With thirty thousand new boots on the ground, Kabul is set to become the primary focus of Obama's strategic agenda. But is this the right choice? Pillar, former national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia, argues that a just intervention has devolved into a worthless quagmire, while Iraq War veteran Nagl believes al-Qaeda must be vanquished in the borderlands of AfPak...

More at The National Interest.

Marine General James N. Mattis, commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, speaking at a Center for a New American Security event on 18 February in conjunction with the official release of a study by CNAS on improving the way military officers are trained, evaluated and promoted. Also see Mattis: Obsolete Thinking Worse Than Obsolete Weapons.

Since the Marine Corps is a major player in NATO's United Nations-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) southern commands, comprising all or parts of six provinces in southwestern Afghanistan, Marine Corps University is hosting this symposium to improve our understanding of this region, to focus on the multidimensional and multinational approaches to enable the USMC and partners to succeed in the historical and ideological birthplace of the Taliban Movement; the current stronghold of the insurgency of Afghanistan; and the epicenter of opium cultivation in the world. The purpose of this one-day symposium will be to understand the integration of all inter-agency elements of national power in the pursuit of national security objectives as it pertains to USMC forces at the operational level.

This symposium will consist of four panels designed around improving our understanding of the Marine Corps Area of Operation, Afghanistan; which include (1) a geographical, cultural and historical overview of Southern Afghanistan; (2) Transitioning Military Authority to the ANSF; (3) governing Afghanistan: district councils, development and judicial reform; (4) and defining, dealing and defeating the Neo-Taliban and their message.

This event is sponsored by the Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation. Space is limited, so you are encouraged to register as soon as possible. To register, please go to: http://www.regonline.com/ee2010.

Inducing alignment: The Dynamic Impact of Repression and Mobilizing Structures on Population Support -- Thesis by Major Brian E. Decker (USA) and Major Philip W. Thomas (USA) -- Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009.

This thesis provides an alternative to the surge theory as a basis for understanding the dramatic change in the security situation in Anbar, Iraq. Typological theory is used to develop a conceptual framework of strategic interaction that explains how different combinations of government and insurgent repression types lead to the alignment of the affected population. Process tracing is used to test our hypotheses of population alignment, to make inferences about how the population reacted to the repression tactics of the government and the insurgent, and ultimately, to construct an explanation for the defeat of AQI through the alignment of the tribal population in the Anbar province of Iraq. Game theory compliments process tracing by verifying the internal logic of the typology and observations.

In addition, the development of an agent based model (ABM) verifies the internal logic and extends the external validity of the author's substantive theory. The model replicates and reproduces the dynamic history of mechanisms and processes by manipulating the parameters that alter the affects of the interaction of repression tactics on population alignment. Then, theoretical predictions are tested against observations from the case study of the Anbar Awakening to assess the degree of congruence between the projections of the conceptual framework and the longitudinal variation of observations. The docking procedure of this research design confirms the utility of channeling for the counterinsurgent against insurgent coercion. However, the findings suggest that this dynamic is heavily dependent on intermediating mechanisms, such as the insurgent's social embeddedness and the population's incentive structures. Lastly, the feasibility and potential areas of applications for the models is provided.

Identifying the Pillars of Stability Operations: Using Social Science to Bridge the Gap Between the Principles of Joint Operations and the Stability Operations Framework -- Article based on a master thesis by Major Ethan H, Harding (USMC) and Dr. David A. Anderson (Colonel, USMC Ret.) -- U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 2009.

In the past, the U.S. military engaged in stability operations as an afterthought to traditional lethal operations. Still, such equality and integration between combat missions and stability operations does not always materialize, leading to diminished returns. This ineffectiveness is due to a myriad of issues ranging from poor synchronization to unit leadership lacking confidence in the benefits of executing stability tasks. Even when stability operations enjoy command and unit support, poor analysis and course of action (COA) development results in actions that minimally effect a situation, while other critical issues are not addressed. Even with the advent of FM 3-07, Stability Operations and the newly published U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and United States Institute for Peace (USIP) Guiding Principles for Stability and Reconstruction, these problems continue to manifest themselves in "cookie-cutter" solutions that are improperly taken from one situational context and placed on another.

