The Founders' Wisdom by LTC Paul L. Yingling.

The U.S. faces a number of difficult challenges in civil-military relations that carry with them profound effects on our national security. Among these issues are declining popular support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, growing isolation between the U.S. military and the society it serves, and unresolved disputes over the limits of executive authority. However difficult these problems may be, they are neither unprecedented nor insoluble.

The underlying issues in these debates were explicitly addressed by America's Founders in drafting the U.S. Constitution. Winston Churchill famously observed that "America will always do the right thing, but only after exhausting all other options." Having today exhausted all other options to provide for our security, Americans would be well served to return to the system of war powers established by the Constitution...

What Civil-military Crisis? by COL Joseph J. Collins.

More than 15 years after Gen. Colin Powell's tour as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, pundits and scholars are again worried about cocky generals "playing politics." For his decisive outspokenness, some critics have assigned Gen. David Petraeus the role formerly played by Powell. At times, the media's need for drama approaches the ridiculous. In one such example, Petraeus' quieter, lower profile after he gave up command in Iraq led the New York Times to speculate that he may be gearing up to run for president.

On other fronts, scholars such as Notre Dame's Michael Desch are still trying to come to grips with the Rumsfeld years, where the defense secretary aggressively guided the preparation of a new-style war plan and later micromanaged the deployment of individual units, which subsequently contributed to problems in Iraq. Compounding that controversy, a few years later there was a noisy - and for many uncomfortable - "revolt" by several retired generals who called for Donald Rumsfeld to be fired...

An Alternative to COIN by Dr. Bernard I. Finel.

The U.S. military is a dominant fighting force, capable of rapid global power projection and able to defeat state adversaries quickly and at relatively low cost in American lives and treasure. Unfortunately, American leaders are increasingly trying to transform this force into one optimized for counterinsurgency missions and long-term military occupations. A fundamental problem with the adoption of population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine as an organizing principle for American military operations is that it systematically fails to take advantage of the real strengths of the U.S. military.

It is true that not all political goals are achievable through the use of conventional military capabilities. However, "victory" in war is not dichotomous, and the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan - often seen as proving the necessity for COIN-capable forces as well as a commitment to nation-building - demonstrate in reality that the vast majority of goals can be accomplished through quick, decisive military operations. Not all political goals are achievable this way, but most are and those that cannot be achieved through conventional operations likely cannot be achieved by the application of even the most sophisticated counterinsurgency doctrine either...

The War of New Words by William F. Owen.

War isn't just transforming - it's ushering in a whole new language to describe conflict, and this language is used in a way that pays little attention to logic or military history. Thus the forces we used to call guerrillas are now "hybrid threats." Insurgencies are now "complex" and require "complex and adaptive" solutions. Jungles and cities are now "complex terrain." Put simply, the discussion about future conflict is being conducted using buzzwords and bumper stickers.

The evidence that the threats of the 21st century are going to be that much different from the threats of the 20th is lacking. Likewise, there is no evidence that a "new way of war" is evolving or that we somehow had a previously flawed understanding. In fact, the use of the new words strongly indicates that those using them do not wish to be encumbered by a generally useful and coherent set of terms that military history had previously used. As war and warfare are not changing in ways that demand new words, it is odd that people keep inventing them...

Much more at Armed Forces Journal.

When David Kilcullen is at his best, he is unexcelled at discussing how to wage a counterinsurgency campaign. And I think the Australian infantry officer turned political anthropologist/COIN guru is at his best when he gathers field observations, boils them down to distilled principles, and then describes those rules in a clear, practical manner.

So I want to take some time to go through a paper he wrote recently in Afghanistan. (I didn't get it from him, by the way.) While it ostensibly is about metrics in COIN campaigning, it amounts to a thorough discussion of what works in such warfare, what doesn't, and -- especially -- how to tell the difference. It is written about the current campaign in Afghanistan, but clearly has broader applications. ...

After some initial throat-clearing (one of my rules when I was an editor was to see if I could cut the first three pages of any long article), Kilcullen's first major section is about metrics to be avoided...

Continue on for "what not to measure in a COIN Campaign" at Best Defense.

... Soldier-writers have long produced American literature, from Ulysses S. Grant's memoirs about the Civil War to Norman Mailer's World War II novel, "The Naked and the Dead," to Tim O'Brien's "The Things They Carried," about Vietnam.

The current group is different. As part of a modern all-volunteer force, they explore the timeless theme of the futility of war - but wars that they for the most part support. The books, many written as rites of passage by members of a highly educated young officer corps, are filled with gore, inept commanders and anguish over men lost in combat, but not questions about the conflicts themselves. "They look at war as an aspect of glory, of finding honor," said Mr. O'Brien, who was drafted for Vietnam in 1968 out of Macalester College in St. Paul. "It's almost an old-fashioned, Victorian way of looking at war."

