Iraq: A False Choice

Dr Adam Cobb

The real choice before the American people is much starker than whether to act on General Petraeus' advice to Congress. Bottom-line: we have to accept the current situation and be realistic about fixing it or we cut our losses and get out.

America's enemies and competitors watch fascinated as Washington turns on itself over Iraq. Gen Petraeus' plea for just a little bit more time underscores the dilemma the US faces. On average, successful counterinsurgencies take over a decade to resolve. The US needs many more years to attempt to achieve a stable, self governing, Iraq. With growing opposition in Congress, including senior Republicans, the Administration is running on incrementalism. Bold policy options are needed, anything else is weakness.

Those who hope for US failure in Iraq know that they win when they do not lose. The deciding factor therefore is time, something America's enemies inside Iraq have in abundance. Time provides the space in which the low flame of insurgency can continue flickering against both US will, and the increasingly dislocated politics of Iraq.

However, it is to misunderstand the war to look to General Petraeus to buy America more time. He should be congratulated for his role in developing the new counterinsurgency doctrine and successfully implementing it on the ground. In counterinsurgencies, political stability follows reconstruction and reconstruction follows basic security. The problem is that General Petraeus is starting a long way behind the curve. A true soldier-scholar, he has made real inroads against the multiple insurgencies in Iraq. Security is improving in some provinces laying the foundation for reconstruction and political stability. However, as the General admitted this week the security environment is not improving everywhere, suggesting the whackamole dilemma (insurgents moving from Anbar to Diyala) might be continuing despite the surge.

Yet, in Iraq the biggest dilemma is political, not military. It is possible that the genie of political insecurity has long left the bottle. If that is the case, all the tactical military success in the world will not stop the rot. The Iraqi elections were a remarkable achievement, with a high turn out in the face of grave threats against voters. But the imbalance resulting from the Sunni refusal to participate, and the subsequent erosion of security, combined to put formidable pressure on the new government. Making matters worse, the new government was itself riddled with factionalism. Clashes among factions continue to occur both in the cabinet as well as on the street as their respective militia struggle for power. Consequently, it should not be a surprise to learn that the police force, in particular, is compromised and questions remain about the loyalty of parts of other security forces.

Notwithstanding the difficulties in Baghdad, an even bigger political problem exists in the United States. American will in the war in Iraq has been undermined by US policy failures. In order to sell the war, the Administration made three critical mistakes that have since come to seriously weaken national will.

First, it over-insisted that it would be a short, inexpensive, war - "It could last six days, six weeks. I doubt six months" (Sec Rumsfeld 2/7/03), "I think it will go relatively quickly, . . . (in) weeks rather than months" (VP Cheney 3/16/03), "the cost of a war with Iraq could be in the range of $50 billion to $60 billion" (Mitch Daniels, 12/30/02).

Second, it failed to anticipate the insurgency "I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators" (VP Cheney, 3/16/03).

Third, it hyper-inflated the treat "there is no doubt Saddam Hussein now has WMD...There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use ... against us" (VP Cheney 8/26/02), "facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud" (President Bush 10/7/02) a comment that repeated and reinforced the same statement of his national security adviser from a month before (Condoleezza Rice, 9/8/02).

The reality is that the US has now been at war in Iraq for the same duration as WWII. The war has turned into an insurgency that the US military, under General Petraeus, has only recently started to manage effectively. ''The enemy we're fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against, because of these paramilitary forces,'' Lt General William Wallace. ''We knew they were here, but we did not know how they would fight'' (3/28/2003). The war in Iraq (excluding Afghanistan) has resulted in 3759 US military, and up to 700 contractor, and 112 journalists, deaths. Military operations cost ca. $2bn a week. The long term costs of the war are harder to calculate. For example, 27,767 casualties (to date) will require medical and related support for years to come. Finally, there was no evidence of WMDs.

The unfolding of these stark realities over the past few years has put increasing pressure on the willingness of the American public to stay the course. This political reality outweighs General Petraeus' ability to provide a military solution measured in weeks or months.

The real choice before the American people is much starker than whether to act on General Petraeus' advice to Congress. Bottom-line: we have to accept the current situation and be realistic about fixing it or we cut our losses and get out.

The question then becomes what is the higher cost -- leaving now or staying another ten to twenty years? If the US leaves now there will be a bloodbath but that will resolve a lot of the political questions the US is frankly unable to influence. Iraq might break-up. Who would gain control of Iraq's oil reserves would also be a key strategic question given the benefit to terrorists the income from the oil fields might generate. Iranian backed pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states would likely grow. But Iran's influence would probably be moderated by Iraqi and regional Arab - Persian tensions. Moreover, a bloodbath would no doubt put refugee pressure on Iran, complicating their strategic choices. It should be noted that the refugee situation (4 million to date) has already placed great pressure on Syria which might impact its decisions. Regrettably Jordan is also shouldering this incredible burden, which is further evidence that widespread sectarian cleansing has already taken place. Al-Qaeda safe havens would no doubt arise in the Sunni uncontested zones but it is unclear if these would be outside of US strategic reach.

If the US decides to stay it should commit to at least ten, if not twenty, years. Such a commitment would put overwhelming pressure on Iraqi insurgents who are currently merely waiting for the day the US leaves. The silent Iraqi majority, who fear US resolve will never outlast the fury of the armed minority in their midst, will be empowered to choose freedom. This would not guarantee a perfect government in Baghdad but it would provide the right conditions (security, reconstruction, political stability) within which Iraqi's can attempt to find their Abraham Lincoln. Iran would be held in check and the long term prospects of the Middle East would be much brighter than today. However, such a commitment would be further fulfillment of Osama bin Laden's warning that the US intends occupying a Mideast country indefinitely and would no doubt continue to act as a recruiting base for his villainous cause. Long term, the problem of course is that there is a very high risk that all of this would be in vain and all of the negatives noted above would be heaped upon many more US deaths and a broken Treasury (if not world economy).

