Navy MC2 (AW) Nikki Carter

USJFCOM Public Affairs

Online registration is now available for the fourth annual Joint Warfighting Conference being held May 11 - 13 at the Virginia Beach Convention Center.

U. S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA), the U.S. Naval Institute, National Defense Industrial Associations Greater Hampton Roads Chapter and the local AFCEA Hampton Roads and Tidewater chapters will host the event.

Navy Capt. John Polowczyk, USJFCOM's business manager, said the Joint Warfighting Conference theme is, "Combatant and Coalition Commanders: What Will They Need Five Years From Now?" During the two-and-a-half day event panel discussions will explore this theme, also to be reflected in industry booths on the exhibit floor.

Polowczyk said key command personnel will be at the USJFCOM booth throughout the three-day event to discuss different aspects of the command's mission in an open-forum setting.

He encourages USJFCOM staff members, and other DoD and community members, to register for the conference.

"This gives the command the ability to show industry and academia what we are doing and what they can do to help us achieve that," he said. "It is also equally important for USJFCOM staff to see what's going on and how they can integrate what they are doing into the bigger picture."

The booth also will provide information to industry and academia on how to partner with USJFCOM and to answer questions about employment opportunities at USJFCOM.

For more information, or to register for the conference, visit the Web site at http://www.jointwarfighting.org.

LaRose thought that a blonde-haired, blue-eyed, United States passport holder (which she is) could be a highly useful counter-surveillance asset to a jihadist terror cell. Where she and her co-conspirators erred badly was in their use of the internet to communicate. As the U.S. District Court's indictment of LaRose makes clear, the U.S. government, along with allied governments around the world, is very effectively using electronic surveillance to uncover terror conspiracies. The cases of Major Hasan and Umar Abdulmutallab are not exceptions; electronic surveillance and other intelligence gave advance warnings, which authorities discarded due to bureaucratic failings.

The decentralized terror model results in poor tradecraft, poor training, easy electronic monitoring, little internal security, and easy police penetration. Organizations typically address such weaknesses through institutional measures such as appointing quality leaders, establishing and enforcing higher standards, instituting training programs, removing incompetent personnel, etc. In other words, establishing central control. Al Qaeda can't do these things, or at least not very easily.

Proponents of the decentralized, self-organizing model will assert that a decentralized, self-organizing network is highly capable of learning, perhaps even faster than a centralized one. Possibly, but the assumption of rapid learning seems to require that the prospective terror cells have unfettered and secure electronic communications. That is clearly not the case.

What's a conspirator to do? Go back to "dead drops," chalk marks on walls, and whispered conversations on park benches? Is that how to advance the global jihad in the 21st century?

The State Department plans to create seven new senior positions to ensure that a public-diplomacy perspective is always "incorporated" in policymaking around the world, as well as to respond quickly to negative coverage of the United States in foreign media.

In an ambitious strategy that goes beyond any previous efforts to reach out to other countries, the Obama administration "seeks to become woven into the fabric of the daily lives of people" there, its top public-diplomacy official said Wednesday.

"We must do a better job of listening, learn how people in other countries and cultures listen to us, understand their desires and aspirations, and provide them with information and services of value to them," said Judith A. McHale, undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs...

More at The Washington Times.

Their briefing, based on a soon to be publish paper, is entitled 'Re-Evaluating the Afghan Balance of Power and Culture of Jihad'. The presentation, as will the paper, challenges our preconceived notions of the role that tribe, government and mullah play in Afghanistan and questions the wisdom of trying to win our counterinsurgency campaign without first conducting a critical examination of the root cause of the insurgency in Afghanistan.

Those interested in attending may view the meeting on-line at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

If you are having trouble connecting please contact Mr. Kirk Hicks at 913-684-5198 or DSN 552 so he can resolve your issue.

Azizullah Khan might be this town's best example of civic-mindedness.

He is a middle-aged farmer here, at the center of a recent large-scale military effort against the Taliban, in Afghanistan's volatile Helmand Province.

His dedication to community under the most trying of circumstances earned him the respect of Marjah's locals, who long depended on his pharmacy in the town's dusty bazaar as their only health-care option.

When news came that Afghan President Hamid Karzai would be visiting on March 7, following the anti-Taliban operation carried out by Afghan and NATO forces, it was Khan who was entrusted to speak for Marjah's residents. With their marketplace in ruins as a result of the offensive, the feeling was that Khan would be well-suited to present their demands and concerns based on firsthand experience.

Addressing the president inside the community's main mosque, Khan peppered his message with salutations and blunt grievances, even reminding the Afghan leader of his oft-repeated promises to step down if he failed to deliver security and services.

"We are not asking you to resign, but our patience is running thin," Khan told the only president that Afghans have ever elected. "For the past eight years the warlords have been ruling us. Their hands have been stained with the blood of innocents and they have killed hundreds of people. Even now they are being imposed on the people in the name of tribal and regional leaders. People are afraid to convey the real feelings of locals because they sense themselves to be in danger from all sides."

