



A squad leader from 1st Battalion, 3d Marines watches an Iraqi role player detainee during a Mojave Viper training exercise. See the MCCLL articles on [Detention Training](#) and the [Law of War](#).

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Inside this issue:

Featured Articles

[From the Director: Rollup of New Lessons and Other Documents:](#) We have begun disseminating a complete list of all new lessons and documents added each week to the MCCLL website. You can easily opt out of this distribution by choosing to "unsubscribe" from the list at any time.

[After Action Report \(AAR\) from Regimental Combat Team 5 \(RCT-5\):](#) The MCCLL repositories are only as good as the data that is entered into them. Among the most valuable sources are after action reports from the operating forces. The recent AAR from RCT-5 is an outstanding example.

[Guide for Law of War, Rules of Engagement and Escalation of Force Procedures:](#) Two versions of this handy MCCLL guide are now available on a topic that is critical to the successful prosecution of any armed conflict. The first version is a standard, full-size topical paper, while the second is suitable for printing as a cargo-pocket handbook that can be easily carried by small unit leaders and other Marines.

[Detention Training and Operations:](#) Battery B, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines was tasked as Task Force Military Police to perform the Marine Corps detention operations mission in Iraq. Many of the lessons learned by this Battery are documented in this topical paper.

[Marine Heavy Helicopter Operations:](#) Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465 deployed to Iraq in October 2006 to provide in-theater transportation for cargo and personnel. Read about its training, organizational and operational lessons learned.

[Vehicle Recovery Operations:](#) This "Quick Look" report documents the lessons learned by Combat Logistics Battalion 6 based on its experiences recovering vehicles and equipment in support of units deployed throughout Al Anbar Province, Iraq.

[Motorcycle Safety: Forum and Survey Summary:](#)

The results of a MCCLL online survey conducted in April and May 2007, together with comments from the MCCLL motorcycle forum, are documented in this report. Marines who are motorcycle enthusiasts of all grades and ranks provided their opinions and recommendations concerning motorcycle safety.

[Infantry Battalion Equipment: Supplemental Report:](#) This report supplements the MCCLL Quick Look report published in March 2007 entitled, [Infantry Battalion Equipment Requirements](#), with additional data on survey responses from specific demographic groups.

News

Three interesting news items are presented this month that address topics of special importance in prosecuting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): (1) [the combat hunter program](#) which is designed to instill a hunter mentality in the infantry Marine, (2) the importance of [efforts to understand the sheikhs in Iraq](#), and (3) major developments in efforts to work for [reconciliation among the key religious authorities in Iraq](#).

[Reading Lists and Book Review:](#) This month, books on two Marine Corps reading lists are highlighted: (1) We again feature *First to Fight* by LtGen Krulak, which is the Capstone book on the Commandant's Reading List. The Discussion Guide for Chapters 2 and 3 of this book is included this month, and (2) *The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History*, by Peter Bergen, which is on the Marine Corps Central Command's list for Staff NCOs and Field Grade Officers deploying to Afghanistan. A review by Richard Clarke is featured.

[Updated List of MCCLL Representatives:](#) This roster identifies the individuals who are assigned at major Marine Corps and Joint commands and organizations as MCCLL representatives.

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) newsletter, like other MCCLL products addressing a variety of topics, is an "initial impressions" summary that identifies key observations and potential lessons from collection efforts. These observations highlight potential shortfalls, risk or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. **The observations are not service level decisions.** Your comments on any topics addressed in this newsletter (or on our website) are welcome. Questions can be directed to: harry.t.johnson@usmc.mil or michael.jones@usmc.mil
 Telephone: 703.432.1279 DSN: 312-378-1279

From the Director: Rollup of "New" Lessons and Other Documents

Authorized users of both the NIPR and SIPR websites of the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) will have noticed that we have begun to push out a new report that identifies all of the products that have been added to our repositories during the previous week. This report is generated automatically every week and distributed to all authorized users of our NIPR and SIPR websites, respectively. The objective is to inform you of any newly available information that has been added to our databases. Note that lessons, including both general observations and specific recommendations, will not be included in this report until they have been validated by the Command Lessons Manager (CLM) of the applicable Major Subordinate Command (MSC) or by a delegated MCCLL systems administrator. For those users who are on the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), the e-mail that is sent out will not support an HTML view of the message, so the format will initially be very difficult to view. If you received the message in a confusing format, simply click on "This message was converted to plan text," at the top of the message and select "Display as HTML," and the message will be re-formatted in tabular format for easy review.

Obviously, everyone may not wish to receive this weekly report, especially if you are already receiving more than your share of spam. If you wish to opt out of this particular report, please follow the directions at the top of one of the weekly reports to unsubscribe. This procedure should automatically remove you from this distribution list; however, if you continue to receive the report for some reason, please contact our Help Desk at 703.432.1279 or DSN: 378-1279.

