

IDENTIFYING THE PILLARS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS:  
USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLES  
OF JOINT OPERATIONS AND THE STABILITY OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK

by

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This article is based on Major Harding's completed Master's Thesis from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which Professor Anderson Chaired. The thesis was nominated for the Birrer-Brookes Award for best thesis of the 2009 graduating class.

In the past, the U.S. military engaged in stability operations as an afterthought to traditional lethal operations. Still, such equality and integration between combat missions and stability operations does not always materialize, leading to diminished returns. This ineffectiveness is due to a myriad of issues ranging from poor synchronization to unit leadership lacking confidence in the benefits of executing stability tasks. Even when stability operations enjoy command and unit support, poor analysis and course of action (COA) development results in actions that minimally effect a situation, while other critical issues are not addressed. Even with the advent of FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* and the newly published U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and United States Institute for Peace (USIP) *Guiding Principles for Stability and Reconstruction*, these problems continue to manifest themselves in “cookie-cutter” solutions that are improperly taken from one situational context and placed on another.

In 2005, NSPD-44 tasked the Department of Defense (DoD) with making the conduct of stability operations as one of their “core missions.” Additionally, it established the Department of State (DoS), specifically the Department of State/Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), as the lead agency for all stability-related activities abroad.<sup>1</sup> This document propelled stability operations to the status of core mission, rather than an afterthought in military planning.

The Department of Defense continued this effort in DoD Directive 3000.5 by officially tasking military forces with the responsibility to conduct and support stability operations.<sup>2</sup> DoDD 3000.5 placed additional emphasis with, “They [stability operations]

shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including, doctrine, organizations, training, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”<sup>3</sup>

The Army, in FM 3-0, *Operations*, went further by placing stability operations on equal status with the more “conventional” offensive and defensive operations, ushering in the concept of “Full-Spectrum Operations (FSO).”<sup>4</sup> This new doctrine represented how the Army adapted during this decade to meet operational demands. FSO accounts for the need of near-simultaneity in the execution of offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support operations in complex environments. Based on the changes made in JP 3-0 in 2001, FM 3-0 now lists the compiled Principles of Joint Operations.<sup>5</sup> These govern the conduct of all four operations under the FSO concept. Although the Army took a large step in following up FM 3-0 with updated doctrine, stability operations continue to suffer from critical gaps in the doctrine itself.

Prior to 2001, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)<sup>\*</sup> enjoyed principles that were unique and separate from the existing Principles of War.<sup>6</sup> In September 2001, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* molded these two lists together to form the “Principles of Joint Operations.”<sup>7</sup> This recognized the importance of viewing all operations under common operational principles and paved the way for the Full Spectrum Operations concept implemented by the Army in 2006. While important steps were taken to ensure that stability operations received equal effort and focus amongst the other more traditional missions, this came at the expense of the uniqueness of stability operations when compared to the offense and defense in both planning and execution.

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<sup>\*</sup>MOOTW was the forerunner of what we now call Stability Operations

Where both the offense and defense have a destructive focus, stability operations are constructive in nature, using lethal actions only as a means to gain security and non-lethal maneuver space. This symbiotic approach to kinetic and non-kinetic efforts is unique to stability operations and requires specific parameters in addition to the Principles of Joint Operations. However, as noted above, *Joint Operations*, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, and the other related manuals in the DoD inventory, contain no foundations, tenets, or pillars that provide a specific baseline for the execution of such missions.<sup>†</sup>

This lack of specific guidance is compounded by the doctrinal approaches contained in FM 3-07, *Guiding Principles for Stability and Reconstruction*, and even the stability-related portions of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. Rather than root themselves in the understanding of social science, these manuals are compilations of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and lessons learned from recent nation-building experience.<sup>8</sup> The Army and Marine Corps' FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* derives its roots from many contemporary lessons, most notably the British in Malaya and David Galula's

