Small Wars Journal

Pamphlet: COIN and Irregular Warfare in a Tribal Society

Sun, 10/14/2007 - 11:03am
The COIN and Irregular Warfare in Tribal Society Pamphlet is designed to assist staff officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers and Marines in conducting counterinsurgency and irregular warfare operations in a tribal society.

This pamphlet provides a general overview of tribal society and behavior to gain an appreciation of the cultural operating environment. The pamphlet is based on the premise that the key component of COIN and irregular warfare is to effectively communicate intent within the cultural frame of reference of the target audience.

Recommendations for improvements to this pamphlet are encouraged from commands as well as individuals.

Fort Leavenworth Soul Searching

Sat, 10/13/2007 - 7:28pm
At an Army School, Blunt Talk on Iraq -- Elizabeth Bumiller, New York Times

Here at the intellectual center of the United States Army, two elite officers were deep in debate at lunch on a recent day over who bore more responsibility for mistakes in Iraq — the former defense secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld, or the generals who acquiesced to him.

"The secretary of defense is an easy target," argued one of the officers, Maj. Kareem P. Montague, 34, a Harvard graduate and a commander in the Third Infantry Division that was the first to reach Baghdad in the 2003 invasion. "It's easy to pick on the political appointee."

"But he's the one that's responsible," retorted Maj. Michael J. Zinno, 40, a military planner who worked at the headquarters of the Coalitional Provisional Authority, the former American civilian administration in Iraq.

No, Major Montague shot back, it was more complicated: the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the top commanders were part of the decision to send in a small invasion force and not enough troops for the occupation. Only Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, the Army chief of staff who was sidelined after he told Congress that it would take several hundred thousand troops in Iraq, spoke up in public.

"You didn't hear any of them at the time, other than General Shinseki, screaming, saying that this was untenable," Major Montague said.

As the war grinds through its fifth year, Fort Leavenworth has become a front line in the military's tension and soul-searching over Iraq. Here at the base on the bluffs above the Missouri River, once a frontier outpost that was a starting point for the Oregon Trail, rising young officers are on a different journey — an outspoken re-examination of their role in Iraq...

Custer Blames Grant?

Sat, 10/13/2007 - 2:33am
Well, this debate has to take place, so here it is - í  la L. Paul Bremer III, retired Army Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez blasted the Bush administration at the Military Reporters and Editors conference Friday for a "catastrophically flawed, unrealistically optimistic war plan" and denounced the current "surge" strategy as a "desperate" move that will not achieve long-term stability.

Ex-Iraq General Blasts War Planners, Media -- Kelly Kennedy, Army Times

The former top commander of forces in Iraq lambasted reporters Friday for having "agenda-driven biases" he called "a threat to democracy," and then laid out the Bush administration and Congress for bad planning and no clear end state for the war in Iraq.

"There is no question America is living a nightmare with no end in sight," said retired Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez at an annual professional conference for military reporters outside Washington, D.C. "There is nothing going on today that would give us hope."

Sanchez was head of coalition forces in Iraq from June 2003 to June 2004.

When asked where accountability lay while he headed the forces, as well as for his part in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, Sanchez said it was too late for him to do anything when he took over...

Ex-Commander Says Iraq Effort Is 'a Nightmare' -- David Cloud, New York Times

Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, who retired in 2006 after being replaced in Iraq after the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal, blamed the Bush administration for a "catastrophically flawed, unrealistically optimistic war plan" and denounced the current addition of American forces as a "desperate" move that would not achieve long-term stability.

"After more than four years of fighting, America continues its desperate struggle in Iraq without any concerted effort to devise a strategy that will achieve victory in that war-torn country or in the greater conflict against extremism," General Sanchez said at a gathering of military reporters and editors in Arlington, Va.

He is the most senior war commander of a string of retired officers who have harshly criticized the administration's conduct of the war. While much of the previous condemnation has been focused on the role of former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, General Sanchez's was an unusually broad attack on the overall course of the war...

Ex-Commander in Iraq Faults War Strategy -- Josh White, Washington Post

... "The administration, Congress and the entire interagency, especially the State Department, must shoulder the responsibility for this catastrophic failure, and the American people must hold them accountable," Sanchez told military reporters and editors. "There has been a glaring unfortunate display of incompetent strategic leadership within our national leaders."

