Small Wars Journal

Kabul Direct

Sat, 10/20/2007 - 8:04am
SWJ just received by e-mail this introductory edition of Kabul Direct.

Dear Friend of Afghanistan (and to our foes too, should we still have any left!)

Attached please find the first edition of Kabul Direct, the first English-language journal produced by Afghans in Afghanistan.

In this introductory issue, we have three exclusive in-depth interviews with:

  • The former Taliban foreign minister and personal spokesman for Mullah Omar;

  • The first elected leader of Afghanistan's other leading insurgent party, Hizbe-Islami; and,

  • Afghanistan's own Al Qaeda expert and former official in the Taliban's foreign ministry

Find out why all of these close observers and former associates of the insurgents in Afghanistan believe that peace negotiations will succeed and should have started yesterday. Also learn why they think Afghanistan will never dissolve into a sectarian conflict like Iraq has.

We also bring you news analysis of the fragile situation in the north and the risk the increasing insecurity there poses to Kabul - and all of Afghanistan's allies.

We feel this is one news analysis publication you cannot afford to miss.

We at Kabul Direct are bringing you the news straight from Afghanistan as only locals can.

Thank you for your interest in Afghanistan, our beloved country, and for your support.

And please help us in our effort by subscribing!

Sincerely,

Rahmani Rahmani, Editor-in-Chief

The document is marked "Free, Introductory Edition" and is not visibily copyrighted or otherwise limited in its distribution. So we've posted it here.

This issue has been produced with love by an all-volunteer staff.

We are asking our readers to help us cover our costs. Please send whatever you can to assist us in this effort.

The document provides a phone number and e-mail should you choose to respond to that or the subscription plea.

MRAPs and COIN

Fri, 10/19/2007 - 6:27pm
Christian Lowe at Military.com reports that Marine Corps commanders in Iraq are asking the Pentagon to slow down the deployment of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. Corps commanders were quoted as saying they needed more time to figure out how to best employ the vehicle as they are four-times heavier than up-armored Humvees and may require a whole new set of tactics to operate effectively in a counterinsurgency environment.

Lowe quotes analysts with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA):

The MRAP has yet to prove its place in future service equipment plans. The gas-guzzling MRAP could impose a strain on logistics, suck funding away from needed vehicle upgrades in the future and could run counter to the intent of counterinsurgency doctrine, which stresses close contact with the population.

But retired Army Colonel Robert Killebrew, a former Special Forces officer and Department of Defense consultant disagrees:

I generally agree with the purchase of MRAPs in large numbers... I find unpersuasive the argument that MRAP will have some kind of doctrinal impact on the conduct of the war in Iraq.

It will have no effect at all on the current tactics of putting troops out on the beat and on their feet taking on insurgents in Baghdad and elsewhere...

Of IEDs and MRAPs: Force Protection In Complex Irregular Operations co-authored by Andrew Krepinevich and Dakota Wood was released by CSBA on 17 October.

About the report:

Simple solutions to complex problems are inherently attractive and almost always wrong. So it is with the Pentagon's recent decision to enter into "crash" production of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected armored vehicles, or MRAPs. Political and military leaders are currently grappling with this problem, which can be summed up as: How much to invest in a new system that appears to provide enhanced protection for troops against the most common, lethal threat in Iraq, without undermining either the ability of the force to conduct the current mission set before it, or the ability to remain effective across the range of missions and operating environments it will also have to be ready for in the years ahead?

This paper's purpose is not to offer a definitive answer to this question; rather, it seeks to ensure that the issues relevant to arriving at a good decision are given proper consideration. Those readers seeking a specific recommendation regarding the overall mix of armored vehicles in the US military's ground force structure will not find it here. However, those who are interested in how to think about the issue in their efforts to reach their own conclusions will hopefully find what follows to be useful.

Gates Nixes Marine Shift to Afghanistan

Fri, 10/19/2007 - 5:52am
Last week, the Washington Post reported that a bid by the Marine Corps to take responsibility for the primary U.S. military mission in Afghanistan generated a heated debate inside and outside the Pentagon, with some senior officers arguing that the Marines are ideally suited for the Afghan war while others contending that the move would undermine the counterinsurgency strategy there.

