The Taliban has begun regularly targeting U.S. government contractors in southern Afghanistan, stepping up use of a tactic that is rattling participating firms and could undermine development projects intended to stem the insurgency, according to U.S. officials.

Within the past month, there have been at least five attacks in Helmand and Kandahar provinces against employees of U.S. Agency for International Development contractors who are running agricultural projects, building roads, maintaining power plants and working with local officials.

The USAID "implementing partners," as they are known, employ mainly Afghans, who are overseen by foreigners. The companies' role is becoming increasingly important as more aid money floods into southern Afghanistan as part of a dual effort to generate goodwill and bolster the Kabul government...

More at The Washington Post.

Topics include:

1) Could a Chinese security guarantee end the standoff with Iran?

2) Hezbollah's Scuds provide a test case for Obama's deterrence doctrine.

Could a Chinese security guarantee end the standoff with Iran?

Perhaps the most important of the numerous sidebar meetings U.S. President Barack Obama held during his Nuclear Security Summit was with Chinese President Hu Jintao. At issue was how much support China would lend to a U.S. drive at the U.N. Security Council to sanction Iran for its lack of cooperation with inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). According to the Washington Post, China is still sticking with its noncommittal position.

According to the U.S. Energy Department's Energy Information Administration, China is Iran's no. 2 oil customer and Chinese companies are heavily invested in Iranian oil and gas exploration and development. China's rapid growth in oil imports virtually guarantees that China's commercial and political relations with Iran will deepen.

Proponents of a diplomatic "grand bargain" between Iran and the United States argue that the reason Iran is pursuing a nuclear-weapons capability is because it feels the need to deter a militarily supreme United States. Under a grand bargain, Iran would completely open itself to IAEA inspection in exchange for a U.S. renunciation of force against Iran, the restoration of diplomatic relations, and the end to the U.S. trade embargo.

The Obama administration has weakly proffered a vaguer version of this deal with little response from Iran. Iran's leaders have likely concluded that a U.S. promise not to use force against Iran is meaningless because the United States could reverse it at any time. But if Washington cannot credibly guarantee Iran's security, what about Beijing? Wouldn't all parties be better off with a Chinese security guarantee to Iran?

A Chinese security guarantee would presumably allow Iran to forswear nuclear weapons (as it claims it has) and would also presumably allow Iran the comfort to give the IAEA the access it needs. For its part, China would achieve some assurance regarding a portion (about 11 percent) of its daily oil import requirement. And the United States, its allies in the Middle East, and Europe would achieve their goal of removing the Iranian nuclear threat (assuming of course that the Iranian government would allow the IAEA the access it would need to provide such an assurance). A Chinese security guarantee would be directly analogous to the security guarantees the United States has long provided its allies around the world, guarantees that have done wonders for nuclear nonproliferation.

Alas, such a "New Grand Bargain" is very unlikely to happen. The U.S. government (along with Saudi Arabia and other Middle East powers) is most unlikely to welcome Chinese military and political power into the heart of the Persian Gulf region. Iran, proud of its history and suspicious of all, would rather rely on nuclear-armed self-reliance than depend on another great power for protection. And China would see no reason to alter the status quo; it is already getting its oil and commercial relationships without having to take any diplomatic or military risks.

Which leaves us back where we are today, with a Persian Gulf arms race about to break out. As he considers Obama's plea, President Hu should ponder what might go wrong with China's Iran policy.

Hezbollah's Scuds provide a test case for Obama's deterrence doctrine

Does Hezbollah now possess Scud missiles? During its 2006 war against Israel, the group employed battlefield rockets against towns in Israel's far north, with a few longer range rockets striking as far south as Haifa. A Hezbollah Scud ballistic missile by contrast could deliver an approximately one-ton warhead of high explosive or chemical munitions anywhere in Israeli territory. The Syrian government denied transferring Scuds to Hezbollah, while the U.S. government isn't sure whether a transfer occurred.

Would a Hezbollah Scud capability fundamentally alter the strategic balance and perhaps lead to an Israeli preemptive strike against Hezbollah? Interestingly, the Obama administration's new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which argues for a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence, seems to have anticipated this type of development. The NPR asserted that an expanded use of missile defenses, counter-WMD efforts, and overwhelming conventional military power should provide the deterrence against an increasing number of threats that nuclear weapons deterred in the past. Under the NPR's reasoning, Israel should be able to employ these same measures to deter and defend against a possible Hezbollah Scud threat without resorting to either a preemptive strike or nuclear deterrence.

