Transforming the National Security Culture
A Report of the Harvard Kennedy School's
Defense Leadership Project
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The team would like to express its tremendous gratitude for everyone who contributed to this project. Paulina Perepelkin, this project would not have been possible. We are especially indebted to our guest speakers who came to Harvard to discuss these issues freely and candidly. Their keen insight offered an education that only deepened what we received in the classroom. General David Petraeus demonstrated his personal commitment to developing the next generation of leaders—speaking with us via teleconference from Iraq during one of the most trying times of the war. Sir, we are profoundly grateful for your time. We would also like to thank the Department of Social Sciences at West Point for its guidance, Donald and Betsy Dixon and the Center for Public Leadership for their generous financial support; and Professor David Gergen for his unflagging encouragement. A special thanks to the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College for their kind assistance with research. Last, but by no means least, we would like to thank the men and women who serve daily within the national security community. For the Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine, and Coast Guardsman, to the intelligence officer, strategist, diplomat, development worker, and federal agent, we offer this simple report in the hope that a few of its ideas might make your jobs easier, safer, or more rewarding.
Transforming the National Security Culture

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General Edward C. Meyer, former Army Chief of Staff, has compared our best leaders to diamonds. Just as the diamond requires three properties for its formation—carbon, heat, and pressure—successful leaders require the interaction of three properties—character, knowledge, and application. We at the Harvard Kennedy School seek to foster an environment in which our student leaders can develop their character, expand their knowledge, and launch into promising career trajectories through the application of newly polished skills for the benefit of our nation’s security. The Harvard Kennedy School Defense Leadership Project is a proud example of the work that can be produced in this environment.

As we seek to generate and promote more effective leadership in national security policy, we are deeply committed to bridging the gap between leadership theory and practice. Supporting collaborative thinking among experts in the field is critical to this objective. The student-generated Defense Leadership Project aptly sought to address a critical shortfall in national security leadership through its collaborative endeavor. As this report attests, the Defense Leadership Project specifically created unprecedented opportunities for reflection and discovery for students and prominent practitioners from different disciplines, sectors, and cultures to elicit proactive solutions to tomorrow’s challenges.

Well-trained and equipped leaders sharing collaborative mentalities are paramount for successfully preserving our national security. The combined support of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, and the Center for Public Leadership speaks to the shared belief in the importance of this initiative, and the associated recommendations. We applaud the students involved in the Defense Leadership Project and the energy this team put into organizing guest speakers and writing this report. We hope our nation’s leaders might draw from their informed and insightful findings.
When the Center for Public Leadership at the Harvard Kennedy School brings together graduate students and national security students at Harvard—military veterans, homeland security officials, intelligence officers, private security contractors, and others—in a Defense Leadership Project, one expects powerful results as they work with distinguished guest panelists. After all, it’s Harvard, the Kennedy School, David Gergen’s Center for Public Leadership, and our own country’s security leaders. We have great expectations.

Rarely do results of such an intellectual engagement provide the call to action that this report delivers. Not an academic treatise, this is a tough report by people on the ground, across the sectors, examining every aspect of the defense community, and this is the powerful result. And it’s all about leadership, the leaders of the future required right across the national security community, to lead, respond, mobilize, inspire, build the alliances and partnerships an uncertain future demands in the emerging security environment.

The formal recommendations the panel makes in this report are sobering and illuminating and fall into four categories:

• Finding critical talent
• Transforming talent into institutional capability
• Reforming the existing organization to promote balance and interoperability
• Accelerating generational change.

Three powerful messages flow through the recommendations, the rationale, and the call to action in this report:

• A massive need for change in the national security organizations and community to prepare our leaders to meet future threats
• Emerging leaders, the new generation of national security professional workers, will generate the change essential to meet evolving challenges
• The inspiring ideas will come from bright young minds committed to our security establishment who know change is the leadership imperative of our time.
Peter Drucker once said, “I never predict. I simply look out the window and see what is visible but not yet seen.”

At Harvard, our Defense Leadership Project team performed an essential function, essential if we are to sustain the democracy. They “looked out the window” and in their report describe what is visible to them, not yet seen by most. It is a call for the transformation of our National Security establishment—not by outside critics, but by the people of the system, within the walls, called to serve, committed to the mission, determined to provide the greatest security system in the most cohesive security community. It is a call for massive change.

A civilian honored to be writing this preface is grateful to the young men and women, the emerging leaders of the security establishment, who bring this report to us, grateful that action will follow their vision of the future of our country's security, the future of our country.

May I end with a message of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, quoted in this report, that closes with, “An unconventional era of warfare requires unconventional thinkers.” Delete “warfare” and we have another great battle cry for all of us: “an unconventional era requires unconventional thinkers.” And, we would add, “requires principled leaders of the future at every level of every institution if we are to sustain the democracy.” The Defense Leadership Report and the Defense Leadership Project team lead the way, and we are grateful.

Frances Hesselbein
Chairman, Board of Governors, Leader to Leader Institute
The Defense Leadership Project was an innovative study group sponsored by Harvard Kennedy School’s Center for Public Leadership. It was formed by combining the energy of national security students at Harvard University with the wisdom of distinguished guest panelists from senior levels of government and academia. The graduate students who initiated the program were deeply concerned that leaders within the defense community were increasingly ill-equipped to understand, visualize, or respond effectively to the modern security environment. Composed mainly of midcareer students with fresh operational experience, the group included military veterans, homeland security officials, intelligence officers, private security contractors, and many others. While the diverse backgrounds certainly produced many differing opinions regarding national security, this team of rivals unanimously agreed on the need for more adaptive, strategically minded leadership in our defense community. To this end, they asked themselves:

How can the defense community develop leaders at all levels capable of operating effectively in the emerging security environment? Specifically, what policies can be undertaken to promote a culture within the national security community that recruits, develops, and promotes leaders who are adaptable, interagency-minded, and comfortable operating across complex ethnic, religious, linguistic, and socioeconomic borders?

The panel explored the trends shaping the security environment. We face an Era of Persistent Conflict, in which local and regional frictions, fueled by the economic disruptions and demographic shifts of globalization, are exploited by extremists to damage U.S. security interests abroad. At the same time, however, conventional threats and peer competitors are vigorously developing technologies that are leading to new threats in space and cyberspace. Bearing in mind this emerging environment, the panel identified several key leadership factors that will become increasingly important for our national security leaders to acknowledge.

**Specialized, multidisciplinary knowledge** – The lack of a monolithic enemy and the complex cultural terrain involved in irregular warfare will likely force individual leaders and operators to learn or rapidly access a high degree of specialized, but multidisciplinary knowledge.

**Understanding of Norms vs. Procedures** – The threat of catastrophic terrorism and the difficulty in predicting a future threat with any degree of certainty will require ad hoc task forces and working groups from various institutions that can work together effectively based on established norms rather than bureaucratic rules and regulations.

**Police Investigative Skills** – The threat of catastrophic terrorism has placed ever greater importance on the early disruption of terrorist networks and the effective processing of criminal evidence from disparate sources; these demands have shifted much of the burden of traditional police work onto nonpolice actors such as the military and private contractors.
Language and Culture – The importance of language and culture in counterinsurgency and irregular warfare makes it critical that these skills be institutionalized in existing combat units through regional specializations.

Media savvy – The 24-hour news cycle, the growth of the “new media,” and the expanded access to television and internet within the developing world are causing a seismic shift in the importance of media savvy and information operations throughout the national security community.

Corporate Social Responsibility – The ever-expanding reach and interconnectivity of the global marketplace will force our multinational corporations to become de facto informal ambassadors, and will require an understanding of the private sector’s informal public diplomacy potential.

Individual Adaptability, Creativity, and Intellectual Capacity – Leaders at the lowest level must be trusted to receive strategic guidance with minimal details and be able to apply their own creative reasoning and judgment to meet the strategic end-state.

Building upon these leadership requirements, the panel developed the following policy ideas:

Finding critical talent: recruiting, retaining, and promoting the right leaders
- Develop new recruiting criteria for stability, reconstruction, and irregular warfare-intensive jobs.
- Move away from a ticket-punching, careerist mindset and allow for specialization and/or crossover if desired.
- Reform the existing “report card” scheme for leaders and incorporate 360° evaluations.
- Investigate individualized benefits packages to retain high performers.
- Enlist the help of academia, “stateside” institutions, and centers of excellence.
- Expand the number of viable paths to public service for promising individuals.

Transforming talent into institutionalized capability
- Develop institutionalized regional expertise.
- Implement a system for early language/culture designation for new military personnel.
- Increase opportunities for graduate-level study among junior/midlevel military officers.
- Reinvigorate strategic thinking at the junior leader level.
- Expand situational cross-training opportunities with local law enforcement, anthropologists, criminologists, border patrol, etc.
- Support the concept of a National Public Service Academy, or a similar institutionalized education program for the interagency.
Reforming existing organizations to promote balance and interoperability

- Re-examine the coordination mechanisms, laws, and patterns of interaction between multinational corporations and U.S. embassies abroad.
- Develop a program for community education and participation: Build a “neighborhood watch on steroids.”
- Reform contracting within federal agencies and the national security industrial base.

Accelerating generational change

- Expand the Army’s Center for Lessons Learned concept across agencies.
- Expand regional/cultural learning opportunities.
- Implement a system for “manual override” in promotion boards and key assignments

Implementing these changes will not be easy. There are significant internal obstacles that the national security community must overcome in order to effect credible change. These recommendations are only a beginning, and not a complete solution. Above all, the purpose of the project was to stimulate thinking, generate new ideas, and seed the debate over future policy. The task now falls to senior leaders to consider these proposals, promote change, and explore the limits of what is possible.
In late winter 2007, a small group of veterans attending Harvard University decided to challenge the status quo. Frustrated by their experiences overseas and what they perceived as a lack of innovative leadership within their own organizations, they sought to develop new ideas. They wanted to create something the business world would call a skunk works, an autonomous group of creative thinkers, charged with working on advanced projects. Enlisting the help of three separate research centers at Harvard—the Center for Public Leadership, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy (which also had played a role in the publication of the Army’s new counterinsurgency manual), and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs—the students took their proposal to the larger student body.

At a special reception for all Harvard graduate students who had served (or were serving) within the national security community, the students announced open applications for an initiative they called the Defense Leadership Project sponsored by the Harvard Kennedy School’s Center for Public Leadership. The response from the crowd—which had been full of veterans returned from combat tours, homeland security officials, intelligence analysts, private security consultants, and others—was overwhelming. Applications poured in, and after selecting the most talented, experienced, and creative individuals, the panel set to work defining its mission.

