On Leadership is a new Washington Post section featuring a weekly video series and panel discussion hosted by former Washington Post Executive Editor Ben Bradlee and Pulitzer Prize-winning Post Columnist Steven Pearlstein. The section offers inspiration and practical advice on how to be an effective, successful leader in a political, financial and technological environment. Craig Mullaney, a West Point graduate, Rhodes Scholar, former Army Captain and author talks about the challenging experiences that made him a leader. In the first video. In the first video, Mullaney recalls his time in the dangerous mountains of Afghanistan and learning that true leadership grows out of hardship and a sense of duty. In the second video, he shares stories from his leadership training experiences; including what he calls his Army Ranger "Ph D in endurance."

After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq by John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton

Since 2003, debates about America's role in Iraq have focused on how to withdraw U.S. forces. Yet the search for an end game" emphasizes a short-term objective - getting out of Iraq - and sidesteps the strategic imperative of establishing an enduring relationship with a key country in a region of vital importance to the United States. It is time for America to take the long view. Neither Iraq nor America's stake in a stable, peaceful, secure Middle East will vanish when the last American combat brigade departs. American policymakers must advance U.S. interests in Iraq and the Middle East through a long-term, low-profile engagement to help resolve Iraq's internal challenges, strengthen its government and economic institutions, and integrate it as a constructive partner in the region.

Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Andrew M. Exum, Nathaniel C. Fick, Ahmed A. Humayun and David J. Kilcullen

Eight years into the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, the situation is as perilous as ever and continuing to worsen. The campaign has been further complicated by a rapidly deteriorating security situation in Pakistan, where the center of gravity of the insurgency has now shifted. In counterinsurgency campaigns, momentum matters. Over the next 12 months, the United States and its allies must seize the initiative back from the Taliban and other hostile actors. This paper makes four operational recommendations and gives specific metrics by which the administration can gage its progress.

Natural Security by Sharon Burke

In the 21st century, the security of nations will increasingly depend on the security of natural resources, or natural security." The modern global economy depends on access to energy, minerals, potable water and arable land to meet the rising expectations of a growing world population, and that access is by no means assured. At the same time, increasing consumption of these resources has consequences, such as climate change and biodiversity loss, which will challenge the security of the United States and nations all over the world. Natural security ultimately means sufficient, reliable, affordable, and sustainable supplies of natural resources for the modern global economy. This will require the United States to both shape and respond to emerging natural resources challenges in a changing global strategic environment. This concept paper outlines a new program of study at the Center for a New American Security that will examine emerging natural resources challenges in six key areas of consumption and consequences -- energy, minerals, water, land, climate change, and biodiversity -- as well as the ways in which these challenges are linked together. Any solution to the country's energy insecurity is likely to involve water, non-fuel minerals, and land-use issues; climate change and biodiversity cut across all concerns, with broad effects on resource vulnerability. Without an integrated, national-level approach that links together natural security challenges, the United States runs the risk of trading one dependency for another and exacerbating the consequences.

The Obama Plan for Energy and Climate Security: Conference Proceedings and Final Recommendations by Christine Parthemore

On April 29, 2009, the Center for a New American Security convened a group of scientists, investors, business executives, academics, nonprofit representatives, defense professionals, and federal, state, and local officials to discuss how to implement President Obama's energy and climate security goals. The conference was the culmination of a year-long CNAS project, called the Big Energy Map, which examined the role the federal government is playing and can play in protecting and promoting the nation's energy security. This report is a compilation and analysis of the proceedings of the April 29 Big Energy Map conference. Drawing on the discussions and recommendations of the group of experts, CNAS has identified three main recommendations for the Obama Administration: draft a comprehensive national strategy; link that strategy to a major, systems-level demonstration project for a future, low-carbon energy economy; and create a scorecard to track progress and capture lessons learned from the historical level of federal investment in energy and climate security.

