Revenge on the Taliban, from 10,000 Feet - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

In their joint operations against Taliban militants hiding in the tribal areas, the United States and Pakistan seem to have embraced a classic bit of battlefield advice: Don't get mad, get even.

Since the beginning of 2010, the United States has stepped up the pace of its Predator strikes, with strong Pakistani support. These attacks appear to have killed Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud, top lieutenant Qarimullah Hussain, who trained Taliban suicide bombers, and other key members of the insurgency, a senior administration official said Tuesday.

Though the Predators launch their Hellfire missiles from the lofty altitude of 10,000 feet, make no mistake: This is an intense and unrelenting campaign of assassination. U.S. officials hope that top al-Qaeda leaders will soon fall prey to the stepped-up drone attacks, as well...

More at The Washington Post.

Senators Warned of Terrorist Attack on U.S. by July - Mark Mazzetti, New York Times.

America's top intelligence official told lawmakers on Tuesday that Al Qaeda and its affiliates had made it a high priority to attempt a large-scale attack on American soil within the next six months.

The assessment by Dennis C. Blair, the director of national intelligence, was much starker than his view last year, when he emphasized the considerable progress in the campaign to debilitate Al Qaeda and said that the global economic meltdown, rather than the prospect of a major terrorist attack, was the "primary near-term security concern of the United States." ...

More at The New York Times.

Intelligence Officials Say al-Qaeda will Try to Attack U.S. in Next 6 Months - Joby Warrick, Washington Post.

The Obama administration's top intelligence officials on Tuesday described it as "certain" that al-Qaeda or its allies will try to attack the United States in the next six months, and they called for new flexibility in how U.S. officials detain and question terrorist suspects.

The officials, testifying before the Senate intelligence committee, also warned of increased risk of cyber-attacks in the coming months, saying that the recent China-based hacking of Google's computers was both a "wake-up call" and a forerunner to future strikes aimed at businesses or intended to cause economic disruption...

More at The Washington Post.

Terrorist Attempt 'Certain' in Months - Eli Lake, Washington Times.

The five senior leaders of the U.S. intelligence community told a Senate panel Tuesday they are "certain" that terrorists will attempt another attack on the United States in the next three to six months.

The warning came during the annual threat briefing to Congress in response to questions from Sen. Dianne Feinstein, California Democrat and chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, who asked, "What is the likelihood of another terrorist-attempted attack on the U.S. homeland in the next three to six months? High or low?"

"An attempted attack, the priority is certain, I would say," Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair, a retired admiral, said in response. Four other intelligence agency leaders who appeared at the hearing with Mr. Blair said they agreed with the assessment...

More at The Washington Times.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review is almost completely devoid of "news." The QDR reaffirms a long series of decisions already taken by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. There are few new initiatives; the report locks in a course that Gates had already ordered. Rather than reading a document about strategies for the future, I had the sense that I was reading a business corporation's annual report covering the past fiscal year. I stopped counting how many times the QDR said, "the Department will continue to ..." or something similar.

Yet the report hints at, but leaves unsaid, many necessary and sometimes painful changes the Pentagon will need to make. In this sense the QDR seems incomplete; it kicks several important cans down the road, leaving for future reports important decisions that should have been in the QDR. Why this QDR did not face up to these decisions now is a mystery.

The QDR should be about preparing for the Defense Department's major responsibilities five to twenty years into the future. From this perspective, the report gets a lot right. The report properly discusses some dangerous trends that are rapidly headed in the wrong direction, such as:

1) Ballistic and cruise missiles growing like springtime weeds in China, Iran, and elsewhere,

2) The rapid proliferation of adversary advanced air defense systems,

3) The growing diesel/AIP submarine threat,

4) Cyber warfare,

5) Space warfare,

6) Non-state actors with advanced weapons,

7) WMD proliferation.

At the same time, the QDR recognizes that the United States has allowed some shortfalls and vulnerabilities to develop which include:

1) Overseas bases that are increasingly vulnerable to attack and suppression,

2) The need for both the Air Force and Navy to expand long-range strike capacity (to compensate for increasingly vulnerable overseas bases and aircraft carriers),

3) Possible overemphasis by the U.S. on short-range tactical aircraft,

4) Global command and control systems vulnerable to shut-down,

5) Possible lack of preparation for long-endurance air and maritime campaigns.