Perhaps the greatest irony is that the longer the US commits to staying the more likely it is to succeed. Anything short of a multi decade commitment is incrementalism that will change nothing.

In a sense, both the Administration and the Congress used the Petraeus testimony as a crutch. "So they go on, in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all powerful to be impotent". Churchill's condemnation of the indecisiveness of the Baldwin government is a suitable epithet for a responsibility-adverse polity that has run out of gumption.

Adam Cobb, PhD, is author of "Iraq: A Strategic Assessment" in the journal Civil Wars, Vol.9, No.1 (March 2007), pp.32--60, and teaches strategy, energy security and irregular warfare at the USAF Air War College at Maxwell AFB in Alabama.

The U.S. Air Force's attempt to seize control over all unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that fly above 3,500 feet is just a glimpse at what will very likely become the most important battle over military roles and missions in sixty years. The maturation of aerial drone technology has already revolutionized reconnaissance in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. But this is just the beginning. Drones will introduce very-long endurance capabilities and, as drone costs decline, something approaching an "everywhere" presence on the battlefield. These are new qualities not possible when aircraft required human crews. It is the arrival of these qualities that will shake up the allocation of roles and missions among the Air Force, Navy, Army, and Marine Corps.

The fact that all of the services are rapidly expanding their drone fleets and experimenting with even more exotic models is the strongest proof of the success of battlefield UAVs. Fearing a gutting of its relevance and thus its budget, the U.S. Air Force, led by its Chief of Staff General Michael Moseley, attempted to take command of all UAVs that fly above 3,500 feet. The Air Force argued that consolidating medium- and high-altitude UAVs under one "executive agent" would ensure efficiencies in research and procurement, and would deliver system-wide compatibility. The other services, particularly the Army, retorted that the Air Force's power grab would stifle innovation, and leave the ground forces vulnerable to a possibly unresponsive Air Force, both in development and on the battlefield.

Much more at Westhawk.

This slim volume has probably had more effect on the way in which Abu Muqawama views counterinsurgency warfare than any other book or article. FM 3-24 is great doctrine, but Galula gives his reader a feel for counterinsurgency warfare in a way the field manual does not. It is also very short, and to-the-point. Which is why, over the past few years, Abu Muqawama has taken to mailing photocopies of this book to friends in the field. One friend, an infantry company commander outside of Baghdad, read the book a little over a year ago while deployed to Iraq and had this to say:

Just finished reading Galula's book. What a great read! It's so common sense, so right, so easy to understand, it begs the questions: Why haven't I heard of it before, and Why aren't they teaching this stuff at the Advanced Course?

Bernard Fall; author of Street Without Joy and prominent war correspondent, historian, political scientist, and expert on insurgencies and COIN; called Counterinsurgecy Warfare the best "how-to" guide.

To enable one country to appreciate what another people really thinks and desires is both the most difficult and the most vital task which confronts us. -- John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years 1908-1958, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), p. 147

John Bagot Glubb's Published Works

1. The Story of the Arab Legion

2. A Soldier with the Arabs

3. Britain and the Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years, 1908 to 1958

4. War in the Desert: An R.A.F. Frontier Campaign

5. The Great Arab Conquests

6. The Empire of the Arabs

7. The Course of Empire: The Arabs and Their Successors

8. The Lost Centuries: From the Muslim Empires to the Renaissance of Europe, 1145 -1453

9. The Middle East Crisis: A Personal Interpretation

10. Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan

11. A Short History of the Arab Peoples

12. The Life and Times of Muhammad

13. Peace in the Holy Land: An Historical Analysis of the Palestine Problem

14. Soldiers of Fortune: The Story of the Mamlukes

15. The Way of Love

16. Haroon al Rasheed and the Great Abbasids

17. Into Battle: A Soldier's Diary of the Great War

18. The Fate of Empires and Search for Survival

19. Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service

20. The Changing Scenes of Life: An Autobiography

With his thirty-six years of service in the Middle East, John Bagot Glubb learned a great deal about life in the desert, the Bedouin tribes, and war-fighting. The following quotes were taken from his books The Story of the Arab Legion, Britain and the Arabs, A Soldier with the Arabs, and Arabian Adventures and were selected due to their relevancy to today's fight in Iraq and, to a somewhat lesser degree, in Afghanistan. I have respectively assigned each book an abbreviation (SAL, BA, SA, and AA) which is listed at the end of the quote so that the reader may look up the reference.

The Tribes of Arabia

Tribal Structure

1. The tribe was a community which went on for ever, because it was based on family relationship, not on the ups and downs of politics. (p. 120) (SAL)

2. Tribal solidarity was the basis of bedouin life. (p. 85) (SAL)

3. The Arab tribesman will accord theoretical and verbal respect to the old families of chiefs, but he will rarely accord them obedience in practice. He constantly opposes and argues against his shaikh. Not infrequently he loses his temper, creates a violent scene and hastens to strike his tent and move away to join the following of some other chief who will treat him with more consideration. Amongst Bedouins freedom always tended to degenerate into anarchy -- but free they were- freer perhaps than any other race in the world. (p.41) (SAL)

4. The Arab tribe was, and in most cases still is, so democratic as to be almost entirely lacking in discipline. The ordinary tribal shaikh has no power to enforce compliance with his decisions. Tribal law is, therefore, based on the absence of any central authority, and hence on the absence of punishment. It is, in fact, little more than civil law, laying down the compensation to be paid to the aggrieved party. Even where damages are awarded, however, there are no police to enforce payment unless the plaintiff can himself collect it. Thus, in tribal law there is no State interested in punishing offenders in order to deter others from crime. There is only the aggrieved party seeking justice. In order, however, to give some security to individuals, the tribe, the section and the family support the aggrieved party in obtaining his rights. (p. 176) (SAL)

