War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age

By Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker

My copy just arrived and from a quick scan through the United States (Small Wars Journal discussed here as an example of a public community of practice and our new media discussion several months ago is cited) and United Kingdom chapters - looks very informative and interesting - I will have a detailed review later.

Book Description

The rise of insurgencies and the rise of the Web are two grassroots trends that are operating in tandem to put modern armies under huge pressure to adapt new forms of counterinsurgency to new forms of social war.

War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age argues that two intimately connected trends are putting modern armies under huge pressure to adapt: the rise of insurgencies and the rise of the Web. Both in cyberspace and in warfare, the grassroots public has assumed increasing importance in recent years. After the dot-com bubble burst in 2000, Web 2.0 rose from the ashes. This newly interactive and participatory form of the Web promotes and enables offline action. Similarly, after Rumsfeld's attempt to transform the US military into a lean, lethal, computerized force crashed in Iraq in 2003, counterinsurgency rose from the ashes. Counterinsurgency is a social form of war—indeed, the U.S. Army calls it armed social work—in which the local matrix population becomes the center of strategic gravity and public opinion at home the critical vulnerability.

War 2.0 traces the contrasting ways in which insurgents and counterinsurgents have adapted the new media platforms to the new forms of irregular conflict. It examines the public affairs policies of the U.S. land forces, the British Army, and the Israeli Defense Force. Then it compares the media-based counterinsurgency methods of these conventional armies to the more successful methods devised by their asymmetric adversaries, showing how such organizations as Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Hezbollah use the Web not merely to advertise their political agenda and influence public opinion, but to mobilize insurrections and put insurgent operations into action. But the same technology that tends to level the operational playing field in irregular warfare also incurs a heavy cost in terms of the popularity of insurgencies.

Authors

Thomas Rid is a Research Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He was a Research Fellow at the RAND Corporation, the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. He organized a conference of the leading exponents of counterinsurgency doctrine from the U.S. Army, the British Army, the Armee de Terre, and the Bundeswehr and directed the foreign policy program of the American Academy in Berlin. He is the author of War and Media Operations and co-editor of Understanding Counterinsurgency Warfare. His articles appear regularly in such periodicals as Policy Review, Military Review, Die Zeit, Neue Zuricher Zeitung, Der Tagesspiegel, and Merkur.

Marc Hecker is a Research Fellow at the Security Studies Center of the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales in Paris. He is the author or co-editor of a presse francaise et la premiere guerre du Golfe, La defense des interets de l'Etat d'Israel en France, and Une vie d'Afghanistan. He is an editor of Politique Etrangere. His articles appear in such periodicals as Politique Etrangere, Le Figaro, Liberation, Etudes, and Ramses.

According to the U.S. government's Energy Information Agency (EIA), Iran's oil fields suffer natural production declines of 8-11% per year, constituting 400,000-700,000 barrels per day of crude oil production lost each year.

As all energy producers must do, Iran compensates for natural production decline with the development of new fields and by stretching the production of old fields through enhanced recovery techniques. But the easy finds have already been exploited and new production and recovery is much more technically challenging. For example, Iran seeks to boost the production of its South Pars natural gas field in order to pump pressurized natural gas into declining oil fields to extract additional crude oil. According to the EIA Iran is highly dependent on foreign expertise to achieve its increasingly difficult production goals.

Steady or declining production combined with rising domestic consumption will mean falling net Iranian oil exports, reaching zero by perhaps 2015. Iran requires foreign partners in its energy sector to avoid this outcome. Yesterday's AP story about rising political risk for investors in Iran darkens the outlook for Iran's financial and economic stability.

The Pentagon will adopt a new strategy that for the first time orders the military to anticipate that future conflicts will include a complex mix of conventional, set-piece battles and campaigns against shadowy insurgents and terrorists, according to senior officials.

