The Other Side of the COIN: Perils of Premature Evacuation from Iraq - Kenneth M. Pollack and Irena L. Sargsyan, Washington Quarterly.

The United States is leaving Iraq. Both the U.S. administration and the Iraqi government have made that clear. In 2008, the United States and Iraq signed a security agreement allowing U.S. troops to stay only until the end of 2011, and in February 2009, President Barack Obama announced that he intended to reduce U.S. forces in Iraq to just 50,000 and to end their combat mission by August 2010. But how the United States leaves is of tremendous importance for the region, the international community, and above all, for the future vital U.S. interests.

Iraq has made remarkable progress since the worst days of its civil war in 2006. Security has improved enormously, democratization has gained a foothold, and democratic pressures have forced Iraqi politicians to change their methods, if not necessarily their goals. Iraq's micro economies have begun to revive and foreign investment is beginning to pick up. But as countless policymakers and commentators have pointed out, these gains are fragile and reversible. All of the tensions that propelled the country into the maelstrom of civil war during the initial years of bungled reconstruction remain, as do the memories of the many horrific acts committed. As numerous scholars of civil war have noted, these lingering fears typically make the resumption of civil war uncomfortably likely in cases like Iraq, unless an external great power is —to serve as peacekeeper and mediator during the critical early years when the new, fragile state must build institutions capable of providing effective governance and public safety.

Indeed, candidate Obama correctly argued that when the United States prematurely turned away from Afghanistan to focus on Iraq in 2002--2003, the result was the near collapse of the new Afghan government and the resumption of widespread civil strife. Even if it is to focus on Afghanistan, if the United States turns away from Iraq prematurely, it would have dire consequences for Iraq, whose fragile government will be more likely to fail, and for the United States, because success in Iraq is vital to U.S. interests...

Much more at Washington Quarterly.

Obama Makes a Surprise Visit to Afghanistan - Helene Cooper, New York Times.

President Obama made a surprise trip to Afghanistan on Sunday, his first visit as commander in chief to the site of the war he inherited and has stamped as his own. Air Force One landed at nighttime at Bagram Air Base after a 13-hour nonstop flight for a visit shrouded in secrecy for security reasons; Mr. Obama quickly boarded a helicopter for the trip to Kabul, landing at the presidential palace for talks with President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan.

Gen. James L. Jones, the National Security adviser, told reporters aboard the flight to Bagram that Mr. Obama would try to make Mr. Karzai "understand that in his second term, there are certain things that have not been paid attention to, almost since day one." Gen. Jones said those things included "a merit-based system for appointment of key government officials, battling corruption, taking the fight to the narco-traffickers," which, "provides a lot of the economic engine for the insurgents." ...

More at The New York Times.

Obama Makes Unannounced Trip to Afghanistan - Laura King and Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times.

President Obama flew into Afghanistan's capital Sunday on an unannounced visit, his first trip as president to a country where tens of thousands of new U.S. troops are being deployed this year. Obama last visited the country in 2008 as a presidential candidate. Previous attempts to visit Kabul during his presidency were cancelled because of weather problems, according to White House officials. Afghanistan, along with neighboring Pakistan, are probably the largest foreign-policy challenges of Obama's presidency, and he has overseen a troop buildup of about 50,000 forces since he took office.

Obama was meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whose relations with the West were badly strained last year by his fraud-tainted reelection. Karzai has been told unequivocally by the United States that he must clean up corruption in his government, a message Obama was to reiterate, according to aides. Security concerns dictated that secrecy surrounded the trip, which was not announced until after the president was on the ground...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Obama Presses Karzai to Fight Afghan Corruption - Jennifer Loven, Associated Press.

President Barack Obama is pressing Afghan leader Hamid Karzai to crack down on corruption in his country while also strengthening the judicial system and promoting good governance. Obama met with Karzai at the presidential palace in Kabul during an unannounced visit to Afghanistan on Sunday. The White House said later than Karzai will come to Washington on May 12 for more talks.

Obama said Afghanistan has made progress in the military campaign against insurgents and improved services to Afghans. Obama is expected to spend several hours in Afghanistan before beginning the long flight back to Washington...

More at The Associated Press.

Ayad Allawi's predominantly Sunni alliance won Iraq's national election, narrowly edging out Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's list to become the largest bloc in the country's next parliament, and kicking off a scrum among political and religious blocs to form a majority government. The Allawi upset threatens to end the lock on power that Iraq's majority Shiites have enjoyed since 2003 after decades of oppression under the Sunni-led government of Saddam Hussein, and could severely test the country's fragile institutions. In the two weeks between the March 7 election and the vote tallies Friday, Shiite politicians warned of violence should their parties lose the election.