This new feature augments the Daily Digest which has been a regular feature of our website for some time. The Daily Digest allows you to identify key words in which you have an interest and then receive notifications when any lessons or documents are added to our system that address these topics. Your individual Daily Digest can be found at the bottom of your profile which can be accessed by clicking on [MYPROFILE](#) located in the upper left-hand corner of the home page. By scrolling to the bottom of your profile, you can review your Daily Digest. You are able to select up to ten key words that represent your major areas of interest. If you are already receiving the Daily Digest and feel the New Lesson Weekly Rollup is not necessary, please do not hesitate to unsubscribe from this service. Our objective is not to overwhelm you with information, but rather to offer you services that you can actually use in your professional careers.

Comments on any of the topics in this newsletter can be addressed to the MCCLL Director, Col Monte E. Dunard, USMCR, at monte.dunard@usmc.mil

Telephone: 703-432-1286 DSN: 378-1286

After Action Report from Regimental Combat Team 5

Although the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) sponsors as many active collection efforts as possible with deployed units or those returning from deployment, much of the best information in the MCCLL repositories is still obtained passively as commands and units submit their approved after action reports (AARs) to MCCLL through their chains of command. These AARs are one of the primary sources for documenting lessons and observations that have an impact on future training, equipment and personnel decisions, as well as, development efforts. In addition, units may introduce issues in their AARs that MCCLL is not aware of that can then be addressed in future collection efforts. The submission of AARS for entry into the MCCLL repositories is one of the best means for ensuring their maximum visibility within the Marine Corps. This is one of the reasons that [Marine Corps Order 3504.1](#) calls for the submission of AARs to MCCLL as part of the Marine Corps Lessons Learned Program (MCLLP).

An excellent example of a comprehensive AAR is one that we recently received from [Regimental Combat Team \(RCT\) 5 that addresses its deployment during Operation Iraqi Freedom \(OIF\) 05-07](#). This particular AAR raises many substantive issues and provides thoughtful recommendations on such topics as command and control, route clearance operations, targeting considerations, electronic warfare, joint operations with the Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi Police (IP), IA and IP training, transition team sourcing, transition team logistics and life support considerations, logistics management issues, fielding commercial off-the-shelf equipment, in-theater safety concerns, and a myriad of other topics.

MCCLL invites units to submit their approved AARs, either directly to the Center using the [SEND AARs/SOPs](#) feature on our website home page or through your command channels. The lessons that you have learned through your deployments are of greatest benefit only if they are passed on to those who will follow you into the theater.



The RCT-5 Commanding Officer, Col Larry Nicholson, and Sergeant Major, SgtMaj Melvin Roundtree, tour the Eagle Range complex, one of the ranges in Camp Fallujah that RCT-5 revamped to expand the training options available to its units.

[Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Law of War, Rules of Engagement and Escalation of Force Guide

Throughout its history, the Marine Corps has upheld an enviable reputation for innovation and adaptation while maintaining the highest standards of conduct in the art of warfare. When individual Marines have failed to comply with these standards, the Marine Corps makes every effort to address these situations quickly and decisively. The component of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities is referred to as the "law of war," or, as it is sometimes called, the "law of armed conflict." The law of war that is binding on the United States and its individual citizens includes treaties and international agreements to which the U.S. is a party, together with applicable customary international law.

The Operational Law Section, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate of Multi-National Force - West (MNF-W) and the Staff Judge Advocate of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) have prepared briefings with specific guidance for Marines to ensure ethical conduct during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Based on these briefings, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) has published a guide for small unit leaders entitled, **Law of War, Rules of Engagement and Escalation of Force Guide**. This guide is available in two versions: (1) a [Cargo Pocket Guide version](#) that can be printed as a "hip pocket" reference and easily carried by small unit leaders and other Marines and (2) a [topical paper version](#) that is in standard page size format and is also more suitable for viewing online. The content of both versions is identical.

The objective of this guide is to serve as a resource for training Marines in law of war measures in order to "keep our honor clean" and integrate ethical conduct into every aspect of operations. The guide addresses the following topics :



A simulated improvised explosive device (IED) hurls a cloud of dust into the air during IED and escalation of force (EOF) training at the U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona. Marines and sailors from Combat Logistics Battalion 11 (CLB-11) attended the week-long training to prepare the battalion for its upcoming deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

- **Law of War (LOW)**, or Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), including measures to protect combatants and non-combatants (civilians) from unnecessary suffering, minimize damage to the infrastructure, maintain international and domestic support, foster amicable relations with the civilian populace, and conduct operations in a disciplined manner consistent with our national values.

- **Rules of Engagement (ROE)**, which is the primary tool employed by military commanders to regulate the use of force. These rules may periodically change depending on the assigned mission, current situation, higher commanders' intent, and other available guidance in determining the level of force necessary to accomplish the mission. The general rule is that the level of force may not exceed that required to accomplish the assigned mission. Military operations should be conducted, in so far as possible, to ensure minimal damage to civilians.

- **Escalation of Force (EOF)** procedures that provide our military forces with a set of tools for de-escalating potential hostile situations and a means for clarifying whether a threat actually exists or not.

The guide includes the basic principles of the LOW from Marine Corps Order 3300.4. An attachment addresses the "5-3-5" tenants that serve as the bedrock of infantry patrolling skills and includes the legal and ethical habits of action and thought that ensure Marines consider LOW, ROE and ethical conduct during all operations.

