Small Wars Journal

Occupying Iraq

Wed, 05/13/2009 - 8:49pm

Occupying Iraq

A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority

by James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Benjamin Runkle and Siddharth Mohandas, Rand

The American engagement in Iraq has been looked at from many perspectives — the flawed intelligence that provided the war's rationale, the failed effort to secure an international mandate, the rapid success of the invasion, and the long ensuing counterinsurgency campaign. This book focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its administrator, L. Paul Bremer, who governed Iraq from May 2003 to June of the following year. It is based on interviews with many of those responsible for setting and implementing occupation policy, on the memoirs of American and Iraqi officials who have since left office, on journalists' accounts of the period, and on nearly 100,000 never-before-released CPA documents. The book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services, reform the judicial and penal systems, fight corruption, revitalize the economy, and create the basis for representative government. It also addresses the occupation's most striking failure: the inability of the United States and its coalition partners to protect the Iraqi people from the criminals and extremists in their midst.

Full monograph at Rand.

A Slow Road to Self-reliance

Wed, 05/13/2009 - 8:35pm
A Slow Road to Self-reliance - Trudy Rubin, Philadelphia Inquirer opinion.

The six young men looked too scrawny to fulfill the high hopes placed on their shoulders.

They were members of the Afghan Public Protection Program, an auxiliary police force recruited from local villages in strategically important Wardak province. The force has been compared (mistakenly) to the Sunni militias that helped U.S. troops stem al-Qaeda violence in Iraq.

The Wardak program is a pilot project designed to provide local volunteers to help hold areas that have been cleared of Taliban by US and Afghan troops. They are trained by the Afghan national police, who in turn are trained by a team of US Special Forces. The special-ops guys call the volunteers "the AP3" or "the Guardians."

"We want to do this all over the country," said Maj. Gen. Michael Tucker, deputy commander of US forces in Afghanistan, referring to the project. Yet some news reports cite the slow progress of this experiment as one reason his boss, Gen. David McKiernan, was suddenly fired on Monday.

So what are we to make of the Guardians of Wardak? If they're so important, why is the project advancing at such a measured pace?

More at The Philadelphia Inquirer.

Obama's Right on Target in Afghanistan

Wed, 05/13/2009 - 5:17am
Obama's Right on Target in Afghanistan - Max Boot, Los Angeles Times opinion.

President Obama and his aides continue to impress with their handling of Afghanistan. Not only have they approved a major troop increase and a de facto commitment to nation-building, but now they have shifted personnel to make the most effective use of the added resources and turn around a failing war effort.

The big news is that Army Gen. David D. McKiernan is out after just 11 months as the top commander. He will be replaced by Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Just as important, if less heralded, is the decision to appoint Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, who had previously served in Afghanistan as commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, as the second-ranking commander. His role will be vital: to help the overstretched NATO staff pull together its disjointed war effort.

When I visited Afghanistan recently, I spent a couple of hours with McKiernan. He struck me as competent but too conventional and too colorless, not the rare kind of dynamic leader who could turn around a campaign in trouble. He was no George Patton, Matthew Ridgway, Creighton Abrams - or David Petraeus...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Petraeus's Tougher Fight

Wed, 05/13/2009 - 4:05am
Petraeus's Tougher Fight - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

It's a small irony of history that Gen. David Petraeus, attacked by the left for his role in revitalizing the Bush administration's effort in Iraq, is now being asked by a Democratic president to do much the same thing in Afghanistan. The Centcom commander intends to apply the same counterinsurgency tactics he developed in Iraq, but Afghanistan will be in many ways a tougher fight.

Petraeus isn't a man who likes to lose, and he's assembling an all-star team. Gone is Gen. David McKiernan, a solid but uninspired commander; he will be replaced by Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, a rising superstar who, like Petraeus, has helped reinvent the US Army.

Petraeus has an asset in this new campaign that was sorely lacking in Iraq, which is strong diplomatic support, and this enables a regional approach to the war. Special envoy Richard Holbrooke and Petraeus are two headstrong bulls in a small paddock, but so far they are making this crucial partnership work...

More at The Washington Post.

McKiernan, McChrystal, SOF & SF vs. GPF, SOF vs. SF, AF, IW, COIN...

Tue, 05/12/2009 - 10:45am
McKiernan, McChrystal, SOF & SF vs. GPF, SOF vs. SF, AF, IW, COIN... - Join the discussion on the Small Wars Council.

If the SF are the solution, why is it that one of primary LOO - develop indigenous capacity, has, for the most part been filled by a 'heinz variety' of elements from across the US services, rather than SF? (For god's sake, in Basra during Charge of the Knights I met a Navy O6 nuclear dude on a MiTT task ...). Why is the JCISFA at Leavenworth largely a big army org?

Discuss at the Council.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Michael Mullen speak to reporters at the Pentagon.

Also see the transcript of the press conference with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen on leadership changes in Afghanistan.