Sanchez lashed out specifically at the National Security Council, calling officials there negligent and incompetent, without offering details. He also assailed war policies over the past four years, which he said had stripped senior military officers of responsibility and thus thrust the armed services into an "intractable position" in Iraq.

"The best we can do with this flawed approach is stave off defeat," Sanchez said in a speech to the Military Reporters and Editors' annual conference in Crystal City. "Without bipartisan cooperation, we are destined to fail. There is nothing going on in Washington that would give us hope." ...

Sanchez Calls War 'a Nightmare with No End in Sight' - Jeff Schogol, Stars and Stripes

While cleared of any wrongdoing, one report found that Sanchez and his deputy, "failed to ensure proper staff oversight of detention and interrogation operations."

Abu Ghraib was a sore subject Friday for Sanchez, who lambasted the media for using phrases like "dictatorial and somewhat dense," "liar" and "torturer" to describe him.

"I also refused to talk to the European Stars and Stripes for the last two years of my command in Germany, for their extreme bias and single-minded focus on Abu Ghraib," he said.

But Sanchez reserved most of his venom Friday for U.S. officials, saying the U.S. government still has not brought all the resources needed to win in Iraq.

"From a catastrophically flawed, unrealistically optimistic war plan, to the administration's latest surge strategy, this administration has failed to employ and synchronize the political, economic and military power," Sanchez said.

Continuing changes to military strategy alone will not achieve victory, rather it will only "stave off defeat," he said.

"The administration, Congress and the entire inter-agency, especially the State Department, must shoulder the responsibility for this catastrophic failure and the American people must hold them accountable."

Even now, the U.S. government has yet to launch a concerted effort to come up with a strategy to win in Iraq, Sanchez said. Such a strategy should involve political reconciliation among Iraqis, building up the Iraqi security forces and getting Iraq's regional partners.

Sanchez acknowledged that U.S. officials have adopted that idea, but added that they do not have the necessary nonmilitary resources to carry it out...

Retired US Iraq Commander Calls Bush Strategy 'Desperate' -- Al Pessin, Voice of America (in full per VOA guidelines)

Retired Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez says there has been a "crisis of leadership" in the administration and the congress that has led to unnecessary deaths, and that the problem has not been solved by the new strategy President Bush announced in January.

"After more than four years of fighting, America continues its desperate struggle in Iraq without any concerted effort to devise a strategy that will achieve victory in that war torn country, or in the greater conflict against extremism. From a catastrophically flawed, unrealistically optimistic war plan to the administration's latest surge strategy, this administration has failed to employ and synchronize its political, economic and military power. The latest revised strategy is a desperate attempt by the administration that has not accepted the political and economic realities of this war, and they have definitely not been able to communicate effectively that reality to the American people," he said.

Asked to say what strategy he would recommend, General Sanchez enumerated many of the points of the president's approach - train the Iraqi military, promote political reconciliation, build national institutions and work with Iraq's neighbors to get their support. But he said the administration has not synchronized the efforts of all U.S. government agencies or provided enough resources to pursue the strategy. And he says military commanders should have been given more authority to work on traditionally civilian issues, particularly early in the conflict.

General Sanchez was the commander of coalition forces in Iraq from mid-2003 until mid-2004. He was in charge during the abuse of detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison, and he has since retired. The general has recently begun to make his criticism of the administration public, and on Friday, speaking to the Military Reporters and Editors Association, he had several very sharp things to say.

"There has been a glaring, unfortunate display of incompetent strategic leadership within our national leaders," he said.

The retired general declined to name individuals, but he singled out the State Department for criticism and charged "neglect and incompetence" by the National Security Council, which operates directly under the president. He was also tough on members of congress.

"While the politicians espouse a rhetoric designed to preserve their reputations and their political power, our soldiers die," he said.

And General Sanchez did not exempt the military leadership, including himself, from his criticism, saying it was a mistake not to get the war strategy right, not to understand the impact the invasion would have on Iraqi society and not to do anything about the problems when they first arose. "It was an absolute lack of moral courage to stand up and do what was right in terms of planning. And we allowed ourselves to believe that we, in fact, would be liberators. That was unacceptable in my view, as a general officer," he said.