Yesterday, Inside Defense reported that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has nixed that proposal:

Defense Secretary Robert Gates today shot down Marine Commandant Gen. James Conway's proposal to shift Marines from Iraq to Afghanistan, which would leave the Army to handle operations in Iraq.

Gates dismissed the idea when asked about it at a Pentagon media briefing.

"I have pretty much literally, up until this point, heard one sentence about it, that they were thinking about it," he said. "So I would say that if it happens it will be long after I'm secretary of defense." ...

All Considered, You'd Think The Registration Fee Would be Waived...

Fri, 10/19/2007 - 5:35am
Blackwater USA - Public / Private Partnership in Peacekeeping Conference

This theme will look at those areas where the military and government can use private sector expertise to successfully accomplish security and reconstruction operations. To most effectively and efficiently accomplish stability and reconstruction missions requires using the most appropriate skill sets. Frequently those skill sets reside in the private sector. To best use the taxpayer's resources may require leveraging the private sector.

Tuesday, December 4, 2007 7:30 AM - Wednesday, December 5, 2007 5:00 PM

Ronald Reagan Bldg & International Trade Center

1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW

Washington, DC 20004

Academic Military or Government $295.00 for a limited time ($395.00 original price)

Industry $395.00 for a limited time ($495.00 original price)

View Event Summary

View Event Agenda

U.S. Maritime Strategy for 21st Century

Wed, 10/17/2007 - 4:09pm

RADM Jake Shuford, ADM Gary Roughead, Gen James Conway, and ADM Thad Allen speaking at the International Seapower Symposium's Combined Service Chief Maritime Strategy Presentation.

Download A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

More on the new maritime strategy...

New Maritime Strategy to Focus on 'Soft Power' - Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post

The U.S. military unveiled a new maritime strategy today -- its first created jointly by the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard -- shifting from a narrow focus on sea combat toward one that also emphasizes the use of "soft power" to counter terrorism and deliver humanitarian assistance.

The strategy, shaped by the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and the wars that followed, stresses preventing conflict as much as winning wars, and recognizes that "no one nation" can secure the world's waters against terrorism and other threats...

The new approach marks a stark departure from the last U.S. maritime strategy, conceived by the Navy in the 1980s, which focused heavily on offensive operations against the then-Soviet Union. "This isn't just a strategy about putting ordnance on a target or sinking someone else's fleet," said a senior Navy official, who like some others spoke on condition of anonymity.

"Soft power, the humanitarian and economic efforts, have been elevated to the same level as high-end naval warfare," said another Navy official, who like others spoke on condition of anonymity because the strategy had not been officially unveiled...

Sea Services Unveil New Maritime Strategy

By Jim Garamone

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17, 2007 -- The new U.S. maritime strategy elevates war prevention to the same level of importance as warfighting.

Adm. Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. James T. Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps; and Adm. Thad W. Allen, Commandant of the Coast Guard, today unveiled "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" at the International Seapower Symposium, in Newport, R.I.

Representatives from 98 countries attended the symposium. Roughead said it was fitting that the new strategy was briefed at the event, because it is an outgrowth of talks with allies that began at the symposium two years ago.

"The American people expect -- demand -- that we as a Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard remain strong," the admiral said. "They also expect our services to defend their territory and to be able to protect our citizens."

This is the traditional mission of a maritime strategy, but the American people also expect U.S. naval forces to cooperate with maritime forces of other nations. U.S. security and prosperity "is completely linked to security and prosperity of other nations around the world," Roughead said.

The new maritime strategy calls on the Navy to develop certain strategic imperatives. "We believe we must be a global force, a globally positioned force," the Roughead said.

U.S. maritime forces must have credible combat power "that can limit various regional issues, that can deter conflict, and that can fight and win when called upon to do so." The Navy must be able to work with others, but also must be able to fight and win without allies, if needed, he said.

U.S. naval forces will be globally distributed but will be concentrated in two general areas: the western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean region. Those forces must be able to be moved, brought together, shaped and structured so the U.S. Navy can conduct operations around the world, Roughead said. They also need to be able to work with long-standing allies and new partners.

Maritime forces must be able to conduct sea-control operations, and they must be able to project power. "When access is denied, we must have the capability to project power and to maintain those capabilities as enduring capabilities," the admiral said.