The shift is intended to assure that the military is prepared to deal with a spectrum of possible threats, including computer network attacks, attempts to blind satellite positioning systems, strikes by precision missiles and roadside bombs, and propaganda campaigns waged on television and the Internet. The new strategy has broad implications for training, troop deployment, weapons procurement and other aspects of military planning.

In officially embracing hybrid warfare, the Pentagon would be replacing a second pillar of long-term planning. Senior officials disclosed in March that the review was likely to reject a historic premise of American strategy- that the nation need only to prepare to fight two major wars at a time...

More at The New York Times.

As Congress turns to the defense budget, battles over constituency politics and cost overruns will mask a deeper story. Defense budgets represent the nation's effort to meet the demands of warfare, and this one in particular reflects an underlying debate over the future of war.

A younger generation of officers and civilian analysts shaped by Iraq and Afghanistan sees the future of war in low-intensity conflicts with non-state actors. Conventional wars between states are a thing of the past, they argue, so high-tech major weapon programs and heavy military formations are dinosaurs in a world of guerilla warfare and terrorism. The military (and the defense budget) should get on with it and transform to emphasize the low-tech weapons, cultural skills, and boots on the ground needed for a future of counterinsurgency and nation-building...

Much more at the Council on Foreign Relations.

... In Counterinsurgency 2.0, the Democrats and their military partners now emphasize a population-centric" over an enemy-centric" approach, rebooting the old clear, hold, and build" by adding a civilian surge" and a ramped-up humanitarian mission. The goal for Afghanistan is to flood the country with Foreign Service officers, diplomats, and aid workers to fight corruption and rebuild institutions. The military serves to protect populations, open up space" for democracy, and eventually marginalize the enemy.

So far it's not happening that way. The Pentagon has maintained a lead on operations, and according to reports, there just aren't enough State Department officials to make a dent in Kabul, so DoD is planning to take up the slack by directing capable Reserve officers (and probably private contractors) toward the civilian component.

Many have been left wondering what happened to Obama's promise to re-orient foreign policy so that it is not so military-centric and whether he will end up authorizing new forces beyond the 68,000 U.S. troops expected in Afghanistan by the end of the year.

We've basically turned our foreign policy over to the military," fumed one national-security analyst from a competing Washington think tank who did not want to be named. Every problem has a military solution. Every problem is a nail because we have a hammer. I think you're starting to see that at CNAS."

Open criticism of CNAS is rare because the COINdinistas are so snug in the Beltway bosom. While Republican warhawks love that CNAS speaks their language, antiwar liberals and others who chafe against the Long War find themselves derided...

Much more at The American Conservative.

Also, in the latest issue of Joint Force Quarterly, John Nagl and Gian Gentile continue the COIN debate with letters to the editor.

The Wall Street Journal sent an intrepid reporter to a beach on Kauai to get some thoughts from the locals about the prospect of ICBM bombardment.

President Obama and his national security staff will have to ponder more than just their defensive preparations. Should North Korea make even a failed attempt to strike a Hawaiian island, what practical and political pressures will the President face to retaliate against North Korea?

John Pike of Globalsecurity plotted North Korea's April 2009 Taepodong-2 test on this graphic. This launch was intended to achieve low earth orbit, with a trajectory in the general direction of Hawaii. The flight failed to achieve orbit and impacted at sea not even half way to Hawaii.

As President Obama and his advisers contemplate how to respond to a possible North Korean missile attack on Hawaii, they must first try to understand North Korea's motives. Why would the North Korean leadership risk or even attempt to incite U.S. retaliation?

In a military crisis, which side perceives itself to have escalation dominance"? Which side believes that its position will improve the more the military crisis escalates?

From a conventional military perspective, it would seem that the U.S.-South Korean side possesses escalation dominance. U.S. air and naval power would finally get an opportunity to bash North Korea's known and suspected nuclear and missile installations. If it came to ground combat, North Korea's undertrained and undersupplied forces likely would not last long. True, North Korean tube and rocket artillery holds part of Seoul hostage. But South Korea can partially mitigate this threat through civil defense preparation and counter-battery fire. And should North Korea actually make good on this threat, the regime must know that that would be the end for them.