The students almost immediately came to realize that most of their frustrations were rooted in leadership and organizational culture. In their eyes, the national security establishment was facing a major crisis: leaders at all levels were routinely ill-equipped to understand, visualize, or respond effectively to the modern security environment. The problem was one of adaptation: decades of Cold War doctrine and thinking had left behind a sense of unassailable institutional inertia. Despite the undeniable rise of asymmetric threats such as insurgents, terrorists, militias, and other nonstate actors, the defense establishment had continued to invest overwhelmingly in preparations for traditional, conventional warfare.

While many blue ribbon panels and study groups have been convened since 9/11 to develop recommendations for the security establishment, few have focused on the role of the individual leader. New organizational models and next-generation technologies may improve our nation’s readiness, but—in the humble opinion of the students—success or failure would be defined by the ability of individual leaders to operate effectively with minimal guidance, adapt, and collaborate across traditional institutional stovepipes. In other words, victory will not be gained by overwhelming our enemies with brute force, but by empowering our leaders to innovate faster than the enemy can respond.

The panel’s methodology would be simple: Invite senior level defense leaders to Harvard for closed door, nonattribution, and brutally honest discussions. Combine the enthusiasm and “on the ground” perspective of the students with the strategic outlook of decision makers and experts. Develop bluesky solutions, record notes for every session, and eventually, write the proposals into a report intended for senior policy makers. This booklet is the end result of our efforts. We respectfully submit these recommendations for your consideration, in the hope that a few of the ideas might prove useful or inspire further inquiry.
This project focused squarely on leadership within the national security community. While organizations and processes will inevitably remain flawed and prone to weakness, if the men and women charged with protecting the country are individually capable of—in the words of Harvard’s Ronald Heifetz—“stepping onto the balcony” to view their stovepiped organizations and institutional charters from a bigpicture perspective, then a unified effort is still possible. The problem then becomes developing leaders who can see beyond their own parochial interests, break away from established traditions, and make sense of the uncertain and dynamic operating environment. In other words:

How can the defense community develop leaders at all levels capable of operating effectively in the emerging security environment? Specifically, what policies can be undertaken to promote a culture within the national security community that recruits, develops, and promotes leaders who are adaptable, interagency-minded, and comfortable operating across complex ethnic, religious, linguistic, and socio-economic borders?

Before grappling with potential solutions, the panel first spent several sessions developing a greater understanding of the security environment. Almost immediately we realized that the nature of the threat faced by our nation is as much about internal bureaucratic politics as it is about shadowy, ruthless enemies. Our nation has become so overwhelmingly powerful at traditional warfare that no rivals dare compete on the same playing field; superior technology, firepower, and resources would make short work of any conventional enemy. Instead, our opponents’ guiding rule for years to come will be to fight us in places where our raw advantage in strength is meaningless: look for gaps in coverage, exploit the seams between our various agencies and among international partners, use low-cost technology to strike at our increasingly brittle (vulnerable to disruption) infrastructure. Our own massive bureaucracy, still largely structured to defend against major state-based threats, is a dangerous liability. To be successful, the next generation of national security professionals must be as competent at overcoming inevitable institutional obstacles as they are at understanding the enemy.
IMAGINING THE THREAT

National security experts are virtually unanimous in predicting that the next several decades will reflect persistent conflict where local and regional frictions, fueled by the economic disruptions and demographic shifts of globalization and other emerging trends, are exploited by extremists to support objectives that are contrary to core national interests and the security of the United States. Other experts point to future space and cyber wars that could seriously affect the U.S. economy and key national infrastructure. The combination of new technologies and new tactical opportunities has fundamentally altered the international security paradigm, raising key questions for the next generation of US national security leaders. How has the threat changed? Does this change challenge or support long-held notions of military and interagency leadership?

While we believe the threat has changed with the rapid pace of globalization, we recognize that the future threat environment will continue to present conventional challenges as well as asymmetric threats. The fight over “how to fight” seems a prevalent concern in the 21st century. Balance is today’s watchword. The American military must continue to modernize and prepare for the possibility of a “big war” against a rising regional power sometime in the future. However, given today’s realities, a major shift in emphasis is needed towards what military planners call “stability operations” and “irregular warfare”—defined by the struggle for legitimacy and control over a population. In these types of campaigns, conflict is primarily political in nature and centers on winning the support of the people. Tanks, bombs, and next-generation fighters, while still important, are not the primary tools that will enable us to win in such environments. The human element is the most important—in other words, the leader who understands insurgency, can speak the local language, can build rapport and work with peers in other agencies, NGOs, or from other countries.

The natural tension over which type of conflict to prepare for has created a generational divide in the American military between the old guard, which generally remains focused on all-out combat and overwhelming firepower, and a new guard, which has revived the study of counterinsurgency and predicted the rise of so-called Fourth Generation Warfare, characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, soldier and civilian. Regardless of which camp proves to be more correct, this panel points to the rise of several trends that national security leaders should study and prepare to address.

TRENDS

Defense leaders who visited our group are on the right track, according to a “future threats” analysis. The following items were addressed during our panel discussions. The evidence cited leaves little room to question the persistent threat each presents.

Globalization has blurred the lines between the foreign and the domestic and reduced the utility of military force as the primary instrument of national power. Increased global connectivity and technological advances will have dramatic and positive effects on global prosperity, but they can also be used to export terror around the world. Globalization has allowed nonstate actors to gain important capabilities in economic, informational, and even military and diplomatic positions that rival or even exceed those of nation states. These trends also create an increasingly diverse array of potential partners among NGOs and private firms.

For the kinds of challenges America will face, the Armed Forces will need principled, creative, reform-minded leaders—men and women who … want to do something, not be somebody. An unconventional era of warfare requires unconventional thinkers.”

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
April 21, 2008
Technology serves as a double-edged sword when terrorists employ innovations that improve the quality of life only to destroy those lives. In this regard, we need to rethink command philosophy in the information age and how it relates to countering threats communicated through chat rooms, blogs, and new forms of media that allow for rapid dissemination of information. These advances are not just threats to our defense; they can also be opportunities for offense if we can adapt our existing structures and ways of thinking. At the same time, an increased reliance on technology in every sector of society creates new vulnerabilities to cyber attacks in which isolated individuals have the ability to seriously harm communications, air and ground transportation, banking, electricity delivery, and defense capabilities, with serious economic and security-related consequences.

Demographic changes also influence the emerging security environment. Population growth will increase opportunities for instability, radicalism, and extremism as populations of some less-developed countries will almost double in size by 2020—most notably in Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. The lack of jobs and sufficient government services created by this “youth bulge” will make vulnerable populations especially susceptible to anti-government and radical ideologies. At the same time, Europe’s population will decline, thereby affecting the capabilities of our allies.

Urbanization will be accompanied by chronic unemployment, overcrowding, pollution, poor health and sanitation, and a shortage of other basic services, which will add to population dissatisfaction and increase the destructive charm of radical ideologies. Population density facilitates the rapid spread of rumors among crowds ambivalent toward U.S. actions and intentions, magnifying our mistakes. As the battlegrounds move from fields to streets, precision in every sense of the word is becoming a tactical and strategic necessity.
Resource demand for energy, water, and food for growing populations will increase competition and, potentially, conflict. Natural resources—especially water, gas, and oil—are finite; by 2030, energy consumption is expected to exceed production. Demand for water doubles every 20 years, and by 2015, 40 percent of the world’s population will live in “water-stressed” countries, especially in the Middle East and Africa. The crisis in Darfur, according to the UN Secretary General Ban-Ki-Moon, is attributable to water shortage, while China’s growing reliance on foreign oil props up problematic regimes in Khartoum and Tehran. In addition, America’s reliance on foreign nations for its own fuel limits our options and makes energy security a major concern. Understanding resource demands and acting preventatively may reduce the future burden of responding to conflict and crisis.

Climate change, natural disasters, and public health threats will compound already difficult conditions in developing countries, causing humanitarian crises, regionally destabilizing population migrations, and the risk of epidemic diseases. Desertification is occurring at nearly 50-70 thousand square miles per year. More than 15 million people die each year from communicable diseases, and these numbers may grow exponentially as urban densities increase. Natural disasters will continue to plague societies, with the potential for ever-greater loss of life and property. The massive cyclone causing tens of thousands of deaths in Burma demonstrated how politically charged even humanitarian aid delivery can be.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction increases the potential for catastrophic attacks that will be globally destabilizing, thereby undercutting the confidence that spurs economic development. There are more than 1,100 identified terrorist organizations; we know that some of them, most notably Al Qaeda, are actively seeking weapons of mass destruction. Horizontal, interstate nuclear proliferation is another concern, as evidenced by ties between North Korea and Syria. With today’s availability of information, chemical weapons can be relatively simple to make yet difficult to detect and trace. Advances in biotechnology will allow for new weapons capabilities, and in a relatively short time the civilized world may be confronted by nonstate actors armed with “super-flu” type biological agents.

Space presents many unknowns along with the allure of a new horizon. Today, space weapons are again being considered by the United States and a few other countries because of a perceived vulnerability of critical space assets to possible attack by states with medium- or long-range missiles. However, there is widespread international opposition to the weaponization of space, and any advances by the U.S. in this area must be made carefully. As more states pursue and achieve space technology, America’s competitive edge will diminish, but new opportunities for cooperative research will emerge.

Terrorists and criminal networks, while operating among some of the same people and using some of the same methods, have very different goals and do not necessarily trust each other. Human, drug, and arms trafficking pose vigorous threats to America’s security and values in terms of both their direct effect and the revenue they provide. Corruption is a threat to good governance and makes stability elusive in many parts of the world. Yet criminals driven by money are perhaps not as dangerous as those driven by ideology who are willing to target civilians directly via methods such as suicide bombing.

Conventional threats remain. As the Pentagon tries to prepare the U.S. military for the future, many military planners are looking to China as the next potential large-scale threat to the United States. The Defense Department’s most recent assessment of China’s power raises concerns about China’s military modernization and contends Beijing could one day try to dominate Asia or challenge

“[W]e imagine the brewing threats of ‘perfect storms’ of failed governments, ethnic stratification, religious violence, humanitarian disasters, regional crises, and the proliferation of dangerous weapons. We see lagging economies, unintegrated and disenfranchised populations, transnational crime, illicit subnational power structures, and destabilizing bulges of uneducated and unemployed youth.”

