested that negotiations might yield an honorable withdrawal - some sort of compromise that extracts American soldiers while not precipitating a collapse inside Iraq. But it's not clear what convergence of interests with Iran or Syria would persuade them to cease supporting insurgents. And inside Iraq, the Jesh al Mahdi extremists and al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) must be destroyed, not placated.

Separate from AQI, though, there are a dozen other Iraqi insurgent groups. At the local level, there have been productive negotiations with the tribes, undoubtedly including some of these insurgents. These bottom-up understandings, focused against AQI, occurred because military action changed the calculus of the tribes about who was going to win. Successful negotiations flowed from battlefield success, not the other way around.

In Anbar, our commander, Major General Walt Gaskin, believes we have turned the corner, with weekly incidents dropping from 428 in July of '06 to 98 in July of '07. In Baghdad and its outskirts, that's exactly what General Petraeus intends to do with his surge strategy - bring security to the local level and break the cycle of violence.

America is divided between two schools of thought about Iraq. The first school - let's call them the Anti-Terror Camp - identifies the jihadists as the main enemy. General Petraeus has said that "Iraq is the central front of al Qaeda's global campaign." AQI is "public enemy number one" because it slaughters thousands of innocent Shiites in order to provoke a civil war. CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden believes that a US failure in Iraq will result "in a safe haven (for al Qaeda) from which then to plan and conduct attacks against the West".

Although AQI is a minority insurgent faction, it is unmatched in savagery. I watched Fallujah descend into hell when the Marines pulled back in May of 2004. Our troops called it the "M & I" campaign: Murder and Intimidation on an astonishing scale. In this war, the moral is to the physical as 20 to one. Most of the Iraqi forces and the tribes don't have yet the self-confidence and experience to stand alone against those killers.

Al Qaeda, however, is losing heavily in Anbar, is on the defense in Baghdad and is fleeing north toward Baqubah. The Anti-Terror Camp believes that fracturing AQI and the Jesh al Mahdi death squads will set the conditions that enable US withdrawal, leaving Iraqi forces to enforce reasonable stability, albeit with continued violence. Based on my observations in a half dozen Sunni cities and in Baghdad over the years, I subscribe to the Anti-Terror Camp.

The Sectarian Camp, on the other hand, believes Iraq is being torn apart by religion, not terrorism. Removing the terrorists will not remove the root cause of the violence. An intransigent hostility between the Shiites and Sunnis will lead inevitably to a full civil war and sweeping ethnic cleansings - regardless of the current surge. So we should get out, because the situation is hopeless.

It is problematic whether the sectarian conflict has metastasized into the body polity, and the top levels of the Iraqi government have certainly performed poorly. But if we declare we're leaving on that account, chaos will ensue. When President Thieu in 1975 pulled back just one division, the whole country erupted in panic. If we pull out because we say the Iraqi government has failed, Prime Minister Maliki will pull back and retrench his forces. When he does, the potential for panic flashing across the country in a few days is real.

Iraq has a wide-open highway network that facilitates spontaneous mass movement. In April of 2004, I was with the task force of 200 armored vehicles that General Mattis sent 200 miles, from north of Ramadi all the way around Baghdad, in order to stop the pandemonium and armed bands spontaneously cascading down the highways. This will happen again if we leave before the Iraqi Army is ready to take over.

Conversely, if we believe the Iraqi forces are dominating the insurgents and can contain the centrifugal forces of the Shiite militias, then we'll withdraw combat units beginning in 2008 -- but leave a hefty presence behind. I am referring to advisers, logisticians and anti-terror combat units. We have 24,000 soldiers in Afghanistan; we would need many more than that in Iraq for years to come. Personally, I'd like to see us say we plan on having American troops in Iraq indefinitely - and repeat that every time we withdrew some of our troops. I'd like to undercut AQI's morale by saying, we're going to continue killing and imprisoning you until there are none of you left.

In summary, I would make four points.

First, General Petraeus is our wartime leader. He has a smart, experienced staff. He will provide to you a fulsome, balanced assessment in September - far superior to anything you will hear in the interim.

Second, how you, our elected leaders, depict our withdrawal will have profound consequences. To a very large extent, you will shape the narrative, determining how our great nation is perceived and how friends and enemies respond to us.

Third, if the rationale for withdrawal is because Iraq seems hopeless, then leaving behind a residual force is fraught with peril. You cannot quit, and expect to manage what happens after you quit. Iraq, if it perceives it is being abandoned, could fly apart quickly.

Fourth, the rationale for withdrawal drives everything that comes thereafter. Why are we withdrawing? Is it because we as a nation have given up, concluding that full-scale civil war is inevitable; or has our military succeeded, allowing Iraqi forces to maintain stability?

I do not see a compromise "middle ground" between those two rationales.

Thank you.