The first part of the equation is missile defense, which through much U.S. financial and technical assistance and its own research, Israel now has in abundance. Long-time skeptics of missile defense were concerned about these systems leading to destabilizing offensive missile arms races. Better, they said, to rely on the threat of devastating retaliation. For the Obama team, that theory is out -- the priority now is on sidelining nuclear weapons.

The new NPR calls for "a devastating conventional military response" to provide deterrence when necessary, especially in response to chemical or biological attacks. Regarding Hezbollah and its alleged Scuds, how would Israel execute "a devastating conventional military response"? What lawful targets could Israel (or the United States in similar circumstances) strike that would inflict the "devastating" response? The Israeli air force's 2006 bombing campaign against Lebanon seemed to exceed the limit of what informed world opinion would tolerate. In the case of hypothetical Hezbollah Scud attacks on Tel Aviv or elsewhere in Israel, would it be militarily useful or diplomatically wise for Israel to be any more devastating than it was in 2006? If not, might this method of deterrence lack credibility?

It might be the case that Israel's air campaign against Lebanon in 2006, combined with the attrition its ground campaign subsequently inflicted, was devastating enough to constitute deterrence against Hezbollah. If true, the NPR's non-nuclear deterrence formulation might have some hope.

But Israel was able to achieve that credibility for itself (if it did) only through a ruthless bombing campaign. Current U.S. military planners consider "a devastating conventional military response" to be an oxymoronic phrase; they are now taught to inflict as little damage as possible. Given the recent trends in U.S. military doctrine that scale back the use of firepower, how credible is it for the United States to threaten "a devastating conventional military response"? Achieving the NPR's vision of non-nuclear deterrence will require convincing some hardened adversaries that the United States can be ruthless when it needs to be. But in today's Pentagon, that attitude is not in fashion.

Update:

One Tribe at a Time: The Way Forward - Major Jim Gant, Small Wars Journal

A District Approach in Afghanistan? - Major David S. Clukey, Small Wars Journal

Tribal Engagement Workshop: The Time Dimension - Dr. Marc Tyrrell, In Harmonium

Tribal Engagement for Afghanistan? - Andrew Exum, Abu Muqawama

Gameplanning a Solution In Medias Res - Joshua Foust, Registan

Local V. National Control - Joshua Foust, Registan

From Whole-of-Government to Whole-of-Place" - Joshua Foust, Registan

Tribal Engagement - Afghanistan - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette

Fighting for isolated mountain valleys like this one, even if they are hide-outs for clusters of Taliban, was no longer sustainable. It did more to spawn insurgents than defeat them. Better to put those soldiers in cities and towns where they could protect people and help them connect to the Afghan government, [General McChrystal] reasoned.

"There's never a perfect answer," General McChrystal said as he visited this outpost on April 8 for a briefing as the withdrawal began. "I care deeply about everybody who has been hurt here, but I can't do anything about it. I can do something about people who might be hurt in the future.

"The battle changes, the war changes," he added. "If you don't understand the dynamics you have no chance of getting it right. We've been slower here than I would have liked."

Forty-two American service men died fighting in the Korangal [sic] and hundreds were wounded, according to military statistics. Most died in the three years from 2006 to 2009. Many Afghan soldiers died there as well and in larger numbers since they had poorer equipment. In a war characterized by small, brutal battles, the Korangal had more than its share, and its abandonment now has left soldiers who fought there confronting confusion, anger and pain.

[...]

The Korangal Outpost was the third area of eastern Afghanistan where combat outposts closed: In 2007 and 2008 two posts and a smaller satellite base were closed in Kunar's Waygal Valley, and in 2009 two posts were closed in Nuristan Province's Kamdesh region. Along with the main Korangal outpost, five small satellite bases have closed, at least two of them, Restrepo and Vimoto, were named for soldiers who died there.

Commentary

What will the various players in Afghanistan's drama learn from America's experience in the Korengal Valley?