Khan pleaded for the government to ensure security, remove any military presence from schools and private homes, compensate locals for losses resulting from the recent fighting, and help rebuild schools, clinics, and irrigation canals.

His most impassioned and telling appeal, however, was for Karzai to avoid repeating a past mistake: Do not hand over control of local affairs to former militia commanders or other "people with influence."

The plea, met with cheers and nods of approval by the hundreds of locals assembled at the mosque, highlights a window of opportunity that has been opened in Marjah, a town that in many ways is a microcosm of what has gone wrong in much of southern Afghanistan...

Much more at RFE/RL.

The objectives of this workshop are to: (1) Evaluate the value and feasibility of a tribal engagement approach in Afghanistan (2) Assess what secondary effects adoption of a tribal engagement approach would have on the political and military situation and (3) Identify the operational components of a tribal engagement approach in Afghanistan.

Particular issues we hope to address include:

- Is a tribal approach, and by extension a bottom-up approach, viable and feasible in Afghanistan?

- What are the baseline requirements at the international (NATO / ISAF / UN), national and operational levels to enable a tribal approach in Afghanistan?

- Is a tribal approach suitable for Afghanistan as whole, or only for certain geographical / tribal regions?

- How would a tribal engagement approach compliment and integrate with other NATO / ISAF efforts at the national, regional and district government levels?

- What conditions are required in Pakistan to enable a tribal approach in Afghanistan?

- What is the relationship of a tribal approach to other efforts in Afghanistan to include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stabilization and foreign internal defense operations / programs? What needs to be done to ensure these efforts are mutually supporting?

- What are both the desirable and the feasible / attainable construct of units / organizations to conduct tribal engagement?

- What are the operational (intelligence, logistics and command and control for example) and training requirements to adequately support a tribal engagement approach?

- What alternatives exist, other than tribal engagement, in implementing a bottom-up approach in Afghanistan?

The TEW will consist of three sessions conducted over a two-day period as described below:

Introductory Remarks, Keynote Address, Panel Discussions and "Charge" to Participants: One half a day plenary of formal briefings, panel discussions and Q&A covering the workshop agenda, objectives, methodology and subject matter expert presentations on tribal engagement and Afghanistan.

Tribal Engagement Working Groups: One day (plus) of guided / facilitated discussion by subject matter expert participants structured to specifically address the workshop objectives and document insights, observations and recommendations.

Working Groups Brief Out: Two hours of briefings and Q&A on working group findings.

While we are keeping the number of participants relatively small to facilitate the "work" in the working group session (and we have some physical space limitations) we do have the need for some additional (5-10 people) tactical and operational representation (both civilian and military) by personnel who have experience (especially in Afghanistan) and / or other expertise in regards to tribal engagement or other local bottom-up approaches. Again, we have some limitations as to the number of participants so we cannot entertain "sit in and listen" requests for this event.

SWF/SWJ cannot provide funding for travel or per diem -- though there are no other costs associated with the workshop -- breakfast and lunch will be provided on both days and dinner on the first.

If you think you have what we are looking for (and we have to be selective in order to have a manageable event) and are interested please e-mail me (Dave Dilegge) at ddilegge (at symbol) smallwarsjournal.com, with TEW Information in the subject line, and I'll provide additional details. Comments below are closed for this post.

The operational environment is exceptionally complex with an expanding array of threats. Increased competitiveness is the norm. Recognizing that fact means that in order to prevail in future conflict we must first win in the competitive learning environment.

To that end, we are developing an Army Learning Concept to describe a 2015 learning environment that will be more effective in meeting the needs of our Soldiers and leaders. Derived from major themes of the Army Capstone Concept and the Army Leader Development Strategy, it will provide the basis for building and adapting our learning models and future information needs while ensuring we still deliver the high-quality content our Soldiers need and deserve.

The Army Learning Concept for 2015 will guide all Soldiers and leaders through a continuum of learning for the duration of their careers. We are going to cut the chaff and augment the most effective aspects of our current learning system while ensuring relevant and rigorous training and education is available and accessible, and not just on the institutional side of the Army. This is a shared responsibility between the operating and generating force as we lead the Army into a future characterized by its persistent learning environment.

SWJ Editor's Note: The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is conducting a Senior Leaders Conference this week. While invited, SWJ could not attend due to scheduling conflicts. That said, we've asked TRADOC to provide us short "snap-shots" from the SLC for posting here. General Martin E. Dempsey is TRADOC's Commanding General.

Secretary Clinton announced the 10 winners of this year's International Women of Courage (IWOC) award. On March 10, Secretary Clinton will present the awards to the honorees at the Department of State.

The awardees are:

Shukria Asil of Afghanistan for promoting government responsiveness to the needs of women.

Colonel Shafiqa Quraishi of Afghanistan for integrating women into the government and police force.

Androula Henriques of Cyprus for fighting human trafficking.

Sonia Pierre of the Dominican Republic for ending discrimination based on country of origin and the human rights abuses of statelessness.

Shadi Sadr of Iran for advocating for women's legal rights and an end to execution by stoning.

Ann Njogu of Kenya for seeking social transformation and being at the forefront of reforms in Kenya.

