The Forever War: Dispatches from the War on Terror

by Dexter Filkins

Knopf, 2008, 368 pages

Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq

by Linda Robinson

Public Affairs, 2008, 416 pages

The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008

by Bob Woodward

Simon & Schuster, 2008, 512 pages

When the insurgency began in Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the United States Army was caught unprepared. Until then, it had been designed, trained, and equipped to win conventional wars, and was without doubt peerless in that arena. But it was not ready for an enemy who understood that it had no hope of defeating the United States on a conventional battlefield, and therefore chose to wage war against it from the shadows.

Yet over the five years that followed, in one of history's most remarkable examples of adaptation under fire, the United States Army learned to conduct a surprisingly successful counterinsurgency campaign. Three new books, each by a prominent journalist, tell the story of that dramatic change, two from on the ground in Iraq and one from the corridors of Washington. Viewing the conflict from their different perspectives provides important insights into a war that America was losing badly only two years ago, and now looks to have turned around. It also suggests something about how America is likely to fight the war in Afghanistan under President Obama, and offers broader lessons about the nature of warfare in the twenty-first century...

Read more of the reviews at Azure.

The War in Iraq - Peter Mansoor, Azure

I enjoyed reading John Nagl's excellent review (Ending the Neverending War," AZURE 35, Winter 2009) of three books that tell the story of the debacle and re-birth of American strategy in the Iraq war. It is a cautionary tale for any number of nations in the twenty-first century, Israel included. Nagl mentions that the U.S. Army was thoroughly unprepared for counterinsurgency warfare in 2003, but since the reasons for that lapse fell outside the purview of the books he was reviewing, he doesn't state why. Simply put, the United States military has a love affair with technology and, during the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, developed concepts that substituted technological prowess for strategic relevance. The future American way of war, according to certain defense intellectuals, was summed up in the phrase Rapid Decisive Operations," otherwise known as shock and awe." Using sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, American forces would be able to find and distinguish all relevant targets on the battlefield and then, using precision-guided munitions, destroy them. Wars would be quick and relatively bloodless.

What the proponents of this approach failed to realize is that military operations are neither rapid nor decisive unless they lead to a more enduring peace. In this regard, the United States was guilty of trying to replace strategy with tactical and operational concepts that had marginal relevance to the kinds of wars that the nation would face after 9/11. We were guilty of becoming the Germans of the twenty-first century—a nation that used brilliant tactical and operational concepts but lost two world wars on account of strategic incompetence...

More at Azure.

I left for the 20 minute drive to the airport early -- 6am -- insurance against unknown delays or issues. Good thing too. One would expect Kabul airport security to be tight. One would hope and expect Indian Airlines security to be extra tight considering the Indian Embassy in Kabul was bombed only two months prior. Correct on both counts. My car had barely reached the outskirts of the airport when we reached the backup for first security checkpoint. The Afghan National Police (ANP) were searching all cars, searching all bags, and doing pat downs on all passengers. After I piled back in the car, we crawled for another quarter mile before reaching the second checkpoint, manned by the Afghan National Border Police (ANBP). This time, passengers and their bags were forced to exit the car, go through a bag and personnel scan/search, and then rejoin their searched car for the final quarter mile drive to a chaotic parking lot where one could catch a bus to the terminal. After a ten minute wait, the bus made the two minute drive to the terminal where all passengers were dumped into an outdoor baggage and personal screening line for the third security check. Successfully passing this check entitled me to enter the airport terminal building and try to figure out how to turn my e-ticket into a boarding pass. Turns out, e-tickets are issued for flights from Kabul but not advised. I lucked out and the Indian airlines agent literally hand wrote my ticket out on a blank piece of white paper. Next came two more security check points inside the terminal (including one where they wrap your baggage in a strap) before finally getting to the gate at 8:55am, only 45 minutes before scheduled departure. The flight was delayed thirty minutes so we finally boarded at about 10am — but not before going through one last bag search and pat down literally right at the door of the plane.

All the waiting in traffic, security lines, and at the gate gave me plenty of time to reflect on the trip and core policy and operational questions about our mission in Afghanistan. At the start of the trip, I intended to learn more about the causes of conflict in Eastern Afghanistan and whether the US strategy and resources were matched and organized effectively to the problem. In particular, I wanted to look at the question of whether the US strategy of expanding governance from Kabul was still realistic or if a more local political engagement approach might make more sense.