5. An Arab tribe is usually full of rival claimants to leadership, family feuds and jealousies. Informers are only too —to give malicious reports against their fellows. (p. 76) (SAL)

6. On the Tigris, the tribal shaikh controlled larger areas, but even so he, like his followers, was a tribesman and in theory their cousin. (p. 372) (BA)

7. Another aspect of tribal law is that the same crime differs according to the circumstances and the identity of the victim. To murder or rob a member of an enemy tribe (in the days of tribal war) was, of course, no crime at all. To kill a man of another but friendly tribe cost the murderer only seven camels in compensation. To kill a man of his own tribe would cost fifty camels and many other expenses. In either case, if the victim were at the time a guest of the murderer, the compensation would be quadrupled. (p. 176) (SAL)

Tribal Values

1. The desert tribes of the interior live in circumstances which differ strikingly from those of the Mediterranean coast. Desert climatic conditions are so severe that the mere struggle for human survival is intense. The surroundings in which they live have there produced a hardy race, endowed with martial qualities and with a practical, as opposed to an intellectual or theoretical turn of mind. (p. 36) (SA)

2. The Arabs in general are hot-headed, hasty and volatile. They are proud and touchy, ready to suspect an insult and hasty to avenge it. To hate their enemies is to them not only a natural emotion but a duty. Should any man claim to forgive an enemy, they find it difficult to believe in his sincerity and suspect a trap. Politically they tend, like the proverbial Irishman, to be against the government. Of whatever form or complexion it may be, they are usually ready to change it, though they may later on regret their action and wish to return to their former state. It is easy to conquer any Arab country, but their natural inclination to rebellion makes it difficult and expensive for the invader to maintain his control. Their mutual jealousies, however, provide their rulers with the means of playing them off against one another, an art which they themselves consider to be of the very essence of politics. But while their hot-bloodedness makes the Arabs good haters, it makes them also cordial friends. No race can be more pleasant or charming. They are delightful company, with a ready sense of humour. In one quality, the Arabs lead the world -- it is the virtue of hospitality, which some of them carry to a degree which becomes almost fantastic. (p. 37) (SA)

3. The idea of protection of the weak is fundamental to Arab ideas of honour, just as it was in European chivalry. (p. 152) (SAL)

4. The absence of a settled government to whom the oppressed could appeal may also have given rise to the system of knightly protection of the weak. (p. 152) (SAL)

5. Arab honour prescribes that the warrior must give his poor neighbours precedence before his nearest relatives and must defend their interests with his life. (p. 153) (SAL)

6. Indeed, the most attractive quality of tribesmen of the old school is that they are almost unaware of social distinctions, and thus are always natural. (p. 78) (SAL)

7. The quality most universally and most justly associated with the Arabs is hospitality. This quality they carry to extremes unconnected with the everyday world, and worthy of fairyland alone. Arab hospitality, life Arab courage, is fantastic, dramatic, romantic and unconnected with the practical needs of the situation. The Arab tribesman, clad often in rags and frequently hungry, lives in a world of dreams in which he behaves like a fairy Prince Charming. (pp. 154-155) (SAL)

8. The bedouins pride themselves on their honesty in preserving property left with them for safe custody. (p. 157) (SAL)

9. The Arab tribesman has an intense sense of the dramatic. He is carried away by a striking situation or a noble gesture. (p. 158) (SAL)

10. Tribesmen take great pride in remembering a past favour, and in repaying their benefactor by similar kindnesses when occasion offers. (pp. 137-138) (SAL)

11. His pride being thus salved, a poor bedouin will often forgo the prospect of wealth in order to make a dramatic gesture of forgiveness before a noble audience. (p. 159) (SAL)

12. This spirit of romance used to -- and indeed still does- control much of Arab life. The thirst for praise and a love of dramatic actions outweighs the dictates of reason or the material needs of a poor people. (p. 159) (SAL)

13. In all the difficulties of my life in Arabia, I have met with success when I have appealed to Arab honour. (p. 206) (SAL)

14. When we say that the bedouin is self-seeking, we do not mean that he is calculating how to build up a fortune. Such an idea scarcely enters his head. It is true that he will rob a traveler and tear his clothes from his back, but this is rather as a child will snatch a toy that has caught his eye. The bedouin robber will celebrate his success by inviting his friends to a meal which will cost him more than the loot he captured. But his passion is glory -- his own personal glory. Such being his ambition, he will admire the romantic heroes of Arab history and legend and the great raiders of his own day and tribe. But he will be bitterly jealous of his rivals and contemporaries, who may outshine him in prowess. The keys of his character are thirst for praise and pre-eminence. Poets and women are the arbiters in the contest for glory, and wandering poets can always win distinction and rewards by celebrating in their ballads the deeds of chiefs and warriors. A life of danger and vicissitudes in great open countries will, perhaps, always produce an heroic culture of this type. . . . Divided by such marked characteristics from the world of town dwellers, the bedouins considered themselves as the elite of the human race. (pp. 148-149) (SAL)

15. Amongst the bedouins, who lived in a world of violence, bloodshed and war, gentleness was not mistaken for cowardice. Intimacy with Arab tribesmen enabled me to visualize more clearly the age of chivalry in England. In contrast to the respectable sameness of Suburbia, the ages of both English and Arab chivalry impressed by their violent contrasts and deep emotions. I have seen among the Arabs depths of hatred, reckless bloodshed and lust of plunder of which our lukewarm natures seem no longer capable. I have seen deeds of generosity worthy of fairy-tales and acts of treachery of extraordinary baseness. Unscrupulous men of violence, and others so gentle that they could scarcely have lived in modern England. The Arabs, like all other races, are neither all saints nor all sinners. But the contrasts between them are more striking and dramatic than those which are outwardly perceptible between the inhabitants of Western Europe. (p. 161) (SAL)