General Sanchez called for the development of a U.S. national consensus on what he sees as the importance of winning in Iraq, and in the broader fight against extremism. Otherwise, he said, Iraq in particular will continue to be what he called "a nightmare with no end in sight."

There was no immediate reaction from the Pentagon spokesman.

Blog Links:

Sanchez on Iraq - The Belmont Club

The Logic of General Sanchez - Captain's Journal

OK, This... Has... Got...To... Stop... - Blackfive

Sanchez Speaks Out - Abu Muqawama

Revising History - MountainRunner

Cruel Mockery - Forward Movement

It Was as if Sanchez Was Just an Observer - Red State

... You Didn't Get it All From the MSM - Chaos-In-Motion

Discuss:

Discuss at Small Wars Council

On-line Continuous Learning

Sat, 10/13/2007 - 1:23am
I ran across this post at the King's College Kings of War blog - Pedagogy for the Long War.

The posting links to a paper that Dr. David Betz, King's College Department of War Studies, will be presenting at the upcoming USMC Pedagogy for the Long War conference.

A Real Revolution in Military Affairs: On-line Continuous Learning for the Operational Warfighter

This paper begins from the premise that continuous change is the new norm of the strategic and operational environment in which military activities take place. That being the case the most vital war-winning qualities to develop in our military forces are adaptability and flexibility. These are a function of mindsets and skill sets not weapons suites and materiel. Therefore, the first step to addressing the maladaptation of our armed forces, whose institutional DNA is rooted in the wars of the Industrial Age, to the needs of the wars of the Information Age is the creation of an appropriate training and educational regime. But this task is complicated by the hard facts that, first, training and education must be continuous throughout the career at a time when, second, operational tempo is such that sending officers and men to school for extended periods, which was never easy to manage, is even more difficult. Solution: if the soldier cannot go to the school then the school must go to the soldier.

If providers of training and education to the military were able to achieve such a transformation of the way in which they operate that would indeed be revolutionary. As this paper will show, not only is it possible, it is in fact already a reality on a small scale for 58 serving officers (of 112 current students), 47 of whom are British army, 3 RAF, 3 US, 3 Danes, 1 Swede, 1 Canadian, and 1 Australian navy commander, all students on the on-line MA War in the Modern World programme offered by the renowned Department of War Studies at King's College London...

Betz: Anyway, in the spirit of building the 'Learning Community' that is Kings of War's corner of the Blogosphere I post my paper for any who may find it interesting. Comments and suggestions welcome.

On the conference:

The Conference Steering Committee for Pedagogy for the Long War: Teaching Irregular Warfare invites paper submissions for a conference to be held 29 October through 1 November 2007 at the General Alfred M Gray Research Center, in Quantico Virginia...

Building upon recent lessons of the US and international community of military educators, Pedagogy for the Long War: Teaching Irregular Warfare focuses on shifting the concepts, curricula, and methods of military training and education for general purpose forces, in order to better prepare service people at every stage in their career for the diverse tasks unique to current and projected operating environments over the next twenty years. It is a conference which focuses on pedagogy both as a topic for deliberation and as an activity animating participation.

A Baghdad "Awakening" in the Works?

Fri, 10/12/2007 - 3:39pm
Based on previous "turning the corner" related statements and news items we may have come "full-circle" in Iraq...

• "Ladies and Gentlemen, we got him" -- Dec 03

• "Coalition forces have turned a corner in Anbar" -- Jan 04

• "The insurgency in Iraq is in its last throes" - May 05

• "The insurgency in Iraq is losing steam" -- August 05

• "I think we've turned the corner, if you will" -- December 05

• "I think, in that area, we have turned the corner" -- April 07

• "... we seem to be turning a corner" -- April 07

That said, and if true and not merely anecdotal, this latest development would be significant and contribute much to neutralizing the influence of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad -- much like the Awakening has accomplished concerning Al-Qaeda in Al Anbar.

Relations Sour Between Shiites and Iraq Militia -- Sabrina Tavernese, New York Times

In a number of Shiite neighborhoods across Baghdad, residents are beginning to turn away from the Mahdi Army, the Shiite militia they once saw as their only protector against Sunni militants. Now they resent it as a band of street thugs without ideology.