First, many enemy commanders are likely to conclude that resistance is not futile, that they have a chance to defeat the U.S. military in combat. This is not a criticism of the soldiers and Marines who fought there or of McChrystal's decision to evacuate the Korengal and other outposts. Furthermore, the lack of success the U.S. had in this region is due to peculiar local factors that may not be present elsewhere in the country. It's just a guess at what this news will likely mean (all else equal) for the Taliban's willingness to resist elsewhere.

Second, it puts under strain President Obama's description of the mission in Afghanistan, namely, "We're going to deny al Qaeda safe haven. We're going to reverse the Taliban's momentum. We're going to strengthen the capacity of Afghan security forces and the Afghan government so that they can begin taking responsibility and gain confidence of the Afghan people." Pulling the U.S. Army out of the Korengal Outpost (and the others in Nuristan and Kunar) doesn't mean that al Qaeda is moving into those places. But it is hard to argue that the U.S. pullout, combined with the new significant restriction on air strikes and direct action raiding, makes it harder for al Qaeda to re-establish safe havens inside Afghanistan.

McChrystal has a finite number of security forces and his strategy is attempting to protect as much of the Afghan population as he can, given what he has to work with. Ceding the Nuristan and Kunar outposts, combined with the limitations on McChrystal's resources, means that there are significant parts of the country under enemy control that the coalition will no longer contest. Again, I'm not criticizing McChrystal's strategy -- in fact, partial Taliban control has always been, and likely always will be the case. But given this, the President and his team should consider a new description of the U.S. mission instead of "we're going to deny al Qaeda safe haven." With parts of the country indefinitely written off, that claim doesn't make sense.

Third, the evacuation of these outposts will likely make it a bit more difficult for U.S. field commanders to reassure the local Afghan partners they are currently working with. There inevitably will be more such modifications to the outpost plan in the future. Local U.S. commanders are undoubtedly working out how to mitigate the first and second order effects of more such withdrawals and adjustments. Local Afghan leaders (including the Taliban) are no doubt doing the same.

Commanders like General McChrystal have to make hard choices in an attempt to maximize the likelihood of success. Hard choices have hard consequences. The U.S. government has chosen to execute a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. A central goal of such a campaign is to establish confidence in America's trustworthiness. McChrystal must be hoping that the tactical adjustments in outposts in Nuristan and Kunar will result in minimal damage to the trust he is trying to build.

The Pashtun tribes, with U.S. military assistance and on-the-ground presence, are the only force capable of pushing back the Taliban and providing the central government and Afghan security forces the time and space in which to assert greater stability. Seen in that light, contrary arguments that empowering the tribes would weaken the central government, interfere with the building of the Afghan Army and police, or prove too risky or unfeasible are short-sighted and reflect a failure to grasp the essential role of Pashtun tribes and tribal relationships in shaping the country's future.

At the same time, if we do not use this opportunity to give Pashtun tribes a voice in politics at the district, provincial and central levels of a reformed Afghan government, the long-term stability of the nation will be threatened. Borrowing a term from David Kilcullen at the Tribal Engagement Workshop, the real challenge may be the "catastrophic success" of tribes that are providing security but are not empowered politically.

A strategy of tribal engagement in the east and tribal-building in the south will play a vital role in determining whether Pashtun tribal influence becomes a force to help stabilize Afghanistan rather than another missed opportunity. Trained teams able to speak Pashtu and see things through the eyes of a tribesman are essential to building the enduring relationships with tribal leaders necessary to make this time-sensitive yet resource-efficient strategy succeed. The Pashtuns have a saying: "You can build anything, but you cannot rebuild trust once it is broken."

The Pashtun tribes want "people" not a plan or a process, a reality that has hit home as I've brushed up on my Pashtu over the last three months in preparation for deployment. The real question is -- are we —to give them that?

Jim Gant

One Tribe at a Time: The Way Forward (PDF)

"Harnessing the potential of the Afghan people to succeed on Afghan terms through Afghan institutions will reinforce stability as it spreads from areas cleared of insurgents, will give more Afghans a stake in the future of their country, and provides the only path to national self-sufficiency," write the authors.

The international community should also help catalyze a number of existing development initiatives that produce tangible benefits quickly for Afghans, including microfinance and public works programs, the National Solidarity Program, and OPIC-offered risk guarantees to potential investors, and:

- Revitalize the role of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.

