... These are not your mother's Marines here in the rugged California chaparral of Camp Pendleton, where 40 young women are preparing to deploy to Afghanistan in one of the more forward-leaning experiments of the American military.

Next month they will begin work as members of the first full-time "female engagement teams," the military's name for four- and five-member units that will accompany men on patrols in Helmand Province to try to win over the rural Afghan women who are culturally off limits to outside men. The teams, which are to meet with the Afghan women in their homes, assess their need for aid and gather intelligence, are part of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's campaign for Afghan hearts and minds. His officers say that you cannot gain the trust of the Afghan population if you only talk to half of it.

"We know we can make a difference," said Capt. Emily Naslund, 26, the team's executive officer and second in command. Like the other 39 women, Captain Naslund volunteered for the program and radiates exuberance, but she is not naí¯ve about the frustrations and dangers ahead. Half of the women have been deployed before, most to Iraq...

More at The New York Times.

Also see Half-Hearted: Trying to Win Afghanistan without Afghan Women - Captain Matt Pottinger, Hali Jilani, and Claire Russo, Small Wars Journal.

Topics include:

1) Mullen finished off the Powell Doctrine,

2) What is Burma learning from the nuclear "rogues"?

Mullen finished off the Powell Doctrine

After a long illness and years of neglect, Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, finally euthanized the Powell Doctrine. Mullen administered the coup de grí¢ce in a speech he delivered on March 3 at Kansas State University.

During his tenure as chairman, Gen. Colin Powell stated the principles he thought the U.S. government should follow when contemplating the use of military force. According to Powell, the situation should involve a vital national security interest. There should be a clear and obtainable objective. A clear exit strategy should be planned from the beginning. The action should have broad political support. The military plan should employ decisive and overwhelming force in order to achieve a rapid result. And the country should use force only as a last resort. Powell's principles were no doubt the product of his negative experiences as an officer during the Vietnam War and the results of Operation Desert Storm, which seemed at the time to be a vindication of his ideas.

Needless to say, the deployments of U.S. military force this decade have obeyed precious few of these guidelines. Powell wrote his doctrine in an attempt to keep the United States from thoughtlessly involving itself in ill-defined and open-ended military quagmires. But critics have argued that modern irregular adversaries have exploited gaps the doctrine left uncovered. By this view, rigid adherence to the Powell Doctrine would prevent the United States from having any effective response to irregular warfare challenges. Neither the Bush nor Obama administrations have followed its precepts.

So what is the new Mullen Doctrine? For the chairman, the issue of whether the United States will employ military force has long been settled. The issue now is how the United States should apply its national power. Mullen summed up his views this way:

We must not look upon the use of military forces only as a last resort, but as potentially the best, first option when combined with other instruments of national and international power.

We must not try to use force only in an overwhelming capacity, but in the proper capacity, and in a precise and principled manner. And we must not shrink from the tug of war -- no pun intended -- that inevitably plays out between policymaking and strategy execution. Such interplay is healthy for the republic and essential for ultimate success.

The Mullen Doctrine accepts that every day for the foreseeable future, U.S. military forces will shoot at, or will be shot at, by somebody somewhere in the world. Given this seemingly permanent state of war, Mullen says that politicians, soldiers, and the public will need to engage in an open-ended discussion that will constantly adjust how the country employs its military forces.

Mullen assumes that the public now accepts that low-level warfare is an enduring fact of life. If he is wrong about this, the Powell Doctrine could rise from the grave.

What is Burma learning from the nuclear "rogues"?

Is North Korea helping Burma build a plutonium-producing reactor? On March 2, the Washington Post discussed this possibility, along with the broader military relationship between the two countries. The article noted that the budding military partnership between Burma and North Korea has the attention of the Obama administration. But as is the pattern with all such isolated and "rogue" regimes, the U.S. government is struggling to achieve diplomatic leverage over the situation.

Could Burma have a clandestine nuclear program? In September 2007, the Israeli Air Force bombed a nearly complete plutonium reactor it found in the Syrian desert. A subsequent investigation revealed that the site was a near duplicate of North Korea's Yongbyon reactor and built with North Korea's assistance. With the discovery of the joint North Korean-Syrian project, many wondered where else in the world North Korea may have secret nuclear partnerships.