The guide also provides thirty-three scenarios that present realistic situations with related questions that can be used during small unit training discussions as an aid for Marines to understand the prescribed actions in these situations. However, it is important to emphasize that ROE and EOF procedures change over time. The content of pre-deployment training must reflect the latest rules. Units that are preparing for deployment should access the most recent rules at the Multi-National Force - West SIPR website. In addition, up-to-date guidance can be obtained by contacting a counterpart unit that is currently deployed.

Readers who would like to review the briefings from MNF-W and I MEF that were used as the basis for this guide can access the documents at: [Law of Armed Conflict/Rules of Engagement/Escalation of Force Training](#), [Escalation of Force](#), and [Keep Our Honor Clean: Ethical LOAC/ROE/EOF Training](#).

General David Petraeus, Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq:

"The idea is to end each day with fewer enemies than when it started."

Major General Walter E. Gaskin, Sr., Commanding General, Multi-National Force - West:

"The people of Al Anbar are our center of gravity. Every innocent Iraqi killed or injured as a result of our actions feeds the enemy's propaganda efforts and causes a negative impact to our own operational center of gravity. Each escalation of force event creates potential enemies and future insurgents if we utilize unrestrained and disproportionate force in the conduct of operations. We can blame the insurgents for contributing to the current operational environment, but we are responsible each and every time we pull the trigger."



A team member with 4th Reconnaissance Battalion demonstrates the proper way to handle a detainee as part of a week-long training package at Al Asad, Iraq.

[Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Detention Training and Operations

The current process of tasking a non-corrections Marine Corps unit to be trained by a Combat Corrections mobile training team (MTT) to conduct detention operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has been employed since March 2005; the selected unit is then augmented with two corrections specialists per regional detention facility (RDF). These specialists attend combat corrections training at Lackland Air Force Base prior to the pre-deployment training of the unit and are used to supplement the MTT instructors. For OIF 06-08, this responsibility was tasked to Battery B, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines which was assigned the Task Force Military Police (TF MP) detention operations mission. In July 2007, a Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) collection team visited the battery to document lessons and observations relating to its pre-deployment training and operations. The results have been documented in the MCCLL "Quick Look" Report, [Detention Training and Operations: Lessons and Observations from Task Force Military Police in OIF 06-08](#).



Marines with Task Force Military Police, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, prepare to engage targets with M-4 carbines during enhanced marksmanship training at the Al Asad fire and maneuver range.



The chief of police in Baghdad, Iraq, leads a group of detainees into town where they were released back into the community. The release of detainees who are not considered a threat can create considerable goodwill among the local populace.

Among the key recommendations from the MCCLL Quick Look are:

• Organization and Staffing

⇒ At a minimum, two senior NCOs should be assigned as corrections specialists at each RDF and be designated as the RDF Senior NCO in charge and the RDF operations chief.

• Training

⇒ The pre-deployment enemy detention operations course was effective in preparing the guard force for deployment and conducting the detention operations mission.

⇒ Arabic language skills are essential to operate an RDF. The language barrier was identified as the major obstacle for personnel upon assumption of RDF duties. It was recommended that the deploying unit send as many personnel as possible to the Defense Language Institute to augment the training from the Combat Corrections MTT.

⇒ RDF sustainment training is conducted during the daily guard mount and debrief. It should be standards based, with the content documented in policy.

• Security

⇒ Pre-deployment training on transfer and release procedures would be enhanced and made more realistic by incorporating mockups for helicopter and C-130 aircraft to simulate detainee movement by air. For detainee movement by ground, Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) seven ton trucks should be available with the same characteristics that the unit will employ in theater.

⇒ Pre-deployment training on the emergency action plan (EAP) was viewed as sufficient; however, the training emphasis should be placed on the Marines initiating the EAP. Delegation of authority should be given to each staff member to activate each EAP and control the situation until competent authority assumes responsibility.

• Non-Lethal Weapons

⇒ Corrections specialists should be qualified on non-lethal weapons through the Inter-service Non-lethal Weapons Instructor Course (INIWIC). A non-lethal weapons package should be tailored to each individual RDF based on an assessment by an INIWIC-qualified instructor.

⇒ Marines are trained by the Combat Corrections MTT on the conditions under which to employ lethal weapons at the last physical barrier. The unit is then responsible for ensuring that proficiency in lethal munitions employment is maintained through sustainment training.

• Biometric Automated Toolset

⇒ Screening and identifying appropriate personnel that are designated to operate the biometric automated toolset (BATS) is essential to ensure that they receive the proper level of training. This training is provided by the 1st, 2nd and 3d Intelligence Battalions of the Marine Corps, the Language and Technology Office, Fort Huachuca, AZ and by the Combat Corrections MTT instructors.

[Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Marine Heavy Helicopter Operations

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465 (HMH-465) deployed to Al Asad Air Base in Iraq from October 2006 to May 2007 with fourteen aircraft in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 05-07. During its deployment, most of the squadron's flight operations consisted of cargo and personnel transportation within the theater. In addition, the squadron conducted approximately twelve to fifteen raids during this period.