I came away from the trip angry at the negligence of the Afghan politicians and the Bush Administration for squandering six years and countless billions of dollars on a politically soft and ineffective version of nation building. Spending money on infrastructure projects and coaching good governance is a grossly insufficient political strategy, particularly in the corrupt and inefficient atmosphere of Afghanistan today. I saw no evidence of a strategic approach to apply pressure and leverage on Afghan politicians, warlords, and tribes in order to build pragmatic support, stamp out corruption and isolate extremist influence. There apparently has been little effort to forge pragmatic political deals with the Pashtun tribes or to devise a more nuanced relationship between tribal authority and participation in the political process. Areas where security is good like Kabul or the West are not nearly the economic success stories one would expect from six years of security and economic development. Organizationally, the US military in has been asked to do the impossible in Afghanistan, burdened with too few troops and unsupported by a US civilian presence so minimal and irregular to render itself strategically meaningless. The net effect has been to falsely raise expectations, effectively lower responsibility and accountability, and turn the US military into an undermanned welfare program.

These critiques do not undercut in any way my admiration for the many tremendous individual leaders like John Spiszer or Steve Erickson who are making a difference despite organizational or resource shortcomings. In my view, Afghanistan's backslide is the result of weak leadership at the national level, not failures at the operational level.

There are reasons for optimism. The Obama team is leaning hard into AfPak, as evidenced by injection of both new and additional senior leadership, both civilian and military, as well as the surge of military and civilian resources into Afghanistan and the new assistance programs for Pakistan. What is less clear at this point, is how the Holbrooke/Eikenberry/McCrystal team will reenergize the political process in Afghanistan to impose more accountability and pragmatic cooperation from key Afghan leaders in Kabul and across the East. Having been an inside observer of Mr. Holbrooke's work in the 1990s, I'm confident we'll see much more political leverage in play in the coming months, in Kabul, Islamabad and in the provinces. Regardless of who wins the fall presidential elections in Afghanistan, the new Afghan President must take a tougher political line with corrupt or tainted warlords and work relentlessly to forge political deals with the Pashtun east at the expense of extremism. He should tell Afghans stop expecting the West to lift them up and call upon them to rebuild the Afghanistan they dream of. Stronger leadership in Kabul and Washington can make secure areas like Kabul shining examples of progress and prosperity to remind people what is possible and offer Afghans a more tangible alternative to conflict or the Taliban.

Having left Kabul, I arrived safely in Nepal, where soaring mountains and ancient Buddhist and Hindu culture now host a fledgling democracy — and a reminder of what is possible. The long time insurgency in Nepal has ended because the Maoist rebels are now part of the political process. Political engagement, process and compromise are the critical ingredients of peace more so than road projects or laser guided bombs. Security and reconstruction operations cannot themselves create political stability, they are only essential tools in pursuit of the political process. In Afghanistan and Pakististan, there is much political work to do. But I am thankful to have seen the beauty and the opportunity of Afghanistan and to meet Afghans who so passionately want peace and prosperity. I look forward to a future visit to Afghanistan that is far closer to that goal.

Thank you to Small Wars Journal for allowing me to share my thoughts on my Afghanistan trip. Readers can contact me at ndowling@idsinternational.net

A Report of the Harvard Kennedy School's Defense Leadership Project

Transforming the National Security Culture (Full PDF Report)

From the Preface

General Edward C. Meyer, former Army Chief of Staff, has compared our best leaders to diamonds. Just as the diamond requires three properties for its formation—carbon, heat, and pressure—successful leaders require the interaction of three properties—character, knowledge, and application. We at the Harvard Kennedy School seek to foster an environment in which our student leaders can develop their character, expand their knowledge, and launch into promising career trajectories through the application of newly polished skills for the benefit of our nation's security. The Harvard Kennedy School Defense Leadership Project is a proud example of the work that can be produced in this environment.

As we seek to generate and promote more effective leadership in national security policy, we are deeply committed to bridging the gap between leadership theory and practice. Supporting collabora¬tive thinking among experts in the field is critical to this objective. The student-generated Defense Leadership Project aptly sought to address a critical shortfall in national security leadership through its collaborative endeavor. As this report attests, the Defense Leadership Project specifically created unprecedented opportunities for reflection and discovery for students and prominent practitioners from different disciplines, sectors, and cultures to elicit proactive solutions to tomorrow's challenges.

Well-trained and equipped leaders sharing collaborative mentalities are paramount for successfully preserving our national security. The combined support of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, and the Center for Public Leadership speaks to the shared belief in the importance of this initiative, and the associated recommendations. We applaud the students involved in the Defense Leadership Project and the energy this team put into organizing guest speakers and writing this report. We hope our nation's leaders might draw from their informed and insightful findings.