Jansila Majeed of Sri Lanka for strengthening rights for internally displaced persons.

Sister Marie Claude Naddaf (a.k.a. Sister Marie Claude) of Syria for working for social services for women.

Jestina Mukoko of Zimbabwe for documenting human rights abuses.

Much more, to include biographies, at The U.S. Department of State.

A Woman of Courage: Col. Shafiqa Quarashi - By Staff Sgt. Sarah Brown, NTM-A / CSTC-A.

Calm, quiet and poised, Col. Shafiqa Quarashi doesn't give the impression of a passionate defender of women's rights, that is, until she speaks. With her voice ringing with conviction, Shafiqa boldly tells an audience full of females that they will never get their rights by sitting at home; they have to go out and get them, to demand them.

"No one will give your rights to you as a gift, you have to take them. Who is saying women can't do anything. We can do everything, anything you want," she said. "We have to fight against corruption and those who are against women working." It is with speeches like this, given at the Ministry of Interior's International Women's Day recognition ceremony March 4, that it's easy to see why Shafiqa, an Afghan National Police office, was selected as a 2010 International Woman of Courage.

The award, presented by U.S. Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, will be presented to 10 women from around the world March 10 at the State Department; 75 women were nominated from more than 70 countries including Zimbabwe, Iran, Republic of Korea, Kenya, Syria, Dominican Republic and Sri Lanka...

Much more at NTM-A / CSTC-A.

According to the article, U.S. surveillance drones are in the air over Mogadishu. The article describes a Somali government motor pool containing rows of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and gun trucks, presumably refurbished with U.S. assistance. The article also discusses a six-month military training program that has recruited thousands of young Somali men, transferred them to military training camps in neighboring countries, and returned them to participate in an upcoming government offensive against Al Shabab. Finally, the article mentioned training for Somali intelligence officers and logistical support for an African Union peacekeeping force that is supporting the Somali government.

But what is the U.S. military's current role in Somalia? "This is not an American offensive," said Johnnie Carson, the assistant secretary of state for Africa. "The U.S. military is not on the ground in Somalia. Full stop." However, the article did quote an anonymous U.S. official who forecast future American air support and direct action missions in Somalia.

Over the past two decades, the U.S. government has tried, with sketchy results, just about every approach to mitigating risk from Somalia. Previous strategies have included a large-scale humanitarian intervention, benign neglect, air strikes, small scale raids, support to warlords, and support for an invasion by Ethiopia. The latest iteration appears to be a methodical and comprehensive foreign internal defense campaign, presumably conducted mostly by other government agencies and contractors.

U.S. special operations forces may soon play a larger role for a time inside Somalia. Across the water in Yemen, they are likewise supporting the FID mission there. The results from the latest efforts in Somalia and Yemen may determine whether this OGA/SOF FID (and perhaps UW) approach will be the new strategy preference for U.S. policymakers. After Iraq and Afghanistan, will the U.S. enter a "post-COIN" era? Will the current operations in Somalia and Yemen be the model for the future? And what future roles should the general purpose ground forces prepare for?

Book Review by Lieutenant Junior Grade Robert J. Bebber

Download the full article: The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad

How is it the United States failed to see a growing insurgency within Iraq after a lightning fast victory over Saddam Hussein's military in 2003? In his book, Mr. Steven K. O'Hern does a valuable service by detailing America's intelligence failure. Despite the massive undertakings of the 9/11 Commission and other "post 9/11" intelligence reviews, major flaws still plague our intelligence system. These flaws place our uniformed service members at risk and undermine our national security.

Mr. O'Hern served as the director of the Strategic Counterintelligence Directorate (SCID) of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) for six months in 2005. The primary mission of the SCID was to identify and locate insurgents who were conducting attacks against Coalition Forces. It was mainly a human intelligence (HUMINT) operation, collecting information from Iraqis who were recruited and trained for the task.

O'Hern traces our intelligence failure in Iraq to three general areas: lack of emphasis and appreciation of HUMINT, the "stovepipe" structure of our intelligence community (i.e., agencies' keeping intelligence to themselves and not sharing it with one another), and the inability/unwillingness to acknowledge threats until after they have manifested. Much was made of the pre-9/11 era's "wall" between intelligence agencies in law enforcement and national security, who intentionally or by prohibition did not share intelligence. This failure led to the inability of analysts to "connect the dots," which might have better warned us of an impending terrorist attack. Despite the restructuring of America's intelligence community, O'Hern says we have failed to learn our lesson. "The single largest hindrance to effectively understanding and acting on intelligence is the intelligence community's collective failure to share information," (p. 208). Frequently, military intelligence units conducting operations do not share their information, creating overlap or even causing units to work at cross purposes.

Download the full article: The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad

Lieutenant Junior Grade Robert Jake Bebber is an Information Warfare Officer stationed at Navy Information Operations Command, Maryland. He served as the Information Operations officer for a Joint Provincial Reconstruction Team in Khost Province, Afghanistan in 2008. He holds a doctorate in Public Policy from the University of Central Florida.