The hardening Shiite feeling in Baghdad opens an opportunity for the American military, which has long struggled against the Mahdi Army, as American commanders rely increasingly on tribes and local leaders in their prosecution of the war.

The sectarian landscape has shifted, with Sunni extremists largely defeated in many Shiite neighborhoods, and the war in those places has sunk into a criminality that is often blind to sect.

In interviews, 10 Shiites from four neighborhoods in eastern and western Baghdad described a pattern in which militia members, looking for new sources of income, turned on Shiites.

The pattern appears less frequently in neighborhoods where Sunnis and Shiites are still struggling for territory. Sadr City, the largest Shiite neighborhood, where the Mahdi Army's face is more political than military, has largely escaped the wave of criminality...

It was a disparate group with one thing in common: All were Shiites killed by Shiites. Residents blamed the Mahdi Army, which controls the neighborhood...

USMC Out of Iraq?

Fri, 10/12/2007 - 5:00am
Marines' Afghanistan Plan Sparks Debate -- Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post

A bid by the Marine Corps to take responsibility for the primary U.S. military mission in Afghanistan is generating a heated debate inside and outside the Pentagon, with some senior officers arguing that the Marines are ideally suited for the Afghan war while others contend that the move would undermine the counterinsurgency strategy there.

Gen. James T. Conway, the Marine Corps commandant, has raised the idea of the Marines shifting from Iraq to Afghanistan in meetings with the military's Joint Staff and the office of Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. "It's just started to be discussed at senior levels," said Col. David Lapan, a Marine spokesman.

Gates yesterday played down the discussion, saying he has not yet seen any proposals. "It's . . . extremely preliminary thinking on the part of, perhaps, some staff people in the Marine Corps," Gates said during a trip to London. "I don't think at this point it has any stature."

The Marine Corps is enthusiastic about a possible move to Afghanistan, with senior officials saying yesterday that its integrated air, ground and logistics units are tailor-made for the dispersed fighting in rugged terrain...

Links:

USMC Distributed Operations - Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory

MAGTF's Rule - Abu Muqawama

A Marine Corps Move to Afghanistan Raises Questions - Westhawk

Marines Want Out of Iraq, Into Afghanistan? - Danger Room

Marines to Take Over Afghanistan? - PrairiePundit

Marines or State Department: Who Does Afghanistan? - Captain's Journal

Marines to Afghanistan? - OPFOR

SECDEF Robert Gates, 10 Oct 07 AUSA Speech

Wed, 10/10/2007 - 7:56pm

Full transcript follows:

Association of the United States Army

Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 10, 2007

First, I would say welcome to Washington. A city where those who travel the high road of humility encounter littler traffic. Where people often say, "I'll double-cross that bridge when I come to it." Where you can see prominent people walking down lover's lane holding their own hands.

The story Peter told about my wanting to be a doctor is true. I often tell people my decision to join CIA probably saved countless lives.

I returned Saturday night from visiting five Latin American countries, including Peru. My visit there reminded me of the perils facing hosts when receiving foreign dignitaries. Some years ago, a European foreign minister, a notoriously heavy drinker, was visiting Peru. He was at a formal event, and he was drunk. Music was playing, someone in a long, flowing gown passed him. The foreign minister asked this person to dance. The individual turned on the drunken minister and somewhat haughtily replied, "First, you are drunk. Second, this is not a waltz, this is the Peruvian national anthem. Third, I am not a woman but the Cardinal Archbishop of Lima."

I leave tonight for Russia, where all visitors for decades have assumed they were being spied on. Often, visitors have been a little too paranoid. Such as the time Canadian hockey player Phil Esposito was in Moscow and he and his roommate decided to find the bug in their hotel room. They searched high and low to no avail. And they flipped the rug back and found there the supposed bug inset in the floor. With great effort, they unscrewed it only to hear a thunderous crash. They had undone the anchor of the chandelier in the room below them.