Thus even a failed North Korean missile strike on Hawaii would seem to be a gross miscalculation. It would offer the U.S. a chance to stop the North Korean proliferation threat for good.

But maybe the North Korean leadership doesn't see it this way. First, based on past experience North Korea's leaders may believe that they possess escalation dominance. From their perspective, previous crises have resulted in diplomatic flurries, the arrival of emissaries, negotiations, and, very frequently, payments to North Korea.

Second, North Korea may be looking for a way to patch up fraying relations with China and Russia. North Korea's leaders may see a threatened or actual U.S. attack on North Korea as a very effective way of renewing North Korea's security relationships with China and Russia.

Finally, an ICBM launch directed at Hawaii would be a good way of collecting data on the U.S. missile defense system, a procedure that perhaps the Chinese and Russians are quietly encouraging. Russian and Chinese intelligence-gathering ships, aircraft, and satellites would welcome a chance to observe the U.S. turning on its missile defense radars and communications systems.

Unless the U.S. absolutely has to attempt an intercept of an incoming ICBM, President Obama's likely preference would be to simply ignore North Korea's antics. With this course, he would preserve his flexibility and enhance his diplomatic advantage.

However, such a course may not be politically or practically feasible. In addition to the possible North Korean ICBM shot is the journey of the Kang Nam, a North Korean freighter suspected of carrying missile components prohibited by UN Security Council resolutions. USS John S. McCain is following the freighter which may be headed for a port in Myanmar.

The U.S. will not get any cooperation from Myanmar authorities regarding an inspection of the Kang Nam. Should the Obama administration fail to respond to both the Kang Nam and a North Korean missile shot aimed at Hawaii, it risks coming under stern criticism for having a feckless policy toward North Korea. At a practical level, U.S. allies in Asia will have new questions about the value of U.S. security guarantees. And bolder challenges to the Obama administration (not just from North Korea) would be inevitable.

If both sides in a conflict believe they possess escalation dominance, escalation becomes likely. But both sides can't be right. Wars are typically the result of miscalculation. It is remarkable that miscalculation over North Korean brinkmanship has not already occurred.

Also at Foreign Policy, an exclusive interview with Mir Hossein Mousavi's external spokesman describing this week's protests in Iran as another revolution - and Mousavi as Iran's Obama.

But wait, there's more at FP, Blake Hounshell describes war on the streets of Tehran, Daniel Drezner thinks it's pretty clear that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is not going to retrench, Evgeny Morozov discusses the repercussions of a Twitter revolution, Stephen Walt says we shouldn't succumb to the illusion that Ahmadinejad's defeat and Mousavi's triumph would produce a dramatic shift in Iran's foreign policy, and Laura Rozen provides Iran news links.

And in the not at FP category - The New York Time's The Lede blog has "blow by blow" coverage with extensive links to the situation in Iran to include Twitter, Facebook, etc...

Of course, these links are by no means an exhaustive listing of the mainstream and new media reports streaming out of and about Iran - please post your top sources in comments below - thanks much!

The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars

By David H. Ucko

SWJ friend and colleague David Ucko's latest contribution to our community of interest -- to be released in August -- you can pre-order a copy at Amazon. Considering David's previous work -- this should be very good and quite an informative read.

Book Description

Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to "re-learn" counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures?

In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD's institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance--all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations. After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, Ucko focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process.

Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. Ucko clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.

About the Author

David Ucko is a transatlantic fellow at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin, Germany and an adjunct fellow at the RAND Corporation, specializing in counterinsurgency, stability operations, and conflict analysis. He has previously worked as a research fellow at the Department of War Studies, King's College London, and as a deputy defense analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Early Reviews

This is an important book for anyone interested in the U.S. military's effort to learn from contemporary conflict and adapt to the demands of counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq. Ucko's thorough research and incisive analysis have produced one of the most valuable books on military affairs to appear in recent years.