The writers say one goal is to explain the complexities of the wars - Afghan and Iraqi politics, technology, the counterinsurgency doctrine of protecting local populations rather than just killing bad guys - to a wider audience. Their efforts, embraced by top commanders, have even bled into military reports that stand out for their accessible prose...

More at The New York Times.

Cross-posted from In Harmonium

-- Washington Post

U.S. Military Faults Leaders in Attack on Base - New York Times

U.S. Outpost in Afghanistan Left Vulnerable to Attack - Washington Post

Fault Found in Outpost's Fall - Wall Street Journal

U.S. Command Errors Preceded Taliban Attack - Los Angeles Times

Camp Keating Blunders Revealed - The Times

Protection, Intelligence Problems Led to Base Attack - CNN

U.S. Faults Command Over Afghan Ambush - Associated Press

Officers to Face Action for Taliban Attack - United Press International

Delay in Afghan Base Closure Led to 8 U.S. Deaths - Reuters

U.S. Army Admits String of Failures - Agence France-Presse

Army Releases Report on Battle at COP Keating - Long War Journal

Maybe, Finally, Some Accountability? - Registan

U.S. Commanders Face Tougher Discipline - Washington Post

For the upcoming Battle of Marja, the element of surprise has already gone by the wayside. NATO ministers and commanders, gathering Thursday and Friday in Istanbul, could barely contain themselves about a major military offensive set to launch 2,000 miles away in southern Afghanistan. Ignoring the usual dictums about keeping battle preparations secret, officials were keen to talk about what they touted as their biggest joint operation since the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

"In the coming days, you will see a demonstration of our capability in a series of operations, led by the Afghans and supported by NATO, in southern Helmand," NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen volunteered to reporters. Although Rasmussen said he could not go into details "for security reasons," other NATO officials said an allied force, led by U.S. Marines, was preparing for an assault on the town of Marja, a Taliban stronghold in Helmand province. Senior military officials began touting the offensive, the first operation since a U.S. troop increase in Afghanistan, even before President Obama announced in early December that he would be sending more forces to the country...

More at The Washington Post.

U.S. Announces Helmand Offensive - Michael M. Phillips, Wall Street Journal.

In a rare break from traditional military secrecy, the U.S. and its allies are announcing the precise target of their first big offensive of the Afghanistan surge in an apparent bid to intimidate the Taliban. Coalition officers have been hinting aloud for months that they plan to send an overwhelming Afghan, British and U.S. force to clear insurgents from the town of Marjah and surrounding areas in Helmand province, and this week the allies took the unusual step of issuing a press release saying the attack was "due to commence." Senior Afghan officials went so far as to hold a news conference Tuesday to discuss the offensive, although the allies have been careful not to publicize the specific date or details of the attack.

"If we went in there one night and all the insurgents were gone and we didn't have to fire a shot, that would be a success," a coalition spokesman, Col. Wayne Shanks, said before the announcement. "I don't think there has been a mistake in letting people know we're planning on coming in." ...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Why are U.S., Allies Telling Taliban About Coming Offensive? - Jonathan S. Landay and Saeed Shah, McClatchy Newspapers at Stars and Stripes.

Thousands of U.S., British and Afghan troops are poised to launch the biggest offensive of the war in Afghanistan in a test of the Obama administration's new counterinsurgency strategy. Military operations usually are intended to catch the enemy off guard, but for weeks U.S. and allied officials have been telling reporters about their forthcoming assault on Marjah, a Taliban-held town of 80,000 and drug-trafficking hub in southern poppy-growing Helmand province. Senior NATO commanders and top Afghan officials have openly discussed the approximate time of Operation Moshtarak - the Dari language word for "together" - the size of the force and their objectives in news conferences, interviews and news releases that have been disseminated around the world and posted on government Web sites. Leaflets have been airdropped on the town.

Though the exact time of the kickoff hasn't been disclosed, a "news article" posted Thursday on the British Ministry of Defense's site announced that operations involving "elements of the Royal Welsh, Grenadier Guards and Scots Guards" and Afghan forces "in preparation" for the Marjah attack had been under way for 36 hours. The unusual approach, according to U.S. and British commanders, is intended to persuade Marjah's civilian population to leave or turn against the Taliban, while pressuring the estimated 2,000 insurgents to flee the town or switch sides...

More at Stars and Stripes.

Rage, Boredom, Misplaced Offensives - Joshua Foust, Registan.