Despite the travel, different time zones and different so on, perhaps the most difficult, confusing aspect of this job for me is closer to home. It may also have vexed some of you at some point and that is navigating the Pentagon -- in every sense of the word. General Eisenhower learned this the hard way shortly after World War II when he tried to return to his office -- by himself -- after eating at the general officers' mess. Eisenhower later wrote: "So hands in pockets and trying to look as if I were out for a carefree stroll around the building, I walked ... and walked and walked, encountering neither landmarks nor people who looked familiar. One had to give the building grudging admiration; it had apparently been designed to confuse any enemy who might infiltrate it."

Newsman David Brinkley used to tell a story of the early days at the Pentagon. A woman told a Pentagon guard she was in labor and needed help in quickly getting to a hospital. The guard said, "Madam, you should not have come in here in that condition." She answered, "I wasn't in this condition when I came in."

I'm honored to be invited to this important forum, and to be with an organization that has done so much to support soldiers and their families. In fact, AUSA was one of the very first speaking events I accepted back in January.

I should start by saying that even before assuming my current job, the state of the Army was one of my chief concerns. Since then, I've had to sign orders extending deployments and sign letters of condolences to the families of the fallen. And then there are the visits with the wounded at Walter Reed, Bethesda, Brooke, Tripler, and at Landstuhl. To be honest, before I went to Walter Reed the first time, I dreaded it, not knowing how I or the wounded would react. But people told me, "No, they'll lift you up." And they were so right.

Through it all I have never forgotten that we are talking about individuals -- America's sons and daughters -- and not numbers on a press release or a web page. To me it's not institutional, it's very personal.

Just a few days ago we swore in a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen. One of the things that convinced me that Admiral Mullen was the right man for the job was when he was asked, as Chief of Naval Operations, what his top concern was. He didn't start talking about a new air craft carrier or submarine. He said: "The Army."

That says a good deal about Admiral Mullen and the priorities of the leadership of the Department of Defense.

These past couple of days you've heard from much of the Army senior leaders about their plans and goals for the service. Today, I'd like to offer my perspective on where the Army stands, and where it needs to be headed as it resets from the current conflicts and reshapes itself for the future.

I would like to frame the discussion in two ways:

- First, what America owes the Army after six years of war; our first protracted conflict with an all-volunteer force since the American Revolution.

- And second, what the Army owes America -- as it prepares to defend this country's freedom and interests in the decades ahead.

The U.S. Army today is a battle-hardened force whose volunteer soldiers have performed with courage, resourcefulness, and resilience in the most grueling conditions. They've done so under the unforgiving glare of the 24 hour news cycle that leaves little room for error, serving in an organization largely organized, trained, and equipped in a different era for a different kind of conflict. And they've done all this with a country, a government -- and in some cases a defense department -- that has not been placed on a war footing.

As a result of this stress, there has been a good deal of concern about the condition of the Army, leading some to speculate that it is "broken." I think not.

On numerous occasions, skeptical reporters have come back from Iraq and Afghanistan amazed at the high morale and discipline they see in our soldiers. Recruiting has been no small challenge, but targets are being met. The high retention rates continue to be nothing short of remarkable, especially when considering that those most likely to re-enlist are those most often deployed. For all that is given up to be in this line of work, our soldiers gain something that few can claim -- they know that they are defending our country and shaping the course of history. That's no small thing, and it is a source of great pride.

But while the Army certainly is not broken, it is under stress, and, as General Casey puts it, "out of balance."

So when one considers what the nation owes the Army, the answer is a good deal. And it starts with gratitude and appreciation for the service and sacrifice of soldiers and their families.

America has come a long way on this front from the late 1960s and early 1970s during our last protracted and controversial war. You see it in airports all over the country, where soldiers are met with standing ovations by passengers in the terminal. I've been there and seen it myself. There are free meals and rounds of drinks. And, above all, simple thank yous. The appreciation is real, it is heartfelt, and it bridges any political divide.

For those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, the country owes their families every care and benefit as they make the wrenching transition to life without a father or mother, brother or sister, daughter or son.

To the wounded we have a moral obligation to see that the superb life-saving care they receive in the theater and at Landstuhl is matched by the outpatient treatment that will allow them to transition smoothly to the next phase in their lives -- drawing on support that facilitates that transition, not impedes it. The lapses that have occurred in this area will not be tolerated nor repeated.