—Joint Operating Concept Irregular Combat manual

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U.S. hegemony. Others insist that such talk is self-fulfilling and that our thinking of China only as a threat will cause China to see the U.S. the same way, thereby increasing the likelihood of war. In this sense, factions and ambiguity within the U.S. government, in addition to the sometimes divergent interests of contractors, may threaten the United States’ ability to send proper signals to the international community. At the same time, Russia’s recent invasion of Georgia has left many analysts far more uncertain about the region’s trajectory. Will we see a return of the old U.S.–Russia rivalry?

Without undermining the need to prepare for conventional war, we must prepare for the security threats inherent in failed or failing states, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia, or Burma. According to the 2007 Foreign Policy Failing States Index, failing states dot every continent. Governments of both megacities and nation states are finding it increasingly difficult to provide effective support to growing populations. Unable or unwilling to maintain control over their territory, failed or failing state governments will cede control over populations and territory to preserve their own hold on power. These compromises can provide safe havens in which global or regional terrorist groups prepare, foment, and export terror. At the same time, our group does not believe that tipping the capability balance to fighting small wars exclusively will serve as a panacea.

It is already clear that the interaction of new challenges—ideology and irregular warfare, environment and ethnic conflict, energy resources and conventional war—is increasingly broadening the scope of most security challenges beyond the purview of any single US agency. In order to confront these threats, the US national security establishment will have to operate more effectively in coordinated, multidisciplinary operations that draw from multiple agencies and departments. The challenge of interagency coordination is exacerbated by the fact that the planning, funding, culture, and traditional core missions of government agencies vary widely. There have been successful efforts to integrate government at the margins—notably USSOUTHCOM—but there is no coherent, national-level effort to harmonize the full range of resources available to national security officials. It remains difficult for the military, State Department and USAID to plan and cooperate on the ground. There is still need for decentralized leadership both, the ability to make decisions in the field and having leaders who can delegate that authority, but with sufficient coordination to ensure that every agency is working toward the same long-term goal.
In early 2006, before mainstream media had fully begun to report on Iran’s pervasive influence within Iraq, a coalition civil affairs team was planning a large opening ceremony to celebrate the completion of a new water purification plant. The plant, situated in the Iraqi border town of Al Kut, had been several months in the making and came at a considerable cost in labor and funding. The ceremony, which was to be held in the morning, was expected to have hundreds if not thousands of attendees present, and the coalition had gone to great lengths to hang banners promoting the project’s sponsors. However, when the time came for the ceremony, only a handful of people showed. The Iraqi governor and mayor gave their speeches, and the coalition officers present assumed that perhaps security concerns had scared away other civilians.

The real reason behind the lackluster showing was much more discouraging and insidious: the morning ceremony was never intended for the public. Only a few hours later, after the coalition forces had left the site, the governor and mayor returned to hold a second ceremony—this time with a crowd of over a thousand present. However, instead of the pro-coalition banners, Iranian flags and posters hung from the walls. The entire project was credited to the Iranian government, which had ostensibly invested on behalf of its humble neighbors. Regardless of subsequent attempts by the coalition to discredit the ceremony, in the minds of the populace, Iran built the plant. The fact that coalition dollars paid for the materials and labor was irrelevant. This type of multi-echelon, well-coordinated propaganda and “reconstruction” operation by Iran is unfortunately not a rarity—it is merely a sign of things to come. And bombs, guns, tanks, and jet fighters are utterly ineffective against it.

A few months later, Hizballah—another Iranian proxy—provided an even clearer example of the protean insurgent enemy’s stunning potential. During the July 2006 “Tammuz War,” Hizballah reacted with incredible effectiveness to every major “kinetic” attack launched by the Israelis. In the words of one participant, “Every time Israel dropped a precision-guided bomb, Hizballah’s media arm al Manar was there to film the supposed ‘atrocity.’ Their social services arm was there to dispense a stipend to the families of the martyrs. Their medical arm was there to care for the wounded. Their recruiters were there to enlist new volunteers. Only months later, the party’s construction arm had already begun rebuilding new, beautiful buildings out of the craters. Yellow Hizballah flags were hanging from every scaffold. They simply turned Israel’s brute strength into their own advantage.”

One can scarcely think of a more prescient warning about naked military force in the new security environment. Even the most effective, textbook-perfect military raid can be turned into a strategic defeat by a savvy enemy. Future military campaigns will routinely require an accompanying media and civic engagement strategy and the collaboration of many nontraditional actors.

Vignette: The Importance of Media and Civic Engagement Strategies
As one DLP guest speaker iterated, strategic leadership involves getting the big ideas right. Future leaders, in this individual’s mind, should focus efforts in the following areas: secure and serve the people—understand the human terrain; hold areas that have been secured; employ all assets; pursue the enemy relentlessly; defeat the network, not just the attack; promote reconciliation—identify/separate reconcilables from irreconcilables; seek sustainable solutions; manage expectations and be first with the truth; finally, prepare for and exploit opportunities.

Regardless of what specific policy decisions are made in the future, the panel concluded that—in terms of leadership—these aforementioned trends, and an emphasis on exploiting strengths and capabilities as well as enemy weaknesses, place a premium on the following:

**Specialized Knowledge:** The lack of a monolithic enemy and the complex cultural terrain involved in irregular warfare will likely force individual leaders and operators to learn (or be able to rapidly access) a high degree of specialized knowledge. Unpredictable future conflicts may suddenly require experts in an obscure language to be teamed with heavy construction engineers, regional intelligence analysts, anthropologists, historians, election officials, and many others. While some of this knowledge can be institutionally maintained within the existing national security apparatus, the unpredictable “surge” nature of this requirement suggests that traditional boundaries separating private sector from public sector, military from civilian, and academia from the battlefield will become less relevant. Getting talented individuals with the right skills and knowledge to the right place fast enough to influence the conflict will become more important than traditional troop deployments.

**Clearly defined norms instead of rules and regulations:** To paraphrase a well-known quote, irregular warfare, like politics, makes strange bedfellows. Contractors, NGOs, IGOs, multinational corporations, the military, intelligence agencies, local citizens, the State Department, and dozens of other actors will frequently find themselves working in relatively ad hoc organizations, with unclear lines of authority, and often for different objectives. While many projects within the government are attempting to clean up this arrangement and minimize ad hoc collaborations, the panel finds it utterly unrealistic to believe that this phenomenon will ever be eliminated entirely. Future
crises can simply not be predicted well enough to prepare for every contractual and legal eventuality. A great deal more work must be done to establish norms rather than procedures for our institutions. In other words, what roles and missions should our respective professions be charged with?

The proverbial elephant in the room is lack of civilian capacity. The past seven years have seen an undeniable growth explosion in the Defense Department’s role, particularly in terms of development work and reconstruction. Simply put, no other agency was prepared to meet the overwhelming need in Afghanistan and Iraq. But as the new administration comes to power and the 111th Congress goes to work rebalancing resources (indeed, a new Foreign Assistance Act is already in the works), what should be our core capabilities? How has the so-called Civ-Mil relationship evolved in the face of Provincial Reconstruction Teams and interagency task forces? Moreover, once these normative concepts are developed via debate in our political institutions, the resulting ideas must be clearly conveyed and incorporated into the military and interagency professional ethic. Rather than consult complex legal codes and regulations in uncertain situations, leaders should have a firm grasp on the spirit of the law and their organization’s fundamental role within the national security apparatus.

**Police/investigative skills:** The increasingly destructive potential of proliferated technology in the hands of terrorists is rapidly stripping away any margin of error. Much like the protagonists in the movie *Minority Report*, our national security professionals are placed in the precarious position of trying to disrupt terrorist plans before they can be executed, rather than gathering evidence after the fact. As a liberal democratic society, the U.S. cannot easily lower the burden of proof in such situations.
investigations without serious political and ideological costs. This environment places exceptional importance on investigative skills and the open flow of information. As one participant remarked, “We can’t even control a crime scene in Washington, D.C. How are we supposed to control one on a mountain in Afghanistan or a farm in East Africa ... much less expect that evidence to find its way across agencies to the right hands in the U.S., then be handled by people with the right clearances and the know-how to apply it properly.” Put simply, more leaders need to understand the investigative process and its legal peculiarities, and critical connections need to be established between domestic authorities and various actors abroad.

**Language and culture:** One of the most fundamental lessons that has been learned and re-learned in counterinsurgency campaigns is the paramount importance of cultural understanding and language ability. Unfortunately, the military’s existing modular structure deploys units overseas in response to a contingency with only minimal language and cultural training (usually done briefly as part of a predeployment sequence). If the military is to take counterinsurgency and irregular warfare seriously, a great deal more investment is needed to institutionalize these skills in existing combat units. The process will take years, require habitual deployment within a region, and cannot be rushed after an emergency develops. Moreover, the same institutionalized skills will be just as important in nonmilitary agencies assigned the political “main effort” in stability operations. Leaders, regardless of whether they wear a uniform, will commonly be required to build rapport and establish relationships across complex cultural boundaries.

**Media savvy:** The 24-hour news cycle, the growth of new media, and the expanded access to television and internet within the developing world, are causing a seismic shift in the importance of media savvy and information operations throughout the national security community. As one panelist explained: “Driving around remote areas in Iraq, you see a land still in Biblical times—farmers in the fields working with a hand plow, mud huts—but the other thing you notice is a satellite dish on top of every home.” In this environment, even a perfectly executed tactical operation or civil affairs project can be twisted in the news by a skillful enemy. Nineteen dead insurgent fighters become a human rights atrocity or an attack on innocents in a mosque. The days of entrusting all media relations to a single point of contact in each organization are over. Leaders at all levels, especially those most junior, must learn the art of media relations and actively seek opportunities to get their message out. Media training and fluency with talking points is no longer the exclusive domain of corporate executives and administration officials.

