Some Taliban Retreat as Pakistan Troops Advance - Zahid Hussain and Matthew Rosenberg, Wall Street Journal. Pakistan's military chief dispatched army troops to the Buner district seized by the Taliban and gave the insurgents 24 hours to pull out, warning they would not be allowed to "impose their way of life" on the nation. Some Taliban were seen withdrawing Friday, piling into pickup trucks and minibuses with their assault weapons and rocket-propelled grenades in video broadcast by Pakistani news stations.

Taliban Shift Forces, but Hold Pakistan Valley - Carlotta Gall and Dexter Filkens, New York Times. The chief of Pakistan's Army, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, on Friday defended his army's performance and said it was committed to fighting militancy, in the face of growing criticism from American officials and Pakistani politicians that the military has failed to halt the Taliban insurgency as it creeps toward Islamabad, the capital.

Bombers Strike Outside Baghdad Mosque - Charles Levinson, Wall Street Journal. A wave of attacks targeting Shiites in Iraq continued Friday as two suicide bombings struck outside the holiest Shiite mosque in Baghdad. The bombings killed at least 71 people according to reports Saturday. The attacks came a day after three bombings -- one in Baghdad and two in Diyala province -- left about 80 people dead and capped one of the bloodiest 24-hour periods in more than a year. Since Thursday afternoon, at least 140 people have died and hundreds more have been wounded in five attacks, all but one targeting Shiite holy sites, pilgrims, or predominantly Shiite neighborhoods.

Secretary of State Makes Surprise Visit to Iraq - Mary Beth Sheridan, Washington Post. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton flew to Iraq on Saturday, stressing the Obama administration's commitment to the country as a series of horrific suicide bombings fanned fears about its precarious stability.

Clinton, in Iraq, Blames 'Rejectionists' for Violence - Mark Landler, New York Times. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton arrived here Saturday morning for a one-day visit, delivering an American show of support for Iraq as it battles a sudden eruption of violence, in the wake of suicide bombings that killed at least 140 people and wounded several hundred more on Thursday and Friday.

In Iraq, Clinton Says Country on Right Track - Matthew Lee, Associated Press. US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton says this week's deadly suicide bombings in Iraq are a sign that extremists are afraid the Iraqi government is succeeding.

Could Iraq Violence Affect US Withdrawal Plan? - Gordon Lubold, Christian Science Monitor. The wave of violence in recent weeks, coming as US troops have begun preparing for withdrawal, threatens to bring Iraq back to the front burner, after months of increased security coupled with Obama's focus on Afghanistan had pushed it back. Gen. David Petraeus, formerly the top US commander in Iraq and who now oversees both the wars there and in Afghanistan, warned lawmakers Friday that despite "substantial progress" in Iraq there remain lingering concerns. Al Qaeda in Iraq, as well as other groups, continue to pose a threat, he said.

The Mercenary Debate by Deborah Avant. Private security contracting undermines democratic control of US foreign policy.

The Mercenary Debate by Max Boot. Mercenaries are inevitable and, if employed wisely, they can be effective adjuncts of US policy.

The Mercenary Debate by Jí¶rg Friedrichs and Cornelius Friesendorf. Privatized security cripples statebuilding; Iraq is a case in point.

Local Wars - Janine di Giovanni, New York Times Book Review

The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One by Dr. David Kilcullen

David Kilcullen is a former officer in the Australian Army, a strategist and a scholar. He is also an expert on counterinsurgency, or how to combat a rebellion, and one of the few brave souls who had the ear of people in the Bush White House and advised against the invasion of Iraq...

In "The Accidental Guerrilla," Kilcullen draws on his vast experience not only as a dedicated field researcher, but also as a soldier — he commanded an infantry company in counterinsurgency operations in East Timor in 1999. The most extensive sections of his book concentrate, naturally, on Iraq and Afghanistan (which he still sees as "winnable" with a long-term commitment), but his analysis leads him as well to smaller movements in such places as Chechnya, Thailand, Indonesia and the Horn of Africa...

Kilcullen skillfully interprets the future of counterinsurgency, the proper use of military force and what we must learn from our losses and mistakes...

The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One by Dr. David Kilcullen

16 January 1971

Department of the Army

Office of the Chief of Staff

Washington

General Westmoreland,

The summarizes my paper on using foreign aide (sic) and military assistance as leverage to improve GVN performance which you saw in another form several years ago. It might be useful background material for your session with the East Asian Bureau tomorrow.

It's interesting to note that, with the exception of their leader Amb Sullivan, the SEA group at State has always opposed the use of any form of advisors in Vietnam or any other developing country. They are convinced that we "made a big mistake" in Vietnam when we brought advisors into the country; they are unable to see that if we "made a big mistake" it was when we let equipment, not people in, for it soon became obvious that if equipment goes, advisors must go with it if there is to be any hope whatever of its effective employment. That's a lesson the Russians learned years ago, but unfortunately everyone in the US Government was not as perceptive.

This, of course, ties in with the PACOM cable I flagged separately which is predicated on the premise that the Nixon Doctrine permits assistance only in the form of material and prohibits advisors in any form. This is a very disturbing element, not only because it leaves the Army completely out in the cold while acknowledging possible need for air and sea power (alone, without land-power" "if our vital interests are threatened." But because it simply will not work, as we proved in Vietnam and are proving again in Cambodia, which may yet prove a good test case of the futility of providing equipment without advisors to insure its good use.

You might like to try to make some these points tomorrow.

V.F. Warner

As the US shifts focus from Iraq to Afghanistan, much attention has been given to how counterinsurgency strategies honed against Al Qaeda in Iraq may be applied to a resurgent Taliban.

If one man has the answer, it just might be Gen. David Petraeus.