We are well familiar with the high pace of deployments and the strain this has placed on soldiers and their families. There are units like the 2nd Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division, now finishing up its 15th month in Iraq. Since 9/11 no other Army brigade has spent more time away from home.

But it is also important for the men and women of the Army to know that relief is on the way:

- While U.S. forces will play some role in Iraq for years to come, a reduction in the size of our commitment there is inevitable. Most of the serious discussion today is over how and when;

- The Army is expanding by some 65,000 soldiers, and I am prepared to support plans to speed up that process as long as we can do it without sacrificing quality;

- With strong bipartisan support in the Congress, tens of billions of dollars have been allocated to reconstitute damaged and destroyed equipment; and

- New programs and resources are coming on line to make the Army's covenant with families a reality.

America's ground forces have borne the brunt of underfunding in the past and the bulk of the costs -- both human and material -- of the wars of the present. By one count, investment in Army equipment and other essentials was underfunded by more than $50 billion before we invaded Iraq. By another estimate, the Army's share of total defense investments between 1990 and 2005 was about 15 percent. So resources are needed not only to recoup from the losses of war, but to make up for the shortfalls of the past and to invest in the capabilities of the future.

How those resources are used, and where those investments are made today will shape the Army for decades to come. We do not get the dollars or the opportunity to reset very often. So it's vital we get it right.

This will call on accountable and visionary leadership across the service and up and down the chain of command.

One of the Army's concerns you've heard about at this conference is getting back to training for "high intensity" situations -- a capability vitally important to deter aggression and shape the behavior of other nations.

It strikes me that one of the principal challenges the Army faces is to regain its traditional edge at fighting conventional wars while retaining what it has learned -- and relearned -- about unconventional wars -- the ones most likely to be fought in the years ahead.

One of my favorite sayings is that "experience is that marvelous thing that enables you to recognize a mistake when you make it again."

In the years following the Vietnam War, the Army relegated unconventional war to the margins of training, doctrine, and budget priorities. Consider that in 1985 the core curriculum for the Army's 10-month Command and General Staff College assigned 30 hours -- about four days -- for what was is now called low intensity conflict. This was about the same as what the Air Force was teaching at its staff college at the time.

This approach may have seemed validated by ultimate victory in the Cold War and the triumph of Desert Storm. But it left the service unprepared to deal with the operations that followed: Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and more recently Afghanistan and Iraq -- the consequences and costs of which we are still struggling with today.

The work that has been done to adapt since has been impressive -- if not nearly miraculous. Just one example is the transformation of places like the National Training Center, where, as one officer put it, the Army has "cut out a piece of Iraq and dropped it into Southern California," replete with a dozen villages and hundreds of Arab Americans employed as role players. The publication of the counterinsurgency manual is another milestone, and is being validated by the progress we've seen in Iraq over the past few months. This work and these lessons in irregular warfare need to be retained and institutionalized, and should not be allowed to wither on the bureaucratic vine.

Put simply, our enemies and potential adversaries -- including nation states -- have gone to school on us. They saw what America's technology and firepower did to Saddam's army in 1991 and again in 2003, and they've seen what IEDs are doing to the American military today. It is hard to conceive of any country challenging the United States directly on the ground -- at least for some years to come.

Indeed, history shows us that smaller, irregular forces -- insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists -- have for centuries found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos. As one officer recently told the Washington Post, "the toys and trappings have changed," but the fundamentals have not.

We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior -- of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.

One of the challenges facing the Army will be how to incorporate the latest in technology without losing sight of the human and cultural dimensions of the irregular battlefield. For example, we have spent billions on tools and tactics to protect against IEDs. Yet, even now, the best way to defeat these weapons -- indeed the only way to defeat them over the long run -- is to get tips from locals about the networks and the emplacements or, even better, to convince and empower the Iraqis to prevent the terrorists from emplacing them in the first place.

In addition, arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police -- once the province of Special Forces -- is now a key mission for the military as a whole. How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking.

The same is true for mastering foreign language -- a particular interest of mine -- and building expertise in foreign areas. And until our government decides to plus up our civilian agencies like the Agency for International Development, Army soldiers can expect to be tasked with reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting good governance. All these so-called "nontraditional" capabilities have moved into the mainstream of military thinking, planning, and strategy -- where they must stay.