**Corporate social responsibility:** The ever-expanding reach and interconnectivity of the global marketplace will force our multinational corporations to become de facto informal ambassadors for the United States. For better or worse, the combination of globalization and dwindling natural resources will increasingly push multinational corporations into crisis zones or “semi-permissive” areas. Rarely will a company enter an area free of civil strife, irregular armed groups, or corrupt governing bodies. The way that these multinational corporations conduct themselves will have a profound impact on public diplomacy efforts and the way that the United States is perceived abroad. Ethical and socially conscious leadership at all levels within these corporations, plus collaboration with public sector counterparts, will be critical to this vision. Make no mistake: corporate social responsibility will increasingly become a national security issue—violations will bear bitter fruit in the form of attacks, lost revenue, broken alliances, and international condemnation. Local citizens in a poverty stricken or unstable country make little distinction between Shell Oil, Coca-Cola, and the U.S. State Department. They all represent America, and usually the corporations will have much
more continuing contact with the population. In the panel’s view, if the U.S. hopes to win hearts and minds abroad, it must realize and support the private sector’s informal public diplomacy potential.

**Dependence on individual adaptability, creativity, and intellectual capacity:**

Irregular warfare is principally a decentralized endeavor. The battlefield, if it can even be called that, is too complex, too heterogeneous for universal plans. Leaders at the lowest level must be trusted to receive strategic guidance—a “mission type order” with minimal details—then determine the best way to proceed and cooperate with their counterparts. Yet this type of leadership does not come easily, and many individuals who might have excelled in a more directed environment will founder in these conditions. Leaders must possess great adaptability, creativity, and the intellectual ability to be a great chess player, overseeing multiple efforts and outcomes. Existing recruiting, training, promotion, and retention regimes do a very poor job of ensuring these types of leaders end up doing the most critical jobs.

U.S. national security officials confer with Iraqi people.
As our panel discovered early in its sessions, understanding the threat is only half the challenge. At the organizational and individual level, strategically minded leaders can overcome threats only after surmounting the myriad internal obstacles to meaningful change. Success requires leaders who can understand the obstacles inherent in their own organizations, step onto the balcony to understand their place in the larger scheme, and act in a way that advances the national security mission. Unfortunately, this task has become incalculably difficult; the United States’ dazzling array of national security agencies and missions—defense, development, diplomacy—simultaneously offers unparalleled institutional capability and unparalleled institutional barriers.

In the next series of discussions, the panel explored the nature of these bureaucratic obstacles, searching for common themes. After some deliberation, we identified the following major areas:

1. **Organizational and Structural**: understanding how national security institutions and procedures inhibit strategic leadership and interagency “jointness,” including incentive structures of members and managers.

2. **Culture and Identity**: assessing the cultural differences between agencies, that arise from distinct and overlapping missions and divergent approaches to strategic leadership.

3. **Adaptation and Learning**: exploring how legacy training institutions, information management systems, and processes for information sharing may hinder the ability of strategic leaders to adapt and learn in a dynamic interagency environment.

Though this list is not exhaustive, these three categories capture many of the obstacles that obscure the path toward institutional change. It is equally imperative to understand challenges at the individual, as well as organizational, level. The person on the ground is more important than ever. In discussing bureaucratic impediments to institutional reform, this chapter will include two vignettes, from the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and State (DOS), that examine internal obstacles at the individual level.
**Organizational and Structural**

In recent history, the U.S. military has been able to achieve a relatively successful level of joint and interdepartmental cooperation. This can serve as a paradigm for interagency cooperation. However, the joint nature of DOD did not manifest itself organically or spontaneously. The military departments were vehemently opposed to jointness, even after the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) legislation made joint training and assignments a requirement for promotion to General Officer. Although GNA realigned incentives and significantly accelerated jointness and dialogue between the military departments, outside the military ranks there are few, if any, incentives for the civilian workforce to engage in interagency assignments.

**Incentivizing Change: Managers and Members**

Our future leaders are among our most valuable resources. Imbuing them with a capacity for understanding joint and interagency cultures and how to effectively leverage them is challenging but necessary. Presently, civilian organizations have little, if any, incentive to place their employees in interagency assignments. There are numerous impediments in the way organizations are structured that disincentivize employees from assignments outside their agencies: parochialism, stove-piped missions, cultural traditions and mindsets, competition for resources, unwillingness to share intelligence information, lack of trust, jurisdictional creep, and the demands of everyday operations. Given the opportunity to work within a partner agency, career and self-interest often come before mission. Employees perceive little value in leaving their organization for interagency assignments. Many believe their career path progression will be (at best) stalled and perhaps even damaged. Managers will often not support such assignments because they lose highly qualified and productive employees, however temporarily. When the employees return to their organization, managers fear they will not have developed skills that are useful to the home organization’s operations, and that the employees will be behind the learning curve.

**Promoting Crossover and Jointness**

In today’s era of ever-increasing globalization, coupled with asymmetric threats, the U.S. national security establishment must create a joint interagency training environment for its future leaders. The system must incentivize employees to follow interagency training assignments at all levels and not just the senior or executive positions. Whether this can happen organically, or if legislation will be required, is uncertain. Such cooperation does occur sporadically, on multiple levels, in many ad hoc arrangements—for example, Provincial Reconstruction Teams. In these situations, it is often necessary for agencies to work together toward a common goal, sharing their personnel and resources. However, such cases of interagency jointness are not typically permanent: agency interactions are often time-limited. The national security agencies need to develop the appropriate incentives for career advancement that include interagency experience, education, and training.

**Culture and Identity**

**Perceptions of Leadership**

The myriad national security agencies view leadership, formal and informal, in widely divergent ways. From the diplomat stationed abroad, to the junior officer on the battlefield, to the special agent on the home front, perceptions of leadership vary. Management is confused with leadership, and
vice versa. Although the former is necessary in the sprawling bureaucracies of the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State (DOS), strategic leadership must permeate these organizations. Leadership does not begin at the Senior Executive Service (SES) level. Rather, leaders with vision, adaptability, and fluency with the interagency process must emerge at all levels. The Marine Corps’ successful Strategic Corporal concept is but one example of what can be accomplished when leadership training and the attendant responsibility are pushed to the lowest levels of an organization.

Nonetheless, strategic leadership is uneven across the U.S. national security establishment. Although some agencies have invested in the recruitment, development, and training of junior leaders, position and rank are often viewed as proxies for leadership. The latter years of one’s career are not the appropriate stage for debuting as a leader. Ascendant members who have labored only within the confines of their organizations, focused only on insular programs or processes, will not suddenly blossom into the strategic, adaptive leaders that this century requires. Leaders who have focused inward throughout their careers, however distinguished, are likely to rise in their organizations with minimal appreciation or understanding of partner agencies. Regardless of what it’s called—jointness, interagency coordination, or unity of effort—the ability to deal effectively with partner agencies is a skill that must be learned at the outset of one’s career. Demonstrating institutional and interagency leadership at junior levels requires such fluency. At the tactical, operational, and strategic level, our young leaders must be institutionally multilingual. Unfortunately, this skill remains exceptionally rare across national security agencies.

Reconciling Agency Cultures

By virtue of their authority, resources, and functions, virtually all executive departments play a role in national security; DOD, DHS, DOJ, and DOS, however, occupy the principal positions. But while their resources and missions should be directed toward common national security objectives, these entities remain disparate departments composed of disparate agencies. Their cultures differ significantly, and distinct and overlapping missions are a primary reason. The law enforcement culture, focused on prosecutions and after-the-fact investigation, characterizes many of the DOJ and DHS agencies; this contrasts sharply with the prevention and deterrence missions performed by DOD and other DHS agencies. As the country’s designated diplomats, DOS agencies and officials often take a longer view of threats and opportunities, and view imperatives for military action differently. For agencies throughout these departments, there is the ascendance of the “cop-on-the-beat” mentality over the “firehouse” mentality—the prevalence of the terrorist threat stateside has amplified the need for “presence” as well as “response” (reactive missions). In the aggregate, national security agencies and missions are diverse and at times in conflict. The consequent variations in culture pose substantial obstacles toward strategic interagency leadership. These differences highlight the need to reconcile disparate agency cultures through enhanced interagency cooperation and fluency.

Building Legitimacy

Transplantation is not synonymous with cross-pollination. Dabbling in jointness, or promoting it wholesale through reforms such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), will not necessarily assuage institutional and interagency challenges. Although GNA experienced some success in institutionalizing jointness among the military services, similar efforts among DHS, DOJ, and DOS agencies have seen less satisfactory results. Absent a viable incentive structure for managers and members, the sharing of national security professionals between disparate agencies will not happen. When members from one agency materialize in another agency, trust is not assured from the receiving agency. Jointness will continue to butt heads with insularity within organizations that oppose interagency representation. A
Transforming the national security culture

regime for reconciling the diverse agency cultures and leadership perceptions will gain legitimacy only through cross-pollination, integration, and dialogue among jointly assigned national security professionals. Strategic leaders at all levels must be multilingual, fluent, and networked with their partner agencies. Otherwise, efforts to integrate and deconflict national security agencies will be futile.

ADAPTATION AND LEARNING

Information Management

Barriers to effective information management are a recurring theme in the national security establishment. At the tactical level, there is clear evidence that a lack of interagency communications technology is preventing effective coordination. From simple voice radios to complex voice and data networks, different agencies have contracted with various companies for services. They have purchased off-the-shelf commercial equipment that is cost-effective and meets operational objectives, but does not fulfill any interoperability, accessibility, or compatibility considerations. At the ground level, equipment shortfalls make it almost impossible to coordinate efforts between agencies or departments. At higher strategic levels, the lack of compatibility and interoperability hinders interagency dialogue and coordination. The lack of organizational and human processes for effective information sharing only exacerbates these trends, sometimes to the point of destructive competition between agencies. The result is highly detrimental, as state and local agencies lack mechanisms for cooperation with federal assets. Furthermore, jurisdictional responsibilities, objectives, and boundaries become extremely vague among federal government agencies and between government and nongovernmental organizations. “What do I know, who else needs to know it, and how do I get the information to them?” is a question that should lead the discussion.

Despite these issues, there have been some encouraging signs. The recent development of “A Space”—a Facebook type of social networking site that allows individuals in the 16 intelligence agencies to share highly classified information and exchange ideas—hints at an exciting new way of thinking in the intelligence community. Similarly, the Human Terrain System—a networked information interface that facilitates the exchange of cultural and anthropological information for

HKS students Oliver Melton and Air Force First Lieutenant Peter Dyrud.
deployed military units—also shows great promise. The panel’s belief is that such programs should be multiplied and expanded. Unfortunately, social networking has until now largely been the domain of college kids and techies. To realize Web 2.0’s true potential, the national security bureaucracy must find a way to engage its most technologically savvy members.