Credited with turning around a war in Iraq that many considered hopeless, the four-star general has since become CENTCOM commander -- putting Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran under his aegis as well. In a speech Tuesday at Harvard University, he laid out the elements that helped reduce violence in Iraq to its lowest levels since 2003. Many aspects of those counterinsurgency efforts, he said, can be successfully applied in Afghanistan -- if they are applied in "culturally appropriate" ways...

More at The Christian Science Monitor.

Reservists Might Be Used in Afghanistan To Fill Civilian Jobs - Karen DeYoung, Washington Post

Military reservists may be asked to volunteer to fill many of the hundreds of additional U.S. civilian positions in Afghanistan called for in the Obama administration's strategy for that nation and neighboring Pakistan, officials said yesterday.

Although the State Department is still recruiting agronomists, engineers, accountants and other experts for Afghanistan, "pressure coming from the president for action is making us consider that some of the people might come from the reserves," one senior administration official said.

In announcing his plan last month, Obama called for a "dramatic" increase in civilian aid and development workers, and the goal is to send several hundred by the end of this fiscal year...

More at The Washington Post.

US Faces Rising Violence in Southern Afghanistan - Yochi Dreazen, Wall Street Journal

The shape of the Afghan conflict is shifting, as US reinforcements have brought hints of progress along the porous eastern border with Pakistan, while security conditions in southern Afghanistan continue to deteriorate, according to US officials.

Senior American commanders say they believe the war may be won or lost in southern Afghanistan, a Taliban stronghold and one of the world's largest opium-producing regions, where an estimated 80% of Afghanistan's insurgent violence occurs. A shortage of US forces has allowed the Taliban to create safe havens in the south.

"We're at a stalemate" in the south, said US Maj. Gen. Michael Tucker, deputy chief of staff for operations for the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization force in Afghanistan. He didn't provide figures on worsening violence...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Taliban Seize Vital Pakistan Area Closer to the Capital - Jane Perlez, New York Times

Pushing deeper into Pakistan, Taliban militants have established effective control of a strategically important district just 70 miles from the capital, Islamabad, officials and residents said Wednesday.

The fall of the district, Buner, did not mean that the Taliban could imminently threaten Islamabad. But it was another indication of the gathering strength of the insurgency and it raised new alarm about the ability of the government to fend off an unrelenting Taliban advance toward the heart of Pakistan.

Buner, home to about one million people, is a gateway to a major Pakistani city, Mardan, the second largest in North-West Frontier Province, after Peshawar...

More at The New York Times.

Want to trim the federal budget and improve the military at the same time? Shut down West Point, Annapolis and the Air Force Academy, and use some of the savings to expand ROTC scholarships.

After covering the U.S. military for nearly two decades, I've concluded that graduates of the service academies don't stand out compared to other officers. Yet producing them is more than twice as expensive as taking in graduates of civilian schools ($300,000 per West Point product vs. $130,000 for ROTC student). On top of the economic advantage, I've been told by some commanders that they prefer officers who come out of ROTC programs, because they tend to be better educated and less cynical about the military...

On Leadership panelists weight in:

Ed Ruggero, author of a definitive book on the training of leaders at West Point, says Ricks missed the mark.

A retired Army General says perhaps leadership can't be taught, but there is something to be said about West Point, which is the only institution of higher education devoted exclusively to creating leaders of character for our Army and the nation.

A retired Navy Captain and former Annapolis professor asks why the question needs to be asked in the first place.

With a faltering economy, soaring unemployment, and overseas military commitments consuming more each day than the gross domestic product of many small nations, the United States urgently needs adaptive and transformational leaders. In paying tribute to Harvard veterans at a Kennedy School Forum tonight, General David H. Petraeus will underline the importance of adaptive leaders in today's complex national security environment.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has called Petraeus the "preeminent soldier, scholar, and statesman" of his generation - roles that he transitions among as the commander of US Central Command.

Is his leadership unique? And if so, in what way? In more than 100 hours of interviews with Petraeus, his mentors, peers, and subordinates, I have elicited numerous perspectives on his style of leadership and approach to juggling the responsibilities of "soldier, scholar, and statesman." A common theme is that Petraeus models the very principles of adaptive leadership that he advocates...

More at The Boston Globe.

A recent article in the Armed Forces Journal by MAJ Myles Caggins, III, discussed possible incentive plans to retain U.S. Army majors. Caggins asserts that qualified enlisted recruits receive up to $40,000; Army captains $35,000; Navy officers $121,000; and a typical Army major -- nothing. He offers some creative proposals he believes would help retain more of our field grade officers -- you all.

The Global War on Terror has tested our Army's personnel management systems. The shortage of majors has many causes, not the least of which is junior officer retention rates, the creation of modular brigades, and growth of our Army.

Consider, for example, the "cohort" of Army officers who were commissioned in 1998. They originally numbered 4,155. Those the Army retained have now served 10 years of active duty. Although the Army still requires about 2,200 of these officers, it has only kept about 1,800. Additionally, the ranks of captain through lieutenant colonel are only manned at 80 percent strength.

The Army cannot accept risk in its officer corps, and the consequences of how we act now will have generational impacts. We're soliciting your help. Please provide feedback on how you think we can retain quality field grade officers. Specifically, what motivates you and your peers to continue to serve? Do you think there should be increased incentives? Should there be changes in assignments, policies or education? What would you recommend?

Would encourage you to read MAJ Caggins' article and comment on the pros/cons of his argument. We need to get this right and we need your help.

Thank you for helping shape the public debate on this important subject. We will highlight your feedback with leaders at the highest level in our Army as they look for creative solutions to today's complex personnel management environment. Nothing would send a more powerful message than to have the entire CGSC class sound off and provide input. We look forward to your thoughts and recommendation.

-----

Be sure to check out this post's comments at the CAC Blog.