-- Wall Street Journal

Nearly three weeks after Iraq's elections, the coalition of former prime minister Ayad Allawi emerged with the most seats in the parliament Friday but fell far short of a majority. The results signaled the start of another protracted phase of uncertainty for this country's fledgling political system. Allawi's coalition won two seats more than that of his fiercest competitor, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Maliki refused to recognize the results and said he would challenge them in court. Even if Maliki's challenges fail, it will probably take several months for a new government to form.

-- Washington Post

The secular party of Ayad Allawi, a former interim prime minister once derided as an American puppet, won a wafer-thin victory in Iraq's election, setting the stage for a protracted period of political uncertainty and possible violence that could threaten plans to withdraw American troops. The outcome, announced Friday, was immediately challenged by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki and his supporters in the State of Law coalition, who hurled accusations of fraud and made vague references to the prime minister's power as commander in chief. Several parties have cried fraud as their fortunes waxed or waned in the slow vote count, an ominous reminder of an Iraqi political culture where winning is everything and compromise elusive.

-- New York Times

Allawi's Coalition Wins Most Seats in Iraqi Election - Voice of America

Upset Vote Reshapes Iraq - Wall Street Journal

Allawi's Bloc Wins Most Seats in Parliamentary Elections - Washington Post

Secular Bloc Wins Most Seats in Iraq - Los Angeles Times

Allawi Edges PM Maliki in Iraq Election - Christian Science Monitor

Secular Challenger Allawi Claims Iraq Election Win - Associated Press

Allawi's Victory in Iraq Election Sets Up Period of Uncertainty - New York Times

Recount Call as Allawi Wins Iraq Election - The Times

Allawi Expected to Start Coalition-Building Talks in Iraq - Voice of America

Election Results: Reactions From Around Iraq - New York Times

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Bargaining in Afghanistan will open up new fissures,

2) Killer drones: our friends today, our worst fear tomorrow.

Bargaining in Afghanistan will open up new fissures

The New York Times reported on March 22 that Afghan President Hamid Karzai met with a delegation representing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of one of the three main insurgent groups fighting against the government and international military forces in the country. According to the Washington Post, Hekmatyar's opening bid was a 15-point plan calling for the withdrawal of foreign military forces over the course of six months beginning in July, the appointment of an interim council to govern the country, a new constitution, and new national and local elections.

Before the arrival of Hekmatyar's delegation, Karzai scheduled a peace conference for late April, which he hopes a broader range of insurgent groups, factions in parliament, and civil society organizations will attend.

One should not make too much of these developments. Gen. Stanley McChrystal's August 2009 assessment of Afghanistan rated Hekmatyar's force as the weakest of the three groups he is fighting. McChrystal also concluded that Hekmatyar has no geographical objectives and is just hoping to bargain for a role in a future Taliban government.

However, some bargaining process, even if notional, has likely begun. The various actors onstage in Afghanistan -- Karzai and his allies, the various insurgent factions, elements of Pakistan's government, and the U.S. government -- will each make their own assessment of what could constitute an acceptable deal and whether continued fighting will get them closer or further away from their goals.

The U.S. "surge" of reinforcements is designed to increase the coalition's bargaining leverage. Neither Karzai nor U.S. President Barack Obama's team will see much reason to scale back their current objectives until this autumn when the results of the summer fighting season are in. Coalition leaders are hoping that continued attrition of Taliban leaders, both from ground combat and from drone strikes, might compel some of those leaders to seek a truce. From the Taliban's perspective, each summer's escalation of combat brings a new opportunity to apply political pain on electorates in Europe and North America. The Taliban's dominant factions -- the Quetta Shura led by Mullah Mohammed Omar and the Haqqani network -- will likely also wait to see whether this summer's combat might drive some less-committed coalition members out of the fight.

Although battlefield results should influence bargaining strategies, such logic might not apply in this case. For Afghan players like Karzai and the Taliban, there may be no incentive to settle no matter how much pressure they might come under. They understand that truces are likely to be broken; here the calculation switches to who can gain an advantage rearming during any lull in the fighting.

Of course, U.S. policymakers will not see it that way. As in Vietnam in 1973, the United States will see a truce as an opportunity to declare victory. The weak South Vietnamese government saw the need to keep fighting no matter how badly its position deteriorated. It correctly judged any truce to be neither credible nor enforceable.

For now, Karzai and the Americans fight the Taliban. But as the bargaining process develops, the next struggle will be between Karzai and the Obama team.