Sharing Lessons Learned

Perhaps the greatest consequence of deficient interagency information management and exchange is the absence of sharing lessons learned. Whether from a domestic security perspective, an intelligence perspective, a military operations perspective, or a state and local enforcement perspective, the global war on terror has resulted in many agencies’ ability for identify and mitigate threats increasing significant threats. However, many of these achievements have been won in isolation. Others have been redundant. A more universal process for sharing lessons learned would ensure that the operational objectives and organizational growth of independent agencies would be convergent, synergistic, and efficient.

Interagency Training Institutions

In many ways, national security training programs have become obsolete. There is a clear need for leaders with interagency knowledge, experience, and insight. However, current training programs neither encourage nor facilitate interagency operations. Few, if any, training programs teach the organizational structure, objectives, and capacity of other agencies in the same or similar sectors of work. Furthermore, training programs do not provide trainees with the necessary contacts, resources, or state-of-mind to access other agencies for assistance and cooperation. These training programs have traditionally taught trainees that personal achievement, through self-sufficiency, differentiates strong leaders and earns rewards toward promotion. Unfortunately, self-sufficiency reinforces insularity and generally undermines attempts to cross-pollinate agencies through jointness.

Ingraining Adaptation: Training Junior Leaders to Think on the Fly

When individuals do effectively cross interagency divides, it is usually because a system of learning by doing is in place. A system of personnel or trainee exchange between agency training programs or daily operations would greatly benefit the entire interagency community. By participating in these exchanges, junior leaders would obtain the experience necessary to understand the inner workings and capabilities of other agencies. Subsequently, they would be able to employ that understanding and exploit those capabilities within parent organizations. In the past, these exchanges might have been considered career killers, or contrary to specific professional development tracks; going forward, however, promotion systems must encourage such exchanges. Interagency assignments must improve and not detract from promotion potential. Organizations must adapt by creating positions that require interagency experience as a standard operating capability.
Vignette: Creating the National Security Workforce of the Future

One obstacle that hinders individual agency and interagency process is the culture of “career over mission.” Within the national security community, this phenomenon has been fostered by recent events that negatively impact continuity and interagency cooperation.

The average tenure of a political appointee at the SES level is approximately 18 months. Many of these appointees serve in strategic leadership positions. Why is there such a reliance on political appointees, and why is their tenure so fleeting?

The national intelligence community failed to adequately realign its workforce after the end of the Cold War. Nearly forty percent of the CIA workforce was hired within five years after the 9/11 attacks; the national intelligence community is now facing a lack of middle managers to mentor these young analysts. The increased demand for middle managers across the intelligence community (including new intelligence organizations) has created an environment where promotions are readily available to analysts simply by changing organizations.

While movement across organizations breeds an increased appreciation for each agency’s unique mission and contribution to national security, the national intelligence community must ensure that its workforce achieves the right balance between agency expertise and interagency experience. It should also examine its career workforce mobility and define community-wide standards of performance and skills. At present, agencies compete for the same talent and analysts play musical chairs with their skills to ensure upward mobility without necessarily demonstrating an increased contribution to the national intelligence community or an increase in performance measured against a community standard. Members of this study group have observed similar rewards for short-term assignments for military and civilian employees in Iraq or other high visibility/high operational assignments with no substantive review of a member’s development, performance, or contribution.

The days of lifetime employment with one organization are gone. The current trend for members of the workforce to change jobs every four years in the private sector may not be desirable for federal and military members of the national security community. The federal government has increased its reliance on contractors to undertake missions typically performed by government members. Many of these contractors received their critical knowledge, skills, and abilities through government experience, yet now serve as private consultants or vice-managers within the government. The government must ask itself: What is the desired balance between government and contractors? How can we retain our own talent to perform essentially government tasks? What does inherently governmental really mean, and once defined, can the state contract for the other activities—and properly oversee and hold accountable those who perform such functions? We still have a long way to go in answering such critical questions.
Bearing in mind both the external challenges posed by today's threat environment and the internal bureaucratic obstacles within our own organizations, the panel developed a series of policy initiatives. While these recommendations are by no means exhaustive, they do attempt to address some of the major structural, cultural, and adaptation-based challenges found within our institutions. The overarching goal is to promote a culture of national security leaders who are strategically minded, collaborative, wellversed in emerging threats, and capable of decentralized action. Our recommendations generally fall into four categories:

- **Finding critical talent**

- **Transforming talent into institutionalized capability**

- **Reforming existing organizations to promote balance and interoperability**

- **Accelerating generational change**

**Finding Critical Talent: Recruiting, Retaining, and Promoting the Right Leaders**

Develop new recruiting criteria for stability, reconstruction, and irregular warfare-intensive jobs. The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), currently the primary test used to determine suitability for various military specialties, is a poor predictor of aptitude for irregular conflict. The test contains nine sections: General Science, Arithmetic Reasoning, Word Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, Mathematics Knowledge, Electronics Information, Auto Shop, Mechanical Comprehension, and Assembling Objects. While these categories may help determine whether a new recruit
can easily learn to be a mechanic, they do little to determine whether he or she can build rapport with a stranger, understand cultural nuances, play politics, read emotional undertone, operate autonomously, or learn a language quickly. The military should consider coding certain critical positions as “Human-Cultural Intensive” and establishing alternate testing and recruiting regimes for these positions. Potential tests include a series of scenario-based interviews, screening for language aptitude or existing ability, role playing exercises, emotional IQ testing, and other diagnostic tools. Examples of Human-Cultural Intensive positions would be combat adviser/trainer, human intelligence specialist, reconstruction team member, psychological operations/information operations specialist, etc. Officers would also be screened for these abilities during their commissioning process. Undergraduate degrees would be a determining factor, and select officer candidates would be encouraged/given incentives to study social science or language-related disciplines. In addition, recruiting command should focus more on potential direct-hire opportunities for individuals with critical irregular warfare-centric skills (interpreters, anthropologists, public works specialists, criminal investigators, etc.).

Move away from a ticket-punching, careerist mindset and allow for specialization and/or crossover if desired; not everyone has to be on track for general or ambassador. The functional area program for officers needs to be updated to reflect the new realities of the security environment. Foreign Area Officers are in far too short supply to keep up with future demands. In all likelihood, the need for “steady state” engagement around the world—that is, low-level engagement in joint training missions, cultural exchanges, counterterrorism initiatives, and other bilateral programs—will require greatly expanded regional/cultural specialists to assist in managing programs, supporting deployed troops, and providing expert advice. Information operations and psychological operations capabilities have to date been underdeveloped. The study of propaganda, media “spin,” and the psychological peculiarities of various regions should be moved to the forefront of the counterinsurgency fight. Apprenticeship programs with the media, outside consultations and training with public relations companies, and augmentation by the private sector should all be considered carefully. Civil affairs billets should similarly be expanded to develop more organic capability for stability-type missions. The Army’s current prescription for officer management, OPMS XXI, is far too restrictive—officers should be much freer to take assignments outside their standard trajectory, serving in interagency billets, interservice billets, or even in the civilian world for periods of time, and beginning at the junior developmental level, before they become locked into a standard, parochial way of thinking. A serious study should be commissioned to examine the potential for direct hires from the civilian world (e.g., information operations, civil affairs, foreign area specialist, etc.). Furthermore, the military, if not the national security community, should reconsider its talent management and human resource management. Matching capabilities to threat, whether with weapons systems or personnel, is essential to attracting and maintaining a fit-to-fight force. The Army Knowledge Online’s (AKO) pilot Facebook-style program—where military members can list skills and qualifications for surveyors up and down the chain of command—is one particular initiative that helps build more effective teams.

Reform the existing “report card” scheme for leaders—incorporate 360˚ evaluations and greater delineation of performance expectations. The military could learn a great deal from corporate America in terms of promotion systems. The current military system, which generally relies on the opinions of two individuals—rater and senior rater (direct supervisors one and two levels up)—takes all emphasis away from the leader’s relationship with his or her subordinates and peers. The current rating system should be augmented by peer and subordinate ratings to give a more complete picture of the individual’s performance. Moreover, rating blocks should be further adjusted to differentiate between officers of varying caliber. Rather than simply top 50% versus bottom 50% (1 block or 2 block), additional designations should be allowed for the top 5%–10% and bottom 5%–10% of

The next presidential administration should undertake a renewed call for public service and expand the number of options available to individuals desiring to serve. Nonmilitary programs that have a direct or indirect impact on foreign assistance capabilities should be given priority.
officers. The number of officers allowed these designations should be limited to prevent inflation. A quantitative indication of a leader’s standing compared with his or her peers should be mandatory (i.e., 14 out of 31, 5 out of 12, top 20%, etc.) In the decentralized, irregular warfare environment, senior leaders will have to make assessments about junior leaders with whom they have little direct contact. The assessments of these junior leaders’ peers and subordinates can provide a much clearer picture of the evaluated officer’s performance in combat. Similar rating concepts can be used in other national security organizations.

Investigate individualized benefits packages to retain high performers. With a more realistic and accurate indication of a given leader’s performance, those individuals with exceptional abilities can be more readily identified and incentivized to stay. The Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA) at West Point is currently developing alternatives to simple lump-sum bonuses applied across entire year groups (as occurred last year in the Army). According to one proposal, individuals should be offered packages based on their demonstrated performance. In other words, those leaders who have proven most valuable to the organization can engage in an ongoing negotiation with human resources command over their respective retention packages. Flexibility will be critical, and human resources personnel should be capable of offering a wide array of bonuses, schooling, training, assignments, and other retention tools to keep the most talented individuals on board. Similar to the process that occurs in the private sector, this recommendation would reduce the number of wasted bonuses and place less emphasis on retaining mediocre performers. The alternative is brain drain, as the best and brightest—weary of multiple deployments and subject to heavy recruiting from the civilian world—leave the military institutions that depend on their talent.

Enlist the help of academia, stateside institutions, and centers of excellence—leveraging talent doesn’t always mean direct recruiting, signing contracts, or enlisting individuals to serve. Modern technology has reached the point where deployed elements—be they military or civilian—can easily and routinely communicate with counterparts within the United States. This capacity for “reachback” should be exploited to allow expeditionary elements to query a network of academic institutions, analytical centers, think tanks, and other organizations across the world for needed information—be it technical, historical, cultural, linguistic, or otherwise. The government should develop centers of excellence where academic and operational information can be fused to provide meaningful analysis and recommendations to practitioners in the field. An online database, with various levels of classification, should be made readily accessible for organizations involved in irregular warfare campaigns or other stability-related tasks. The government should consider exploring a Facebook for development workers or Facebook for diplomats, where individuals can share their lessons learned, opinions, recommendations, and other valuable information.