In 2005, NSPD-44 tasked the Department of Defense (DoD) with making the conduct of stability operations as one of their "core missions." Additionally, it established the Department of State (DoS), specifically the Department of State/Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), as the lead agency for all stability-related activities abroad.1 This document propelled stability operations to the status of core mission, rather than an afterthought in military planning.

Causes of Improvement in the Security Environment of Iraq, 2006-2009 -- Thesis by Major Seth A. Wheeler (USA) - Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009.

Popular consensus exists that the 2007 surge of U.S. forces in Iraq led to an improved security environment. The surge was designed to reduce violence and improve security by protecting the Iraqi population—a change in strategy. According to the consensus, the security environment improved due to the surge, measured by the decreasing number of attacks.

For this thesis, the security environment consists of the number of attacks and their lethality, supported by data from U.S. Department of Defense reports to Congress. This thesis compares the timelines of the surge forces with the numbers of attacks, the lethality of those attacks, and with factors other than the surge that may have improved the security environment. This thesis argues that the surge and associated strategy may have hastened improvement to the security environment, but they were neither necessary nor sufficient for the improvements in the security environment.

Several theories and conflict models offer insight into how improvement in the security environment occurred: through efforts that countered insurgent sanctuary and social support, and consequently decreased the lethality of insurgent attacks. This analysis reveals that the political efforts of the Iraqi government and grass roots movements were the necessary and sufficient conditions for improvement.

1) He appoints a new field general in Afghanistan,

2) His army will use less firepower and adopt a more targeted counterinsurgency strategy,

3) He will engage in diplomacy with Pakistan in a effort to close the border and cut off support to the insurgents,

4) He orders a major effort to strengthen the Afghan security forces, in order to prepare for the withdrawal of his army from the country,

5) His commanders institute a tribal engagement effort, focused around Kandahar and along the Pakistan border,

6) The client government in Kabul will push a "national reconciliation" agenda in an attempt to increase its legitimacy and to weaken the insurgent movement. This agenda will include offers of amnesty for insurgents who reintegrate into Afghan society.

The new strategy for Afghanistan succeeds well beyond the expectation of the president and his advisors. Through a combination of military pressure, tribal engagement, political alliances inside Afghanistan, and international diplomacy, violence subsides and the client government in Kabul achieves growing authority. The president negotiates an international agreement on the future of Afghanistan and successfully withdraws his army from the country. To the amazement of outside observers, the client government in Kabul survives on its own for four years, outlasting the president's time in office.

Commentary

Is this a forecast of how President's Obama's plan for Afghanistan will play out? No -- it is a description of how Mikhail Gorbachev extracted Soviet forces from Afghanistan between 1986 and 1989, in a study written by four U.S. military officers for the U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings journal. These officers, three of whom have direct experience in Afghanistan, reached several interesting conclusions.

1) After 1986, the Soviets adopted many of the military, political, and diplomatic strategies the United States is currently attempting,

2) Although the Soviet Union had far less capacity to implement these strategies than does the U.S. today, its efforts still succeeded.

3) Gorbachev's goal was to get the Soviet army out and leave behind a friendly government in charge in Kabul. He succeeded. We will never know whether this government would have survived longer had the Soviet Union itself not collapsed.

4) Under Obama, the U.S. is "following the Bear" -- and is correct to do so.

The conventional wisdom is that the mujahideen defeated the Soviet army and chased it out of Afghanistan, which eventually led to an Islamist takeover. This perception (true or not) had crucial implications. It may have energized the willingness of people inside the Soviet empire to resist Soviet control. And Osama bin Laden used it to bolster his reputation and build his own organization.

If the Soviet client government in Kabul had lasted for ten years instead of just four, would the conventional wisdom about Soviet defeat in Afghanistan have taken hold? The answer to this question matters greatly for the U.S. regarding its post-withdrawal outcomes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Should, after U.S. military disengagement, the governments in Baghdad and Kabul quickly collapse due to factional fighting or military coups, the impression may very well develop that insurgencies successfully ejected the U.S., as is the impression for the Soviet experience in Afghanistan.

The U.S. government intends to prevent such outcomes from happening by establishing robust country teams in both countries, combining strong diplomatic, economic, and security assistance missions. What remains to be seen is whether these efforts will be a match for variables beyond anyone's control.