The report includes initiatives designed to address these problems and mismatches. The initiatives mentioned in the report include:

1) Hardening overseas bases,

2) Next generation bomber/long-range strike programs for both the Air Force and Navy,

3) Developing a joint air-sea battle concept,

4) Electronic warfare programs,

5) Expansion of unmanned and manned ISR systems,

6) Hardening and redundancy for space assets,

7) Greater effort and improved management for cyber warfare.

The QDR thus properly calls attention to the deterioration in relative U.S. capabilities in the naval, aerospace, electronic, and cyber dimensions. Reversing these trends will be very expensive. Yet the QDR foresees almost no change to the U.S. force structure by Fiscal Year 2015 (p. 46-47). An urgent need for naval and aerospace recapitalization plus constrained Pentagon budgets plus no change in force structure doesn't add up.

What the QDR leaves unsaid will be the need to find an exit for general purpose ground forces from Afghanistan, followed by a reduction in headcount in the Army and Marine Corps. The QDR implies, but does not make explicit, the need for the Pentagon to reduce personnel costs in order to free up money for high-end hardware (see pages 40-41 for some of the report's discussion of unmentioned tradeoffs).

The report kicked some other cans down the road. Gates ordered a separate study on how the U.S. will project power into defended areas over the next two to three decades (p. 33). Another study will review the future role of the Reserve Component (p. 54). Yet another study will be a government-wide review of security assistance programs (p. 74). [In her press conference at the Pentagon, USD(P) Flournoy mentioned yet another unfinished study on USAF/USN long range strike.] With such major issues still unsettled, this QDR feels unfinished. Yet a deadline loomed and the Pentagon had to publish what it could.

Naturally Gates does not neglect current operations. The QDR calls for more helicopters, more support for special operating forces, and more foreign language and cultural training. Equally important for the long-run, the report repeats Gates's long-standing calls for warrior and family support and steps to preserve the all volunteer force. Regarding future "small wars," the report recognizes the growing importance of security force assistance for both special and general purpose forces. With a reduction in ground force headcount seemingly inescapable, greater proficiency at security force assistance will be a necessity.

The 2010 QDR had no surprises and very little news. It simply locked in Gates's long established course. It properly recognized the deterioration in the U.S. strategic position at the high end of the spectrum. But it failed to explain the difficult trade-offs that will be necessary to address these problems. In this sense it is incomplete staff work, with a lot of tough decisions left for the future.

Gates Submits 'Wartime' Defense Blueprint - National Journal.

Defense Secretary Gates has submitted a "wartime" Quadrennial Defense Review of military capabilities and requirements, balancing near-term priorities with the future needs of the force, according to a copy of the document obtained by Congress Daily.

"This is truly a wartime QDR," Gates wrote in an introductory letter accompanying the review, slated to be released Monday...

To prepare the military for a range of conflicts, Gates wrote that the QDR "directs more focus in investment in a new air-sea battle concept, long-range strike, space and cyberspace, among other conventional and strategic modernization programs."

The 105-page planning document will be released along with the FY11 budget submission.

More at The National Journal.

Click here to read the QDR dated 1 February 2010 at National Journal or read it here (H/T Abu Muqawama):

Quadrennial Defense Review Report

A Look at America's New Hope: The Afghan Tribes - Ruhullah Khapalwak and David Rohde, New York Times

For three decades now, Communism, civil war and Islamic fundamentalism have laid siege to Afghanistan's tribes. In many ways, Afghanistan's tribal structure is arguably the weakest it has been in the country's history. Nonetheless, American civilian and military leaders are turning to some of these tribes as potentially their best hope for success against the resurgent Taliban after being frustrated by the weak central leadership of President Hamid Karzai.

Tribes have existed for millennia in the area that is present-day Afghanistan. They emerged over centuries in various sections of the country, taking form along extended kinship lines. Led by councils of elders, tribes provided their members with protection, financial support, a means to resolve disputes, and punishment of those who had committed crimes or broken tribal codes of conduct. For Pashtuns, the country's largest ethnic group and the Taliban's primary source of support, tribes are particularly important. Successfully turning Pashtun tribes against the Taliban - or perhaps families or sub-tribes if they deal with the government on their own - could deliver a serious blow to the insurgency and potentially create a means of stabilizing the long-suffering country...