Expand the number of viable paths to public service for promising individuals at all levels. The next presidential administration should undertake a renewed call for public service and expand the number of options available to individuals desiring to serve. Nonmilitary programs that have a direct or indirect impact on foreign assistance capabilities should be given priority. USAID is the organization most badly in need of expansion and culture change. Incentive packages such as college reimbursement, tax benefits, and healthcare should be explored thoroughly. As military personnel transition to civilian life after successful tours of duty, the government should make a concerted effort to recruit them for public service jobs in the interagency or nonprofit world. Organizations such as Service Nation (www.bethechange.org), the U.S. Public Service Academy (uspublicserviceacademy.org), and the numerous veterans organizations can also be places where experienced national security professionals choose to serve. Additionally, the frequently mentioned idea of creating a National Security University (along the lines of the National Defense University) merits further discussion.
While some individuals may not be willing to serve overseas again for a long time (many having just returned from combat), the character and spirit of service that compelled them to enlist in the first place will certainly compel many of them to continue serving the nation in other capacities. But the government must make a greater effort to find them, support them, offer attractive options, and justly reward them.

**Transforming Talent into Institutionalized Capability: Training, Education, and Assignments**

**Develop institutionalized regional expertise:** The modular concept that guides the military's force structure does little to address the need for language and cultural fluency. As the system is currently designed, any brigade can “plug and play” into any contingency in the world. While this type of capability may work well for standard, conventional operations (where firepower and maneuver are at a premium), it will consistently fail in more nuanced, stability, or counterinsurgency operations. Units arriving in these complex environments must show up with the ability to work across cultural boundaries, communicate in other languages (or through interpreters), and train/advise indigenous personnel. Even with several months’ lead time (which will rarely occur), the selected brigade cannot hope to develop the kind of human/cultural skills needed to be truly effective on the ground. The military should investigate the possibility of regional modularity. That is, part of the military’s total force (a designated number of brigades) should be assigned regional responsibility, then gradually develop the organic language, area familiarization, and cultural fluency associated with that region/subregion. Within these regionally aligned brigades, a smaller Stability Operations Field Team (SOFT) would be established—essentially a permanent battalion-sized force of combat advisors/trainers, civil affairs and information operations personnel, civilian advisors/ liaisons, and special contractors.

Military personnel serving in these SOFT teams would do so as a second assignment, having already demonstrated the ability and desire to work with foreign counterparts. These stability teams would remain engaged in the brigade’s assigned area of operations (be it Africa, Latin America, the Far East, etc.) continually, building relationships with foreign personnel, learning language/culture, and bolstering partner nation capabilities. In the event of a crisis, the teams would essentially serve as the advanced force for a larger military response. SOFT teams would advise their parent brigades on the complex human landscape and continue to build local capacity (security, governance, rule of law, etc.).
The rest of the brigade, still largely dedicated to conventional operations, would be charged with direct security operations and/or “quick reaction force” roles. This way, the military retains its ability to train for and fight conventional wars, but builds a larger capability to “Train, Assist, and Advise” and support civilian agencies.

This new capability would free up the special operations community, already overtasked, to focus on unconventional warfare/foreign internal defense missions of the highest strategic importance, in areas where a sensitive, strategic footprint is necessary. The State Department and USAID should also investigate the possibility of greater regional specialization and increased assignments with military units (and vice versa). While current civilian capabilities can barely keep pace with operational requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the next few years offer the opportunity to rebalance the resources available to the interagency and create innovative joint assignments.

**Early language/culture designation option for new military personnel.** Coupled with the military’s new focus on regional capabilities should be a language program that trains individuals earlier in their careers and assigns them so that they continue to improve their skills. ROTC and military academy graduates should be required to take at least two years of a foreign language prior to commissioning, and that language should be decided as part of a greater strategic vision. Officers should have the opportunity to serve in units focused on the geographic area they chose for specialization. Current and projected operational needs should drive the military’s language program: more Arabic, Farsi, and Chinese; less Spanish, German, and Portuguese. Existing language training programs, both in the military, State Department, and civilian academia, should be expanded, with more opportunities for individuals to attend. Highly motivated leaders who undertake language training on their own (outside of formal channels) should—at the very least—be reimbursed and rewarded for their efforts.

One- to six-month language immersion programs should greatly be expanded to allow individuals serving in regionally aligned units to spend greater amounts of time learning their respective target language (or languages). Further, there are many in the national security establishment who have never taken or who have not passed language proficiency exams but who nonetheless are proficient in languages. These “sleepers” should be identified and further evaluated for future assignments.

**Continue to increase opportunities for graduate-level study among junior and midlevel military officers.** The military must stop punishing its most promising officers for attending graduate schools, taking nonoperational assignments, or otherwise leaving “the line” for more than a year. In the words of Thucydides, “The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools.” While official military policy suggests that officers can and should attend graduate school, if the individual officer hopes to remain competitive for operational assignments, his or her graduate education must usually be obtained through distance learning, special night school programs, or in conjunction with official military education (such as ILE) in order to avoid missing out on key developmental assignments. Officers
who attempt to study for two years at prestigious universities such as Harvard, Columbia, Princeton, Stanford, and others usually do so at the cost of their own career—returning to an operational unit afterward is exceedingly difficult. The military should strive to fill its key leadership positions with individuals who have both served operationally and studied at the best institutions in America. It cannot go unacknowledged that today’s enlisted ranks have the most baccalaureate degrees than at any other time in our military history. Identifying those with specific education in critical leadership areas is important. Exploring advanced degree programs for those who choose to remain enlisted is necessary to ensure that all levels—tactical, operational, and strategic—can benefit from the collective education of the unit.

Reinvigorate strategic thinking at the junior leader level. Too many junior leaders in the national security community begin their careers thinking only of parochial, institutional interests, or, worse still, not understanding the greater strategic picture. The federal bureaucracy is so large and complex that a formal introduction is necessary for all new recruits—whether they are to serve in the military, State Department, USAID, Justice, or an intelligence agency. A training course, akin to “Orientation to the U.S. Government and National Strategy” should be undertaken jointly by the newest members of the security and development community. The course would be conducted in Washington, D.C., and include several weeks of programmed joint training, with opportunities to mingle, tour various government facilities, receive briefings directly from White House staff/National Security Council, and discuss current issues in interagency cooperation. One of the most important components of this training would be a “Command Vision” briefing, where the current national strategy is discussed at length. Beyond this formal instruction, each department should encourage its recruits to take courses in interagency processes, national security policy, and/or regional studies as part of their undergraduate education. Distance learning courses or short-duration, intensive seminars should be made available for individuals whose universities do not offer sufficient instruction.

Expand situational training venues, and think outside the box for apprenticeship opportunities with local law enforcement, anthropologists, criminologists, border patrol, etc. The military’s existing National Training Centers (such as Fort Irwin, California) are excellent places to expand interagency training and develop skills for complex contingency operations. However, these training centers cannot be relied upon as the primary mechanism to prepare for deployment. Many other opportunities exist for both military and civilian security professionals to learn from each other. The government should consider funding entrepreneurial training ventures developed at the lowest level and based on existing opportunities created by geography, timing, or personal relationships. In other words, the government should establish a “Joint Training Account,” where individuals or collective units who take the initiative and develop a training plan with a sister agency, civilian institution, or private company can apply for funds to conduct training. Some examples might be: an artillery company preparing to deploy to Afghanistan that partners with the nearby border patrol station to learn about drug trafficking and illegal immigration; a military police unit that partners with the Department of Corrections in its state to learn about detainee issues; an infantry company that partners with the local police department to learn about gang warfare and weapons smuggling; a civil affairs team that partners with a nonprofit charity organization to learn about early childhood education; and an intelligence unit that partners with the FBI to learn about money laundering.

Of particular note would be the potential for information operations and psychological operations personnel to interact with public relations professionals, advertising firms, the news media, bloggers, the radio industry, and cultural anthropologists. Fluency with information operations, spin, and media engagement are skills where military and interagency personnel have the most to learn. A carefully developed training, engagement, and exchange program could literally transform our capabilities.

Support the concept of a National Public Service Academy or a similar institutionalized education program for the interagency. Explore the possibility of a “West Point for the Interagency,” where promising high school students could volunteer for public service, receive a free, top-notch educa-
tion, then serve a mandatory term in the government as a leader in one of several selected agencies and programs. The academy would also include a midcareer program for promising individuals from across the government. Lower cost options might include transforming an existing military education program into an interagency education program (such as the National Defense University, the War College, Command and General Staff College, etc.), and/or expanding the existing the service academies to incorporate a junior leader exchange program with the interagency. Civilian universities might serve as another potential location for a centralized interagency education program, whether at the undergraduate or graduate level, which would be similar to the National Security Fellows program, but with more common core instruction, and at a more junior level.

Reforming Existing Organizations to Promote Balance and Interoperability: Expanding the Circle of Stakeholders and Shifting Priorities

Reexamine the coordination mechanisms, laws, and patterns of interaction between multinational corporations and U.S. embassies abroad. A vignette serves as the best illustration of this compelling issue. In Colombia, where a narco-insurgency continues to plague the local government despite millions of U.S. dollars spent in foreign assistance, an interesting dynamic has emerged: U.S.-based multinationals are coming under great scrutiny for their alleged former ties with terrorists and narco-traffickers. These companies, many of them operating in remote jungle areas, routinely claim they were coerced by local militias and guerrillas to pay extortion money, or in other cases found their security forces heavily infiltrated by former criminals and terrorists. Yet a closer examination of the rules of the game reveals a disturbing systemic issue: U.S. regulations require that the corporations hire at least 51% of their security and contract staff from the local employee population. But at the same time, U.S. embassy staff refuse to assist the corporations in vetting their prospective local hires—despite the fact that the U.S. embassy maintains a highly sophisticated database of prior narcos, criminals, and insurgents, which it routinely uses to screen all Colombian soldiers who are preparing to receive U.S. military training. In this case, it appears that the multinationals were set up for failure by existing regulations and standards.