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<sup>†</sup>In paragraph 1-79, FM 3-07 does list out an adaptive framework that serves as a possible underpinning for inclusive USG planning at the operational and tactical levels, consisting of five "end state conditions" (A safe and secure environment, Established rule of law, Social well-being, Stable governance, A sustainable economy). However, while listing out objectives for each individual end state, FM 3-07 "relies on concrete principles and fundamentals in application" of these conditions, yet fails to detail what any of these principles or foundations are. Ironically, there are no established principles or fundamentals for offensive, defensive, or civil-support operations per FM 3-90, *Tactics*, FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, FM 3-0, *Operations*, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* and FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Publication*. However, *Offense* enjoys "characteristics" as per FM 3-90. FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations* lists out the acronym ASCOPE to help operators detail what exists in an area, but does not attempt to explain what societal institutions should be there. The same goes for USAID's *Principles of Stabilization and Reconstruction* contained in FM 3-07.

opinions on French Counterinsurgency.<sup>9</sup> FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* evolves directly from experiences in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, as well as lessons learned while training stability operations forces at the Army's training centers in Germany and Louisiana.<sup>10</sup> The United States Army's PKSOI, in collaboration with USIP, published *Guiding Principles of Stability and Reconstruction* in 2009 as a common doctrine for all civilian practitioners of stability operations. Like FMs 3-24 and 3-07, *Guiding Principles* is also derived from recent historical experience.<sup>11</sup> This results in problem identification and solving that focuses on demographics similar to those that contributed to the development of the respective manuals, at the risk of excluding other possible root causes not seen in those particular historical examples.

FM 3-24 mentions basic needs, and the importance of providing for them, in many portions of the manual. Chapter 3 devotes a significant amount of information to describing aspects of society and details a list of needs that are met when one fulfills essential services; these are food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment. The manual argues, "People pursue essential needs until they are met, at any cost and from any source."<sup>12</sup> However, FM 3-24 does not list what institutions and functions are common to all stable societies by enabling needs-fulfillment. Additionally, the list of needs mentioned in chapter 3 is not comprehensive, as history proves that unstable behavior occurs for reasons other than those listed above. While FM 3-24 frequently mentions providing for popular needs, and spends a significant amount of chapter 3 discussing aspects of society, it provides no comprehensive model for basic human needs and societal functions that apply across demographics.

FM 3-07 acknowledges the importance of basic needs fulfillment to operational success, but not what these needs are. It does refer to “immediate humanitarian needs,”<sup>13</sup> much in the same manner as FM 3-24 refers to “essential services.” *Stability Operations* does go one step further than *Counterinsurgency* in mentioning the importance of “solutions that focus on ensuring sustainable access to these basic needs” in order to “prevent the reoccurrence of systematic failure.”<sup>14</sup> However, while *Stability Operations* does provide ideas for what the basic needs of populations are,<sup>15</sup> and begins to quantify the importance of formulating courses of action based on meeting those needs,<sup>16</sup> the manual does not mention how “sustainable access” to critical needs-fulfilling resources should be ensured.

A significant amount of FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, mainly chapters 2 and 3, details specific tasks to accomplish in the course of an operation. These directly link to accomplishing Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) end-states. However, no theory exists to explain how or why the accomplishment of these tasks leads to a more stable community. This results in lists of tasks that are grouped together with other related topics, but no purpose or linkage<sup>‡</sup> that allows the operator to understand when certain tasks are more appropriate to solve the problem than others. To correct this, stability operators must understand the institutions and relationships that make societies function.<sup>17</sup>

*Guiding Principles* contains the best attempt at obviating a detailed list of basic needs and conditions for providing for them in sections 7-10.<sup>18</sup> However, the manual

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<sup>‡</sup>In the spirit in which “purpose” relates to “task” in FM 5-0, *Planning and Orders Production*

fails to link together how government functions relate to and ensure individual needs fulfillment, allowing for prioritization of resources for defeating the most threatening sources of instability.