More at The New York Times.

Marines Invest in Local Afghan Projects - C. J. Chivers, New York Times.

... Following the emphasis on a more assertive counterinsurgency approach mandated last year by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of American forces in Afghanistan, here on some of the country's most dangerous ground, infantry units are using this winter to try a soft touch.

In the province's lower Nawa District, many conventional missions for now are a low priority. Airstrikes and high-explosive artillery fire are in disfavor. Even mortar fire is rare. Instead, in places where it is able, the infantry is sending patrols to enter into development contracts with local men. The ambition is to use local labor to build bridges over canals, shore up irrigation systems, repair water gates or small dams and, in the most determined contest of influence against the Taliban, renovate mosques.

The effort rests on a simple premise: to fight the Taliban, money may be more effective than guns. "We're trying to buy a little peace," said Capt. Paul D. Stubbs, commanding officer of Company W, First Battalion, Third Marines, which operates in this area...

More at The New York Times.

Bringing National Security into the 21st Century - Daniel Langberg, World Politics Review.

Two weeks ago, while discussing last November's tragic events at Fort Hood, Defense Secretary Robert Gates proclaimed that the Pentagon "is burdened by 20th century processes and attitudes mostly rooted in the Cold War." This acknowledgement by a wartime defense secretary is yet another stark reminder that the broader U.S. national security system was also designed for a much different era, and stands in need of a holistic review and systemic modernization...

Prior to the financial meltdown, it was post-invasion Iraq, Hurricane Katrina, and the events of Sept. 11, 2001, that spotlighted the mismatch between our outdated system of governance and its foremost mission of preserving the viability and vitality of the nation. Perhaps the 9/11 Commission (.pdf) said it best when it called the specific problems revealed by 9/11 "symptoms of the government's broader inability to adapt how it manages problems to the new challenges of the 21st century." ...

More at World Politics Review.

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) The United States fights another counterinsurgency -- in cyberspace,

2) Yes, let's partner against al Qaeda. But who, exactly, will be the partners?

The United States fights another counterinsurgency -- in cyberspace

On Jan. 25, the New York Times published a story that discussed a cyberwarfare exercise conducted earlier this month inside the Pentagon. The purpose of the exercise was to examine how top civilian and military leaders would respond to sudden cyberattacks that targeted the country's power grids, communication systems, or financial networks. According to the article, the result was confusion and paralysis -- the Pentagon decision makers did not know where the attacks came from, who instigated them, or whether they even had the legal authority to respond.

Cyberwarfare has characteristics that are similar to the matchup between insurgents and counterinsurgents. Like an insurgent picking up a rifle or a homemade bomb, the cost of becoming a cyberwarrior is minimal. Like insurgents, cyberwarriors hide among the population and do an even better job at remaining anonymous. Their anonymity provides leaders with plausible deniability if they desire it. Even more than insurgents, they are inaccessible to counterattack and are not subject to deterrence. Worst of all, it is the cyberwarriors and not the U.S. military, who enjoy "escalation superiority" -- the more a cyberwar escalates, the worse things would get for the United States.

It is therefore very timely that the Center for a New American Security published a report this week on protecting the global commons, the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace realms through which people, commerce, ideas, and military forces flow.

Chapter Five of the report focuses on the threats to cyberspace. How should the United States deal with the threat of malicious cyberattacks on its infrastructure? The authors of this chapter draw an analogy to how officials in the public and private sectors coordinate their actions during a public health threat, such as a flu outbreak. There is no single action that brings flu under control. Success requires a wide variety of actions, including data collection, public service announcements, the targeted distribution of vaccines, and individual self-help, such as voluntary isolation and hand-washing. According to the authors, the same pattern of responses applies to a computer virus attack.

Yet in at least one sense, the analogy breaks down. A bad flu outbreak is a random act of nature. National governments and populations have an incentive to cooperate on containing these outbreaks and generally appear do so. At least it doesn't appear to be the case that countries or non-state actors are engineering flu bugs, deliberately distributing them, or actively disrupting efforts to contain their spread.

