Pakistan Again Squares Off Against Taliban in Swat - Matthew Rosenberg, Rehmat Mehsud and Zahid Hussain, Wall Street Journal.

With soldiers again squaring off against Taliban militants in the Swat Valley, Pakistan faces a dual test it has often failed before: fighting a counter-insurgency campaign while caring for those displaced by the conflict.

For the past several days, Pakistan's army and the Taliban have been fighting sporadically along the mountain ridges of Swat after a peace deal collapsed. Pakistani officials say they are determined that the offensive will continue until the military asserts control over the 400-square-mile area.

But even with a fresh infusion of U.S. military technology and training, it is far from clear that the army will do any better this time than last, when it was ground to a halt by the militants and entered a peace that gave control of the valley to the Taliban...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Ex-contractor Given Probation in Slaying of Afghan - Associated Press. A former military contractor has been sentenced to probation for shooting and killing a handcuffed prisoner in Afghanistan. Don Ayala of New Orleans pleaded guilty to manslaughter charges that normally would carry up to eight years in prison. But U.S. District Senior Judge Claude Hilton decided probation was warranted under the circumstances. The man whom Ayala shot had set fire to 1 of Ayala's colleagues (Paula Loyd) minutes before the shooting...

The Committee for the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (CAMOS), a cooperating organization of the International Studies Association (ISA) has been allocated two panels at the 2010 ISA Convention in New Orleans, LA (Feb. 17-20 2010).

This year's convention theme, Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners", addresses the issue of trying to bridge the gap between theory and practice and between academics and practitioners. This has always been the core mission of CAMOS in relation to the broad field of strategic and security studies. Thus, CAMOS seeks paper proposals that address the following topics:

• the sources of military effectiveness and force employment in war;

• the causes and effectiveness of intervention policy;

• the origins and effectiveness of terrorism, as well as the sources of terrorist recruitment;

• non-traditional conflict triggers, including refugee flows, environmental scarcity, and NGO involvement in conflict settings; and

• the relationship between coercive and non-coercive strategies in a counterinsurgency or reconstruction environment.

We especially welcome panel or paper proposals that draw on both scholars and practitioners and that have clear policy relevance.

Paper proposals should include the paper titles, a short abstract (500 words max), and contact information for the author(s). Panel proposals should include the same for each paper, along with a title and abstract for the panel as a whole, and contact information for panel chair and discussant, if included.

Please submit proposals by Friday 29 May 2009 to:

Dr. Sergio Catignani

Assistant Professor in International Security

University of Leiden

Phone: +31615166911

Email: sergiocatignani @ gmail.com (If you send your proposal as an attached document, please include your surname and paper title as the document title.)

Give the Afghan Army a Governance Role - Bing West, Wall Street Journal opinon.

The only way to reach Viper Company of the 26th Regiment, First Infantry Division, is by helicopter. When I fly in, Capt. Jimmy Howell greets me. "I'm holding a shura [meeting of village elders]," he says. "We won't be shot at until they leave." The steep-sided Korengal Valley, 70 miles northeast of Kabul, is the scene of the war's fiercest fighting, claiming 57 American lives over the past three years.

Sure enough, an hour after the elders leave the shura, 30-millimeter shells strike the outpost. Cpl. Marc Madding, an Afghan army adviser, begins firing .50 caliber rounds at the enemy position, laughing as an Afghan soldier scurries from the latrine with shells bursting behind him. Capt. Howell adjusts mortar and artillery shells on the hillside, followed by an A-10 aircraft dropping 250-pound bombs. It's another afternoon in the Korengal, the hot spot in a district that's recorded some 1,990 similar engagements since mid-2005.

Overwhelming American firepower forced the wily fundamentalist insurgents to maintain a respectful distance. A few days earlier, an enemy unit had let down its guard and lost 15 combatants to a well-staged American ambush. Most of the fundamentalists killed were from villages that frequently receive food and medical aid from the U.S. Army outpost. The following day, an American soldier was killed outside a nearby village...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Understanding the Long War - Tom Hayden, The Nation.

The concept of the "Long War" is attributed to former CENTCOM Commander Gen. John Abizaid, speaking in 2004. Leading counterinsurgency theorist John Nagl, an Iraq combat veteran and now the head of the Center for a New American Security, writes that "there is a growing realization that the most likely conflicts of the next fifty years will be irregular warfare in an 'Arc of Instability' that encompasses much of the greater Middle East and parts of Africa and Central and South Asia." The Pentagon's official Quadrennial Defense Review (2005) commits the United States to a greater emphasis on fighting terrorism and insurgencies in this "arc of instability." The Center for American Progress repeats the formulation in arguing for a troop escalation and ten-year commitment in Afghanistan, saying that the "infrastructure of jihad" must be destroyed in "the center of an 'arc of instability' through South and Central Asia and the greater Middle East."

The implications of this doctrine are staggering. The very notion of a fifty-year war assumes the consent of the American people, who have yet to hear of the plan, for the next six national elections. The weight of a fifty-year burden will surprise and dismay many in the antiwar movement. Most Americans living today will die before the fifty-year war ends, if it does. Youngsters born and raised today will reach middle age. Unborn generations will bear the tax burden or fight and die in this "irregular warfare."