But in addition to maritime security, the strategy calls for an expanded core capability: disaster response and humanitarian assistance. The Indonesian tsunami that ravaged the Indian Ocean basin in 2004 is a case in point for the need for this capability. Maritime forces of many nations converged upon the area and saved countless lives.

But there has to be a basis for those forces to come together. "We develop the relationships; we develop the procedures; we develop the methods that allow us to be more effective should something like that happen," Roughead said.

And this is not just an international issue, as the military and maritime response following Hurricane Katrina in 2005 proves, he said.

The key to the maritime strategy is trust, Roughead said. "We believe that trust cannot be surged. Trust is not something that has a switch and you can turn on and off," he said. "Trust is something that must be built over time. Trust is built through discussions, operations, activities and exercises and through initiatives that each of us may undertake and bring others into. It is built on seeking opportunities to work more closely together."

The admiral said he especially wants young naval officers and sailors to participate in military-to-military exchanges. Relationships with members of other navies must be developed so that when the maritime forces serve together it is not the first time the sailors have met.

Conway said the Marine Corps absolutely agrees with the new strategy. But, given the pressure of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it may be some time before his service can embrace it fully, he added. "We are closer to the United States Army than we have been for a long, long time," Conway said. "We have been operating alongside them -- intertwined with them really -- over the last four, five years."

The Marine Corps is an expeditionary force by nature, and having 26,000 Marines in a land battle in Anbar province takes some of that capability from the corps. "We go down to the sea in ships," he said. "But right now, we are very much taking on the profile of a second land army.

"We have to go through an expeditionary filter when we get out of there to get back to a lighter, faster, more hard-hitting capability that is deployable aboard our nation's ships."

Allen said the U.S. Coast Guard completely subscribes to the strategy. "It reinforces the time-honored missions we carried out in this country since 1790," he said. "It reinforces the Coast Guard maritime strategy of safety, security and stewardship, and it reflects not only the global reach of our maritime services but the need to integrate and synchronize and act with our coalition and international partners to not only win wars ... but to prevent wars."

Allen called the new strategy a "convergence of ideas and leadership" and said it represents a step "forward in a very uncertain future and an era of persistent, irregular conflict."

Roughead said the global system in place today requires this maritime strategy. The global system changes every day as changes occur among people, nations, economies, law and knowledge. "Change is a good thing, because change gives us the opportunities to make adjustments to pursue new initiatives, and that's what the strategy is about," he said.

Mid-Week Reading...

Tue, 10/16/2007 - 7:09pm
To Raise Them Up. Part 1: The Lesser and Greater Insurgencies of the Philippines by B.A. Patty at The Long War Journal

B.A. Patty was recently embedded with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In part one of his three-part series, Patty examines the roles of organizations such as Abu Sayyaf and MNLF in the insurgency and what Filipino and US troops are doing to squelch terrorist activities.

Debating Iraqi Federalism is Pointless by Westhawk at Westhawk

Howls of protest greeted a recent non-binding resolution passed by the U.S. Senate. That resolution, which received a bipartisan 75-23 approval, called for a "soft partition" of Iraq into Sunni, Shi'ite, and Kurdish regions, while retaining Iraqi sovereignty under a weak central government.

Prime Minister al-Maliki, leading Sunni politicians, U.S. Ambassador Crocker, and the U.S. State Department in Washington all shouted down the Senate resolution.

Why is the Use of Anthropology a Contentious Issue? By Marcus Griffin, Ph.D., at From an Anthropological Perspective

The debate in a nutshell is as follows. The general objection to anthropologists working with the military is that research will be used to facilitate the capture, torture, and killing of Iraqis. The professional code of ethics we abide by states that we must not conduct research that will cause harm to research subjects or the subject population. This code came out of the Vietnam War experience whereby some anthropologists used social network analysis to identify tribal leaders that the CIA apparently then assassinated. The second objection is that by using the anthropological perspective, US Forces will be in a position to more effectively prolong their "illegal occupation of Iraq." I am embarrassed to say that academia is taking this issue very seriously, with some anthropologists writing in the blogosphere to get the national association to consider certain sanctions that include denying the publication of any research conducted in association with the military. That is serious because it leads to ignorance generally and specifically denies faculty like me avenues to measure scholarship and service for purposes promotion and merit pay...