What is missing from all the above manuals is information on how to ensure the availability of critical needs-satisfying resources, and thus avoid the “reoccurrence of systematic failure.” While the information contained in all three manuals listed above provides an idea of what the basic needs of stable societies are, there remains no theoretical basis<sup>19</sup> that proves these are correct. As noted, these three manuals are based on historical experiences, and may only be valid when applied in similar circumstances. Consequently, current stability operations doctrine lacks both theoretical basis and potential global viability, as the demographics and context that led to previous success may not translate to contemporary scenarios. In execution, this narrows the focus of stability operations problem analysis and subsequent course of action development to those root causes and solutions found in the specific historical examples that contributed to current doctrine. This does not discount that some methods from recent operational experiences were/are successful. Rather, the lack of theoretical background in current doctrine means these historical lessons are being considered for future use without understanding *why* they were successful in the first place.

Such understanding can only come when a stability operator comprehends the basic needs and functions of societies, and then analyzes how a historical course of action fulfilled those needs. This allows them to understand the contemporary scenarios better and adjust the historical solution to fit the current problem demographics. A void of this theoretical understanding predisposes stability operators to focus analysis on identifying

threads between current problems and fixes from chosen scenarios. This blinds planners to solutions that fall outside the boundaries of historical experience, resulting in classic, “they did it this way in [insert historical example of choice]” or solutions. Furthermore, the dogmatic execution of tasks, without understanding the true purpose behind them (in terms of societal interrelatedness), limits an operator’s ability to troubleshoot the problem when the execution of such tasks does not yield the desired results, or the problem evolves outside the historical models used to develop the doctrine.

To truly understand basic needs, institutions, and functions of stable societies, we must turn to the social science school of Functionalism. Only through this study can we understand and validate ideas of needs, functions, and societal interrelatedness that enable stability operators to identify and defeat Primary Driver of Instability (PDIs), Secondary Drivers of Instability (SDIs), and Tertiary Drivers of Instability (TDIs). Since, as noted in FM 3-24, a void of any of these needs will cause one to pursue them until they are filled, these are a PDI, and must be addressed for success in any post-conflict situation. Therefore, stability operators must ensure unity of effort in allocating critical resources to immediately address PDIs in the wake of conflict. However, nowhere in FMs 3-24 or 3-07 is there information that details what these critical sectors are. Guiding Principles attempts to explain what actions must be taken to combat drivers of conflicts,<sup>20</sup> but these are not explained in a manner that allows stability operators to identify Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Drivers of Instability, and prioritize efforts and resources to defeat them. Furthermore, in describing measures to defeat drivers of conflict, it fails to detail how societies adapt to do the same. This void in knowledge prevents stability operators from implementing far-reaching solutions that leverage societal structures and



facilitate the transfer of these responsibilities and actions from intervening forces to indigenous ones.

This understanding allows us to develop a Social Doctrinal Template (DocTemp), establishing what individual basic needs are, and possibility and probability for how groups and societies foster fulfillment of those needs.<sup>§</sup> The Social DocTemp, when compared to frameworks derived from limited historical analysis, expands the scope of analysis to include possible and probable Drivers of Instability based on social science theory. This enables operators to then develop a Social Situational Template (SitTemp), pairing the Social DocTemp with analysis of an unstable area and the deduction of needs gaps and societal adaptation failings. In turn, this Social SitTemp drives course of action development to solve the problem. In execution, knowing how societies function allows operators to adjust plans when certain tasks fail to provide desired results, or situational dynamics change. This knowledge enables subsequent prioritization inside the massive lists of tasks associated with existing post-conflict state building doctrine.

In short, while remaining nested inside the Principles of Joint Operations, we must identify the theoretical foundation to stability operations. Only then can we account for the uniqueness of stability operations inside the Spectrum of Conflict with additional operational governing guidance. These theoretically based guidelines will enable stability operators to fully comprehend societal interrelatedness and enable more efficient action and success on the ground, rather than the trial and error experienced by many in this

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<sup>§</sup> The Social DocTemp and SitTemp is used in a similar manner to the Doctrinal Template's use in FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, enabling course of action development. However, they describe how groups and societies foster needs-fulfillment rather than conduct military operations.

decade. It also gives contextual understanding to stability operators by providing theoretical foundation for understanding how stable societies function.