16. His Highness [King Abdullah I of Jordan] had reiterated again and again that he and his country would live or die with Britain. "Arabs do not abandon their friends just because the times are bad," he said. (p. 346) (SAL)

17. The fact is that to divide and rule is regarded among the Arabs as a fundamental basis of politics, with the result that Britain has been almost inevitably accused of practising it. (p. 270) (BA)

18. Those who read the history of earlier centuries, or who have been fortunate in living in intimacy with still existing peoples who have not yet been modernized, are struck by the extraordinary contrasts which they encounter. The depths of villainy and brutality on the one hand, the almost unbelievable heights of saintliness or heroism on the other. No such variegated human picture survives in the West. (pp. 420-421) (BA)

Tribal Life

1. The sanctity of the tent comes first. If the Englishman's house is his castle, the Arab tent is a sanctuary not only for himself but for all the world who may appeal to it. (p. 136) (SAL)

2. There are two things which the desert traveler or raider learns to recognize in the mists of the blue distance -- black tents and camels. These things mean to the traveler hospitality, shelter, food and company instead of another night of half-asleep with one eye open, in the open waste with the headrope of this riding camel tied to his wrist. To the raider, they mean battle and loot, or death or humiliation -- the arrival of the moment of crisis. (pp. 138-139) (SAL)

3. Life in a black tent in the desert is often extremely arduous to any but a bedouin. (p. 143) (SAL)

4. But we discovered unexpectedly that raiding had been not only a pastime for the chivalry of Arabia but also a social-security system of which our ill-timed intervention had destroyed the balance. (p. 169) (SAL)

5. The most obvious means of livelihood for nomad paupers was agriculture, but to inaugurate it required something of a minor revolution. For the bedouins regarded themselves as a race of aristocrats, to whom manual labour would be a humiliation. Mere wealth weighed for nothing in their eyes compared to the preservation of their traditions. (p. 169) (SAL)

6. These three old men had been calm and wise old sages, with the profound wisdom and knowledge of human life which is sometimes achieved by illiterate old men who have not cluttered up their minds with quantities of irrelevant information derived from books. Gifted by nature with penetrating intellects, their knowledge of life had been acquired by direct observation, uninfluenced by clever theories derived from books or the press. (p. 199) (AA)

Tribesmen as Fighters

1. The Arabs have always become formidable soldiers when a religious movement has reinforced their martial virtues. (p. 67) (SAL)

2. For the bedouin's chief pleasure in life is to bear arms, and the simultaneous abolition of raiding drove the most gallant and enterprising young men into the service. (p. 103) (SAL)

On Fighting a Guerilla War

1. The only way to defeat guerillas is with better guerillas, not by the methods of regular warfare. (p. 241) (SAL)

2. Frontier areas are always good places for bandits. If they see the police approaching from one side they can always step across the frontier into the other country. (p. 245) (SAL)

3. Guerilla warfare depends chiefly for its success on the support of the people of the country. Guerillas cannot have regular lines of communication, and are obliged to resort to the villagers for food and shelter and for their intelligence as to the movements of Government forces. (p. 238) (SAL)

4. In any form of guerilla warfare, considerable ground work is necessary firstly in the way of securing leaders, and secondly in the formation of an entourage around each leader, the smuggling of arms, equipment and money, and the preparation of plans. (p. 279) (SAL)

5. The cavalry had found the key to this gang warfare in keeping the enemy on the move. The rebel bands were obliged to live on the country, and the country was not particularly anxious to be lived on, although the villagers were too afraid of the gangs to offer active resistance. (p. 240) (SAL)

6. To the religious fanatic, all the human race except his own sect are enemies of God, deserving of extermination. With such persons, there can be no question of sport, honour or fair play. (p. 149) (AA)

7. I have often found that when I was afraid, the best course was to advance towards the enemy. (p. 95) (SAL)

8. The experience of life teaches us that money is but a superficial incentive, and mercenary motives cannot produce heroism. With the Arabs in particular, it is vital to remember the existence of a capacity for passionate and heroic courage . . . All of a sudden appears a cause or a leader possessing the flaming quality which can inspire the exalted courage that lies hidden deep in the Arab character. Suddenly they throw away money in disgust or exaltation, and develop a courage which staggers, if it does not sweep away, their astonished opponents. (pp. 253-254) (SAL)

9. Soldiers are always extremely particular about seniority and the chain of command -- doubtless rightly, for disaster can scarcely fail to overtake a force which has competing rival commanders. (p. 268) (SAL)

10. For I believe the Arab tribesman to be first-class military material. I am convinced that they are the same men who conquered half the world 1,300 years ago. (p. 355) (SAL)

Service to the Nation

1. Above all, let us not take "a higher standard of living" as our motto. Mankind, no matter the colour of his skin, is of too noble stuff to be attracted by such low ideals. Rather let us take human brotherhood as our objective; there is wealth in plenty for all, if we were not jealous of one another. (p. 445) (BA)

2. A few generations ago, the flower of Britain's youth had served overseas, believing that they were sacrificing themselves to a great and humane task. When they were told that service overseas was mean and unworthy, they turned to industry or commerce for their life's work. Thus the quality of service rendered by Britain in Asia and Africa became lowered as a result of the destruction of imperial idealism. (p. 450) (BA)