From the Introduction

In late winter 2007, a small group of veterans attending Harvard University decided to challenge the status quo. Frustrated by their experiences overseas and what they perceived as a lack of innovative leadership within their own organizations, they sought to develop new ideas. They wanted to create something the business world would call a skunk works, an autonomous group of creative thinkers, charged with working on advanced projects. Enlisting the help of three separate research centers at Harvard—the Center for Public Leadership, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy (which also had played a role in the publication of the Army's new counterinsurgency manual), and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs—the students took their proposal to the larger student body.

At a special reception for all Harvard graduate students who had served (or were serving) within the national security community, the students announced open applications for an initiative they called the Defense Leadership Project sponsored by the Harvard Kennedy School's Center for Public Leadership. The response from the crowd—which had been full of veterans returned from combat tours, homeland security officials, intelligence analysts, private security consultants, and others—was overwhelming. Applications poured in, and after selecting the most talented, experienced, and creative individuals, the panel set to work defining its mission.

The students almost immediately came to realize that most of their frustrations were rooted in leader¬ship and organizational culture. In their eyes, the national security establishment was facing a major crisis: leaders at all levels were routinely ill-equipped to understand, visualize, or respond effectively to the modern security environment. The problem was one of adaptation: decades of Cold War doctrine and thinking had left behind a sense of unassailable institutional inertia. Despite the undeniable rise of asymmetric threats such as insurgents, terrorists, militias, and other nonstate actors, the defense establishment had continued to invest overwhelmingly in preparations for traditional, conventional warfare.

While many blue ribbon panels and study groups have been convened since 9/11 to develop recommendations for the security establishment, few have focused on the role of the individual leader. New organizational models and next-generation technologies may improve our nation's readiness, but—in the humble opinion of the students—success or failure would be defined by the ability of individual leaders to operate effectively with minimal guidance, adapt, and collaborate across traditional institutional stovepipes. In other words, victory will not be gained by overwhelming our enemies with brute force, but by empowering our leaders to innovate faster than the enemy can respond.

The panel's methodology would be simple: Invite senior level defense leaders to Harvard for closed door, nonattribution, and brutally honest discussions. Combine the enthusiasm and on the ground" perspective of the students with the strategic outlook of decision makers and experts. Develop bluesky solutions, record notes for every session, and eventually, write the proposals into a report intended for senior policy makers. This booklet is the end result of our efforts. We respectfully submit these recommendations for your consideration, in the hope that a few of the ideas might prove useful or inspire further inquiry.

From the Foreword

When the Center for Public Leadership at the Harvard Kennedy School brings together graduate students and national security students at Harvard—military veterans, homeland security officials, intelligence officers, private security contractors, and others—in a Defense Leadership Project, one expects powerful results as they work with distinguished guest panelists. After all, it's Harvard, the Kennedy School, David Gergen's Center for Public Leadership, and our own country's security leaders. We have great expectations.

Rarely do results of such an intellectual engagement provide the call to action that this report delivers. Not an academic treatise, this is a tough report by people on the ground, across the sectors, examining every aspect of the defense community, and this is the powerful result. And it's all about leadership, the leaders of the future required right across the national security community, to lead, respond, mobilize, inspire, build the alliances and partnerships an uncertain future demands in the emerging security environment.

The formal recommendations the panel makes in this report are sobering and illuminating and fall into four categories:

• Finding critical talent

• Transforming talent into institutional capability

• Reforming the existing organization to promote balance and interoperability

• Accelerating generational change.

Three powerful messages flow through the recommendations, the rationale, and the call to action in this report:

• A massive need for change in the national security organizations and community to prepare our leaders to meet future threats

• Emerging leaders, the new generation of national security professional workers, will generate the change essential to meet evolving challenges

• The inspiring ideas will come from bright young minds committed to our security establishment who know change is the leadership imperative of our time.

Transforming the National Security Culture (Full PDF Report)

By Captain Timothy Hsia

"We are looking at the future of the force mix, examining what it is going to look like in the years ahead, and it's possible at the end of this process the decision will be made that some of the heavy brigades will become Stryker brigades." [Secretary of the Army Pete] Geren said, adding that the Stryker concept has been an extraordinarily successful program."

Since 2003, the Army has fielded seven Stryker brigade combat teams, each equipped with about 300 Stryker wheeled vehicles built on common chassis. Stryker units have spent most of their time in Iraq, but the Pentagon announced in February that the 5th Stryker BCT would deploy to Afghanistan for the first time.