The old saying that war is boredom punctuated by moments of sheer terror is very much relevant to the fight in Helmand. Over the summer, when the Marines were advertising their latest "surge" into Helmand (at least the third Marine Surge and at least the fifth misfocused ISAF surge into the province), many expressed surprise at the Taliban's propensity to "melt away" from a fight - that, rather than facing certain death with the Marines, they'll just slink away to cause trouble elsewhere.

This isn't a new thing - the Taliban have been doing it since, oh, let's go with 2001 - but the Marine Corps nevertheless seemed surprised by it. And it is indeed a bizarre, frustrating thing to deal with an enemy that generally won't fight "fairly," choosing instead to rely on roadside bombs and mortars (the unfairness of such an idea - as if the American reliance on overwhelming air power was any less terrifying to the Taliban - is probably best left for another post). It would be understandable, even easy to find the Marines are running out of patience trying to fight a counterinsurgency while their opponents are not...

More at Registan.

Announcing the Marja Offensive - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal.

Let's not overdo the surprise and offer too many superlatives at announcing the Marja offensive. A similar strategy was taken for Operations al Fajr and Alljah, both in Fallujah. The U.S. Marines have a rich history of using intimidation as one of the many tools in their bag. My problem isn't with announcing the offensive. It comes at a more basic level than that...

I have also spoken strongly against targeting the poppies. I cannot speak directly to whether the Marines are targeting poppy in Helmand at the moment, but my objections to the handling of the Marja offensive are much more basic and foundational. If there is no one in charge who can explain why we are in Helmand, let me do it (sigh) once again...

More at The Captain's Journal.

OEF Philippines: Thinking COIN, Practicing FID - Lieutenant Colonel Brian Petit, Special Warfare.

Counterinsurgency is the formative mission of today's military. The dominant missions of the past seven years - Iraq and Afghanistan - have inexorably shaped a new force. Our leaders, equipment, tactics, logistics, and doctrine all bear the traumatic discoveries learned from the Iraq and Afghanistan counterinsurgency campaigns. Reasonably, the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts will continue as the primary shaping experience for U.S. forces in counterinsurgency (COIN) and for the practice and theory of stability operations. Given the dominant hold of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A) on our military culture, what then, does Operation Enduring Freedom - Philippines (OEF-P) contribute to the expanding aperture of U.S. military counterinsurgency study?

OEF-P is more relevant to the broader COIN conversation now than ever before. The OEF-P operating environment is characterized by strict - yet prudent - constraints executed by a strikingly small U.S. Task Force. Similar constraints are now in place in Iraq and Afghanistan. Legal prohibitions, strict operational directives, host-nation caveats, and reduced U.S. forces are all constraints that force a revision of operational thinking, a reconsideration of tactics, and increasingly disciplined force application. The existing and forthcoming constraints in Iraq are similar in nature to the constraints imposed upon U.S. forces deployed to Southern Philippines since 2001. Under such constraints, U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines apply an operational approach and tactical methodology that has applicability to current and future U.S. counterinsurgency and stability endeavors. The U.S. involvement in the Philippines (2001 -- 2009) can be examined as a preview of the way U.S. counterinsurgency and stability strategies and tactics might look in other theaters as governments stabilize and security responsibility shifts primarily to the host nation. This article presents three tactical vignettes illustrative of the way U.S. forces in the Southern Philippines operate effectively within confined parameters...

Much more at Special Warfare.

Topics include:

1) China growls at the Taiwan arms sale. Is this time different?

2) Gates calls for expanded long-range striking power -- but not until 2020.

China growls at the Taiwan arms sale. Is this time different?

On Jan. 29, the Obama administration approved a $6.4 billion package of weapons sales to Taiwan. The Chinese government's reaction was all-too predictable: The next day, the Chinese Foreign Ministry summoned the U.S. ambassador to China for a dressing-down and threatened "serious repercussions" if the U.S. government did not reverse its decision.

Beijing has had to live with U.S. support for Taiwan's defense ever since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. Each arrival of another arms sale for Taiwan has resulted in an outraged response from the Chinese government. Tempers then cool and business, both political and commercial, soon returns to normal. Will this time be different?

The best bet is that it won't. The Chinese government will most likely deliver its routine bluster and then allow the issue to fade away. Obama administration officials are likely hoping that the composition of this arms package -- mostly defensive systems such as surface-to-air missiles, minesweepers, and communications equipment, but not new F-16 fighter-bombers -- will appear non threatening to China.

The Chinese government needs to save face and protect China's reputation in the eyes of a domestic audience that is occasionally prone to nationalistic outbursts. But at the same time, the government has to maintain an export-driven economic policy that generates millions of new jobs each year. Failure to do so risks social instability. Thus, in spite of China's anger over U.S. military support for Taiwan, no confrontation with the United States is likely to result.