David Albright, a nuclear proliferation expert at the Institute for Science and International Security, has concluded that information that Burma is constructing major nuclear facilities is inconclusive and that the regime is not close to establishing any significant nuclear capability. He also notes that trade in nuclear materials with North Korea is banned by the U.N. Security Council.

Albright is hopeful that the early detection of a possible Burmese nuclear effort will enable the international community to stop such a program, in contrast to its failure to do so with the Syrian reactor, with Iran's program, and with Pakistan in the 1970s.

U.S. Sen. James Webb's visit to Burma in 2009 reopened direct talks between the two governments. Such contact is helpful and could be part of a solution, but is not worth much unless the United States and its partners develop some significant leverage to counter the numerous incentives in favor of nuclear proliferation.

"Rogue" states contemplating whether to begin a clandestine nuclear program find numerous cases of positive reinforcement for doing so, and few if any cases of effective punishment. For example, China is a strong defender of state sovereignty and has stood up for this principle by defending nuclear rogues such as North Korea and Iran that most in the international community would like to rein in. Sharing strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, Burma could expect similar protection from China.

Burma has no doubt observed how North Korea has converted its nuclear and ballistic missile programs into lucrative cash businesses. In addition, North Korea has repeatedly extracted food and energy assistance in exchange for promises of good behavior. And Pakistan has exemplified how rewarding a nuclear arsenal can be. Concern over the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is a significant factor in the U.S. strategies for Afghanistan and South Asia and is a reason why Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid.

On the other side of the ledger, there are few examples of the international community effectively punishing a nuclear proliferator. Iran's case remains open and is an opportunity for the U.N. Security Council to change that pattern. Until that happens, Burma and others considering their options will watch and learn.

Caveat emptor.  Received the email below from John, complete with

his apropos signature line (personal info redacted). His thorough

YouTube Channel is evidence of

his commitment to this "science" and features an eclectic set of clips and soundtracks

in the mix along with his rigorous explanation of the topic.  I'm

shocked, shocked that DoD

and DARPA refused comment.  One would think that after all the experimentation

to come up with a technological nose that can out-rover Fido, they might open their

aperture to lower tech alternatives.  They may get more of these unsolicited

proposals than we do so a little slack might be due, but they are better

staffed.

Happy weekend.

Dear Small Wars Journal,

I've put out on YouTube a 12-part

series on using low-tech methods to counter the low-tech methods in the current

small wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Of course, the Dod and DARPA have refused

to even comment on them.  I believe the techniques work, and for pennies, much

like the tactics used by the guerillas.

You may or may not be interested in these YouTube offerings, but they can be

found under "iesigma" or "dowsing rod science." The technique works on coat hangers,

welding rods or other such items energized by the earth's natural electricity (known

since the 1840's).  That means anyone, anywhere can use it.

At any rate, please give at least some of them a try.  Like many things

in science, it does not fit the current paradigm, and is scorned by much (but not

all) of the established.  At the moment, other countries are beginning to put

their  fingers in it.  There are no fee, charges, or commitments.

Write me if you are considering any or all of the videos!  I look forward

to hearing from you.  <snip>

Keep up the good work! 

<snip>

"Good decisions come from experience. Experience comes from making a lot of

bad decisions."  -Anon.

Re: "other countries are beginning to put their fingers in it."  I'm not

really sure what to make of that. Should we brace for a dowsing rod race? Explore

counter-counter-measures? Or just put our fingers in it, too?

... The recent captures and killings of feared Abu Sayyaf Group leaders in the southernmost Philippine islands, such as Sulu and Basilan, are part of the military's success at using community engagement by local military units. Local intelligence tip-offs by community residents and the rejection of the ASG's terror tactics by the vast majority of Muslim Filipinos have been the key to success.

In recent years, the U.S. military employed a civil-affairs-style approach to counterterrorism, especially the successful counterinsurgency strategy used by Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander in Iraq and later U.S. Central Command leader, and being adapted in the current surge in Afghanistan. Even before U.S. forces used local engagement programs, allied militaries such as those in the Philippines were using similar techniques such as engaging with local communities...