3. On the humble level on which I have served, I have formed the opinion that people do appreciate a man whose life is genuinely dedicated to selfless service in complete sincerity. Such men have seemed to me more effective leaders than the politicians, who seek popular support by promising the voters more money. (p. 216) (AA)

4. In time of war, soldiers have always been regarded with respect, perhaps with enthusiasm, because they have been felt to be men dedicated to a cause, in the service of which they were ready to suffer privations, wounds or death. The most noble soldiers, in all ages and countries, have developed a mystique of sacrifice, which has caused them joyfully to face death, as martyrs for a splendid cause. . . . These ideals of military sacrifice were still alive in Britain in 1914, when soldiers believed themselves to be peculiarly destined to give themselves to wounds or death in order to protect the weak, the women and the children. (pp. 465-466) (BA)

5. Britain will be revitalized as soon as her citizens abandon selfish materialism, and offer to her in simple sincerity the service of their lives. (p. 217) (AA)

6. For the rest, 1927 left me ever afterwards with an intense aversion to party politics which so often tempt those who indulge in them to place the interests of their party before those of their country. (p. 171) (AA)

Working in the Middle East

7. The Arabic-speaking countries are easy to conquer. They are not as yet consolidated and organized, as are the Western Powers. The troubles of the would-be invader only begin when the conquest is over. Insufficiently organized to oppose a regular army in battle, these people are experts at sedition, conspiracy and rebellion. (p. 113) (BA)

8. The factor which emerged most clearly in my mind was that the Ottomans and their immediate Arab successors (most of whom had previously served under them) had lacked a positive outlook. The tribes were disorderly and, therefore, their power must be forcibly destroyed. Nobody had ever thought of converting the tribes from their lawless ways and leading them to a better way of life. This would have required sympathetic and positive leadership, which had hitherto been totally lacking. The policy had always been limited to smashing all opposition. (p. 76) (AA)

9. To a great part of the world the desert means fear, exhaustion or at best discomfort. For ten years, it replaced for me the relaxation, the happiness and the affection of home. (p. 234) (SAL)

10. Lord Cromer [British consul-general and diplomatic agent in Egypt] had, in English politics, a tendency to liberalism, though his policy in Egypt had been governed by the facts on the situation rather than by political theories. (p. 186) (BA)

11. The liberals adopted the theoretically obvious solution. They decided to expedite the rate of democratization, in order to set up a popular authority as a check on the autocracy of the khedive and, at the same time, to make concessions to Egyptian political independence. It was an early example of the many equally false solutions to similar problems which Britain and the U.S.A. were to adopt or support in the ensuing years. It was the abandonment of the Cromer policy of trusteeship for the Eygptian masses, and the adoption in its place of democratic political theories. (p. 188) (BA)

12. When considering the transformation which Lord Cromer effected during his twenty-four years in Egypt, we are reminded of certain remarkable qualities which have frequently been shown by British administers and soldiers in Africa and Asia. Of these, the most striking peculiarity was the enthusiasm and devotion which such officers have often developed for the particular nation or community with which they have worked. Again and again, British officers can be found consecrating their lives in the welfare of their Sikhs, their Arabs, their Ghurkhas, their Africans or whatever race they have chanced to serve with. (p. 185) (BA)

13. I did not personally believe that any universally acceptable solution was possible. Every country was different. In general, wherever possible, development should be in the nature of the gradual modification of existing institutions. (p. 230) (BA)

14. It has been said, perhaps with justice, that it is not the vices, but the narrow-mindedness of men, which makes for so much sorrow and unhappiness in the world. (p. 260) (BA)

15. It is not treaties which make friendship but friendship which makes treaties. (p. 471) (BA)

16. To Americans, a peasant economy is perhaps strange, or at least unrewarding. They tend to be impatient of petty items and to long for vast projects, a single one of which may suffice to revolutionize the country. (p. 326-327) (SA)

17. Whereas the British were inclined to work through the Jordan government, the Americans were more in the habit of doing everything themselves. (p. 327) (SA)

But it is always risky to transfer the customs of one nation bodily to another, without regard to local conditions. (p. 347) (SA)

18. Our hopeful reformers, who aspired to teach the bedouins to settle down and grow tomatoes, were unaware of the beauties of the high desert or of the freedom of the nomadic life. (p. 97) (AA)

Dan Green works at the U.S. Department of State (DOS) in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. He served a year as a Political Advisor to the Tarin Kowt Provincial Reconstruction Team in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan, for which he received the DOS's Superior Honor Award and the U.S. Army's Superior Civilian Service Award. He also received a letter of commendation from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Bush Administration, the DOS, the U.S. Navy, or the Department of Defense. Mr. Green recently returned from Iraq where he served as a tribal liaison officer (US Navy Reserve).

(1) The following sources were used for this biography: John Bagot Glubb, The Story of the Arab Legion (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1948); John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1957); John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years 1908 to 1958 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959); John Bagot Glubb, Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service (London: Cassell, 1978); James Lunt, Glubb Pasha: A Biography (London: Harvill Press, 1984); wikipedia.org (accessed on September 22, 2007)

(2) David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989), p. 503.

(3) John Bagot Glubb, Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service (London: Cassell, 1978), pp. 100-109.

(4) Ibid., pp. 47-51.

(5) Ibid., 176.

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Glubb's Guide to the Arab Tribes (Part 1)

Meet Glubb - Jules Crittenden's Forward Movement

This professional website is not the place to untangle Mr. Nance's eschatology. Waterboarding has become a tool of political gotcha that demeans serious discussion of the changing values underlying our operational approach to national security. It is politics, not morality, when senators vote their conscience along overwhelmingly party lines.