Upon the squadron's return to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar, CA, a team from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) conducted interviews in June 2007 with key personnel and administered two surveys, one for the aircrew and one for other enlisted personnel. The results of the interviews and surveys have now been summarized in a MCCLL "Quick Look" report entitled, [Marine Heavy Helicopter \(HMH\) Operations: Post-Deployment Lessons and Observations from HMH-465](#). In this particular Quick Look report, the complete results from the two surveys are included as attachments.



A CH-53 from HMH-465 carries an M198 howitzer over the Iraqi desert in support of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. The Warhorses of HMH-465 conducted the first external lift of an artillery piece in a combat situation since Vietnam.



A CH-53 Super Stallion from HMH-465 maneuvers around mountains in the desert outside of Yuma, Arizona, during its pre-deployment training which included gun fires, confined area landings, and external lifts.

Some of the key points made by the interviewees and survey respondents were:

- **Organization and Personnel**

⇒ Squadron personnel indicated that they had plenty of notice of the deployment and were able to prepare for it accordingly.

⇒ However, 36% of the enlisted respondents to the survey and 50% of the aircrew respondents said that they had been in the squadron less than six months prior to the deployment.

⇒ Contractor maintenance personnel who assisted the squadron with different

maintenance functions were considered to be a key asset.

Maj David Borkowski, Aircraft Maintenance Officer, HMH-465:

"We weren't able to fully stabilize the squadron even up until the days just before our deployment. . . one again we were getting people in at the last minute."

⇒ The majority of the squadron's leadership, especially the senior NCOs, had already been deployed to Al Asad during previous tours; this fact significantly aided the transition during the relief in place/transfer of authority.

- **Training**

⇒ During its preparation for combat operations, the squadron focused its training on night operations, and was able to train and qualify all of its pilots in both "high light" and "low light" night vision goggle capabilities.

⇒ The majority of interviewees and respondents to the surveys indicated that Desert Talon was beneficial and provided an opportunity to respond to ground threats and landing in dusty zones. Aircrew also stated that the best training flights were those that simulated conducting raids.

⇒ Once the squadron arrived in theater, training opportunities were limited. Aircrew were not able to stay current on low level flying operations or external operations (although there was little demand for these skills in theater). All aircrew survey respondents stated that aviation skills required to accomplish the missions they were assigned in combat did not deteriorate during their deployment.

⇒ Since landing in dusty zones is a perishable skill, pilots indicated that there is a need to practice both day and night austere landings in dusty zones while deployed. When they were able to practice austere landings, aircrew stated that it paid benefits in supporting actual operations.

- **Operations**

⇒ Aircrew indicated that during this deployment, a concerted effort was made to avoid over flying urban areas or rural villages.

⇒ Several staff commented that there was insufficient integration with the ground combat element.

LtCol Robert Tobin, Commanding Officer, HMH-465:

"We deliberately chose where we flew—what terrain we flew over and what terrain we didn't fly over . . . Why would I fly over somebody's house at 500 feet and [scare] his goats and chickens . . . And now the guy hates the U.S. being there where previously they didn't care."

[Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Vehicle Recovery Operations

The recovery of damaged or disabled equipment and the movement of the equipment to locations where repairs can be made is one of the current missions of Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) 6 during its deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 06-08. This mission includes the recovery of damaged or inoperative HMMWVs, Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacements (MTVRs), amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs), Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles (Categories I, II and III), and civilian non-tactical cars, buses, and trucks. The Vehicle Recovery Section of the Maintenance Company, CLB 6 satisfies this requirement with a combination of motor transport and ordnance recovery assets in a cohesive recovery team providing enhanced efficiency and effectiveness with complementary equipment capabilities and Marines with relevant experience. The equipment employed in these recovery operations includes:

- M88A2 Heavy Equipment Recovery Combat Utility Life Evacuation System (HERCULES),
- MK-36 Wrecker MTVR,
- Logistics Vehicle System MK 48/15, and
- Chains, slings, bottle jacks, and two cables.

Since the MK-36 has a lifting capacity of only 22,000 pounds, the M88A2 retriever is used for the recovery of AAVs and many of the MRAP vehicles.

To document the lessons and observations of the unit concerning its pre-deployment training and operational experiences, a collection team from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) visited the Vehicle Recovery Section at Camp Fallujah in July/August 2007. The results of this collection have been documented in the "Quick Look" report entitled, [Vehicle Recovery Operations: Lessons and Observations from Combat Logistics Battalion 6](#). The report highlights some of the factors that contributed to successful recovery operations and also provides some recommendations made by the interviewees for consideration as Marine Corps Urgent Universal Needs Statements.



A damaged vehicle waits to be recovered by a wrecker crew from the 9th Engineer Support Battalion during a recovery mission in Al Anbar Province.