If the U.S. is to become more effective in the globalized world, much more constructive arrangements are necessary. The government and business community must reexamine existing programs and look for areas for mutual benefit and cooperation. The business community is starting to learn that promoting development and humanitarian assistance wherever it operates is in its own best interest—employees stay safer, locals are left with a more positive view of the corporation (and in turn, the United States), and the international community is generally more supportive. Why can’t the U.S. government harness this emerging force in development and coordinate programs with USAID and the State Department? Why can’t nonsensitive intelligence and human rights databases be shared with corporations in sensitive locales? A great number of opportunities also exist for the business world to promote social programs directly: select businesses have even begun to send promising employees on short tours with development-oriented NGOs. The employees gain valuable experience, form key relationships, and return to their parent companies better equipped to develop strategies for socially responsible investment and corporate social responsibility abroad.

Community education and participation: build a “neighborhood watch on steroids.” Homeland security depends as much on watchful, informed, coherent communities as it does on advanced technologies. In the same way that every American was taught nuclear attack drills in school during the Cold War, all Americans should be given a basic antiterrorism class as part of their high school education. Once they graduate, all attendees should be enrolled in a database and connected to a national social network that would allow them to receive updates, share information, and sign up for
additional training. Individuals interested in taking leadership roles would have the opportunity to apply for security clearances and become local community organizers/points of contact. Periodic training events, hosted by the Department of Homeland Security, would be held regularly in key metropolitan areas, all in conjunction with local law enforcement and emergency services. Potential training might include mass casualty exercises, evacuation rehearsals, vigilance weeks (to be conducted during elevated threat windows), and other contingency preparations. Unclassified portions of the community response plan could also be disseminated in this manner. In the event of an emergency, these social networks would prove invaluable for collecting information from the public, assisting law enforcement, and disseminating messages from government responders such as FEMA.

Reform the culture of privatization/contracting. The 180,000+ contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, most of whom work directly for DoD, DoS, USAID, NGOs, multinational firms, the UN, partner nations, and local firms have become an integral and essential part of the operational environment. A cogent effort to plan for, integrate, and oversee contractors is critical to our nation's security. As the demands on the nation increase and new technologies emerge, the “whole of government” approach becomes, in effect, a “whole of America” approach. With a fuller view of security that includes nonkinetic means, the nation’s defense industrial base (meaning all available government and private resources) will continue to play a major role.

Train as you fight. In order to practice this frequently cited maxim, the national security establishment should include the private sector in its training and deployment cycles. Of particular importance are those contractors who are authorized to use force. Additionally, DoD and other federal agencies should be required to design and implement new acquisition models that meet the requirements of the various departments, ensures the best value for taxpayers and end users, and can manage properly the entire process, while creating the conditions that enable the defense industry to remain an remain an innovative, relevant, productive partner in the protection of the nation. In the past, government and DoD contracting have been like a used car deal; each agent tries to get as much as it can for the lowest cost. But new DoD leaders will have to imagine a new and collaborative relationship with the national security industrial base that addresses these issues in the combat replacement centers, service academies, basic officer training, midcareer schools, command and staff colleges, the war colleges, the national strategies, doctrine publications, and field manuals. Geographic Combatant Commands will have to include private sector capabilities in contingency planning models, and the COCOMs will have to exercise that capability in major exercises. Integrating national security industrial base presentations into predeployment and theater briefs is essential to ensuring that leaders from the platoon to the brigade levels understand the role of contractors on the battlefield—their status, their accountability, and their contributions. The capabilities the private sector brings to national security are vast. The national security establishment should seek to shape those capabilities into an accountable system, not exclude them.

Accelerating Generational Change and Adaptation: Rewiring the Feedback Loop

- Center for lessons learned. The Center for Army Lessons Learned model has evolved into a highly effective feedback system that incorporates that latest lessons from the battlefield, synthesizes them, and develops products (handbooks, diagrams, reference cards, etc.) for use throughout the force. The State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense should have a major role in developing and sharing this mechanism. The newly created Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO) is a positive step, but it is still largely the domain of pure academics, educators, and administrators. A lessons learned mechanism, tied directly to professionals in the field, must be established to keep the information relevant and timely—a program akin to the web blog known as platoon leader.com.
or companycommander.com phenomenon at the beginning of the Iraq War, where junior leaders bloggers in real time, sharing valuable ideas and lessons learned. Only a handful of irregular warfare enthusiasts are currently aware of the existing program; the center, whatever form it eventually takes, should be actively and aggressively promoted throughout the service academies, civilian universities, the Foreign Service Institute, the intelligence community, and at regular conferences and seminars.

- **Regional/ cultural learning.** While the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has provided some excellent tactical/operational and Middle East-specific information, this mechanism should also be improved by the aforementioned system of regional specialization. CALL, the Defense Language Institute, the J-2 (Intelligence) or another hub should form the basis of a regional information database, developed using the feedback from units deployed under “steady state” conditions overseas. As more and more military units conduct “Train Assist and Advise” missions throughout other regions of the world (e.g. Africa, Latin America), this information can be used to assist other units preparing for upcoming tours. The system would ultimately become highly sophisticated (with some sections classified), and provide helpful information such as local personalities, customs, traditions, language peculiarities, history, etc. Information would be cross-referenced with a map, so that leaders preparing to deploy need only highlight the area where they intend to work, “zoom in,” and pull up geographic/cultural/historical/political information (a la “Google Earth). The end state would be a highly developed database of detailed, location-specific information with after action reviews from prior exercises, supplemental products (“How to make friends and influence people in Paraguay,” “Train, Assist, Advise Lessons Learned: Sudanese Forces,” “Understanding tribes and power structures in Sub-Saharan Africa,” “Key Leaders in the Colombian Military,” “What NOT to do in Yemen.”) This center for lessons learned would also, by design, be extended to the interagency.

- **Manual override for promotion boards and key assignments.** Like any large bureaucracy, the national security apparatus is extremely resistant to change, especially at the most senior levels. Exceptional times call for exceptional measures. To address the widely recognized generational divide between those leaders raised in counterinsurgency conditions (roughly, those who graduated from college after Desert Storm) and those who were raised in the Cold War, civilian overseers must exercise *subjective control* in one critical, limited dimension: the selection/ promotion of the next generation of midlevel and senior leaders. A civilian representative, directly appointed by the Secretary of Defense, should sit on Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, and General promotion boards to ensure that a premium is placed on those individuals with exceptional facility for counterinsurgency, those who break from standard “groupthink,” and those who are committed to transforming the military to be more capable at irregular warfare. In other words, this appointee’s job would be to select those individuals who best represent the military’s future, as opposed to its past—individuals who would normally be punished for their independence and innovation (or perhaps, their nonstandard career paths).

The same directive approach would apply to candidates for positions at key academic institutions. The leaders assigned to head schools such as the Infantry Officer Basic Course, The Basic School (TBS) for the Marines, the Command and General Staff College, the National Defense University, and other institutions should be handpicked individuals who “get it” and understand the military’s future direction. The State Department must undergo a similar transformation, promoting those individuals who embrace interagency collaboration—particularly those who have excelled in Iraq, Afghanistan, or in lesser-known initiatives such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, Colombia, the Philippines, and other complex environments.
Conclusion

The future of military leadership and that of the national security establishment writ large depends upon visionaries with the courage and conviction to real change. Today’s security environment—full of new challenges and dynamics—demands a fundamental change to the culture of leadership within our national security institutions. At its core, we need to build the concept of a *national security professional* who is 1) devoted to acquiring expert and relevant multidisciplinary knowledge and 2) adaptive enough to apply that knowledge in new ways to changed situations. This concept hinges upon things that are antithetical to a bureaucracy: individual autonomy, career paths that routinely defy organizational boundaries, as well as nonstandard and experiential learning. Although the panel has developed a series of recommendations, our primary intent is to stimulate further thinking among policy makers—to seed the debate that has already started regarding the future of our security institutions. If even one or two of the ideas here can generate discussion, then we have succeeded. But our greater hope is that bold leaders throughout our community will have the vision and commitment to help transform our institutions in the years to come—nothing will happen unless individual leaders are willing to risk their careers and livelihoods to change the status quo.
MAJ Fernando M. Lujan

MAJ Fernando M. Lujan (USA) is the founder and chair of the Defense Leadership Project. He studied at the Harvard Kennedy School as a Presidential Scholar and Public Service Fellow, graduating in 2008 with a Master in Public Policy (International Security). Fernando is an active duty Special Forces officer and Latin America FAO who has served in Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, and the Tri-Border Area in a variety of counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism roles. He is a 1998 West Point graduate and returned to the Academy this year to teach American Politics and Comparative Politics. Fernando is also an associate of the West Point Combating Terrorism Center and a part-time advisor for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, where he is assisting with issues involving human rights, illegal armed groups, and corporate social responsibility in Latin America. He has traveled extensively throughout South America and the Middle East, and published several articles on irregular warfare, al Qaeda, Iraq, Afghanistan, Latin American politics, and defense transformation. Fernando is fluent in Spanish and has a working knowledge of Arabic. His current research interests are Mexican drug violence and competitive adaptation between Hizballah and Israeli Defense Forces.

Paula Broadwell

Paula Broadwell is the cochair of the Defense Leadership Project and a 2008 graduate of Harvard Kennedy School, where she earned a Master of Public Administration degree. She is currently a predoctoral Research Associate at the Kennedy School’s Center for Public Leaders while she writes her PhD dissertation for King’s College, London. Paula is also completing Army Command and General Staff College as a US Army (Reserve) Military Intelligence Major. She has an MA degree in International Security, a Certificate in Conflict Resolution from the University of Denver’s Graduate School of International Studies, and a BS from West Point. Paula has served on active duty military intelligence tours in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and Africa, and domestically on various tours with US Special Operations Command, DIA, and an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. She is on the executive board of Women in International Security. Paula has appeared on national television and radio shows to address terrorism threats, and has published articles on leadership in the edited volume, Military Leadership, as well as in various news syndicates, including the Boston Globe, Christian Science Monitor, and US News & World Report.
MAJ Kent Park

MAJ Kent Park (USA) is the cofounder of the Defense Leadership Project. He is a Public Service Fellow and a Master in Public Policy candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is a U.S. Army Infantry officer who commanded a Stryker company in Iraq. Kent is also the president of the Harvard Armed Forces Club, where he works to promote military outreach throughout the broader Harvard student body. After graduation, Kent will return to the US Military Academy to serve as an instructor for the Department of Social Sciences. His research interests are civil-military relations, interagency reform, and counterinsurgency.