There is a chance, of course, that the Long War can be prevented. It may be unsustainable, a product of imperial hubris. Public opinion may tire of the quagmires and costs--but only if there is a commitment to a fifty-year peace movement...

More at The Nation.

Mexico's Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy - Hal Brands, US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute.

In late 2007, the U.S. and Mexican governments unveiled the Merida Initiative. A 3-year, $1.4 billion counternarcotics assistance program, the Merida Initiative is designed to combat the drug-fueled violence that has ravaged Mexico of late. The initiative aims to strengthen the Mexican police and military, permitting them to take the offensive in the fight against Mexico's powerful cartels. As currently designed, however, the Merida Initiative is unlikely to have a meaningful, long-term impact in restraining the drug trade and drug-related violence. Focussing largely on security, enforcement, and interdiction issues, it pays comparatively little attention to the deeper structural problems that fuel these destructive phenomena. These problems, ranging from official corruption to U.S. domestic drug consumption, have so far frustrated Mexican attempts to rein in the cartels, and will likely hinder the effectiveness of the Merida Initiative as well. To make U.S. counternarcotics policy fully effective, it will be imperative to forge a more holistic, better-integrated approach to the war on drugs."

More at the Strategic Studies Institute.

The helo flight to Camp Wright in Asadabad took us to the central front of the counterinsurgency battle for RC East. Kunar is the most dangerous province in the East, yet also features some vibrant development efforts and an energetic moderate reformist governor. Along Kunar's river valley, development, governance and security follow the growth of bridges and roads. In the northern valleys, a mix of tribal and Taliban insurgents challenge US extension of the security bubble at every ridge.

There is no denying the opportunity in Kunar. Along the Kunar river valley and where there are roads, the 3-1 is effectively applying security operations capacity building, and reconstruction projects with strong results. This is indicative of the 3-1 leadership's strong emphasis on non-lethal operations and effects. One example is the Kunar construction corps, a program which offers young military age men throughout the East a small stipend and the opportunity to learn a range of construction skills. Every graduate is immediately hired by one of the plentiful construction companies building infrastructure in Kunar.

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) works well with moderate and reform minded Governor Wahidi and various district governors and ministry officials. Wahidi is slowly building legitimacy by delivering (thanks to the PRT) strong flows of projects to the province while also carrying a strong anti-corruption banner.

But central Kunar's development is untenable if the northern valleys can continue to harbor a strong Taliban sanctuary.

In small wars, we talk of human terrain as well as geographical terrain. In both senses, Kunar has some of the roughest, most inaccessible terrain in the world. Deeply isolated, xenophobic, independent tribes occupy steep northern valleys of Gaziabad, Pech, and Korengal with no roads in or out. Tribal conflict and smuggling interests incite violence and well-established collaboration with the Taliban. Attacks on ISAF forces are a daily threat, including major coordinated operations.

Sometimes in COIN, circumstances favor a paradoxical approach. Such may be the case in Korengal, where the short, tough, bearded Korengalis on these steep ridges conjure up the image of Pashtun Gimlis defending Helms Deep. By all accounts, the Korengalis hold no ambitions for global terrorism or an Islamic caliphate. They largely seek to be left alone, sell their timber, and resist control by any foreigner -- foreigner meaning someone from outside their Valley. The Korengal provide Taliban limited sanctuary and transit of their territory as a matter of practical resistance and collaboration against Afghan and ISAF forces attempts to extend control into the Korengal and enforce anti-logging laws. The Korengalis offer fierce resistance and are difficult to engage on projects. One wonders if a better approach would be to look the other way -- in several respects. Pull back US and Afghan forces and seek to de-emphasize ANP and ANBP timber smuggling enforcement in the area. Heck, the US could even offer to buy the timber at a good price if the Korengalis promise to keep the Taliban out of their valley and/or agree to a dialog with the Afghan government on key issues (e.g. when will the trees run out, balancing autonomy with government services, etc). At a minimum, shifting emphasis from the Korengal would enable the Army to apply more resources in Gaziabad and Pech, areas where population security and clear-hold-build strategies may have a better chance. As always, this issue is more complicated than I present so I don't know what is the best strategy -- only US and ANA forces on the ground are in a position to make that determination. But we do know that adaptive, non-linear strategy tied to conflict assessment is essential to COIN and, likely, to success in Afghanistan's East.

Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and soft power" types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.

Gian Gentile: Exposing Counterfeit COIN - Kelley B. Vlahos, Antiwar.com.

... Hadn't you heard of Gian Gentile?

He shook his head.

He's active duty. He's West Point, I pressed on. He's at the forefront of this pushback against COIN.

The journalist shook his head. He let me write down Gentile's name. Looking skeptical, he moved on.

It really shouldn't be a surprise, that members of the elite news media — particularly the ones who don't necessarily focus on a national security beat — fasten easily onto the conventional narrative and "move on" condescendingly, satisfied their knowledge is au courant and complete.

