Ex-Spy Sits Down With Islamists and the West - Robert F. Worth, New York Times.

Talking to Islamists is the new order of the day in Washington and London. The Obama administration wants a dialogue with Iran, and the British Foreign Office has decided to reopen diplomatic contacts with Hezbollah, the Shiite militant group based here.

But for several years, small groups of Western diplomats have made quiet trips to Beirut for confidential sessions with members of Hamas, Hezbollah and other Islamist groups they did not want to be seen talking to. In hotel conference rooms, they would warily shake hands, then spend hours listening and hashing out accusations of terrorism on one side and imperial arrogance on the other.

The organizer of these back-door encounters is Alastair Crooke, a quiet, sandy-haired man of 59 who spent three decades working for MI6, the British secret intelligence service. He now runs an organization here called Conflicts Forum, with an unusual board of advisers that includes former spies, diplomats and peace activists...

More at The New York Times.

This week's SWJ contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick - is now posted. Topics include - Do Pakistan's leaders lack an instinct for survival? - Will the United States ever fix its combat advisor problems?

Training Afghans as Bullets Fly: A Young Marine's Dream Job - C. J. Chivers, New York Times

Three stone houses and a cluster of sandbagged bunkers cling to a slope above the Korangal Valley, forming an oval perimeter roughly 75 yards long. The oval is reinforced with timber and ringed with concertina wire.

An Afghan flag flutters atop a tower where Afghan soldiers look out, ducking when rifle shots snap by.

This is Firebase Vimoto, named for Pfc. Timothy R. Vimoto, an American soldier killed in the valley two years ago. If all goes according to the Pentagon's plan, this tiny perimeter - home to an Afghan platoon and two Marine Corps infantrymen - contains the future of Afghanistan. The Obama administration hopes that eventually the Afghan soldiers within will become self-sufficient, allowing the fight against the Taliban to be shifted to local hands...

More at The New York Times.

"The American Military Advisor" - Michael J. Metrinko, Middle East Quarterly

In the post-9/11 world, an advisory position at the political and strategic level in the Islamic world can have great and immediate consequence for US interests, and can make the American advisor a prime figure in the decision-making process of foreign leaders. The advisor is as likely to be dealing with a civilian counterpart as he is with a foreign military officer, and the range of duties will go far beyond mere military tasks. The position has become a critical one in today's world where stability, peacekeeping, and obtaining civil support are considered equally important to kinetic offensive and defensive operations, and where "nation-building" has become a de facto and integral part of the military mission.

The American advisor must take care not to let himself be regarded as just another person who has come to pass out gifts in order to curry favor. He must not be regarded as simply a source of material assistance, supplies, high tech presents, and trips abroad under the rubric of training. In resource-strapped Afghanistan, for example, local and even senior officials became accustomed to requesting telephones, office furniture, office supplies, security accessories, equipment of all sorts, vehicles, and a wide variety of other items from Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders, American officials, and other foreign visitors and donors. On many occasions, the Afghans would request the same items from multiple sources. The advisor must look at himself through local eyes and the local culture. If the American officer's "can do" attitude is too highly developed, he may just seem ill-mannered and abrasive to the official and his staff, who often operate at a different tempo than that in US military circles. If he appears to be too young and lacking in authority, the American may be regarded simply as a decorative foreign staff aide who tags along to add luster to the official's entourage...

More at Middle East Quarterly.

US Takes Dutch Military as Role Model in Afghan Operation - Jay Solomon, Wall Street Journal

The Obama administration, which wants to send hundreds of additional civilian personnel into Afghanistan, is looking at the Dutch military's operations there for lessons on how to combat the Taliban.

The civilian deployment is part of a US focus on economic development meant to weaken support for the Taliban and dry up finances it derives from the opium trade. The civilians will complement the deployment in the coming months of 21,000 new troops, many of whom will be posted to southern provinces where the Taliban are thriving.

The Obama administration, however, is having trouble finding civilian experts at the State Department to send to Afghanistan. Pentagon officials said they may need military reservists to fill any shortfall in the 500 to 600 civilians Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is seeking for Afghanistan.

The Netherlands, with nearly 2,000 personnel in southern Uruzgan province, has better integrated the efforts of its military and civilian personnel than the US, senior US officials say...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

National Security Facilitator - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

One of the puzzles of the Obama administration's first few months was how the National Security Council would work under Gen. James Jones. He had the tricky challenge of managing an all-star "team of rivals" and working with a young president who was just 6 when Jones went off to Vietnam in 1967 as a Marine Corps second lieutenant.

So far, the foreign policy process has generally been smooth, and one reason is that Jones has played a lower-profile role than some of his predecessors as national security adviser. That collegial style has helped avoid fireworks, but some analysts have wondered about Jones's own strategic views. Jones explained his outlook in an interview this week at the White House...