Beyond Bullets: Strategies for Countering Violent Extremism by Kristin M. Lord, John A. Nagl, Seth D. Rosen, David Kilcullen, Larry Diamond, Camille Pecastaing, Harvey M. Sapolsky, Daniel Benjamin, and Alice E. Hunt (editor)

To counter the threat from violent Islamist extremism more effectively, the Center for a New American Security launched a strategy development process modeled after President Eisenhower's Project Solarium. CNAS asked five experts to recast the effort to defeat al-Qaeda in sustainable terms consistent with American values. The result is a series of essays, produced in this report, that recommend a rich array of counterterrorism tools and strategies for the new administration.

Beyond Bullets: A Pragmatic Strategy to Combat Violent Islamist Extremism by Kristin M. Lord, John A. Nagl, and Seth Rosen

This paper, which is part of a larger edited volume, presents a pragmatic and comprehensive strategy to combat violent Islamist extremism, one that engages all appropriate instruments of national power in a cohesive vision for action. As other national security concerns proliferate, the authors argue, America must re-commit to countering violent extremism by employing an approach that is sustainable, properly resourced, grounded in bipartisan political support, and bolstered by a dense network of partnerships that engages actors both inside and outside of government. The authors establish a clear analysis of the threat, a realistic vision of success, and strategic principles to guide U.S. actions. They also offer specific ways and means" in order to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives.

Inside the Surge: One Commander's Lessons in Counterinsurgency by Lieutenant Colonel James R. Crider, Foreword: Thomas E. Ricks

When Lieutenant Colonel Jim Crider arrived in the Doura neighborhood of Baghdad in February of 2007 as the commander of 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment out of Fort Riley, Kansas, the Sunni neighborhood appeared beyond hope. The streets were largely empty of life and the air was filled with the foul smell of burning trash and open sewage. Improvised explosive devices, small arms fire, hand grenades, and dead bodies were a normal part of every 1-4 CAV patrol in the spring and early summer of 2007. However, through the ruthless implementation of the counterinsurgency principles outlined in Army Field Manual 3-24 and several pragmatic decisions along the way, the neighborhood began to turn in July of 2007. By the end of September, the unit had seen the last attack on its forces. Businesses reopened, the streets were full of people, and there was hope. This paper contains some of the primary lessons learned during their 14 month combat tour and has been called the first in-depth review offered by an American battalion commander about post-invasion operations in Iraq."

... Having said all that, 2006 may represent something of a watershed; it's probably too soon to tell but my hunch is that the stuff which John Mackinlay and David Kilcullen are writing about global insurgency is significant. Kilcullen's Accidental Guerrilla has garnered a ton of deserved praise. And having seen several chapters of Mackinlay's book The Insurgent Archipelago which is about to be published, I think he pushes the envelope further still. He reckons that there has been a sea change from Maoist to 'Post-Maoist' insurgency: Maoist insurgent objectives were national whereas Post-Maoist objectives are global; the population involved in Maoist insurgency was manageable (albeit with difficulty) whereas the populations (note the plural) involved in Post-Maoist insurgency are dispersed and unmanageable; the centre of gravity in Maoist insurgency was local or national whereas in Post-Maoist insurgency it is multiple and possibly irrelevant; the all important subversion process in Maoist insurgency was top-down whereas in Post-Maoist insurgency it is bottom-up; Maoist insurgent organization was vertical and structured whereas in Post-Maoism it is an unstructured network; and whereas Maoist insurgency took place in a real and territorial context the Post-Maoist variant's vital operational environment is virtual. My question is whether this is still insurgency or has it evolved into something else sufficiently different as to be actually something else?

Mor at Kings of War.