Among the many comments and observations from the Vehicle Recovery Section staff were:

• Organization:

- ⇒ Although the tables of organization (T/O) and equipment (T/E) were considered adequate for the missions assigned, an increase of one additional M88A2 retriever and an additional four-man team of MOS 2146 Marines would improve capabilities and versatility.
- ⇒ Deploying CLBs should make every effort to deploy with six vehicle recovery operators (MOS 3536), as called for in the T/O, to support anticipated concurrent recovery and convoy missions.

• Training:

- ⇒ MOS training matched the standard tactical equipment employed in recovery operations. However, due to the unavailability of MRAP vehicles during the deployment work-ups, no training on their recovery was possible.

• Equipment:

- ⇒ Marines praised the capabilities of the MK-36 wrecker. It was found to work the best in a majority of missions due to its versatility and maneuverability, with the dual winches being a recognized asset.
- ⇒ On most 6x6 Cougar, Buffalo, and AAV recoveries, the M88A2 was used due to the lifting capacity of the crane.
- ⇒ Consideration should be given to the capabilities of the LVS wreckers and Army HEMTT wreckers as an interim recovery means for the Type III MRAP.

• Operations:

- ⇒ During recovery operations, the assignment of military police units to establish a 360 degree cordon provided necessary security for the recovery missions.



Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles await transportation to units throughout the Multi-National Force West (MNF-W) area of operations. The 2d Supply Battalion, 2d Marine Logistics Group, at Al Taqaddum takes delivery of all the MRAPs arriving for MNF-W units. The recovery of some of the MRAP variants requires use of the M88A2 retriever.

[Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Motorcycle Safety: Results of Forum and Survey

One of the topics that has generated the most interest of all those that the Marines Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) has addressed during the past two years in its discussion groups, online surveys, and Safety Corners has been motorcycle safety. Whenever this topic is discussed, Marines of all ranks and from all commands and theaters have been eager to offer their personal experiences and to

express their opinions on ways to improve safety. MCCLL appreciates the participation of all Marines who have taken the time to let us know about their experiences and to offer opinions on this topic. When we set up an online discussion group for motorcycle enthusiasts, we received 136 postings in only a few weeks. When we solicited Marines to complete an online survey on the topic of motorcycle safety, over 500 individuals participated. Based on all of this data, MCCLL has now published a topical paper entitled, [Motorcycle Safety: Forum and Survey Summary](#).

The Safety Corner



Results of the Motorcycle Safety Survey and the Motorcycle Discussion Group!



A representative sample of some of the thoughtful observations made concerning motorcycle safety:

- "Acknowledge and accept the risks involved while being active in managing those risks."
- "Training, experience, and the proper rider attitude are the keys to safe(er) riding in all environments."
- "You have to be 'hyper-vigilant' when there is an intersection, on/off ramp, side road, anything other than straight roads where cars can't turn in front of you. Left-hand turns are notorious, because it is hard to gauge a motorcycle's speed from head on, and some drivers assume that 'I can make it' and turn directly in front of a motorcycle."
- "I look in every car that gets beside me, to see if they are on the phone, eating, texting, putting on makeup, etc. . . or if they are paying attention. Because if they are distracted, I make sure to get distance between them and myself."
- "My personal opinion as to where do we go from here is that we should stop griping about whether or not, in our opinions, PPE [personal protection equipment] is effective and start trying to push for uniformity in the orders. . . Standardize the orders from base to base. . . and compliance/enforcement becomes easier. You learn the requirement at one base, and it is the same at all the other bases. This not only assists the rider, but it also assists the officers, SNCOs, NCOs, and PMO who are actually trying to enforce the regulations."



Marines at Camp Pendleton, CA, participate in stopping drills during a Basic Rider's Course held by the Motorcycle Safety Office. Active duty motorcycle riders are required to take this course before riding on or off base.



Members of the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion motorcycle club at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, work together to help build unit camaraderie and to mentor junior Marine riders.

- "I agree the Motorcycle Safety Foundation (MSF) courses are a huge help, but you will still have the young riders that 9 times out of 10 are the ones that are getting hurt on their bikes, and at that same rate, they are usually showboating, riding wheelies, and acting like fools with their friends."
- "Bottom line is, there will always be Marines on bikes getting hurt. Especially as gas prices continue to rise, and a motorcycle is much more economical than a regular vehicle. We can continue to preach safety to these Marines, but until we really begin holding them responsible for what they do, I don't see a big change."
- **HQMC Safety Division:** "As for the advanced training and continuation training, we are just now breaking new ground on this effort. There are numerous courses [and] . . . we have to consider those courses that fit our needs. We do not want motorcycle policeman, nor do we want racers. But those courses that teach critical reaction skills are paramount." . . . "We have to get far more effective at communicating our message. . . The mere utterance of 'safety' elicits a reaction [due to] the stigma attached to that word. Changing perceptions about why our efforts are important should be communicated."

[Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Infantry Battalion Equipment: Supplemental Report

The [April 2007 edition](#) of the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) newsletter featured a Quick Look Report entitled, [Infantry Battalion Equipment Requirements](#), that summarized the results of an online survey of 1,300 personnel who had been assigned to Marine infantry battalions since October 2001. The survey solicited their opinions on existing and emerging individual and unit equipment requirements of the Marine infantry battalion. A more detailed analysis of the same survey results has now been published in a supplemental report that focuses on the responses of specific interest groups. The supplement also includes more detailed information on the methodology used and the demographics of respondents. The supplemental report can be accessed at [Infantry Battalion Equipment Study: Supplement to the Quick Look Report of March 2007](#).