The post-war reputation of the United States rides on the ability of its post-war country teams to prevent success from slipping away. Only when that happens will the U.S. control the post-war narrative -- the last but most important battle of the wars. Will the U.S. country teams in Iraq and Afghanistan be ready for these battles?

The keynote speaker for this year's conference is Gen (R) Anthony Zinni, USMC, and the tentative agenda includes five panels that will debate the essence of the following questions for the purpose of "Defining War for the 21st Century:"

- Why does it matter how we define war?

- How does a nation know it is at war?

- Will all "wars" have discernable start and end points, or will some "wars" have no definable end?

- What are the political and social implications when the political elite and general polity differ in their interpretations?

- What are the dangers of misusing or overusing the "war" label?

- Must a new "theory of war" be developed?

- What are the dimensions of war -- unrestricted war, lawfare, hybrid war, cold war, asymmetric war, cyber war?

- What are the challenges in defining victory?

View the program and register at the 21st Annual Strategy Conference web page.

By John J. Kruzel

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Feb. 19, 2010 -- The only thing worse than obsolete weapons in war is obsolete thinking, a top U.S. commander cautioned in remarks on revitalizing America's military officer corps.

Marine Gen. James N. Mattis, commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, yesterday emphasized the role education plays in enabling military officers to adapt quickly to strategic and tactical changes they encounter.

"It's opening the aperture," he said, describing the value afforded through education. "Once you stretch the mind open, it's hard for it to go back to how it was before."

Mattis delivered his remarks at an event hosted by the Center for a New American Security, a policy think tank, in conjunction with a study by the center on improving the way military officers are trained, evaluated and promoted.

"The U.S. military must develop a model that trains and educates officers for the complex interactions of the current threat environment while being agile and versatile enough to adapt to a swiftly changing world beyond," contributors John Nagl and Brian Burton wrote in the CNAS study published ahead of yesterday's panel discussion. Mattis underscored the importance of complementing experience operating as part of a coalition on a battlefield with study of history and wars of the past.

"Through education built on an understanding of history and through experience gained on joint coalition operations, and probably commencing earlier in officers' careers," he said, "we can create an officer corps at ease with complex joint and coalition operations."

Mattis stressed the need for a new "strategic reawakening" among military officers, making an apparent reference to the design in place before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

"By setting the problem first and spending a lot of time up front getting it right, you don't invade a country, pull the statue down and say, 'Now what do I do?'" he said, in an allusion to the iconic image of deposed dictator Saddam Hussein's likeness being pulled down by a U.S. military recovery vehicle.

Focusing on the culture of the senior military officer corps, Mattis bemoaned that senior-ranking military members aren't allowed ample time to reflect critically on important issues.

"I believe the single primary deficiency among senior U.S. officers today is the lack of opportunity for reflective thought," he said. "We need disciplined and unregimented thinking officers who think critically when the chips are down and the veneer of civilization is rubbed off -- seeing the world for what it is, comfortable with uncertainty and life's inherent contradictions and able to reconcile war's grim realities with human aspirations."

I have departed the Office of Net Assessment, OSD, and for the next four years, at least, I will serve the United States by serving with or among other nation's military forces. This means that, among other things, I can write again. I arrived at the NATO Defense College recently. Not exactly a hardship tour, to be sure. I am in Rome, Italy, for six months. At the end of this gig, so I hear, the odds are not bad that I will go downrange for a while, working as a Strategist for somebody. We will see. Following that...the European Rapid Reaction Corps, Lille, France, where I will be one of about six Americans.

In other words, the only time when I will be among the majority, nationality-wise, for the next four years, will be when I am in Afghanistan. How messed up is that?

Not really much at all, as it turns out. Which is why I not only accepted these gigs, but sought them.

Old Winnie once noted, "It is better to jaw jaw than to war war." Churchill knew whereof he spoke. Although, to the best of this historian's knowledge, he never made a very big deal about it personally or politically, following his deserved dismissal in disgrace in the wake of the debacle of Gallipoli from the post of First Lord of the Admiralty, Winnie did something that few other politicians have done since 1865, he went all military, in person. (His only real peer in this act being Teddy Roosevelt who did much the same following his stint as UnderSec of the Navy, following some hijinks of his own.) He jiined 'th infantry. And, while Teddy's excursion was short, if brutal, it really does not hold a candle to Winston's. Churchill, for at least a little while, was a battalion commander on the Somme Front, in WWI. Folks, as bad as we have it now, that sort of experience defines "suck." (We ought not forget, while we are at it, that Churchill fought in what is now Pakistan as well. His other wars were, technically, as a "correspondent.")