... the British role in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is slowly being consigned to the memory hole. To listen to most American commentators on the wars, you would not even know the British are there. Indeed, we only hear about them when one is accidentally killed by US fire, or when they are reducing their troop commitments (which makes it look like they are running away). Even conservative American commentators have had a somewhat condescending attitude towards the British forces, blaming them for the policies of the British government that, e.g., had them passively watch while Iranian Guards took a Zodiac full of British sailors hostage, or when it had them stand by while Shiite militias occupied their former base camp. But soldiers only follow the orders they are given by their civilian masters, and would we really want it any other way?

It is fortunate, therefore, that British veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan are finally putting their stories down on paper, and that these books are beginning to make their way into the American market. Two recent releases document with perception, wit, and humanity the unique experiences of two extraordinary British soldiers, which should put to rest any idea that the British army is becoming effete or less capable than it has been since Marlborough's day...

More at The Weekly Standard.

Pritzker Military Library

610 North Fairbanks Court, 2nd Floor

Chicago, IL 60611

Phone: 312.587.0234

RSVP: events@pritzkermilitarylibrary.net

Member Reception - 5:00pm cst

Presentation & Live Webcast - 6:00pm cst

It's not that we haven't fought the war in Iraq before, argues David Kilcullen. We have - the U.S. and its allies have dealt with similar conflicts in post-war Germany, in Vietnam, in the Balkans, and even against the IRA. The difference is that, back then, we weren't fighting all of those wars at the same time, on top of each other, tied together at the wrists and kicking.

Kilcullen has worked as an officer and military advisor on the ground in hotspots ranging from East Africa to the jungles of the Philippines. In 2007, he served as Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to Gen. David Petraeus during the planning and implementation of the Iraq troop "surge". The Accidental Guerilla describes the situation in Iraq as Kilcullen sees it: a hybrid war that combines the insurgency of the Viet Cong, the challenge of nation-building after years of dictatorship in post-war Germany, the sectarian strife in the Balkans, and the domestic terrorism of the IRA.

The "accidental guerillas" of the title are people who fight not because they hate the West or have any desire to see it overthrown, but because their space has been invaded by a large outside force as it tries to deal with a small, extremist element like al Qaeda - which then manipulates and exploits the backlash against the larger force, thereby creating the "accidental guerillas" and turning them into a loosely cooperative group.

Drawing from his experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and lesser-known conflicts in West Java, East Timor, Pakistan, and southern Thailand, Kilcullen describes a maddening state of affairs where solutions to some problems only deepen others, and the military prowess of the U.S. in high-tech conventional warfare is virtually no help at all. In his final estimation, there are no across-the-board answers to counter-insurgency - only to adapt to the unique challenges of each one, and devote focus to securing the population along with defeating the enemy.

Kilcullen is a contributor to Small Wars Journal and Military Review. He retired from the Australian Army as a lieutenant colonel after twenty years of service. He is currently a counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency advisor to NATO and several governments, including the United States, and a senior fellow at the EastWest Institute.

The Pentagon is preparing to graduate its first pilots of unmanned drones from the elite US Air Force Weapons School - a version of the Navy's Top Gun program - in a bid to elevate the skills and status of the officers who fly Predators, one of the military's fastest growing aircraft programs.

The elite flight schools of the Air Force and Navy are most closely associated with smart, tough fighter jocks. But over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the MQ-1 Predator and more heavily armed MQ-9 Reaper craft have become, to many in the Pentagon, the most important aircraft the US has deployed.

In 2006, the Air Force was able to fly only 12 drones at a time. Today, the service flies 34 regular combat air patrols. As the program has expanded, the job of keeping the best pilots flying drones has proved to be a challenge.

Until recently, pilots would work on the Predators and Reapers, then return to their assigned aircraft. But the Air Force would like officers to make a career out of flying unmanned craft and become experts at operating the drones...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

It was no accident that former vice president Dick Cheney chose the American Enterprise Institute as the venue for his full-throated defense last month of the Bush administration's national security policies. In the Bush years, AEI wielded significant influence and helped develop major initiatives on national security, including the surge in Iraq.