Army Colonel Gian Gentile just doesn't fit into their equation, though his name is known well enough, if only at the U.S Military Academy, military journals, critical foreign policy webzines like Antiwar.com, and as a foil and vexation for the COIN-centric blogs, the doctrine's biggest promoters, like Small Wars Journal and Abu Muqawama (a moniker for Andrew Exum, Iraq war veteran and senior fellow at Flournoy's CNAS).

To the rest of the world, the mainstream media included, Col. Gentile is kind of a ghost. Persistent and clever, sometimes noisome and everywhere. That he might remain invisible to people inside-the-beltway is only a problem in that information gatekeepers like the aforementioned journo, craft narratives about the war — about future wars — without the consistent insight of the contrary view. As consumers of the news — as Americans — we should demand the whole scoop...

More at Antiwar.com.

A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare - Admiral Eric T. Olson, The Journal of International Security Affairs.

To successfully deter and confront the global insurgency threatening the world and our nation today, the U.S. military must be able to employ a balanced approach to warfare, carefully blending the full spectrum of military, para-military and civil action to achieve success. It is an approach I refer to as balanced warfare." It is the manner in which our nation's Special Operations Forces are combating terrorism today, and it is the guiding principle behind the Department of Defense's campaign plan to combat global terrorism.

Today, we find ourselves living in a new normal." The world is not going to go back to the way it was before 9/11. Our national security is threatened not only by terrorists and terrorist organizations, but also by fragile states either un—or unable to provide for the most basic needs of their people. Further, sovereignty is not what it used to be; advances in communications, transportation and global networking continue to make borders more transparent, economies more interconnected, and information available on an unprecedented scale. The effects of this globalization create stresses on underdeveloped and developing nations and societies, which in turn create regional instability and unrest...

More at The Journal of International Security Affairs.

The road from Kabul to Jalalabad is as spectacular a drive as you can find. Toyota Corollas and jingle trucks snake along a river that cuts through dramatic mountains, along the edge of spectacular gorges, and across lush river valleys. As we made the trip, scores of Kuchi nomads walked the road, shooing their livestock off the road as we pass. The drive also gave me reason to ponder the example of Nangarhar province, often cited as the success story of the East. The drive is relatively safe because Nangarhar is relatively safe -- and increasingly prosperous thanks to its fertile land and its trade route to Pakistan.

Many attribute Nang's success to its legendary and controversial warlord governor, Gul Agha Sherzai. Sherzai is practically a caricature of the Afghan warlord: a former Muj against the Russians, he combines ruthlessness with Machiavellian political skills and a convenient comfort with corruption or worse. He would be easy to dislike if not for the fact that he keeps Nangarhar safe and increasingly prosperous while staunchly pro-American. The visible focused police presence I saw in downtown Jalalabad is indicative of how Sherzai has tamed the province and increased capacity along many dimensions. Fertile lands and an increasing role as a regional economic hub have spurred ideas of what reliable power, further irrigation, and an airport could yield in turning Jalalabad's agricultural wealth into a valuable export.

My hosts in Jalabad were the fine soldiers of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry division at FOB Fenty. I am indebted to these guys for their invitation and taking the time to talk with me about our handbooks and training projects. Long gone, however, is the cushy life of the Burz Al Arab or Kabul Serena. My Fenty quarters were a plywood prison cell right next to a busy helo pad. The 3-1 has really faced some extraordinary challenges -- reforming as an entirely new unit only months before deployment to RC East -- a treacherous and challenging counterinsurgency mission. It is a great credit to COL John Spiszer and his team that they have sustained modest progress in the Northeast even as the situation in the South has deteriorated. The 3-1 has an extraordinary, if perhaps overly stovepiped, group of support units for the engagement and reconstruction of Nangarhar. You have a PRT, HTT, ADT, MTT, not to mention vairous partners in a collection of NGOs and IOs. WTF! Leaving aside (for now) the organizational wisdom of this alphabet soup, Nangarhar is potentially a worthy example of success in the East. Or is it?

Is Sherzai's strongman approach one we would want to duplicate elsewhere? Does the Provincial government have a self-sustaining income stream to function? There is little taxation collected in the province except for the tariff at Torkham Gate -- the primary trade route with Pakistan. The Afghan Torkham profits go directly to a fund controlled by Sherzai, allegedly used for "reconstruction" in an account he controls. Real development is almost entirely funded by outsiders such as the US PRT and various USAID programs. A small budgetary allotment from Kabul just about pays for existing salaries, with none for development, construction, or even much maintenance. Thus, much of the governance and economic growth may be unsustainable servicing of the US grant-making and logistics appetite.

One can think of stabilization as a sequence from engagement to ceasefire to managed peace to self-sustaining peace to long term development and (perhaps) democratization. Nangarhar is ready for a stronger emphasis on sustainable development and governance capacity building that can withstand the inevitable departures of Sherzai and most US assistance. This is not to dismiss the contribution made by Sherzai. He is a good example that working with nasty characters can be a necessary and effective part of small wars.

Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and soft power" types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.