Even so, some analysts wonder whether there might be a trend toward greater Chinese combativeness. John Pomfret of the Washington Post cataloged a range of worried views from both U.S. and European analysts. Writing at the Financial Times, Gideon Rachman asserted that China and the United States are on a collision course. Rachman notes that should the U.S. unemployment rate remain in the double digits, many Americans, not least nervous politicians, will wonder why the government stands by while China manipulates the yuan-dollar exchange rate, thus transferring jobs to China.

The United States went through this same story with Japan in the 1980s and early 1990s. But Japan was a pacifist ally and eventually fizzled as an economic challenger. China, by contrast, is a worrisome military competitor with rapidly expanding air and naval power in the Western Pacific. Others will note China's support for repressive rogues such as North Korea, Burma, and Sudan, along with its failure to cooperate with the United States and Europe on blocking Iran's nuclear program. Friction with Japan was confined to trade and eventually faded as an issue, but friction with China encompasses trade, U.S. financial vulnerability, the strategic balance in Asia, U.S. alliances, human rights, and nuclear proliferation.

Policymakers in both countries are eager to avoid conflict. But they also don't control many of the variables in play, most notably the impulses of their populations. Even with the best of intentions, the friction may still burn.

Gates calls for expanded long-range striking power -- but not until 2020

Pages 31 to 34 of the just-released 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) discuss how the U.S. Department of Defense plans to "deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments," one of the report's principal operational concerns. This section of the QDR describes the growth of military capabilities by potential adversaries that could prevent U.S. air and naval forces from entering contested areas during a crisis. The QDR's second recommendation to address this concern is for the United States to expand future long-range strike capabilities. However, the Pentagon's budget proposal, and its associated long-term aircraft investment plan, calls for the purchase of zero long-range strike aircraft by the U.S. Air Force through 2020. The aircraft investment plan's discussion of the Navy's contribution is vague, mentioning a research program for aircraft carrier-based drones, but offering few specifics on when this operational capability will actually arrive. The QDR identified a problem and recommended a solution. But the Pentagon's budget demonstrates little urgency on the matter.

Additionally, the report explains how growing inventories of ballistic and cruise missiles could threaten forward U.S. air and naval bases in Asia and the Middle East. It also discusses how expanding fleets of quiet submarines, anti-ship guided missiles, and advanced sea mines could prevent U.S. aircraft carriers from bringing their short-range strike aircraft within range. Advanced air defense systems could make it too risky for older non stealthy U.S. aircraft to be effective.

The Pentagon plans to buy thousands of advanced, stealthy, but short-range, F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. But if the Air Force's overseas bases are closed due to missile bombardments and naval threats prevent the Navy's aircraft carriers from approaching close enough, the only strike option remaining would be the Air Force's 162 long-range bombers. Only 20 of these could persist against a challenging air defense system, and because of their value and commitment to nuclear missions, the Pentagon would not likely risk more than a few.

Given the QDR's description of the problem, the current shortage of long-range strike platforms, and the call for expanded long-range strike capability, it is odd that the Pentagon budget seems to take such a leisurely approach to a remedy. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has ordered additional studies of both the anti-access problem and what to do about long-range strike capabilities. U.S. allies and adversaries are no doubt watching the trends. Hopefully Gates won't wait even longer before making some decisions on these problems.

MAJ Jim Gant has initiated healthy discussion and analysis concerning the way ahead in Afghanistan by publishing his bold paper "One Tribe At A Time." the level of interest and dialogue it has stimulated within the COIN community is extremely positive, whether you agree or disagree with his conclusions.

I agreed with many of MAJ Gant's points, particularly his thesis. "The answer to the problems that face the Afghan people, as well as other future threats to US security in the region, will be found in understanding and then helping the tribal system of Afghanistan to flourish." I couldn't agree more. At this point in the game, it seems to me that leaders understand this war will be won at the local, village, and tribal level up, rather than from the central/government level down. Like MAJ Gant, I am one soldier sharing one hard-earned perspective on the Afghanistan puzzle. Please understand that I do not wish to imply that my time in Afghanistan gave me all the answers. Truly, it left me with more questions than answers. But the pivotal piece of MAJ Gant's proposed solution to Afghani empowerment runs so counter to the realities I grappled with there, I feel I must add my voice, in a formal way, to this discourse.

I strongly disagree with MAJ Gant's ideas on how to go about empowering the tribal system in Afghanistan. Even referring to that nation's labyrinth of tribes as "the" system over-simplifies the situation on the ground. A complicated web of Afghani tribes, sects, sub-tribes, and clans have existed there for hundreds of years, inextricably bound to that nation's history, culture, and families...

More at The COIN Center Blog.