A representative sample of responses by specific demographic groups includes:

• Company-level Marines (E-1 to E8 and O-1 to O-3):

- ⇒ 96% of respondents agreed that everyone except medical officers, chaplains and automatic riflemen should be armed with either a rifle or carbine.
- ⇒ 93% agreed that an appropriate rifle combat optic should be issued with every rifle, carbine and SAW.
- ⇒ 92% agreed that a service pistol should be issued as a secondary personal weapon to everyone armed with a M-240 MMG.
- ⇒ 90% agreed that an effective grenade launcher day-night sight should be issued to every Marine or sailor armed with an M-203 50mm grenade launcher.



Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) attain battle site zeros for their rifle combat optics during a shoot at a range aboard Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia, in preparation for the MEU deployment.

• Rifle Squad Leaders:

- ⇒ 99% agreed that a tactical handheld radio should be available for issue to every squad leader.
- ⇒ 97% agreed that every vehicle should be configured so as to be able to mount and operate at least one tactical radio in a "plug and play" manner.
- ⇒ 93% agreed that an inexpensive digital camera should be available for issue to every team.
- ⇒ 90% agreed that the average squad leaders, with the appropriate training, is capable of properly employing SATCOM radios in combat operations.

• Enlisted Infantry Marines:

- ⇒ 99% agreed that every Marine or sailor should be issued a carbineer.
- ⇒ 97% agreed that, except for ambulances and MRC vehicles, every vehicle in a Marine infantry battalion should be capable of mounting either a light, medium, or heavy machine gun.
- ⇒ 95% agreed that an intra-unit radio should be issued to every four-man team.
- ⇒ 91% agreed that an integrated GPS device should be available to every unit leader from a squad up.



A Marine from 3d Battalion, 6th Marines (3/6) reads his GPS system and map to determine the specific house the 3/6 Marines had just searched during Operation Michigan. This operation was designed to eliminate insurgent activity south of Fallujah and was conducted by 3/6 Marines and by U.S. Army soldiers from the 7th Cavalry Regiment.

• Heavy Machine Gunner Marines:

- ⇒ 100% agreed that at least one thermal imagery device or sight should be available to every platoon.
- ⇒ 100% agreed that enough armament carriers should be included in the table of equipment (T/E) of an infantry battalion so that every heavy machine gun can be mounted and employed from a vehicle.
- ⇒ 97% agreed that every medium and heavy machine gun should have a tripod included in its basic items of issue.
- ⇒ 93% agreed that at least one thermal imagery device or sight should be available to every squad.

[Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

News

The Combat Hunter

As noted in our [June 2007 newsletter](#), the "Combat Hunter" program is an initiative designed to incorporate skills into infantry training that have traditionally been used by hunters and by African hunting guides. The objective is to instill a hunting mentality that encourages a more proactive posture in searching for snipers, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), IED emplacements, and other threats.

Two excellent resources that have recently been added to the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) repositories provide additional insights into the Combat Hunter program. The

first, [a short paper by Mr. Ivan Carter](#), notes that "African hunters look at the world in minute detail, looking for often very small tell tale signs. . . don't look for the IED wire. . . look for the shadow it casts; the wire can be colored to match the ground; the shadow stays the same."

"African hunters use their peripheral vision; look all around you and communicate with the team what you are seeing. Four guys in formation have four different perspectives and views. What one guy sees is different. African hunters always use trackers and never just one, to broaden this horizon. . . remember the threat is often behind or to the side. . .

look there. . ."

"When hunting an animal, the first thing to consider is where would I be if I were that animal. . . do the same with snipers and IED emplacements. In fact, with IEDs themselves. . . Don't just look for the IED . . . Look for the likely place to find one . . ."

The second resource is an informative [briefing on the Combat Hunter Program](#) that provides specific examples of binocular usage, scanning your surroundings, stalking, and maintaining an observant posture.

[Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Understanding the Sheiks in Iraq

[To Understand Sheiks in Iraq, Marines Ask 'Mac'](#)

By Greg Jaffe, 10 September 2007, Wall Street Journal

Fallujah, Iraq -- Earlier this summer, William "Mac" McCallister's Marine Corps bosses asked him for help selecting gifts for tribal sheiks who had teamed up with U.S. forces to fight radical Islamists.

Mr. McCallister, the Marines' resident expert on tribal culture, settled on the perfect gift: a Mameluke sword. The swords, which all Marine officers

carry, date back to 1804 when a Marine lieutenant led a group of Arabs in a successful attack on pirates and was awarded a sword by an Ottoman pasha.

There was only one problem: The swords were banned as gifts because their value exceeds the government limit of \$305.

So Mr. McCallister launched an impassioned campaign to obtain a waiver. Sheiks, who see themselves as products of a warrior culture, would love the swords, he insisted in an email to his bosses. Every time the sheik carried one, it would remind his constituents of their special

"warrior bond" with the Corps, he wrote.