- Support the creation of a National Task Force for job development and training.

- Reaffirm the significance of Afghanistan's economic ministries.

- Create a global task force to identify gaps in strategy, financing mechanisms and to explore and set up additional financial instruments.

Download The Economic Imperative here.

If only there was some extra insight in there for DC traffic - kind of rough today with all those road & Metro closures and heads of state motorcading around. But there is an alternative.

You are probably already familiar with the Wikileaks-edited video released April 5 of the 2007 airstrike in which a number of people were killed, including armed and unarmed men as well as two employees of the news agency Reuters. As of this writing, the initial instance of the edited version of the video titled "Collateral Murder" on YouTube is over 5 million views, not including reposts of the video by others using different YouTube accounts, and, according to The New York Times, "hundreds of times in television news reports." An unedited and not subtitled version upload by Wikileaks to YouTube, in contrast, has less 630,000, reflecting the lack of promotion of this version.

This video represents the advantages and disadvantages of social media in that highly influential content is easily propagated for global consumption. The persistency provided by the Internet means it will always be available and easily repurposed. Further, this situation highlights the ability to suppress unwanted information, both by the propagandist (omission of information) and by the supporter (removing an adversarial perspective). Lastly, the official response to this video shows the Defense Department still has a long way to go in understanding and operating in this new global information environment.

This video is, on its face and in depth, inflammatory and goes well beyond investigative journalism and creating transparency. It has launched debates about the legality of the attacks and questions of whether war crimes were committed. The video, as edited, titled, and subtitled is disturbing. It will continue to get substantial use in debates over Iraq, the US military, and US foreign policy in general...

Much more at MountainRunner.

"There are people alive today as a direct result of what Milbloggers

do each and every day"

--Gary Cagle of

Team Rubicon.

Military bloggers gathered in Arlington, VA this weekend for the 5^th

Annual Milblog Conference.  The "Milbloggers" came from all walks of life: 

from veterans, to journalists, charity workers, even Gary Trudeau, the author of

Doonesbury.  The conference kicked off on Friday night with a panel

entitled "It's a Marathon, not a Sprint", which chronicled the early days of the

milblogosphere.  Led by pioneers of milblogging, such as Matt "Blackfive"

Burden, Lt. Col. Mitchell Bell (The SandGram),

Julia Hayden (SGT Mom), and Juliette Ochieng

(Baldilocks),

the panelists shared anecdotes about their entry into the blogging world and the

role of blogging within their lives.  For many in the audience, it was a chance

to finally meet the people behind the blogs they had been reading for years.

Moderating the panel was J.R. "Greyhawk"

Michael, a retired US Air Force weather forecaster, who promised that the next morning's

guest would be electrifying.  He wasn't kidding.  Saturday morning's special

guest was none other than General David H. Petraeus, who recorded a special message

for the milblog community.  General Petraeus praised milbloggers for their

work providing an unfiltered glimpse of the  story of America's fighting men

and women abroad—be it good, bad, or sometimes just asinine.  General Petraeus

noted that although he may have learned to tweet from his kids, Army senior leaders

are not completely in the dark when it comes to modern technology.  "You should

see us when we get together to play Guitar Hero—it's pretty awesome".  After

a chuckle, the general conceded, "Actually, it's not". 

Saturday's events began with a panel entitled "The Charitable Landscape", featuring

speakers from Soldiers' Angels,

Blue Star Families, the

Wounded Warrior Project, and

the US Navy Memorial.  The panel

principally focused on the role of incorporating social media in promoting awareness

for events and organizations which benefit service members and their families. 

One particularly interesting vignette was offered by Keith Hensley of the Wounded

Warrior Project, who runs a program called "Soldier Ride", a rehabilitative bicycle

ride for injured service members.  Hensley recalled spreading word of a bicycle

ride over Twitter, only to to find it re-tweeted by none other than Lance Armstrong,

resulting in a massive turnout and incredible support.  Yet another example

of super-empowerment through the new media. 