--H. R. McMaster, Brigadier General select, U.S. Army and author of Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam

This is hot-off-the-press history, an essential look at how the Pentagon has--and has not--changed in response to the Iraq war.

--Thomas E. Ricks, author of Fiasco and The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-08

The Ministry of Defence intends to cut army manpower to its lowest level since the Crimean war.

Plans to axe three infantry battalions - a total of 1,800 men - are being discussed despite the overstretch caused by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This would see the size of the army drop below 100,000 for the first time since the 1850s.

The army is so desperate to protect funding for Afghanistan that it could offer cuts only in infantry units to meet demands for savings.

General Sir David Richards, the incoming head of the army, offered to sacrifice The Green Howards, the regiment of General Sir Richard Dannatt, the current head of the army.

The plan was discussed at a high-level meeting of the army, the navy and the RAF in Whitehall last Tuesday. The defence ministry said this weekend it could not discuss the proposed cuts because next year's planning round was ongoing".

The RAF proposed the scrapping of Harrier jump jets while the navy proposed axing Type42 destroyers early, and putting back the replacement for its frigates for 20 years...

More at The Times.

by Dr. Nadia Schadlow

I like William Easterly because he's usually right on the money. The respected economist took on the aid-industrial complex in his trenchant analysis of the persistent dysfunctions of the development community, White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. In that book, which is very much worth reading, Easterly carefully documents how decades of aid failed to produce desired outcomes because it ignored local realities, tended to apply utopian" plans, lacked approaches to measure and evaluate actual outcomes (as opposed to money spent), and ultimately, failed to impose any accountability for failure. Thus, literally billions of dollars have been wasted, with few material benefits for the individuals on the ground such aid sought to help.

Nonetheless, on his NYU post, in which Easterly takes on the Army's new Stability Operations manual (FM 3-07) for being too utopian and exemplifying a tendency toward social engineering" gone awry, I think his analysis is mistaken. Easterly is conflating the need for preparation under fire, with the desire to build a colonial Army that would go out and change the world. He argues that The danger is that, if put into practice, such delusions create excessive ambition, which creates excessive use of military force, which kills real human beings, Afghans and Iraqis."

The Army has learned the hard way that the failure to prepare for the intensely political machinations of war can cost both military and civilian lives. It was apparent within days after the fall of Baghdad in April of 2003, that navigating the political landscape of Iraq would become paramount for any consolidation of the operational successes that had just occurred. U.S. political leaders failed to understand too. Over and over again, accounts during the next few years in Iraq, revealed how many young captains, majors and lieutenant colonels had to learn on the ground, under fire, literally, as they sought to figure out the murky politics of getting Iraqis to stop killing each other. Yes, we could have just left, but most agreed that a bloodbath would have ensued - an outcome that was not in U.S. interests.

This manual reflects the Army's first effort, in a long, long time, to institutionalize lessons related to the political challenges inherent in any war. It reflects an understanding that wars are not just about force on force combat, but fundamentally about politics. And like it or not, in every conflict in its history, the U.S. Army has been enmeshed in politics on the ground. This does not mean it wants to go out and change the world. Few Army officers would express such a view: indeed, Army engineers aren't eager to become social engineers. Rather, it means they don't want to be caught off guard.

Sure, the issues raised in the Stability Operations manual are daunting. From spurring economic development, to addressing the root causes of conflict, to integrating the use of military force with non-military actors -- we wouldn't wish these kinds of complex challenges on our enemies. But spelling them out and thinking about how to approach conflict as more than a force-on-force problem is a requirement and a responsibility for U.S. political and military leaders. Precisely because such challenges are inherent to war and are so daunting, they should give pause to US political leaders who make the decision to go to war. But if, after careful consideration, political leaders make a decision to use force, we might as well have the best prepared Army that we possibly can. That's what this manual is about.

Dr. Nadia Schadlow is a senior program officer at the Smith Richardson Foundation who has written widely on issues related to stability and reconstruction operations.