Expertise in 1,000-year-old tribal customs has given Mr. McCallister a position of some importance in the U.S. effort to pacify Iraq. The 46-year-old retired Army major has spent the past four years in Iraq studying the tribes' myths, histories and ancient legal system. . .

Read the [complete article from the WSJ](#).

[Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Breakthrough in Iraq -- in Cairo

One of the most positive developments in the Iraq political environment that has not received the media attention that it deserves, is the reconciliation initiative among key religious figures in the country. Mr. Robert McFarlane, who served as National Security Advisor in the Reagan administration, has written a very informative piece for the Wall Street Journal that addresses a major breakthrough among key Iraqi religious leaders that occurred in

Cairo in August. Mr. McFarlane writes: "Last week, I participated in a three-day meeting of the most senior Iraqi Sunni and Shia religious leaders in Cairo, at which they have formally agreed to ". . . end terrorist violence, and to disband militia activity in order to build a civilized country and work within the framework of law." Given the authority of the participants, who included Sheikh Dr. Ahmed al Kubaisi, acknowledged by all Iraqis as the senior Sunni religious authority (who has a

weekly audience of 20 million Muslims for his Friday sermons broadcast from Dubai) and Ayatollah Sayyid Ammar Abu Ragheef, Chief of Staff for Grand Ayatollah Ali at Sistani, the acknowledged leader of the Shia community in Iraq and beyond, this is truly a historic event."

Please review the [complete article from the Wall Street Journal](#).

[Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Reading Lists and Book Review

For the past two decades, the books included on the [Commandant's Reading List](#) have formed the basis for informal, self-paced professional development by Marines, incorporating "classics" of Marine Corps history and doctrine. The current set of titles has been streamlined to five books and one capstone doctrinal publication per grade. Other reading lists augment the titles on the Commandant's list and include the [Reading List of the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command \(COMUSMARCENT\)](#) and the [II Marine Expeditionary Force \(MEF\) Forward \(Fwd\) Reading List for OIF 06-08](#). Readers may also be interested in other military-oriented reading lists, many of which are identified on the public website, [Military Reading List](#), including reading lists of the other military services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This month MCCLL is pleased to feature the following publications from the Commandant's and the MARCENT lists:

- **First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps**, by LtGen Victor H. Krulak. This is the "Capstone" book on the Commandant's list that is required reading for all Marines. [Last month's newsletter](#) included the Discussion Guide for Chapter 1 of this book. This month, we include the Discussion Guide for Chapters 2 and 3.
- **The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader**, by Peter L. Bergen. This book is on the COMUSMARCENT list for Staff NCOs and Field Grade Officers deploying to Afghanistan.

First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps,
by LtGen Victor H. Krulak

Chapters 2 and 3 Discussion Guide

1. Identify LtGen Krulak's mission (task and purpose) in writing this section?

In Parts II and III, Lieutenant General (LtGen) Krulak writes about some of the men whose vision, ingenuity and problem-solving revolutionized "operational techniques and material development" (p.69) for the Marine Corps as well as its sister services. The author highlights the individuals and the difficulties they underwent for three reasons. The first is to instill a sense of vigilance in the reader, to remember the work of these men. Secondly, to "keep the pioneering spirit alive because it is very near to the heart of what the Corps is all about." (p.119) Thirdly, he notes how common generalizations can become when those in the "military world" (p. 71) fail to recognize the facts, or reality, behind our present day capabilities, techniques, and requirements. For example, he mentions General Eisenhower's opinion of how simple an amphibious landing is to execute. Such uninformed opinions, when applied to current operations pose a threat to mission success, the welfare of our troops, and, in the author's opinion, possibly the future of our Corps as we know it.

In *The Innovators*, the author tells the story of the development of amphibious doctrine and how it came to be our primary mission as a service. From Lieutenant Commander William F. Fullam to Commandant Gen John A. LeJeune to Mr. Andy Higgins, the men highlighted in Part II are there because they are the why and how of the Marine Corps' amphibious doctrine and its ultimate success in WWII.

In *The Improvisers*, LtGen Krulak focuses on the ingenuity and improvisation of Marines and the resulting round-the-clock close-air-support capability that proved essential in Korea. Chapter 8 chronicles the author's personal experience in the lead up and execution of the amphibious landing at Inchon.

Read the [remainder of the Chapters 2 and 3 Discussion Guide](#).

[Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader, by Peter L. Bergen

Review by Richard A. Clarke, *The Washington Post*

"When the Arabic news network al-Jazeera broadcast a new audiotape believed to be from Osama bin Laden on Thursday, it gave us the first evidence we've had in 13 months that the al Qaeda leader still lives. Safely distanced from tell-tale telephones and e-mails that could be used to track him, he may now be giving broad guidance to his followers via a "Pony Express" of trusted couriers. Or he may have fled to a country other than Afghanistan or Pakistan, where he's most frequently said to be lurking. One thing he is definitely not, however, is caught, "dead or alive," at the instructions of President George W. Bush.