As near as I can tell (and this is sketchy, because the sources are all over the place and you need to adjust for the periods of the major offensives) at that time, in that place, the Brits were taking about 600 casualties every day along their part of the front. And so were the French, on their lines, and of course the Germans and Austrians too. It is no exaggeration to note that conditions, as I said, sucked. Even as a life-long infantryman who has seen his share, I cede that I never experienced the likes that which line dogs did in WWI. And Churchill did this on his own volition. So he knew whereof he spoke.

Which brings me to NATO, and the entire constellation of treaties, and consultation groups, and advisory committees, and Brownie-troop sleep-overs, which sit over any "decision" made about force from these, our allies. The collection of which constantly seem to annoy us Americans, civil and military.

Bottom Line: Their history is not our history. We should understand that.

Yes, we fought a horrific war in which a huge percentage (demographically speaking) of our male population died. But that war was internal, both sides were American, and it ended in 1865. The Brits, our most pugnacious allies even now, fought a war so disgustingly brutal THAT THE AVERAGE HEIGHT OF A MAN IN THAT COUNTRY WENT DOWN BY TWO INCHES. (approximately) Consider that friends. Consider that and gape, particularly when you recall that the same happened to the French, the Germans, and the Austrians. (We don't have good data on the Russians of that period.) Then, barely more than 20 years later, they did it again.

Yah, me too.

Getting my head around those numbers, the sheer volume of them, is difficult. Even for a historian, understanding the breadth of human tragedy from those two wars is difficult. But you have to do it, as an American, if you want to grok. We have not had anything in the American experience to compare it to in almost 150 years. For them, it's right there. It's there in the now-disappeared bombed out medieval center of Bristol, in the shell that is the remains of the Kaiser Wilhelm church in Berlin, in the preserved ghost-village of Oradour-sur-Glan, France, and a thousand other locations.

And so, it seems to me when I think about it dispassionately, logical. For the first time in their history, a bloody and destructive history the likes of which we Americans can barely understand, the Europeans slowly, collectively, came to the conclusion that while they were very good at waging war, war sucks. Then they came to the further conclusion that they should construct systems to keep them from doing, again, that which they are so good at. I submit to my fellow Americans that this is not an unreasonable conclusion, particularly considering the evidence the Europeans live with every day, in the abstract.

And so we return to the wisdom of Winston. We must comprehend our allies. It is not an option. It is not a luxury. It is an imperative, if we are to succeed. As Churchill noted, "The only thing worse than fighting with allies...is fighting without them." Let us remember that.

Topics include:

1) Could Mullah Baradar arrange a truce in Afghanistan?

2) What will get Iran to change course?

Could Mullah Baradar arrange a truce in Afghanistan?

On Feb. 15, the New York Times revealed that Pakistani and United States intelligence officers captured Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Afghan Taliban's second in command. According to the Times, the capture occurred in Karachi several days before the publication of its article. Both Pakistani and U.S. intelligence officers were interrogating the Taliban leader.

What was Baradar doing in Karachi? The United States and Pakistan have greatly expanded the employment of drone missile strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas. The countryside might now be so dangerous that Taliban leaders such as Baradar might now be forced to take their chances in cities, away from the drones' hunting grounds. But avoiding detection in the cities is even more challenging. If the drones are eliminating the countryside as a safe haven, the survival options for Taliban leaders may now be running out.

Could Baradar's capture have actually been a defection? Seeing his life expectancy running short, he might have opted for the safety of capture. Another twist on this scenario is the possibility of a rift inside the Afghan Taliban's leadership; Baradar may have defected to avoid assassination at the hands of his comrades.

Much of the commentary on Baradar's capture has focused on the role of Pakistan's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI has been the Afghan Taliban's sponsor and protector in the past. Yet now the ISI is publicly involved in Baradar's capture (or defection). Does Baradar possess some long-term value to the Pakistani government?