According to the CNAS authors (see page 149), the Russian and Chinese governments have been doing exactly this in cyberspace. If a nation-state were found to be deliberately distributing a flu virus, it seems reasonable to assume that sanctions and a quarantine of the offender would follow. Cyberattackers have yet to kill somebody, at least directly. Perhaps this is why they still enjoy virtually complete impunity.

The U.S. government understands the country's vulnerability to cyberattack and is attempting to organize a defense. Yet at the same time, most Americans view cyberspace much like the air or oceans, an open and neutral commons. By contrast, various non-state actors, along with the Chinese and Russian governments, view cyberspace as a tool of power and leverage. Cyberwarfare, although a concern for a few in the United States, has not become a concern for the vast majority. As long as that is the case, the U.S. government is likely to remain a passive defender against an army of anonymous cyberinsurgents.

Yes, let's partner against al Qaeda. But who, exactly, will be the partners?

On Jan. 28, Washington Post columnist David Ignatius argued that the U.S. military needs a new approach to fighting Islamic extremists. According to Ignatius, "America has to get out of the business of fighting expeditionary wars every time a new flash point erupts with al-Qaeda." Instead of U.S. general-purpose ground forces engaging in direct combat, Ignatius argues for more limited partnerships "to train other countries to fight Islamic extremism that threatens them at least as much as us." Ignatius is calling for more "security force assistance," the promise and perils of which I discussed last September in an essay for the Stimson Center.

After the painful experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, any reasonable policymaker will be hoping that security force assistance partnerships will prevent the United States from having to mount another major counterinsurgency expedition. What remains unsettled is who, exactly, will be these security-force assistance partners. Ignatius's column discusses U.S. training support for foreign governments ranging from Africa to the Philippines. Programs that aim to boost the effectiveness and legitimacy of foreign governments are certainly the policy preference of the U.S. government, especially the State Department.

But as U.S. officials are learning in Afghanistan, what the State Department prefers might not be what actually works. U.S. military officials in Afghanistan are eager to move ahead with local security initiatives using village and tribal militias. But according to the Washington Post, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, supported by special envoy Richard Holbrooke, is resisting local defense efforts that are not coordinated with the Afghan Interior Ministry in Kabul. State's resistance may be futile; according to the New York Times, the U.S. military is already bypassing both the central and provincial governments and awarding a $1 million grant directly to a 400,000-person tribe in eastern Afghanistan that has turned against the Taliban.

Ironically, Eikenberry's cables to Washington, sent during the Obama administration's exhaustive Afghan policy review, described how the central Afghan government was "not an adequate strategic partner." But no matter how flawed a partner government may be, it appears as if Foggy Bottom will operate only "by, with, and through" the nation-state system. In an age of irregular warfare, slavishly adhering to that system will leave many problems unsolved.

American Forces in the Philippines: Drawing Lessons From a Rare Success - The Economist (H/T Max).

... This is part of an American mission that started in 2002, not long after the Taliban fell in Kabul. A force of up to 600 American soldiers, many of them counter-insurgency specialists, has been training elite Filipino troops to fight militant groups ever since. American gadgets, tactics and intelligence seem to be helping. Fifteen of the 24 names on a Philippine most-wanted poster have been crossed out, either captured or killed. Foreign troops are forbidden to fight, so combat duties fall to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Americans keep busy with aid projects designed to woo locals in areas thick with militants. These days, there are fewer of them. The AFP estimates that Abu Sayyaf, a group notorious for bombings and beheadings, has fewer than 400 fighters on Jolo and Basilan islands. General Benjamin Dolorfino of the AFP boasts the group can no longer stage attacks on Mindanao itself.

American military thinkers wonder if there are lessons for other parts of the world where al-Qaeda lurks. With a modest outlay here, the Pentagon has dealt a blow to Islamist radicals and sharpened the skills of an ally. American troops are overstretched, expensive and make attractive targets for jihadists, so it makes sense to train other forces to fight where they can.

America, however, is unlikely to find other partners as perfect as the AFP, which is modelled on America's armed forces. Filipino officers speak English, know and admire America, once the colonial power, and can bond with their comrades over beer and karaoke. Try that in Yemen...

More at The Economist.