Iraq Symposium: If We Fail by Steve Schippert at Threats Watch

Regarding the consequences of failure in Iraq, along with Ralph Peters, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Kimberly Kagan and Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, ThreatsWatch recently participated in a FrontPage Magazine Symposium: If We Fail. Much was discussed and the general conclusion that the consequences of failure in Iraq would be most severe, there was some disagreement among the group regarding particulars.

Too Soon To Dance on Al Qaeda in Iraq's Grave? By James Gordon Meek at Counterterrorism Blog

On the heels of Tom Ricks and Karen DeYoung's excellent Washington Post piece about the internal military debate over whether to declare victory over Al Qaeda in Iraq, given its decimation, we write in today's New York Daily News about those in the intelligence community who feel it's way too soon to dance another victory jig in Baghdad's Paradise Square. CTBlog contributors Evan Kohlmann and Bill Roggio are quoted in my story, as are several intelligence officials who were curiously hesitant to even confirm that AQI has its back to the wall.

12 Captains by Jules Crittenden at Forward Movement

This will be cited as more iron-clad proof that the military can't win in Iraq, and even the military doesn't think so. Petraeus' erstwhile counter-insurgency advisor, Australian LTC David Kilcullen, said an interesting thing recently. When you served in Iraq tends to color how you view Iraq. Here's the list of captains and when they served. No 2007s in there. All the 2007s are still over there. I'd add that where you served probably makes a difference as well, as some critics have suggested the NYT's seven grunt war critics who are 2007-deployed soldiers were doing combat patrols in a particularly bad area. However, along with those seven grunts and a handful of generals, this oped will be cited as evidence the military itself doesn't think it can win.

Reorganizations and Defections within the Insurgency in Iraq by Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal

In Iraq: al Qaeda's Quagmire, we noted that al Qaeda in Iraq had lost one of its few remaining allies in Iraq, Asaeb al-Iraq al-Jihadiya, or "the Iraqi Jihad Union," due to pointless violence perpetrated on them by elements affiliated with al Qaeda in the Diyala province. These jihadists are similar in nature to Hitler's Nazi Germany and Stalin's Russia in that violence doesn't have to be directed or meaningful, per se. It only has to intimidate. Those who suffer in its wake are fodder for a power grab. But it always has unintended consequences, and has never won the long term struggle for the soul of a population.

Is Blackwater Evil? By John Robb at Global Guerrillas

Here's another example of dysfunction in our societal discussion about the future of security: rather than an informed/constructive debate on the future of private military contractors in warfare (a big topic that WILL NOT go away), we end up demonizing Blackwater with hyper-ventilation from Scahill, Singer (Salon) and the New York Times. If anything, Blackwater's current problems have everything to do with its (ill advised) super-macho image and anger over an unpopular/unsuccessful war. In truth, it's simply a security company with an excellent reputation for keeping its high value clients alive and a record of violent incidents in a dangerous war zone on par with the US military's experience. Were we expecting something different?

No, the real issues lie much deeper than this. It has to do with unease with the underlying shift from "defense" to "security."

Folly to Attack Iran? By Dr. David Betz at Kings of War

Not that I've done any scientific survey of opinion on the matter but it seems to me that by and large most analysts and pundits are broadly in accord with the argument in the article linked to above: attacking Iran would be a bad idea. That, more or less, is the view I hear from colleagues here in the Department of War Studies. We'll just have to learn to live with a nuclear Iran--as we have a nuclear China, India, Pakistan, and now North Korea. (Note, nobody seriously doubts that Iran is working towards a nuclear capability).

I beg to differ. I think Hillary Clinton is right to strike a hawkish note on Iran. While I see no reason to attack this instant a certain amount of credible saber-rattling now may make saber-wielding later less necessary; but ultimately, if Iran cannot be encouraged to desist by diplomatic and other means, then other other means must be employed: force. The CSM article makes a strong argument against it which, for me, is ultimately unconvincing.

Publicly Airing the Military's Dirty Laundry: Caught on the Horns of a Dilemma?