A follow-up story in the New York Times revealed that prior to his capture, Afghan and U.S. officials had indirect contact with Baradar and had negotiated with him, presumably about reconciliation. According to the piece, the Pakistani government was not a party to these talks.

In the long run, U.S. and Pakistani interests regarding Afghanistan diverge. Pakistan maintains a permanent interest in the greater Pashtun region, and a weak Afghan government in Kabul is to their advantage. The United States seeks a strong government in Kabul. Even more important to Pakistan: In the long run the United States will inevitably tilt toward India.

But in the shorter run, there may be some convergance. Similar to the forthcoming U.S. exit from Iraq, the Obama team is hoping for a political settlement in Afghanistan that leads to a relative calm, at least long enough to allow most of the U.S. military forces in the country to gracefully exit. For its part, Pakistan might also prefer a truce. Pakistani leaders may worry that an escalating ground war in Afghanistan and a drone campaign on Pakistan's frontier could eventually obliterate the Afghan Taliban's command structure, crippling Pakistan's influence inside Afghanistan. By this reasoning, both the United States and Pakistan would have an interest in a truce occurring sometime soon.

Might Baradar be the man in the best position to bring about such a truce? If he was able to convince most of his comrades to cease fire, Pakistan is in a position to reward him. U.S. officials would hardly frown on such a settlement, as long as it lasted long enough for Washington's purposes. The biggest loser might be Afghan President Hamid Karzai. But few in the White House seem concerned for his feelings these days.

What will get Iran to change course?

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Saudi Arabia on Feb. 15 to talk Iran with Saudi leaders. Her message to the public in the region was that Iran was turning into a "military dictatorship." Clinton asserted that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) was assuming ever greater control over Iran's economy, military, and politics.

Clinton is hoping that her message -- which she stated to reporters on three separate occasions - will induce Arab states around the Persian Gulf to rally against Iran. U.S. officials have long sought greater defense cooperation among the Arab states. These officials have dreamed of a strong Arab defense alliance balancing Iranian power and thus providing a stable end-state for the region.

Alas, suspicions among the Arab states run almost as deep as suspicions about Iran's intentions. And if Clinton was calling for greater Arab energy, cooperation, and self-help regarding Iran, she muddled her message with this reasoning:

Iran's neighbors, she said, have three options. "They can just give in to the threat; or they can seek their own capabilities, including nuclear; or they ally themselves with a country like the United States that is —to help defend them," she said. "I think the third is by far the preferable option."

If Clinton's preference is for the United States to be the principal military defender of the Arab states, those states won't have much incentive to either get energized about the problem or overcome their suspicions and cooperate with each other.

On Feb. 8, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates met in Paris with French leaders to discuss the Iran problem. At the press conference, Gates concluded, "[W]e have to face the reality that if Iran continues and develops nuclear weapons, it almost certainly will provoke nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. This is a huge danger. The key is persuading the Iranian leaders that their long-term best interests are best served by not having nuclear weapons, as opposed to having them."

Gates seems to be saying that the threat of a regional arms race aimed at Iran might do a better job of changing minds in Tehran than any measures taken thus far. Iran's leaders discount this possibility because they know that nonproliferation is a very important U.S. policy goal. Clinton's analysis of the available options quoted above also seems to discard an arms race as a policy alternative.

But what if, by Gates's logic, it is the only policy that might change Iranian behavior? Credibly threatening Iran with an arms race might be the only way to avert such a race; nothing else tried so far has worked.

As the Marja offensive winds down, it falls to local police to keep order. But the State Dept. and defense contractors have done a lousy job of preparing them.

President Obama says bolstering Afghanistan's security forces is critical to ultimate success in Afghanistan, and few would dispute the point. But how to bolster those forces is a far more difficult question. It's an issue that has bedeviled NATO for years—and will become an especially vital concern when soldiers begin falling back after the Marja offensive and the burden of holding on to the gains shifts to the local police. Lieutenant General William G. Caldwell, the new commander of the NATO training mission, has declared Afghan leadership the mission's top priority for 2010—a welcome departure from prior years, when NATO often lost sight of the quality of the Afghans' officer corps. Experience has shown time and again that defeating rural insurgents hinges on the caliber of army and police leaders...

More at The Daily Beast.