Finally, there is a generation of junior and mid level officers and NCOs who have been tested in battle like none other in decades. They have seen the complex, grueling face of war in the 21st century up close. They've lost friends and comrades. Some have been deployed multiple times and want to have a semblance of a normal life -- get married, start a family, continue their schooling.

These men and women need to be retained, and the best and brightest advanced to the point that they can use their experience to shape the institution to which they have given so much. And this may mean reexamining assignments and promotion policies that in many cases are unchanged since the Cold War.

In closing, I should tell you that when I speak to Army leaders I make it a point to ask them to communicate to their subordinates not only the thanks of a grateful and admiring nation, but also our pride in what they have accomplished.

The story of just one unit explain why.

The 1st Brigade of the First Armored Division, the "Ready First Brigade," had been based in Germany for more than 60 years, most of that time preparing to beat back a Soviet invasion across the Fulda Gap. It was deployed to Iraq in 2003, and extended after the Sadr uprising in 2004.

Last year -- before there was a "surge," or a "new way forward," or a new counterinsurgency manual -- they were sent back to Iraq, this time to Ramadi. The city was controlled by insurgents and Al Qaeda, and was written off as lost. The brigade commander was told: "fix it, don't destroy it." It was up to him, his staff, and his soldiers to figure out the rest.

And so instead of patrolling from large bases, the Ready First Brigade set up small combat outposts in Al Qaeda strongholds -- where troops led by sergeants and lieutenants and captains cleared and held neighborhoods one at a time. The enemy would not go quietly -- and responded with an onslaught of roadside bombs, mortars, and ambushes. Among the hundreds of stories of heroism that emerged from this period was of Sergeant David Anderson. He saved the lives of several soldiers on September 24th after they were ambushed and hit by multiple IED attacks. He would later receive the Silver Star for his efforts.

One of the Brigade staff officers was Captain Travis Patriquin. He spoke several languages, including Arabic, and he grew a mustache to fit in. He became the expert on the neighboring tribes -- local power brokers going back hundreds of years who had been largely shunned up to that point by our military.

Like any self-respecting army officer, Patriquin had a Powerpoint presentation. It was called "How to Win in Al Anbar by Captain Trav." But instead of charts and graphs, this presentation used stick figures and simple stories to teach soldiers how to deal with Iraqi tribes -- a relationship where "shame and honor" meant a good deal more than "hearts and minds." At this young captain's direction, the brigade courted local sheiks over cigarettes and endless cups of tea -- outreach that, combined with Al Qaeda's barbarism, helped spark the "Anbar Awakening" that has garnered so much attention and praise in the past months.

Over time, Ramadi was taken back from Al Qaeda and given back to its people. These gains came at no small cost. During its tour, this brigade would suffer more than 95 killed and 600 wounded. One of them was Captain Patriquin. He did not have a chance to see his ideas and efforts bear fruit, but no doubt would have been proud to have seen what the hard work, courage, and ingenuity of the soldiers had started: A city liberated. Al Qaeda uprooted and reeling. And the tide turned, at least in this one important battle, in a conflict that will determine the future of the Middle East for decades to come.

It is soldiers and stories like these -- repeated in so many places and so many times -- that inspire us and make us proud and hopeful about the future of America's Army. Our country's defense could not be in better hands.

Thank you very much.

MCCLL Oct 07 Newsletter

Wed, 10/10/2007 - 7:52pm
Among the articles in the October 07 issue of the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) Newsletter are:

- Highlights from the recently produced MCCLL pocket guide on the subject

of Law of War, Rules of Engagement and Escalation of Force procedures.

- The results of a recent collection visit with Battery B of the 1st

Battalion, 12th Marines to discuss its tasking to conduct the Marine Corps detention operations mission as Task Force Military Police.

- The results of a recent collection visit with Marine Heavy Helicopter

Squadron 465.

- A report on lessons learned by Combat Logistics Battalion 6 concerning

its experiences performing vehicle recovery missions.

- The results of the MCCLL motorcycle safety survey and motorcycle

enthusiasts forum that resulted in numerous thoughtful comments from Marines

on motorcycle safety issues.