Also, more by:

Ex at Abu Muqawama

Ex (again) at The Argument

Fred at Slate

Tom at The Weekly Standard Blog

Richard at Belmont Club

James at Outside the Beltway

Jules at Forward Movment

Herschel at The Captian's Journal

Noah at Danger Room

Robert at Westhawk

Judah at World Politics Review

Joshua at Registan

Laura at The Cable

Tom R. at Best Defense

Tom B. at Thomas P.M. Barnett

Travels With Nick # 5

Tue, 05/12/2009 - 6:08am
PRT Nuristan is just barely in the untamed frontier of Nuristan. Tucked in the southwest corner of the province, the PRT is located at FOB Kala Gush -- at the end of the road from Mehterlam. Beyond Kala Gush, western Nuristan is accessible only by dirt tracks largely unfit for vehicles and trafficked on foot by Nuristanis and their animals -- and the occasional Taliban smuggler and insurgent. Parun, the provincial capital, is in the center of Nuristan and not accessible to Kala Gush except by a four day hike over 18,000 foot mountains. Provincial officials make the hike to visit the PRT or to catch a ride to Kabul. US officials only find their way to Parun by helicopter. Eastern Nuristan is similarly partially accessible by road before mountains and dirt paths present the only way forward to the north or west. Three valleys, all mostly inaccessible.

How does one execute a population-centric approach to COIN in an area where you cannot go except by a three day hike? About six weeks ago, the PRT and both US and Afghan supporting forces pushed north along a mountainous dirt track in order to reach Doab, one of the bigger villages about 30km north of FOB Kala Gush. The idea was to conduct an extended engagement with village leaders to discuss reconstruction projects, establish some rapport, and to contest any anti-Afghan forces in the area. There was dispute among US officers about whether MRAPs or Humvees could navigate these rough mountain tracks. The drive was slow and precarious, the US vehicles clinging to the edge of dirt mountain but they did reach Doab and engage the elders. So far so good. Not long after they began the drive home, an estimated 100-150 insurgents attacked the US convoy, engaging in an extended 8 hour firefight along the entire route back to FOB Kala Gush. If one can imagine walking a balance beam while getting shot at for 8 hours, one can get a feel for the engagement. To the credit of US forces, they returned to base largely intact, have suffered two non-critical wounds and losing one HUMVEE. However, one wonders the secondary effects of pushing into the Doab valley and the ensuing violence.

In the words of Paul Newman's harried and hunted Butch Cassidy, "who are those guys?" Is the Taliban and al Queda actually using the dirt tracks of Nuristan as meaningful transit routes? Or are these tribal warriors defending their valley from foreigners as they have any other force that ventured into their mountains? The answer to that question informs how important Nuristan is to the COIN fight in northeast Afghanistan. Mountains with xenophobic locals should be left alone. Significant Taliban transit routes may need interdiction. It is hard for to believe that the Taliban can move significant men and supplies across the mountains of Nuristan -- or why the independent minded Nuristanis would help them. But mountain men of Afghanistan can hike for days and days and perhaps the Taliban have found some acceptance among the Nuristans.

Meanwhile the PRT and maneuver forces at FOB Kala Gush will try to remain positively engaged with the locals at Doab and others in the Afghan frontier -- with aid if not military force. Yet this quandary underscores one of the weaknesses of the current US reconstruction approach -- the very military nature of PRTs. When military presence is in itself an incitement to resistance and anti-US/anti-government sentiment, would a more traditional civilian/NGO assistance approach make more sense in many areas? A team of Afghan locals working on behalf of a USAID-funded NGO could likely have gotten in and out of Doab without violence and more positive effect.

Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and soft power" types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.

Gen. McKiernan Replaced in Afghanistan

Mon, 05/11/2009 - 6:35pm
U.S. Replaces Commander in Afghanistan - Peter Spiegel and Yochi Dreazen, Wall Street Journal.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced Monday that he had asked for the resignation of the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, saying he believed new leadership was needed to implement the Obama administration's war strategy.

Speaking at a Pentagon news conference, Mr. Gates said he had recommended the appointment of Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal to replace Gen. McKiernan. Gen. McChrystal is a Green Beret who ran special operations forces in Iraq until moving to a top Pentagon job last year.

"We have a new strategy, a new mission and a new ambassador," Mr. Gates said. "I believe that new military leadership also is needed"....

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Gates Recommends Replacement for Top Command in Afghanistan - Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates today asked for the resignation of the top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, saying the U.S. military "must do better" in executing the administration's new strategy there.

Gates recommended that President Obama nominate veteran Special Operations commander Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal to replace McKiernan, who would depart as soon as a successor is confirmed. Gates also recommended that Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, the former head of U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan who is currently serving as Gates's military assistant, be nominated to serve in a new position as McChrystal's deputy...

More at The Washington Post.

U.S. Replaces Commander in Afghanistan in War Overhaul - Elisabeth Bumiller, New York Times.

The Pentagon is replacing the top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, less than a year after he took over, marking a major overhaul in military leadership of a war that has presented President Obama with a worsening national security challenge.

Defense officials said that General McKiernan was removed because of what they described as a conventional approach to what has become one of the most complicated military challenges in American history. He is to be replaced by Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, a former commander of the Joint Special Operations Command who recently ran all special operations in Iraq.

The decision reflects a belief that the war in Afghanistan has grown so complex that it needs a commander drawn from the military's unconventional warfare branch...

More at The New York Times.

Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan

Sun, 05/10/2009 - 1:48pm
Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan - Trudy Rubin, Philadelphia Inquirer opinion.

It is cold and wet on the vast and desolate grounds of the Kabul Military Training Center, ringed by mountains on the outskirts of the city. Here, Afghan officers backed by NATO mentors are training new recruits to shoot and care for their AK-47s.

Seventy percent of the new grunts are illiterate, although officer cadets have a high school education. But the motivation of these youths seems high, in a country where the Afghan National Army is a respected institution.

On the shooting range, trainee Mohammed Arif from Kandahar has no qualms about the possibility of fighting a fellow Pashtun who is a Taliban. "If he comes to destroy my country, then I will kill him because he is the enemy," he says...

More at The Philadelphia Inquirer.