More at The Washington Times.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has published a detailed backgrounder on this Sunday's parliamentary elections, Iraq on the Eve of Elections, by Marisa Cochrane Sullivan and James Danly. ISW's 15 page report offers analysis and likely outcomes from two Iraq experts who have written about the region extensively.

"Our report details the precarious position Prime Minister Maliki is in at the moment because he is surrounded by rivals seeking to unseat him," said former U.S. Army officer and ISW Fellow James Danly. "It is likely that this election will be viewed as legitimate but it is the period of government formation that follows the vote which will be messy," Mr. Danly concluded.

"In an emerging democracy like Iraq, the second election is often the most important test for a peaceful transfer of power and the reason why so many are watching this election closely," explained ISW Research Director, Marisa Cochrane Sullivan.Mrs. Cochrane continued, "This publication also highlights the fact that Sunnis, Shi'as and Kurds in Iraq have the opportunity to express their political will via democratic processes rather than through violence."

More at The Institute for the Study.

The nation's top military officer expressed concern today that U.S. government agencies other than the military have been slow to expand their role in Afghanistan. Speaking to an audience at Kansas State University here, Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, underscored the need for a "whole-of-government" approach to Afghanistan, with greater input from so-called "soft power" agencies such as the State Department.

"My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren't moving fast enough in this regard," Mullen said. "U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent on the generals and admiral who lead our major overseas commands, and not enough on the State Department."

Mullen's remarks at the Landon Lecture echoed a familiar refrain that the United States should seek balance in military and nonmilitary efforts, a tack that represents a departure from what Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has referred to as a "creeping militarization" in American foreign policy. The chairman embraced requests by Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton for more funding and greater emphasis on soft power, suggesting that deployment of U.S. troops should depend on other government agencies' readiness to engage...

More at American Forces Press Service.

Joint Chiefs Chairman Readjusts Principles on Use of Force - Thom Shanker, New York Times.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, laid out new principles Wednesday for how to use the military in meeting contemporary threats, saying that overwhelming force can be counterproductive if used recklessly.

In a careful recalibration of well-known principles set forth years ago by a predecessor, Gen. Colin L. Powell, Admiral Mullen said the military "must not try to use force only in an overwhelming capacity, but in the proper capacity, and in a precise and principled manner."

Speaking at Kansas State University, he pointed to new rules restricting the use of combat force in Afghanistan, where civilian deaths caused by American troops and American bombs have outraged the local population and made the case for the insurgency. That kind of restraint, at the insistence of the field commander there, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, has been criticized in some quarters as reneging on the so-called Powell Doctrine, which favored overwhelming force to achieve unambiguous victories...

More at The New York Times.

Top U.S. Military Official Outlines Tempered Approach to War - Julian Barnes, Los Angeles Times.

The U.S. military must use measured and precise strikes, not overwhelming force, in the wars it is likely to face in the future, the nation's top uniformed officer said Wednesday in outlining a revised approach to American security.

The view outlined by Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, differs both from the doctrine of overwhelming force advanced by Colin L. Powell, a onetime Joint Chiefs chairman, and the "shock and awe" approach of former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. "There is no single, defining American way of war," Mullen argued. "It changes over time, and it should change over time, adapting appropriately to the most relevant threats to our national security."

Mullen's views, presented in a speech at Kansas State University, mirror the latest U.S.-led offensive in Afghanistan, a showcase effort in which troops in Marja are trying not only to seize control of territory but to obtain influence over the local population in a bid to break the hold of insurgents. His comments are significant because the Joint Chiefs chairman under the Constitution serves as the president's chief military advisor...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

This year will be the third in a row that tens of thousands of new United States troops have arrived in Afghanistan with plans to "clear, hold and build" areas controlled by the Taliban. Those previous surges have achieved little success at holding or building, as the international coalition and Afghan government have inevitably failed to come up with realistic plans for what happens after the fighting is done. Is the campaign in Marja destined for the same fate?

The international coalition's strategic goal for Afghanistan is to build "an enduring stable, secure, prosperous and democratic state." Only by focusing on the messy medium-term stages of reconstruction - those months, and possibly years, after the fighting dies down - do we have any chance of achieving such a goal. In this regard, Marja presents us with four distinct hurdles...

More at The New York Times.