Killer drones: our friends today, our worst fear tomorrow

On March 21, the Washington Post ran a profile of Leon Panetta, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The article began with an anecdote that revealed an unexpected ruthlessness in the former congressman from Monterey, Calif.: A CIA Predator drone flying over Pakistan spotted terrorist suspect Baitullah Mehsud on the roof of a house, accompanied by his wife. Panetta ordered a missile strike that killed them both.

According to the article, since the beginning of 2009, CIA drones over Pakistan have killed 666 suspected terrorists and as many as 177 noncombatants (the CIA claims a lower figure). This drone killing rate is a marked acceleration from the George W. Bush years. This acceleration is partially explained by both the greater number of drones available for hunting and increased cooperation from Pakistan in identifying targets. But the stepped-up drone campaign also required the willingness of Obama and Panetta to employ the tactic. That will has obviously not been lacking.

The Obama administration's unforgiving employment of hunter-killer robots over Pakistan is a conspicuous change from the ambivalence Panetta observed during his tour as President Bill Clinton's chief of staff. In his book Ghost Wars, Steve Coll describes how the Clinton White House agonized over what actions were permissible for dealing with Osama bin Laden. That vacillation came to haunt Clinton's legacy. Perhaps Panetta now wants to make sure that no one gets away again.

Are there any legal or geographic limits on the CIA's authority to observe and strike? The CIA claims that the program is legal but does not elaborate. Kenneth Anderson, a law professor at American University and a supporter of drones as a counterterrorism tool, warns that the U.S. government needs to explain its legal reasoning before lawsuits or even international arrest warrants threaten the government's authority. Specifically, if it is legal for the CIA to employ Predator drones in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, what about remote reaches of Asia, Africa, Latin America, or the high seas? Can the United States shoot at any sorts of criminal suspects and not just al Qaeda suspects or their allies? What if the target is a U.S. citizen? Why is it legal for drones with missiles to do what an overseas FBI agent with a pistol cannot? Does any suspect deemed "too difficult to apprehend" become legally eligible for a Hellfire missile instead?

Finally, Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution reminds us that the U.S. monopoly on lethal drones might end very soon. According to Singer, the technology is surprisingly cheap and accessible. Defending against drone attacks might soon become an overwhelming concern, not only for deployed U.S. military forces, but for military forces in garrison bases, which may be even more vulnerable than troops in the field. Then there is the problem of protecting U.S. political leaders from assassination by drone. One more worry to keep the Secret Service awake at night.

Pentagon Revamps Afghanistan Deployments - Yochi Dreazen, Wall Street Journal.

The Pentagon is revamping the way it deploys troops to Afghanistan, putting in place a new system that will return units to the same parts of the country so they can develop better regional expertise and closer relationships with local Afghan power brokers.

Senior military officials say the "Campaign Continuity" initiative will determine the specific provinces and regions where many of the 30,000 soldiers and Marines who are being sent to Afghanistan as part of the Obama administration's retooled war strategy will end up serving.

The plan represents a significant change for the military, which has long rotated its combat forces through both Afghanistan and Iraq...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Holding Pakistan: The Second Phase of Pakistan's Counterinsurgency Operations - Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, Foreign Affairs.

Summary: Conventional wars are won by capturing territory, but counterinsurgencies are won by holding it. Rather than rushing to open new fronts against the Taliban, Pakistan must now focus on keeping the territory it has already cleared.

Much more at Foreign Affairs.

In my last SWJ blog entry, I introduced the Army Learning Concept 2015 being "championed" by the TRADOC G3. Following up on that post, I want to briefly highlight our discussions on this subject during last week's TRADOC Senior Leader Conference.

What resonated most clearly was the shared agreement that in order to increase rigor, maintain relevancy, and prevail in the competitive learning environment we have to change. Our current models have not kept pace with the rapid pace of change, the demands of Soldiers rotating in and out of the fight, and a continuous influx of Soldiers with significant "digital literacy."

We all recognize the challenge and are working to adapt our learning models. We're changing our assumptions to look at the problem differently, because we know we can't afford to come up with the same solutions. We're reaching out to those both inside and outside the military to help in this effort. I've asked the TRADOC G3 to draft a white paper that we'll circulate among the communities of interest in the next 90 days. I welcome views from across the force on ways to ensure we get this right.

GEN M. Dempsey

SWJ Editor's Note: The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command conducted a Senior Leader Conference last week. We asked TRADOC to provide us short "snap-shots" from the SLC for posting here. General Martin E. Dempsey is TRADOC's Commanding General.

Gates Seeks Review of Information Programs - Craig Whitlock, Washington Post.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has ordered a review of the military's information operations programs in response to allegations that private contractors ran an unauthorized spy ring in Afghanistan.

Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said Tuesday that Gates had instructed a small group of senior officials to determine whether there were any "systemic problems" with the operations, which include electronic warfare, psychological operations and other noncombat programs and have a budget this year of more than $500 million.

Gates's decision was prompted by reports that a senior Defense Department official, Michael D. Furlong, hired contractors to run a $24 million intelligence-gathering program to track down suspected insurgent leaders in Afghanistan. The program was shut down late last year after the CIA and some military officials complained that Furlong was operating an off-the-books spy network...

More at The Washington Post.

Caution Lights for the Military's 'Information War' - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

It has become commonplace since Sept. 11, 2001, to speak of the "war of ideas" between Muslim extremists and the West. But there has been too little attention paid to the U.S. military's mobilization for this war, which is often described by the oxymoronic phrase "information operations."

To populate this information "battle space," the military has funded a range of contractors, specialists, training programs and initiatives - targeted on the hot wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the broader zone of conflict in the Middle East and Central Asia. Gen. David Petraeus, the Centcom commander who oversees that region, has been one of the military's most vocal proponents of aggressive information operations.

The potential problems were highlighted on March 14, when the New York Times revealed that a Pentagon official from the "strategic communications" realm had funded contractors to gather intelligence in Afghanistan. Last week also brought a report by The Post's Ellen Nakashima that the military, in an offensive information operation, had shut down a jihadist Web site that the CIA had been monitoring for intelligence purposes. In both cases, it seemed the military was wandering into the covert-action arena traditionally reserved for the CIA...

More at The Washington Post.

JFCOM Likes Navy IW Plane - Greg Grant, Defense Tech.

The quest for a low-cost, low-tech, irregular warfare aircraft to provide ground pounders with long loitering, on-call recon and strike got a big boost recently when Joint Forces Command's Gen. James Mattis threw his support behind the Navy and Air Force "Imminent Fury" effort.

Mattis told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week that he was taking a personal interest in the classified project, being run chiefly out of the Navy's Irregular Warfare Office, that is looking at small turboprop aircraft for ground support. The sought after design falls somewhere between the Vietnam era OV-10 Bronco and A-1 Skyraider. It must stay aloft for a long time for surveillance needs but also have the punch to provide precise fire support when needed; a true "over the shoulder" aircraft for small ground units doing distributed operations in remote locations.

Mattis thinks using top-line fighter jets for close air support to troops patrolling rural villages in Afghanistan is overkill. As he diplomatically puts it: "Today's approach of loitering multi-million dollar aircraft and using a system of systems procedure for the approval and employment of airpower is not the most effective use of aviation fires in this irregular fight," he told the SASC...

More at Defense Tech.

Every so often Small Wars Journal receives master theses or articles based on a master thesis written at our professional military education institutions. We recently received two of particular interest and share them with you here

A District Approach to Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency - Naval Postgraduate School Master of Science thesis by Major David S. Clukey, U.S. Army.

Abstract:

Since the initial invasion and ousting of the Taliban regime in 2001, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the United States (U.S.) military have lost the initiative and become sedentary in Afghanistan. This case study analysis considers if ISAF and the U.S. military are appropriately employing the current disposition of military forces to maximize effects against the insurgency in Afghanistan. This study objectively compares and contrasts the current ISAF and U.S. strategy with a district level FID/COIN methodology. This study explores why it is necessary to approach the problem at the district/village level to enhance the security, control, and influence of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA), and to eliminate systematically the conditions that have supported the insurgency in Afghanistan.

No Child Left Behind: COIN Strategies to Deny Recruitment of Adolescent Males in the Southern Philippines - Naval Postgraduate School Master of Science thesis by Major Herbert A. Daniels, U.S. Army.

Abstract:

Severing the link between the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Jolo population is critical to destroying the terrorist organization. The U.S. support to Philippine Security Forces (PSF) has helped to capture or kill the ideological cadre of the ASG but fails to prevent younger rebels from taking their place. While PSF continue to aggressively pursue the ASG, the U.S. has provided abundant assistance to improve the livelihood of the Jolo population. Positive results from the U.S.-supported development can be observed through increased access to healthcare and education. However, the strategy may fail to target a key demographic of the Jolo population, adolescent males, who currently make up approximately 80% of the ASG's estimated population of 400 rebels. To prevent their recruitment by the ASG, operations and development on Jolo must not marginalize adolescent males. The warrior traditions of the native Tausugs on Jolo present a challenge when it comes to addressing the needs of adolescent males and encourages their participation in the security and development of Jolo vice participation in rebellious or illicit activities.

Also see:

SWJ Theses Time -- (Part I)

Turning a COIN Problem into a Solution -- NPS Thesis at SWJ