The afternoon featured speakers ranging from Michael Yon and Major General David

Hogg, currently the Deputy Commanding General of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan,

both of whom joined live from Afghanistan. Abraham Sofaer of the Hoover Institute

also dropped by, and his book "The

Best Defense?  Legitimacy and Preventive Force" was included in the official

conference goodie bag.  The crowd was also moved by a presentation from

Major Norman T. Hatch, a combat cameraman who served at Tarawa and Iwo Jima,

who reflected on his experience filming what would ultimately become "The

Marines of Tarawa". 

However, it was a panel called "The View from the Top", which focused on the

views of senior military leaders on social media, that proved the most memorable. 

Featuring Admiral J.C. Harvey (Commander of US Fleet Forces Command and a contributor

to the US Naval Institute Blog), Colonel Gregory

Breazile (Director of Communication for NATO Training

Mission-Afghanistan),

Price Floyd (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs),

and

Jamie McIntyre (currently at Military.com's editorial team), the panel highlighted

senior leaders' embracing of social media, and its role in facilitating communication

between senior leaders and service members at the lowest levels.  The panel

was particularly notable, as Admiral J.C. Harvey singled out of Small Wars Journal

for its high standards of content, praising both the authors and the commenters. 

Jamie McIntyre and Price Floyd also addressed the issue of the infamous "Collateral

Murder" video, both noting that the best analysis of the video came not from the

mainstream media, nor from the Pentagon, but rather, through milbloggers who offered

a more balanced, in-depth look at the incident.  Floyd also gave MountainRunner

high marks for his coverage

of the story.  Interestingly, after the panel,

Commander Salamander (of the US

Naval Institute) spoke off-line with McIntyre, mentioning that the BBC had actually

contacted a number of military bloggers asking for information on the incident,

as the BBC couldn't find an American public affairs officer —to comment on

the video.  

The conference concluded with "Legislation, Military-Style", featuring Colin

Clarke of DODBuzz, Brandon Friedman (Director

of New New Media at the Department of Veterans' Affairs),

and Winslow Wheeler, of the Center for Defense Information. 

Representatives from a number of charities attended the event, including the

USO,

Vets for Vets,

Team Rubicon,

You Served,

Pinups for Vets and

Homes for our Troops.  

Dozens of blogers liveblogged the two-day event at

Twitter and

Facebook.

For more (list is ever-growing), see:

Military

Blogging Conference (Anne's Spot)

Director's Comments:

During the March 2010 Train the Trainer Course (T3C) at the COIN Training Center-Afghanistan (CTC-A) in Kabul, GEN McChrystal underscored to joint and multinational COIN trainers that his operational priority for ISAF is counterinsurgency, and that COIN is not merely a recommended technique -- it is a requirement. Receiving this COMISAF guidance firsthand were representatives from the USA/USMC COIN Center and Battle Command Training Program who will rapidly retransmit this guidance and additional insights to multiple training audiences preparing for deployment.

In support of COMISAF's population-centric approach to COIN, we recently engaged in a number of endeavors to include: continued training of the Human Terrain Teams that provide units with a deeper understanding of their operational environment; support to the Tribal Engagement Workshop sponsored by Small Wars Journal to better understand implications of tribal dynamics (report will soon be posted at http://smallwarsjournal.com); and participation in the Wilton Park's Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Developmental Aid in COIN Operations, specifically focused on this complex and multi-dimensional challenge (Blog and Conference Report).

Would encourage your continued great feedback on COIN Center blogs on topics such as root causes and tribal engagement. Recent blog activity [Stabops ATTP blog link here] was so useful that it served as the catalyst for the Army to develop an on-line ATTP to address a crucial doctrinal gap in Stability Operations tactics, techniques, and procedures. Recommend you also review The Azimuth, a primer focused on preparing for COIN challenges.

During his recent orientation as Commander, Combined Arms Center (CAC), LTG Robert Caslen, stressed the imperative to ensure the Army is prepared both for this and the next fight and the need to ensure institutional pre-deployment training leads to the knowledge and skills required by our soldiers to conduct their operational missions. In that light, the COIN Center has been chartered to establish a CAC operational planning team (OPT) to increase focus on efforts to ensure doctrinal and training products reflect relevant lessons from operational application. We will keep you apprised on ongoing initiatives in this line of effort.

Thanks for your efforts in support of our troops,

Colonel Dan Roper

See full SITREP here