Bin Laden is the man who defied America, who gored the only superpower and got away with it. He is now a symbol -- Abu Jihad, the father of the holy struggle -- and a spiritual leader, an inspiration and a role model to millions. Much as Che Guevara was as important in life as in death to the communist cause in Latin America, bin Laden will be a force for years.

In large part, that's because he founded not only his relatively small jihadist group, al Qaeda, but also created or rebuilt terrorist organizations in the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, the Pacific Rim, South Asia and the Arabian Peninsula. Those organizations took over from the original core of al Qaeda (Arabic for "the base") when the United States belatedly invaded the sanctuary that bin Laden had created in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. When that base was largely destroyed, its offspring took over the struggle. Al Qaeda-related groups staged twice as many attacks in the 36 months after 9/11 as al Qaeda itself had in the previous 36 months, according to State Department reports. The second stage of jihad that bin Laden seems to have planned is still unfolding today.

So who was this son of a Yemeni businessman turned Saudi construction magnate? What made him into history's most successful terrorist?"

Read the [complete review from The Washington Post Online](#).

[Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Reading Lists and Book Review (continued)

First to Fight: Chapters 2 and 3 Discussion Guide (continued)

2. What part of the book was the most effective in accomplishing LtGen Krulak's mission? What part of the book was least effective?

Chapter 8 proved most effective. The story of Inchon and how the Marine Corps came to be assigned an amphibious landing at the most undesirable location under a shortened timeline with very little in the form of assets or input to the planning process is enough to make any Marine sit up and take note. LtGen Krulak effectively illustrates the vigilance and vision required by all involved as well as of the factors that hindered and helped make the operation a success.

3. The part of the book that is most relevant to what I/we do is:

As a Marine leader, the most relevant part of *The Innovators* and *The Improvisers* was learning about the men and what they went through in the development of amphibious doctrine, close-air support and the culminating test at Inchon. Additionally, the behind-the-scenes struggle for combatant authority of forces maintains the "sensitive paranoia" mentioned in Part I. The perspective LtGen Krulak provides as one who experienced these doctrinal developments and the Korean conflict at such a personal level is remarkable. He instills a sense of awareness upon the reader. It is incumbent upon all of us to remember how our Corps has come to be what it is today and to be our own best problem-solvers for future innovations.

4. Identify LtGen Krulak's specific and implied conclusions.

In the *Innovators*, LtGen Krulak notes that in the absence of those who would wish to provide for the equipment and techniques necessary for the Marine Corps to accomplish its mission, Marines themselves will have to be the innovators. This is essentially, as it should be, since Marines know what Marines need.

"The Marines' combatant function was and is unique. Nobody has ever been interested in providing the necessary operating techniques or hardware for them, so they have had to do it themselves." (p. 67)

"...in the face of apathy and sometimes opposition from within their own ranks, the Marines were determined that there must be a family of mechanisms that would be able to carry them, their weapons, and their equipment through the seas and the surf and deliver them face-to-face with the enemy on his own shore. That those mechanisms materialized was a product of stubborn faith...the prime ingredient in the innovative quality that has become such a vital part of the Marine personality." (p. 110)

In the *Improvisers*, LtGen Krulak states, *"Improvisation has been a way of life for the Marines...(b)ut few improvisations are more impressive than their figuring out how to drop bombs accurately in the dark or their contriving to land at Inchon, Korea, in 1950 without the forces, means, or time to do the job."* (p. 111)

He further concludes that the improvisations that resulted in success at Inchon were ultimately made possible by the cooperation and teamwork across services by Gen MacArthur, LtGen Shepherd, Commandant Cates, Gen Smith, Admiral Doyle and even President Truman.

5. With respect to LtGen Krulak's conclusions (either specified or implied), I/we accept or agree with the following:

I agree with the author that it is necessary to constantly review our processes, techniques, equipment and training to see if we could be doing something better. I also agree that in many cases, it is the end user, the Marine, who may have the most innovative ideas. And usually it will take an element of cooperation to make such new ideas a reality.

5a. With respect to LtGen Krulak's conclusions (either specified or implied), I/we do not agree with the following:

N/A

6. This book made a favorable impression on me and it will change the way I approach:

Generalizations. If we forget or disregard history, or fail to inform ourselves on the present, the more general statements, assumptions and opinions become factual.

6a. This book made an unfavorable impression on me for the following reasons:

N/A

[Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

Updated List of MCCLL Representatives

The latest roster of Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) representatives to major Marine Corps and joint commands and organizations is provided below. Note that there have been many changes and additions from the list posted in our June newsletter. There are also several pending changes that will be reflected in future newsletters: (1) Capt Watts is scheduled to replace CWO5 Harty at the end of October as our representative at Al Taqaddum, (2) Mr. Clark will arrive at 29 Palms in early October and his contact information will be available shortly, (3) Mr. Petroff will arrive at MARFORRES in mid October, with his contact information to be posted soon, and (4) Maj Tucker will replace MSgt Sheaffer at RCT6 in November.

[Return to the Table of Contents!](#)

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