Mon, 10/15/2007 - 7:04pm
By Wayne Mastin

More and more, America is witnessing an outcry from its military members about the competence and responsibility of its leadership. The beginning of this current crop of critical analyses seems to have been an article entitled "A Failure in Generalship" in the May 2007 issue of Armed Forces Journal by Army Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling. Another example is the piece entitled, "The War as We Saw It," by several young soldiers from the 82d Airborne Division that the New York Times published on August 19, 2007. Now retired General Ricardo Sanchez has added his voice to the clamor.

Discussion of the military's failings is not a new phenomenon. What makes this round of comment unique is the venue in which the criticism is being made—the mainstream media. The military has its own series of publications that, while publicly available, tend not to be noticed by the public. These publications are more like their civilian academic counterparts, catering to a narrowly focused audience rather than the person on the street. Parameters, for example, is the journal of the Army War College; Military Review comes out of the Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. The Marine Corps Gazette is the professional journal of the Marine Corps Association, while Proceedings is the journal of the U.S. Naval Institute, which bills itself as the "Professional Society of the Sea Services. The U. S. Air Force also has its professional journals. A second group of publications by publicly held companies exist, like Armed Forces Journal, and the Military Times publications - Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force - but these too cater to a military audience with news and commentary about the life and work of serving military members. In the past, when military members had critical comments, about the services, they sought to have them printed in publications such as these.

The military has traditionally kept itself out of the mainstream media when it came to criticizing its own internal workings, at least until earlier this year. Still, the genesis is probably much earlier. While in Iraq, LTC Paul Yingling was a subordinate of Colonel H.R. McMaster. McMaster published a book in 1998 entitled Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. He argues in this book that senior military leadership failed in its duty by not protesting vigorously enough against commitment of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia during the 1960s. Yingling is leading a charge that is making a similar claim about the more current military leadership and its duty regarding the use of U.S. forces in Southwest Asia in the first decade of the 21st Century. Traditionally, the military, like almost every other profession has sought to be a self-policing organization. That is, it has established it own internal policies and procedures for investigating and punishing alleged misconduct by its members. While the results of these investigations have been public to some degree, they have usually stayed well below the level of a call for public investigation beyond that already conducted by the military. The interesting question is why the call for accountability has been brought to a more public venue now. What is causing military members to create a hullabaloo in the mainstream media?

One argument is rather straightforward. These writers, having been raised in the aftermath of Vietnam, do not want to undergo treatment similar to that accorded to the veterans of America's Southeast Asian adventure in futility. Neither do they want the institution of the military to have to go through a period of malaise comparable to the one that marked the post-Vietnam military.

Another possibility is that these authors represent a different generation that has a different outlook on what is important. The members of the "Great Generation" who fought in World War II and Korean apparently placed a very high value on the good of the whole and were —to sacrifice themselves to attain it. They seemed to be likely to accept the slogan "My Country - Right or Wrong."

One of the effects of the Watergate years has been a significant loss of trust in government by the American public. This was compounded by such scandals as Iran-Contra during the Reagan years, the Lewinsky scandal in the Clinton Presidency, and the allegations of lying about Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction that was a centerpiece of the Bush Administration's justification for invading Iraq in 2003. In light of such events, Americans seem to have become much less —to believe that their country's leaders are really doing what is best for the nation and for the people who comprise it. When an attitude such as that begins to become pervasive, allowing an organization to be self-policing becomes much harder to make palatable to its members. Those who see what seems to be improper conduct in their organization find it hard to believe that an investigation will yield appropriate results. Consequently, to avoid a whitewashing or cover up, they turn outside the organization to seek accountability for what happens within.

When calls for more public accountability are answered, they bring with them more public scrutiny. Once the investigating "camel gets its nose into the tent," keeping its body out becomes extremely difficult. Self-policing functions are likely to be eroded even more as the spotlight is turned on to the organization. The military is not the only profession that is subject to this type of concern. Healthcare is also under more lay scrutiny. A common physician complaint is that they are forced to practice medicine inappropriately by those who really know little or nothing about healthcare besides the profit and loss statements associated with health insurance.

Specialty areas--which traditionally have been the purview of a profession, which are not considered to be common knowledge or "common sense", and which may even have been the basis for creating the profession in the first place--suddenly are the subject of conversation by anyone and everyone. Everyone becomes an expert and a critic. While Monday morning quarterbacking is not likely to have very drastic national consequences when discussing the failure by Joe Torre in his managing of last week's baseball efforts in the American League Division Series, It seems hard to accept that the same can be said for on-going combat operations against committed American forces in a theater of war.