The repetition of the word waterboard is a means of embarrassing the current administration at the risk of narrowing the interrogation options that a president, current or future, may choose. That is why Senator Clinton has been circumspect in her comments. Both Mr. Tenet and Gen. Hayden have been firm in arguing that there is solid evidence that American lives have been saved by harsh interrogation. Picking on one technique is a political maneuver.

It does illustrate, though, how the values and standards of our society change over time. When I went through a Marine "POW camp" 45 years ago, I was tied up and walloped. That, as Mr. Nance points out, was part of the training. In my book, The Village, I described how in 1966 the police chief Thanh of Binh Nghia village used what is now called waterboarding, rubbing lye soap into a wet cloth and placing it across the face of the prisoner. (p. 67). I never saw a prisoner die or not be able to walk out of that room. But they talked. I reported it and our orders were to keep the Marines in our Combined Action Platoon out of that room. The PFs were under our command, but not the National Police.

Today, 40 years later, the order would be for the American adviser to physically stop Thanh and to bring him up on charges. We all know this is tough stuff. Iraqis, like the Vietnamese and the South Koreans who operated in Vietnam, sometimes thump prisoners and their own jundis. Advisers are expected to advise on operational matters, but on matters of physical abuse they are expected to impose - not advise about - American standards.

Our advisers are held to a very high moral code. Neither our advisers nor our military units are involved in waterboarding or other such techniques, be they labeled "torture", or "harsh interrogation" or whatever the vernacular.

Mr. Nance writes that he personally supervised the waterboarding of "hundreds of people". Nothing like that is going on. Nothing. The CIA has said the number of harsh interrogations is very low, implying a figure of perhaps ten to twenty in five years. The senators on the oversight committees have been briefed for years on the specifics. The Senate chose twice not to pass legislation banning waterboarding. Now they have stirred up a ruckus that forces them to take another vote in order to avoid being called hypocrites.

This subject has been exaggerated for political gain.

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Waterboarding, Elsewhere - Max Boot

Is no news good news or bad news? In Iraq, it seems good news is deemed no news. There has been striking success in the past few months in the attempt to improve security, defeat al-Qaeda sympathisers and create the political conditions in which a settlement between the Shia and the Sunni communities can be reached. This has not been an accident but the consequence of a strategy overseen by General David Petraeus in the past several months...

Moreover, The Times recognizes that the "surge" is much more than the number of boots on the ground -- it is "what" they are doing that is showing results.

While summarised by the single word "surge" his efforts have not just been about putting more troops on the ground but also employing them in a more sophisticated manner. This drive has effectively broken whatever alliances might have been struck in the past by terrorist factions and aggrieved Sunnis. Cities such as Fallujah, once notorious centres of slaughter, have been transformed in a remarkable time...

Continuing, the editorial rightly cautions that this success does not necessarily guarantee that past difficulties are history.

A weakened al-Qaeda will be tempted to attempt more spectacular attacks to inflict substantial loss of life in an effort to prove that it remains in business. Although the tally of car bombings and improvised explosive devices has fallen back sharply, it would only take one blast directed at an especially large crowd or a holy site of unusual reverence for the headlines about impending civil war to be allowed another outing. The Government headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has become more proactive since the summer, but must immediately take advantage of these favourable conditions...

And in conclusion.

Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic have to appreciate that Iraq is no longer, as they thought, an exercise in damage limitation but one of making the most of an opportunity. The instinct of too many people is that if Iraq is going badly we should get out because it is going badly and if it is getting better we should get out because it is getting better. This is a catastrophic miscalculation. Iraq is getting better. That is good, not bad, news.

Related

Not Cricket - Jules Crittenden's Forward Movement

In Iraq, a Lull or Hopeful Trend? - Washington Post

Iraqi Civilian Deaths Plunge - Los Angeles Times

Deaths in Iraq 'Continue to Fall' - BBC

To enable one country to appreciate what another people really thinks and desires is both the most difficult and the most vital task which confronts us. -- John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years 1908-1958, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), p. 147

As military units prepare for service in the Middle East, it is not uncommon for them to consult the published works of British military personnel and diplomats who played such a large role in the politics of the region in the 1910s to the 1930s. It is already customary for deployers to consult the works of T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell and for those who have read more expansively, perhaps even the writings of Sir Alec Kirkbride, Sir Percy Cox, or even General Aylmer L. Haldane. Collectively, these various authors have taught our military personnel a great deal about working in the region, fighting alongside Arab irregulars, working with tribes, building governments, fostering development, and combating insurgents. The reason I've written this brief essay is to bring to your attention another great British soldier and diplomat, John Bagot Glubb, whose experience is as expansive if not more so than many of the aforementioned authors. His robust experience of thirty-six years in the great deserts and Bedouin tents of Iraq and Jordan greatly informs our current operations. I have written a brief biography of Glubb in order to familiarize the reader with his achievements and then compiled a collection of his observations, thoughts, and musings taken from his published writings about working with the Arab tribes, fighting guerillas, service to the nation, and on operating in the Middle East. Glubb's views are as useful today as when he made them, incorporating them into our operations in the Middle East will greatly improve our chances for victory.