LT Timm Balunis

LT Timm Balunis (USCG) is a 2008 graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School, where he earned a Master of Public Policy degree. Timm is currently a Public Policy instructor at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. He graduated from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in 2000 with B.S. in Government, then served as Operations Officer and Navigator aboard USCGC BRAMBLE, a buoy tender on the Great Lakes. LT Balunis was subsequently assigned to Coast Guard Sector Baltimore, serving as Command Center Chief, Search and Rescue Mission Controller, and Incident Management Division Chief for the Baltimore-Washington Area.

George Bamford

George Bamford is a 2008 graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School where he earned a Master of Public Administration degree. George is currently Chief of the Cyber Threat Branch at the Department of Homeland Security. He has held intelligence officer positions at the Department of Transportation (Office of the Secretary, Intelligence & Security), U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters (9/11 Incident Management Team), and the U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center. Before attending Harvard, George served as a senior intelligence operations specialist and founding member of the DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC). He developed public-private partnerships by sharing terrorist threat information with state and local government officials, first responders, and owners and operators of critical infrastructure throughout the U.S.

Caitlin Costello

Caitlin Costello is currently a Master of Public Policy candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School, concentrating in International Security and Political Economy. Before coming to Harvard, Ms. Costello worked for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict from 2004–2007. There she served as both the Assistant for Foreign Consequence Management and Assistant for Counterterrorism Policy. Her responsibilities included the development, oversight, and implementation of counterterrorism policy and strategy for the European Command Area of Responsibility, acting as the liaison to the National Security Council, and serving as the Office of the Secretary of Defense lead for the National Implementation Plan. She graduated from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in 2004, with a Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service.

Bradford Davis

Bradford Davis is a joint degree student at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Tuck School of Business. Following his graduation from Dartmouth, Brad Davis entered Navy Officer Candidate School and was commissioned as a Naval Intelligence Officer in November 2001. During his first tour, he was the intelligence officer for Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One, where he served in Operations Southern Watch, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. In March 2003, he and his crewmembers were decorated for valor under hostile fire for flying under heavy anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile fire to provide aerial intelligence support to advancing Coalition forces in Iraq. In his second tour, Brad served as the Navy’s liaison to the maritime and petroleum communities throughout the Middle East, helping to ensure the flow of goods and services to a rebuilding Iraq.
1st Lt Peter Dyrud

1st Lt Peter Dyrud (USAF) is a 2008 Harvard Kennedy School graduate, where he earned a Master in Public Policy degree, writing his Policy Analysis Exercise on American interests in the China-India relationship for the National Security Council’s Senior Director for Strategic Planning. He graduated in the top 2% of the U.S. Air Force Academy Class of 2006, where he served as Cadet Wing Honor Education Officer and Cadet Wing Operations NCO with a double major in physics and mathematics. He has published articles on optical physics, human trafficking, and religion’s role in fighting corruption, and has completed internships at the White House Office of Presidential Speechwriting, National Reconnaissance Office, and Institute for Global Engagement. He is currently in training to serve as a Combat Rescue Officer.

COL Charles N. Eassa

COL Charles N. Eassa (USA) is a 2008 graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School, where he earned a Master of Public Administration degree. Colonel Eassa is currently the Director for Information Operations at U.S. European Command (EUCOM). He was commissioned as a Field Artillery Officer and is now an Information Operations Officer who recently served as the Deputy Director of the United States Army Information Operations Proponent at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Previously, Colonel Eassa served as the Deputy Chief of Plans and the Corps Information Operations Officer for the U.S. Army’s V Corps in Iraq, Kuwait, and Germany. Colonel Eassa is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He holds a bachelor’s degree from The Citadel, an MBA from Bernau University, and a master’s degree in Military Arts and Science. Research interests include national security and climate change, the impact of the information environment on military operations, and the evolving nature of warfare.

Adam Gonzales

Adam Gonzales is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs. His interests include security and development in Latin America; his Harvard studies are focused on International Trade and Finance, International Security, and Private-Public Partnerships. Mr. Gonzales continues to serve the Office of the Secretary of Defense as a private consultant.

CPT Conway Lin

CPT Conway Lin (USA) is a Master of Public Policy candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School. He was born and raised in Huntington Beach, California. Conway graduated from the United States Military Academy with a B.S. in electrical engineering. He is currently a Captain in the U.S. Army Signal Corps and has served in the Republic of Korea in the Second Infantry Division; at Fort Lewis, Washington, fielding the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division; and in Paso Robles, California, as a Company Commander for a Defense Satellite Communications System Operations Center and Wideband Global Satellite fielding site. His research focuses on the economics of defense and national security.

LCDR Matt Maasdam

LCDR Matt Maasdam (USN) is a 2008 graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School, where he earned a Master of Public Administration degree. He is a Navy SEAL and currently the Executive Officer of Naval Special Warfare Unit THREE in Bahrain. He served with SEAL Team ONE and THREE in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, and Asia. Most recently, he was the Officer-in-Charge of SEAL Qualification Training and 1st Phase at Basic Underwater Demolition /SEAL (BUDS) Training in San Diego, CA.
COL Chad Manske

COL Chad Manske (USAF) was a 2008 Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, following a nineteen-month assignment as the 436th Airlift Wing Vice Commander at Dover Air Base, Delaware. He is currently the Chief of the Strategy and Integration Division for the U.S. Air Force Directorate of Strategic Planning at the Pentagon. Previously, he was responsible for a wing comprising both C-5 Galaxy and C-17 Globemaster III airlift aircraft totaling over six billion dollars and the welfare of a base community of nearly 12,000 active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air Force civilians, and their dependents. Colonel Manske received a bachelor’s degree in political science pre-law from Michigan State University, a master’s degree in airpower art & science from the USAF’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies, a master’s degree in military operational art & science from the USAF’s Air Command and Staff College, and a master’s degree in aeronautical science from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University.

Nicholle Manz

Nicholle Manz is a 2008 graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School, where she earned a Master of Public Administration degree focusing on economics and public finance. She is a Foreign Service Economic Officer who joined the State Department in May of 1998 and is currently serving in Washington, DC. Nicholle has served in Ecuador, Honduras, Washington, and Algeria. Nicholle graduated from the University of Wisconsin at Madison with undergraduate degrees in International Relations, Spanish Literature, and Latin American and Iberian Studies.

MAJ Ed Matthaidess

MAJ Ed Matthaidess (USA) is a 2008 graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School, where he earned a Master of Public Administration degree. He is currently serving at the Pentagon in the Army G3-5 SSP Concepts division. Ed recently served as a Stryker Rifle Company Commander in Iraq and has conducted multiple training deployments to Southwest Asia and the Pacific Rim. He is a 1999 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. His research interest is the balance of capabilities needed to wage war across all spectrums of conflict.

Oliver Melton

Oliver Melton is a Master of Public Policy candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School. Most recently, he worked as an analyst on issues related to China and U.S. national security for CENTRA Technology. Prior to that, he spent three years in Beijing, where he worked as a teacher and a journalist, covering economic and social issues for the Economist Intelligence Unit and Voice of America.

Ben Renda

Ben Renda is a 2008 graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School and the Tuck School of Business, where he earned, respectively, a Master of Public Administration and a Master of Business Administration. Ben currently works for Google. He served twelve years in the U.S. Navy as an F-14B Tomcat pilot and an F-18E/F Super Hornet pilot and flight instructor. His primary roles included being a Forward Air Controller Airborne (FAC-A) operationally in the F-14—helping to bring the FAC-A capability to the F-18F Super Hornet—and was a senior Landing Signals Officer. He was the first F-18F Super Hornet flight instructor pilot to receive instructor qualification status from the Navy Fighter Weapons School (Top Gun). He also served as a strategic air planner at STRIKFORNATO (Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (based in Naples, Italy) before returning to graduate school.
Elias J. Rigas

Elias J. Rigas is a 2008 graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School, where he earned a Master of Public Administration degree. He has been an engineer at the U.S. Army Research Laboratory for nearly 15 years, managing technology development programs for the Army. Elias recently spent two years at the Pentagon as Chief of the Science and Technology Branch for HQDA-G8. There he planned and advised on policy and programs in research and development for the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Elias has published more than technical 40 articles and has been awarded more than 15 Department of the Army Special Act Awards, including the prestigious Department of the Army Research, Development, and Achievement Award.

Chris Taylor

Chris Taylor is a 2008 graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School, where he earned a Master of Public Administration degree in political economy and international security. He is the Senior Vice President for Global Strategy at Mission Essential Personnel, a veteran-owned, service-disabled global professional services firm. Chris was also the Director of the Harvard Defense & Security Initiative. He spent 14 years in the U.S. Marine Corps as an enlisted infantryman and Force Recon Marine. He finished his undergraduate degree while serving on active duty and left the Marine Corps in 1999 to attend The College of William & Mary, earning his MBA in 2002. He frequently speaks at professional forums and has testified before Congress on private sector contributions to national and international security, peace support and humanitarian operations, and reconstruction and stabilization operations. He has appeared on MSNBC and CNN offering commentary on global security challenges. Chris is the founding Chairman of the International Peace Operations Association, a board member at the Peace Operations Institute, a member of Business Executives for National Security, and has attended Harvard’s Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security.
DISTINGUISHED GUEST PANELISTS

GEN David Petraeus, Commander of Coalition Forces in Iraq (via VTC)
Mr. James Locher, Director of the Project on National Security Reform
COL Joe Felter, Director of the West Point Combating Terrorism Center
Ms. Caryn Hollis, Director of SOUTHCOM Interagency Partnering Cell (J-9)
COL John Tien, NSC Desk Director for Iraq/Afghanistan
COL Thomas Kolditz, Head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences, West Point
MG Robert Williams, Commandant, U.S. Army War College (via CSA Grand Strategy Panel)
MG David Fastabend, Director of Strategy, Department of the Army G-3/5/7
Mr. Jack Bailey, Boston Detachment Chief, Defense Intelligence Agency
Mr. Mitchell Silber, Director of Analysis, NYPD Intelligence Division
Mr. David Gergen, Director, Center for Public Leadership, Harvard Kennedy School
Dr. Sarah Sewall, Program Director, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
Dr. Eric Rosenbach, Executive Director of Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Dr. Jerry Mechling, Faculty Chair, Leadership for a Networked World Program, Harvard Kennedy School
Mr. Terry Pudas, Deputy Director of the Office of Force Transformation
Mr. James Trainor, FBI Special Agent In Charge, Boston