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House Armed Services Committee

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Guidelines for NGHO -- U.S. Military Relations

Mon, 07/30/2007 - 8:12pm
On 24 July the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) rolled out their guidelines for relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations (NGHO). From the USIP publications page:

On July 24, 2007, leaders of the U.S. military and NGO community celebrated a promising moment for civil-military relations in peace operations: the rollout of Guidelines that will serve as "rules of the road" for how the two entities operate in hostile environments.

Facilitated by the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Guidelines seek to mitigate frictions between military and NGO personnel over the preservation of humanitarian space in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Principles in the Guidelines include ensuring that military personnel wear uniforms when conducting relief activities to avoid being mistaken for nongovernmental humanitarian organization representatives. Conversely, it recommends that humanitarian relief personnel avoid traveling in U.S. Armed Forces vehicles with the exception of liaison personnel to the extent practical.

The heads of both the U.S. military and InterAction (an umbrella organization for U.S. NGOs) have endorsed the Guidelines and will be disseminating them throughout their organizations. Two years in the making, the effort represents "a desire from both sides to move beyond polemics to proactive problem solving," said Jeb Nadaner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations at the Pentagon. NGO leaders likewise expressed optimism at the potential for change. "We do not want to understate the importance of this document for us," said Sam Worthington, InterAction President and CEO. "We believe that these guidelines will serve a purpose beyond U.S. NGOs to our global partners."

The initiative was launched in March 2005 when Amb. Carlos Pascual, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S. State Department, asked the Institute to establish a Working Group on Civil-Military Relations in Non-permissive Environments. What began as a dialogue between military and NGO leaders has resulted in a pioneering effort upon which both sides hope to expand. Military and NGO leaders intend to promulgate the Guidelines throughout their communities via media and education channels: NGOs will publish the Guidelines in their newsletters and literature; the military will incorporate the Guidelines into joint military doctrine publications. The next challenge lies in implementing the Guidelines in the field and creating a monitoring mechanism by which the Guidelines can be continuously tested and revised.

For the U.S. Armed Forces, the following guidelines should be observed consistent with military force protection, mission accomplishment, and operational requirements:

1. When conducting relief activities, military personnel should wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing to avoid being mis­taken for NGHO representatives. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should not display NGHO logos on any military cloth­ing, vehicles, or equipment. This does not preclude the appro­priate use of symbols recognized under the law of war, such as a red cross, when appropriate. U.S. Armed Forces may use such symbols on military clothing, vehicles, and equipment in appropriate situations.

2. Visits by U.S. Armed Forces personnel to NGHO sites should be by prior arrangement.

3. U.S. Armed Forces should respect NGHO views on the bearing of arms within NGHO sites.

4. U.S. Armed Forces should give NGHOs the option of meeting with U.S. Armed Forces personnel outside military installations for information exchanges.

5. U.S. Armed Forces should not describe NGHOs as "force mul­tipliers" or "partners" of the military, or in any other fashion.

6. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should avoid interfer­ing with NGHO relief efforts directed toward segments of the civilian population that the military may regard as unfriendly.

7. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should respect the de­sire of NGHOs not to serve as implementing partners for the military in conducting relief activities. However, individual NGOs may seek to cooperate with the military, in which case such cooperation will be carried out with due regard to avoid­ing compromise of the security, safety, and independence of the NGHO community at large, NGHO representatives, or public perceptions of their independence.

For NGHOs, the following guidelines should be observed:

1. NGHO personnel should not wear military-style clothing. This is not meant to preclude NGHO personnel from wearing protec­tive gear, such as helmets and protective vests, provided that such items are distinguishable in color/appearance from U.S. Armed Forces issue items.

2. NGHO travel in U.S. Armed Forces vehicles should be limited to liaison personnel to the extent practical.

3. NGHOs should not have facilities co-located with facilities in­habited by U.S. Armed Forces personnel.

4. NGHOs should use their own logos on clothing, vehicles, and buildings when security conditions permit.

5. NGHO personnel's visits to military facilities/sites should be by prior arrangement.

6. Except for liaison arrangements detailed in the sections that follow, NGHOs should minimize their activities at military bases and with U.S. Armed Forces personnel of a nature that might compromise their independence.

7. NGHOs may, as a last resort, request military protection for convoys delivering humanitarian assistance, take advantage of essential logistics support available only from the military, or accept evacuation assistance for medical treatment or to evacuate from a hostile environment. Provision of such mili­tary support to NGHOs rests solely within the discretion of the military forces and will not be undertaken if it interferes with higher priority military activities. Support generally will be provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with appli­cable U.S. law.

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Links:

Guidelines for NGO -- U.S. Military Relations Pamphlet - (USIP)

Guidelines NGO -- U.S. Military Relations Handout - (USIP)

Small Wars Journal Reference Library

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