More at The Washington Post.

Gates's Next Lever to Reshape the Pentagon: QDR - Gordon Lubold, Christian Science Monitor

Defense Secretary Robert Gates's bid to remake the Pentagon enters a new and crucial phase this week as the Defense Department begins a year-long review of its own strategy that will inform how it should spend billions of dollars and what its priorities should be.

The result is the Quadrennial Defense Review, and in addition to the Pentagon budget, the QDR is one of the most powerful tools at Secretary Gates's disposal to try to put the military on a new course. He has argued the Pentagon must get its head in the current fights in Iraq and Afghanistan instead of gazing at the strategic horizon -- preparing for hypothetical threats, such as the one posed by China.

The QDR, released every four years, is designed to consider all scenarios. According to a Pentagon internal document, this year's QDR will assess the risks for scenarios including the possibility of militants in Pakistan getting control of its nuclear weapons and a potential conflict between China and Taiwan. Ultimately, the review must answer the question of whether the US should worry about conventional threats from established countries or more "asymmetric" threats emanating from unstable countries such as Somalia...

More at The Christian Science Monitor.

MEDIA ADVISORY

April 29, 2009

2009 Joint Warfighting Conference Addresses Key Themes of Building a Balanced Joint Force

Norfolk, Va. -- U. S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) will address the theme of Building a Balanced Joint Force: How Best to Meet the Demands of the Future Security Environment," during the 2009 Joint Warfighting Conference from May 12-14, at the Virginia Beach Convention Center, Virginia Beach, Va.

USJFCOM Commander Marine Gen. James N. Mattis will deliver opening remarks, and USJFCOM Deputy Commander Vice Adm. Robert S. Bob" Harward will participate on a panel Tuesday, May 12, to provide insights about hybrid warfare and its impacts on the future of joint warfare.

The conference also will focus on two recently released military documents -- the Joint Operating Environment (JOE) and the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO).

The JOE lays out the problem statement and sets demand signals for future challenges, and the CCJO, signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, articulates his vision for how the future Joint Force will operate to address the challenges and meet the demands of future operating environments.

For current conference information and to register for the Joint Warfighting Conference, go to our registration site. Registration is free and open to the public.

During the conference, senior leaders from the Joint Warfighting Center, the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate as well as many others will be available to discuss individual programs and subjects of interest.

For those who will not be in attendance USJFCOM will provide "liveblogs" on both the command's website and USJFCOM's Twitter channel.

Interested media should contact Kathleen Jabs at the USJFCOM Public Affairs Media Section (757) 836-6553 or via e-mail and LCDR Rob Lyon, USJFCOM Media Operations Officer, at (757) 836-6559 or via e-mail.

Been on two road trips and missed getting an early jump on Dave Kilcullen's testimony before the House Armed Services Committee concerning the situation in Pakistan. They dragged Dave out of our wargame last week to testify and I saw him off as he headed from our pristine suburban Maryland locale to the Hill -- but such is life - and our loss was a gain for Congressional SA on a worsening problem.

Anyway, kudos to Ex (also at the wargame) at Abu Muqawama for the link and for a bulletized summary of the "lowlights of the Pakistani Army's recent history". I have to agree - Studying the past few years, one could arrive at the conclusion that Pakistan's army is epically incompetent. One could similarly arrive at the conclusion that Pakistan's army is competent -- but fighting for the other side. Either way -- not much to cheer about.

Here is Dave's "bottom line" from his testimony:

The United States Government has spent $10 billion dollars supporting Pakistan since 9/11, and in that time we have seen a dramatically worsening situation across the whole country. More of the same will not help, and indeed may make the situation worse. I fully support the benchmarks in the bill and would like to see an even greater emphasis on rule of law, policing and civilian administration, with even greater conditionality and stringency placed on continued assistance to the Pakistani military, unless and until it demonstrates a genuine commitment to cease supporting the enemy and begin following the direction of its own elected civilian government.

Rather than continuing to pretend that Pakistan is a weak but —ally against extremism, we need to recognize that while some elements in Pakistan -- some elected civilian political leaders, the majority of the Pakistani people, many tribal and community leaders and some appointed administrative officials -- are genuinely committed to the fight against extremism, substantial parts of the Pakistani security establishment are complicit with the enemy, whether through incompetence, intimidation or ill intent. Our approach in assisting Pakistan should be to strengthen our friends and limit the power of our enemies, while helping Pakistan stabilize itself and govern its people responsibly and humanely. Increasing assistance to the police -- making the police, in effect, the premier counterinsurgency force -- while channeling all military support through civilian authorities and ensuring greater accountability and conditionality on military assistance, is the correct approach. We are way past prevention in 2009, and need to focus on stopping the rot and stabilizing the situation in 2009-2010, then rolling back extremism and militancy thereafter.