In the era of Obama, however, the Center for a New American Security may emerge as Washington's go-to think tank on military affairs. Founded in 2007, CNAS has already filled key posts in the new administration (such as former CNAS president Michele Flournoy, who is now undersecretary of defense for policy), and its top people include John Nagl, who helped draft the Army's counterinsurgency manual, and David Kilcullen, a former adviser to Gen. David H. Petraeus. Now CNAS has completed a 31-page report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, advising Team Obama on how to best meet its goal to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in its safe haven in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future."

More at The Washington Post.

Sacrifice and the Greatest Generation - Tom Brokaw, Wall Street Journal.

When asked how I came to write The Greatest Generation, I recount a trip to Normandy in 1984. I went there to produce a documentary on the 40th anniversary of D-Day. I had looked forward to a week of stirring stories, evenings of oysters and Calvados, and long runs through the countryside.

Instead, from the moment I stepped onto Omaha Beach with two veterans of the First Division I had an out-of-body experience. Geno Merli, who earned the Medal of Honor, and Harry Garton, who lost both legs in combat, landed in the first wave at Omaha. Working-class products from Pennsylvania, they were soft-spoken and matter-of-fact as they described for me the horrors of that day and all the fighting that was yet to come.

More at The Wall Street Journal.

One small part of President Obama's much-heralded speech in Cairo this week hit squarely the two key planks of both the US and the UK's Afghanistan/Pakistan policy: 1) a promise to bring troops out as soon as we are confident that there is no threat emanating from" violent extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan determined to kill as many Americans [or Brits] as they possibly can"; and 2) a promise to continue building and strengthening our respective relationships with the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments and people, not least through long-term, non-military assistance programmes.

Obama said: "make no mistake: we do not want to keep our troops in Afghanistan. We seek no military bases there". To the extent that we can work out accurately the motivations of the various parts of the insurgency in Afghanistan, we continually find that straightforward nationalism plays a part (just one part). The stationing of one country's troops on another country's soil has always, and almost universally, generated this characteristic, anywhere in the world. The people of Afghanistan, of whichever ethnic group, are no exception. We need to continue to make clear that we have no designs on any form of long-term, military occupation of these proud people.

But in the same breath, this policy needs to be balanced by another clear message - again President Obama brought it out in his speech. While the US and UK, and all our other allies, want to bring our combat troops home as soon as we can, we also want to emphasize that our governments are setting up a long-term commitment to support Afghanistan and Pakistan, politically and through our respective overseas aid departments. Obama said: "we also know that military power alone is not going to solve the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is why we plan to invest $1.5 billion each year over the next five years to partner with Pakistanis to build schools and hospitals, roads and businesses, and hundreds of millions to help those who have been displaced". The UK has committed $811 million to Afghanistan over the next four years - this is one our biggest overseas aid commitments. We need to reinforce the message at every turn that we are not going to cut and run. We will not leave both coutries to whatever fate befalls them, once we decide that the threat to us has subsided.

A tip of the hat - or tam - some SWJ types are of Scots heritage - to the British Embassy for sharing this with our community. Cheers.

Key take-aways:

Mattis discussed how today's adversaries have adapted to U.S. conventional military superiority by forming disaggregated networks of small irregular teams that hide among indigenous populations. United States military forces, by contrast, have only come under greater central control. According to Mattis, this shift is due to evolutions in intelligence-gathering and communications technologies. Call it the new iron law of military bureaucracies: when commanders gain the technical ability to micromanage, they will micromanage...

Perhaps the most interesting question raised by Mattis's speeech is not whether the youngest soldiers can rise to the new demands that would be placed on them, but whether the colonels and generals -- and their civilian masters above -- will be able to relinquish the tight control technology has given them and to which they have become so accustomed. Will they ever acquire the courage necessary to trust a decentralized and distributed force of independent small units to find its own way of achieving the goals of a campaign? Mattis believes that this is the only path to success against tomorrow's enemies. What general or politician will have the nerve to take it?