Thus, we have the dilemma or the Catch-22 of Joseph Heller fame. In order to ensure we have better organizational leadership expertise, perhaps we need to have more public scrutiny. However, in getting more public scrutiny, perhaps we undermine the leadership expertise that makes the organization good in the first place. Sometimes, we need to be careful what we wish for.

Anthropology by Savage Minds - A Self-Licking Ice Cream Cone

Sun, 10/14/2007 - 6:01pm
Marshall Sahlins on Anthropologists in Iraq - "Open Letter to the NYT" at Savage Minds.

You decide - read the letter and all the self-righteous comments that follow. Seems these guys and gals believe anthropology as a social science exists for anthropologists' feel-good, feed at the public trough sake. Unbelievable, to say the least...

The Good, The Bad, and The Replace Media with Concerned Anthropologists

Cox and Forkum

The Long War? Or the Wrong War?

Sun, 10/14/2007 - 11:25am
General Creighton Abrams fought in several long wars. As a result of his last, he directed a reorganization of the U.S. Army, an effort some called the Abrams Doctrine. This doctrine was subsequently converted into the Weinberger Doctrine and / or Powell Doctrine. All were subtle attempts to avoid the evils and problems of counterinsurgency (COIN) by influencing political masters in national government.

All failed as world events overtook best of intentions. We are now told we are in a long war. Possibly, but we must insure we are not, yet again, preparing for the wrong war. It is fairly obvious that for the next decade or so that commitments, if any, may -- note that, may -- be focused on nation building and COIN or similar missions. To focus on these missions by adding a large and dedicated foreign advisory training capability would create a large, rank heavy and most certainly unwieldy bureaucracy -- in other words -- a capability searching for a mission.

The Army went into Iraq "conventionally" on 20 March 2003. A month later, major combat operations ceased and the question was what next? On 11 May 2003 an answer was provided -- an occupation by an Army and Nation that had trained and oriented toward the wrong war.

That said, the Army deserves credit for turning around the debacle that might have occurred in Iraq but did not due to a major course adjustment. The Army also deserves credit for current efforts to reform from within -- this includes doctrine, training and organizational changes -- as there are many ongoing programs at multiple levels that are not clearly visible to the casual observer and they all bode well.

We unquestionably have to be a "full spectrum" force. And we must acknowledge that we long neglected the lower end of the spectrum -- to include COIN. While the Army has made some needed changes, it also needs to ensure that additional changes do not push Army core capabilities too far toward the low end of the spectrum.

Officers and non-commissioned officers trained in both advisory roles in foreign area specialties are needed -- no question about that.

Both categories, area specialists and advisors, are required. They would also be valuable specialties in Military Assistance and Advisory Groups. Just as the politicians shortsightedly destroyed USAID and the USIA, we destroyed the MAAGs. They worked and should be brought back.

The Army has for many years spent millions training foreign area specialists -- and has then pretty much ignored their advice concerning their specialty. That must change and in fairness appears to be changing. Foreign Area Specialists are important and we need more.

Creating a dedicated advisory training and support element of about 5,000 Area Specialists and Advisory Specialists -- some minimally language trained—to prep and assist General Purpose Forces (GPF) as required is a necessary approach that would minimally impact force structure, officer and senior NCO spaces or end strength while employing GPF units that are capable of doing considerably more than their essentially simple basic missions still unfortunately predicated on a industrial age land war in northern Europe. Both Advisors and Foreign Area Specialists would be melded to mission specific task organized cells for deployed units that would be attached and adopted by operating that unit for an entire deployment. Both would rotate through MAAG and DAO for area, cultural and language refresher.

General Purpose Forces are the Army. They must be flexible and balanced and capable of doing the entire gamut of missions looking us in the face. They can do them easily with only a slightly better training regimen. We train better now than we ever have. We can still do better. If we produce more capable people -- and thus more capable units, the job gets a little harder for everyone but the flip side is that as capability and competence increase, so do job satisfaction -- and retention. A large pool of underemployed and fairly senior advisors looking for work will not have either benefit.