-- Army Brass Hint at More Stryker Brigades by Matthew Cox

Eric Shinseki, the Secretary of the Veteran Affairs, has his work cut out from him. For the next few years, the Veteran Affairs will be handling the cases of thousands of returning veterans from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq who return home with physical and psychic wounds as testament to their tours of duty downrange. If the past is any guide to Shinseki's competence and character, then the future bodes well for the Veteran Affairs, as Shinseki's reforms of the Army during his tenure as Chief of Staff were absolutely crucial to the Army's ability to better wage a counterinsurgency campaign.

As the Army Chief of Staff, Shinseki introduced the Stryker vehicle and changed the Army's organization into a more capable, lethal, and modular fighting force by pushing logistics and intelligence capabilities to lower echelons in the form of Brigade Combat Teams. But underpinning all of his reforms was a deep understanding that no amount of technology can substitute a nation's will to wage war effectively then having troops on the ground. Despite America's technological superiority in air and sea, boots on the ground are the only way to secure a populace.

Today Secretary Shinseki is primarily remembered for boldly telling Congress that there needed to be something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers" for the invasion of Iraq. But this was not the first time he asked for additional troops in a theater with the idea that no amount of technological superiority can compensate for additional troops. Shinseki also advised his superiors that an entire Airborne Corps was necessary for the initial invasion of Afghanistan in order to fully eliminate Al Qaeda and Taliban strongholds.

The immediate success of the surge in Iraq left many pundits to search for the original proponent of the troop surge. Perhaps General Shinseki's name should be thrown into the mix, because if his advice had been followed in the first place, the military could possibly have avoided the terrible conditions which existed in Iraq that forced military leaders to decide on the troop surge. This notion could also easily apply to the Afghan surge today, where conditions in Afghanistan have worsened since America's initial invasion due to a lack of soldier manpower and resourcing since the inception of the Afghan war.

Unfortunately for the nation, Shinseki's advice on Iraq and Afghanistan were not followed. But thankfully, General Shinseki's desire to field the Stryker brigade combat team was not shelved.

Immediately after becoming the Army's chief in 1999, General Shinseki sought to take advantage of the opportunity in terms of peace and economic capability... to transform" the Army. General Shinseki's transformation of the Army called for decentralizing command and control and logistic capabilities from a division level down to the brigade combat team. This decentralization of resources has enabled the military to better handle the fluid battlefield known as counterinsurgency.

Gen. Shinseki then developed a fighting force which bridged the firepower inherent in heavy mechanized forces with the mobility of light infantry forces. He immersed himself in the Army Science Board in researching cutting edge technologies in order to develop a vehicle platform best suited for America's future wars. The end result of Shinseki's studies was the Stryker vehicle, which incorporated the latest technologies in communication, weaponry, survivability, and maneuverability.

Shinseki's bold plan to restructure an Army comfortably enjoying the Cold War peace dividend was met by fierce opposition within Washington and even within the halls of the Pentagon. Many critics derided his efforts as too costly, and insulted him professionally by lampooning him as a Clinton general. Newt Gingrich and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were among the most adamant opponents to the creation of the Stryker brigade. They disparaged Shinseki's plan as outdated and one only suitable for Bosnia like peacekeeping operations.

After repeatedly attacked by his opponents, Shinseki felt compelled to defend himself to the military and the nation. In 2002 he quickly silenced opposition to the Stryker brigade combat team during his keynote address to the Association of the United States Army by stating, I appreciate the debate...but don't question our honor or our integrity."

Thankfully, Shinseki's Stryker concept survived Rumsfeld's budgetary cuts because in Iraq today they have been instrumental in the Army's ability to wage counterinsurgency successfully. And now because of the success of Stryker units in Iraq, the Army is now preparing a Stryker brigade to deploy to Afghanistan. Today no one questions Shinseki's honor or integrity. His adamant insistence on candor as it applied to the Stryker brigade and troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq have withstood the harshest of critics-the test of time. Secretary Shinseki warned everyone about the dangers of phase four in Afghanistan and Iraq. But he now faces an equally arduous task in phase five of war: taking care of veteran warriors.

During his retirement ceremony in 2002, Army Secretary Thomas White stated that History will show him to be one of the greatest Chiefs of Staff the Army has ever had." And it seems that the events of history since his retirement have vindicated General Shinseki's previously unpopular positions. As a result, U.S. soldiers possess a Stryker vehicle ideally suited to the counterinsurgency fight because of its balance between speed, maneuverability, firepower, command and control systems, and armor. This year West Point will honor him as a Distinguished Graduate Award, but more accolades will follow, as historians begin to fully examine his career, and especially so if he can right the course of Veteran Affairs.

CPT Timothy Hsia is assigned to the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment.

Via CavGuy at the Council.