Success in Afghanistan hinges on the ability of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines to establish close personal relationships with the local Afghan population we are chartered to protect. Please note I did not say only leaders should maintain these relationships. I said everyone. These relationships must be genuine, with actual emotional investment and trust extended on each side. It is not simple. It is tricky to befriend those we are unsure of.

Americans start out at a young age learning classic adages like "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you." Our time-honored golden rule has worked in every situation for me - until I got to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan the rule should read, "Do unto the Afghans as the Afghans do unto each other." We should not expect them to embrace our approach simply because we believe we are efficient problem solvers. They see our approach as hasty and arrogant. We encroached on their culture so we must adapt and learn to collaborate in a more personal way. Our cultures are disparate but we can do this. My men and I have done it.

The Afghan men I encountered in rural Eastern Afghanistan weren't interested in our technology, desire to achieve quick results, attain immediate information, or solve their problems today. They were interested in what we were made of on the inside. They looked to see if we were for real or were just faking it, if we cared about them and could be trusted, and finally, why we were interested in them in the first place.

As I have studied Afghanistan through both my own experience and through extensive reading, I have identified a common theme. Gaining and maintaining personal relationships is the critical element necessary to be successful in a population-focused strategy ... The personal relationships we make and maintain with the Afghans we encounter in our Areas of Operation are directly related to our success or failure.

The question remains on how we leverage these relationships long term, beyond the 12 (or 7) month rotation of combat units. Comment over at the COIN Center site, which has been really provocative lately.

Nuclear deterrence kept the peace during the Cold War. Data mining and drone hits may be keeping al Qaeda at bay. But fixing America's vulnerability to cyber attack will be much more complicated. And disruptive -- it may require the "Balkanization" of the World Wide Web and a de facto government seizure of the country's telecommunications infrastructure.

In his essay, McConnell reminds us of some features of the internet that currently make deterrence theory impractical. Anonymity is built into the current structure. It is difficult to retaliate (or bring legal action) if one cannot identify the perpetrator. A new, redesigned, and security-conscious World Wide Web could require user authentication. But many would be un—to use such a system. After a cyber "Pearl Harbor," some governments may require the addition of security features that defenders of privacy and individual liberty have thus far resisted. The result could be the breakdown of the World Wide Web into a multitude of internets that, due to security features, will not link to each other.

The private sector telecommunication firms that provide the backbone of the internet have made enormous capital investments on which they expect a return. Further innovation in telecommunication will require further capital investments, which won't occur unless these firms have a prospect of making reasonable returns on those investments. These firms want a mass, unified market, not Balkanization. Governments, responsible for national security, will have a different perspective. McConnell calls for the two sides to work together on the security problem. But if a cyber "Pearl Harbor" happens first, de facto nationalization might be the result.

Finally, McConnell mentions deterrence but doesn't get explicit on how the U.S. would or should employ retaliation (assuming it could find an attacker in the first place). Assuming legal and diplomatic remedies in a certain case are meaningless, must the U.S. respond to a cyber attack only with cyber retaliation? Once again, the analogy to the Cold War breaks down. The U.S. built a nuclear arsenal as large as it needed and made it clear that it held at risk assets that adversaries valued. The U.S. did what it needed to do to achieve "escalation dominance." In cyber warfare, the U.S. is on the losing side of escalation dominance. With a very high density of computers and telecom systems, the more a cyber war escalates, the more the U.S. will suffer.

However, the U.S. retains (at least for now) its dominance in purely military responses. Will U.S. cyber deterrence doctrine contemplate the use of Tomahawk cruise missiles or B-2 strikes in response to a large-scale cyber attack? If an attack doesn't go "bang," is it war?

McConnell's essay urges action on cyber defense. But there are a lot of cyber players inside the U.S. and they have a long list of things to work out with each other. I'm not counting on progress any time soon -- and that probably won't be fast enough.

Here is our list of 20 outstanding movies on political violence, insurgency, and counterinsurgency - small wars, somewhat liberally defined. This selection has been included as "recommended viewings" in a forthcoming textbook, Understanding Counterinsurgency - with a permalink to this post and of course a note of acknowledgement to the fine readers of this blog...

Get the low-down at Kings of War.