John Bagot Glubb was a British military officer and veteran of World War I who served in Iraq and Jordan from 1920 to 1956. Originally assigned to Anbar Province, Iraq, he worked as a military engineer building bridges and airfields and quickly became fascinated by the world of the nomadic Bedouin and "town" Arabs. Traveling by foot, camel, and horse from Fallujah in the east to Al Qaim in the west, Glubb visited with the tribes of the province, getting to know their leaders, customs and organization, and their concerns and motivations. These initial experiences began a lifelong interest for him in the tribes of the Middle East and he became a strong and enlightened advocate of their interests. In 1922, Glubb became a Special Service Officer (SSO), forever putting his engineering career behind him, and was charged with directing British air forces to their targets on the ground in Iraq by having a detailed understanding of his assigned geographical area and its people. The British Government hoped that by replacing large standing armies with a technological solution of air power supplemented with a ground intelligence force, they would be able to reduce the costs of occupation while maintaining their ability to shape events in the region. In order to do his job, Glubb ventured into southern Iraq, traveling and living among the Beni Huchaim tribes, among others, polishing up his Arabic skills in the process, and becoming thoroughly familiar with the personalities, concerns, rivalries, and geography of the area. He only traveled with an Iraqi servant, often enlisting local tribesmen as his sponsors for safe travel, and lived among the tribes. Over the next eight years, Glubb gained an encyclopedic knowledge of the area and its people, gaining their trust and understanding their concerns. While he would still fly with the pilots as they discharged their duties of sanctioning tribes at the behest of the Iraqi Government, he used his knowledge of the area to inform British and Iraqi policymakers in Baghdad about the concerns of the tribes, seeking to avoid bloodshed through a wiser policy.

In December 1922, he was transferred to Ramadi where he served as an intelligence officer reporting on the movements of Turkish troops, which continued to lay claim to Mosul following the end of World War I, and on the intentions of local tribes. Once again, Glubb traveled among the tribes, acquainting himself with their concerns and keeping an eye out for Turkish agents. By the summer of 1923, hostilities between the Turkish Government and the Allies had dissipated and Glubb returned to southern Iraq and his SSO responsibilities. Informed by the British military that he needed to leave Iraq to assume command of a British unit, Glubb resigned his commission in 1926 and was hired by the Iraqi Government as an Administrative Inspector, eventually becoming the Administrative Inspector of the Southern Desert, and, by 1928, head of the Southern Desert Camel Corps. From his return to southern Iraq in 1923 to the end of the decade, Glubb became the government's designated protector and unofficial advocate of the tribes as they ventured south to graze near the border with Saudi Arabia. In his capacity as "SSO Ikhran Defense" and as Commander of the Southern Desert Camel Corps, Glubb organized an effective defense of the southern tribes against the raids of the Ikhwan, or Brotherhood, who were "new-style Wahabis" encouraged in their religious fanaticism by Saudi Arabia's leader Ibn Saud. Their raids were unique among the Bedouin because they killed every man they captured, when causalities were typically quite light, and their fighting abilities were enhanced by their intense religious zeal. Over the course of the next few years, until their final defeat in 1930, Glubb fought alongside the southern tribes of Iraq against the Ikhwan. He was the government presence in that area and he single-handedly led the tribes in not only a successful defense of their people but on several successful offensive operations as well. The tribes of southern Iraq were no longer afraid of the Ikhwan because of Glubb and due to his efforts cross-border raiding between Iraq and Saudi Arabia ceased.

Due to Glubb's impressive accomplishments in southern Iraq, he came to the attention of King Abdullah I of Jordan, the brother of King Faisal I of Iraq. Much like southern Iraq, Ikhwan raids also plagued Jordan, and its tribes were caught between the Ikhwan to the south and east and British military troops charged with stopping Jordan's tribes from counter-raiding to the west and north. Stuck between the Ikhwan and the British military, the tribes of the Huwaitat, Beni Sakhr, and Jebel, among others, became increasingly impoverished. When Glubb arrived in 1930, the tribes were deeply resentful of the Jordanian Government and the British, who they blamed for their plight due to their long-standing support of Ibn Saud and the Jordanian Government, but Glubb thought that a wiser policy could be followed. He set out to replicate his tribal model of self-defense in Iraq in the southern deserts of Jordan. He removed the British military presence in the area and, starting from nothing, began to assemble The Desert Patrol.

Beginning with just a small number of nomadic tribesmen from southern Iraq who had followed his move to Jordan, Glubb slowly convinced the tribes that their salvation would come about through joining the government's security forces to patrol their own tribal areas. With strong dedication to his work, Glubb organized the tribes into an effective fighting force, broadening its membership beyond the tribes immediately located near the Saudi Arabian border. Through his patient work of meeting with the tribal leaders, quietly reasoning with them, appealing to their self-interest, and convincing them of the great benefit of a Bedouin fighting force, Glubb ended not only the raiding by Jordan's tribes but effectively checked the incursions of the Ikhwan. In two years time, Glubb moved from being an officer in The Arab Legion, which The Desert Patrol was but one-fifth of, and moved to the position of second-in-command. In 1939, he succeeded Peake Pasha, the British Officer who had founded The Arab Legion, as its commander, a position he would occupy until 1956.

Glubb continued to expand and professionalize The Arab Legion as one of only two former British officers in the whole Jordanian military. Though Jordan was a very poor country and quite limited in its resources, Glubb patiently grew the force, never letting its size outstrip its abilities. During this period, Glubb was involved in a number of anti-guerilla campaigns in Jordan directed at Syrian and Egyptian irregulars seeking to foment discord against the monarchy. Glubb very ably dispatched these fighters and worked to consolidate the authority of the Jordanian Government over its lands. By this point, The Arab Legion was already widely recognized as the fighting force of the Middle East. But it was during World War II that this reputation was solidified. At the beginning of the war, The Arab Legion invaded Iraq, as part of a British military campaign, seeking to relieve British forces that had been surrounded by the Iraqi Army in Habbaniya, Iraq and capturing Baghdad to reinstall the Iraqi monarchy. Glubb led his Bedouin troops to Habbaniya, using their skill at tracking and knowledge of the desert to guide British troops, and eventually blocked the road between Baghdad and Mosul while planning to descend upon the capital. This adroit maneuver effectively cut off the generals in Baghdad who had revolted against Iraq's monarchy from receiving additional forces from Mosul, prompting the general's cabal to sue for peace. Later in the war, Glubb would lead The Arab Legion in combat again, as part of a military campaign to defeat the Vichy French regime that had established itself in Syria along with their German military advisors. In this campaign, Glubb's men saw combat against the French, and, once again, guided British troops through the desert. With the conclusion of hostilities, Glubb returned to Jordan to continue his work of building The Arab Legion.