Seasoned military writer David Wood, who left the Baltimore Sun during the paper's massive layoffs in April, has joined AOL's new site, Politics Daily...

Previous to working at the Sun, Wood has covered national security and reported extensively overseas for Time Magazine and the Los Angeles Times. A Pulitzer-finalist, Wood won the Headliner Award for his Iraq coverage last year...

Via The Baltimore Sun and The Morning Call:

Wood has accompanied US troops in the field many times, both on domestic and overseas training maneuvers and in Desert Storm, the Persian Gulf tanker war, the operations in Panama, Somalia and Haiti, peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. He was embedded with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit in Somalia and the 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne Division units for Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. In four trips to Iraq he has embedded with numerous units including the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment's 2nd Squadron in East Baghdad, the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines in al-Anbar and the 386th Air Expeditionary Wing.

With that - here's David's inaugural post at Politics Daily - Moving Target: The Pitfalls Facing US Air Power in Afghanistan.

... In Iraq, the war against insurgents was largely fought on city streets, by infantrymen, and the role of air power was limited. In Afghanistan, there are fewer US troops and a lot more territory to cover -- perfect conditions, it would seem, in which to use America's formidable power to strike from the air. But it is more difficult than it seems.

This is bad news for the US war effort in Afghanistan. It's not something easy to fix, like tweaking strategy, inventing a new target sensor, or selecting a 250-pound bomb instead of the 2,000-pounder. The problem is that the United States doesn't know who, exactly, it is fighting in Afghanistan, and it doesn't know where they are...

Much more at Politics Daily.

The PRT paved road through the Panjshir valley features gorgeous scenery contrasting with rusted hulks of Russian vehicles -- memorials to the Russian failure to control Massoud's Panjshir valley. The Taliban learned this lesson and didn't even challenge Massoud for control of Panjshir. Today, Panjshir is one of the most secure and peaceful provinces in Afghanistan. But the anger and impatience with Kabul is on the rise. Where is Massoud's successor as the leader of Afghanistan? The joke in Panjshir today is that Massoud died as a warrior but all Massoud's lieutenants became fat and rich.

Having met with many American officials in the early portion of my trip, the remaining days in Panjshir and Kabul focused on the perspectives of the Afghans themselves, from Governors to senior Karzai advisors to leading Kabul businessmen.

The lack of a political leadership or strategy in Afghanistan was obvious from both US and Afghan sources. The reconstruction effort has essentially created a corrupt welfare effort, with little political responsibility. The leadership on the Afghan side has been negligible. In my meetings, one Afghan governor went on for twenty minutes about how ineffective Karzai had been. Karzai's doesn't seem to take a strong position on anything. Meanwhile, US aid has been given out with no more strategy or conditionality than more the merrier" creating essentially a welfare economy rife with corruption and with no Afghan having much incentive to take responsibility or initiative. One former government official and Kabul businessman told us you have turned Afghanistan into a nation of conniving beggars."

Ambassador Holbrooke, so effective in applying leverage to chart a political course in the Bosnia and Kosovo, must apply a similar approach in Afghanistan. This means applying US and international leverage to demand much more from the Karzai government and Afghan political officials in terms of taking responsibility, countering corruption, and countering Taliban influence in eastern tribal areas. We must single out or sideline those Afghans that are content to milk the reconstruction effort and not challenge militant influence in their areas. We must challenge substantive corruption that threatens key political objectives in reconstruction. And we must view the application of force primarily in political terms, not military terms.

None of this is to suggest that the US choose the next President of Afghanistan. When one Afghan politician advised me that the US choose more carefully than they did with Karzai, I firmly noted that it was the responsibility of the Afghans themselves to choose their leadership. No American anointed President can hold credibility or legitimacy in Afghanistan.

The blame for this political ineffectiveness in Afghanistan lays with both Karzai and the Bush team. Both have neglected their responsibilities in Afghanistan over the past six years. Obama's enhanced focus on Afghanistan is apparent, but it is too early to see effects. State has outlined a broad enhancement to the civilian capacity both in Kabul and in the field. The elevation and/or reshuffling of political and now military US leadership in Afghanistan is the clearest indication of both higher priority and a new direction. A new strategy is in play in broad strokes but the application in the field is not underway substantially.

Others are also thinking strategically about Afghanistan. Perhaps the most stunning and visual construction effort in Panjshir is Massoud's tomb - a massive undertaking impressively perched on a mid-valley promontory. This project, a worthy memorial for Afghanistan's fallen hero, is funded by Tehran for pennies compared to the US reconstruction effort.

Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and soft power" types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.