With the end of British control of Palestine on May 15, 1948, The Arab Legion crossed into the West Bank, securing its various Arab communities. In the ensuing battles between Israeli forces and the Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, Lebanese, and Jordanian militaries, The Arab Legion comported itself admirably, winning most of its battles and, perhaps most importantly from Jordan's perspective, keeping a good portion of the land meant for the Palestinians in Arab hands. The Arab Legion was the only Arab military that the Israelis feared and their actions during this conflict once again showed their admirable fighting qualities and superior organization. They were also the only Arab army to leave the conflict with its reputation enhanced. With the outbreak of peace, The Arab Legion set about securing the West Bank from incursions, from the Israelis on the one hand and from Palestinian refugees seeking to enter Israel on the other. It was tedious work, erecting outposts, organizing local guards, and continually patrolling, but Glubb's work paid off, with cross-border incidents decreasing dramatically.

As an uneasy peace broke out in the region, Glubb continued his work at professionalizing and expanding The Arab Legion. But the birth of Israel and the Palestinian refugee problem had started to irrevocably change the politics of the region. Though Glubb was a faithful servant to the country of Jordan, his status as a British national complicated Jordan's domestic and international politics. With time, resentment against him grew among a small group of educated officers in The Arab Legion, many of whom bristled at seeing illiterate Bedouins promoted over them due to their superior fighting abilities and aversion to political agitation. Taking advantage of the young King Hussein, and inspired by Egyptian political intrigues, they conspired to have Glubb and the now several dozen British officers in the Jordanian military removed. King Hussein, responding to these depredations and influenced by the negative pan-Arab reaction to the British and French invasion of the Suez Canal in 1956, fired Glubb on March 1, 1956. Glubb was given less than a day to pack his things, ignominiously leaving a land he had spent thirty-six years of his life in, carefully working on behalf of the tribesmen and the Arab people. Though disappointed by the king's decision, Glubb was not bitter and he remained friends with the young monarch. His predications that The Arab Legion would only be able to withstand a determined Israeli assault on the West Bank for a few days, hoping this would be enough time to prompt the British to intervene as part of the Anglo-Trans-Jordan Treaty were proven correct in 1967 when the Jordanian military was swept from the area. To the king's credit, he later admitted that Glubb had been correct and that his opposition to Glubb's security plans in 1956 --another reason for his dismissal- had been in error.

With retirement, Glubb began to write about his experiences, delivering lectures at universities, and giving talks around Britain and the United States. He eventually wrote twenty books about his life and adventures in the Middle East and sought to improve Western understanding of the Arab people, Islam, and the history of the Middle East. He settled down into a peaceful life in Britain, living with his wife Muriel and their four children and he passed away on March 17, 1986 and is buried near Mayfield, East Sussex. He was appointed a Knight Commander of the The Most Honourable Order of the Bath, a Companion of The Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, an Officer of The Most Excellent Order of the British Empire and also received the Distinguished Service Order and the Military Cross.

Dan Green works at the U.S. Department of State (DOS) in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. He served a year as a Political Advisor to the Tarin Kowt Provincial Reconstruction Team in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan, for which he received the DOS's Superior Honor Award and the U.S. Army's Superior Civilian Service Award. He also received a letter of commendation from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Bush Administration, the DOS, the U.S. Navy, or the Department of Defense. Mr. Green recently returned from Iraq where he served as a tribal liaison officer (US Navy Reserve).

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Glubb's Guide to the Arab Tribes (Part 2)

Meet Glubb - Jules Crittenden's Forward Movement

This article appears in the November 2007 edition of Foreign Service Journal.

From the Introduction:

The CORDS Program could not have been

successful in today's Iraq or Afghanistan.

Over the past year, President George W. Bush and other senior administration officials have on numerous occasions invoked the U.S. assistance program in South Vietnam as an experience that offers lessons for Iraq. Specifically, the Vietnam-era Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program has frequently been held up as a model for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams currently operating in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The CORDS teams administered both security and development programs at the provincial and district levels in South Vietnam during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Like today's PRTs, they comprised military and civilian personnel, the former always significantly outnumbering the latter. The civilians came primarily from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, augmented by a limited number of direct hires from other agencies (e.g., Commerce, Treasury and Agriculture). There were also a limited number of personnel whom USAID brought on board expressly for CORDS, with no promise of career employment beyond Vietnam.

Yet despite basic similarities and parallels between the CORDS teams and today's PRTs, there are also important and sharp distinctions. Lest today's policymakers be misled into assuming that the earlier experience can be replicated today, I believe it is vital to identify several critical differences that affect the Foreign Service's ability to help Iraq and Afghanistan deal with their internal difficulties and emerge as functioning economies with democratic societies...

Much more and well worth the read.

Links contained within quoted text inserted by SWJ.

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Link

"Iraq is Not Vietnam" - The Belmont Club

In a frank and outspoken interview, David Kilcullen, who has just become policy advisor to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, outlines his view of the conflict in Iraq and the future of the struggle with militant jihadism.

He tells the BBC's security correspondent Frank Gardner that the coalition is achieving success by a radical change in its tactics in Iraq...

More at the link and this BBC article by Hugh Levinson.

Now back to our regularly scheduled program... (2)

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Endnotes:

(1) Everything ever written by everyone who ever wrote about anything.

(2) This information will not be used in the conduct of military operations, planning, wargaming, training, education or doctrine writing.