To develop this theoretical foundation, we must develop three primary areas: the Fundamentals of Social Stability (FSS), the Smart Practices of Stability Operations, and the Pillars of Stability Operations.

### Fundamentals of Social Stability (FSS)

The FSS are individual needs common to all humans, including the institutions and functions that societies create to enable individual need fulfillment. These are common to every person and society, regardless of demographics. They also apply to all levels of society, whether local, regional, or national. While the concept of Basic Needs is widely written about, surprisingly little actually explains what the specific needs are. Of the experts in this area, there are two main groups. The first comes from the social anthropological school of Functionalism, while the second group resides in contemporary global development theory; specifically the Basic Needs Approach (BNA). We focus on works within the Functionalist movement, since they identify individual needs and the mechanisms societies develop to fulfill those needs.

Figure 1 shows a synopsis of five of the major works that attempt to explain individual basic needs. \*\* While the range of works spans the 20th Century, each provides vital information that answers the question of what an individual's basic needs are.

However, no one list serves as a "Rosetta Stone." The various writers have disagreements

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\*\*Of these experts, only Bronislaw Malinowski and Len Doyal and Ian Gough go further to specify what functions societies must implement to ensure individuals can meet these needs. The others speculate on this in the course of explaining individual basic needs.

regarding what truly constitutes a “need,” as opposed to what only contributes to the fulfillment of such needs and is thus incorrectly labeled. More important than their disagreement on categorization, these sociologists and scientists do recognize many of the same needs, wants, and desires, regardless of their chosen naming conventions. This loose consensus allows us to derive a list of truly important needs and functions, while accepting that those of a more academic stature may argue whether our labeling is correct, or not. For stability operators, regardless of the naming methodology, basic needs and those desires closely connected to needs fulfillment must be identified and addressed.




Figure 1. Genesis of the Fundamentals of Social Stability

Source: Developed by author with information from David Braybrooke, *Meeting Needs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 36; Peter A. Corning, *Holistic Darwinism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: 2005), 285-297; Len Doyal and Ian Gough,

*A Theory of Human Need* (New York: The Guilford Press: 1991), 80, 157-8, 191-193; Bronislaw Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays* (New York: Oxford University Press: 1960), 91, 125; Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* 50 (1943): 372-384.

The list at the center of figure 1 synthesizes the lists of crucial needs defined by the various theorists in the Functionalist school of social anthropology and provides us with the "Fundamentals of Social Stability" (FSS). These are common to all stable societies regardless of time period, geography, or other demographics and are derived from the Functionalism school of social anthropology. The FSS provide the theoretical basis currently lacking in stability operations doctrine and consist of two parts: "Individual Needs" and "Group Fulfillment Adaptations."

Individual Needs are what an individual must access in order to survive, for the foreseeable future, within minimal quality of life parameters; examples are food, water, and shelter. When these needs are not fulfilled, an individual will adapt and satisfy them (through stable or unstable behavior), or experience harm.<sup>††</sup>

Group Fulfillment Adaptations are functions and/or institutions that societies develop and maintain to allow individuals to better achieve the continual satisfaction of their basic needs, such as rule of law and security apparatus like the police and military. If a society is unable to adapt to provide these functions for its population, it will either mal-adapt to do so or its constituents choose between unstable behavior to meet their individual needs or experience harm.

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<sup>††</sup>See Major Harding's *U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Master's Thesis for detailed descriptive of individual basic needs at: [cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?...2589](http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?...2589)*

## Group Fulfillment Adaptations

Human collaboration allows for specialization in labor, fostering a more efficient fulfillment of individual basic needs. As people join together and form cohorts or societies, the items below must exist to allow the group to exist in relative stability. Without them, the society will collapse and cease to enable the fulfillment of the basic needs, threatening their survival as well. The order is important, as the economic systems mentioned below will exist in any society, regardless of the security situation (as in Somalia today).<sup>21</sup> However, a government's ability to control a society will make the difference between an economic system that enables the population to prosper, and one that fails to allow society to meet their basic needs.

1. Economic System of Needs-Satisfier Production. Every culture must produce satisfiers that allow individuals to achieve a normative level of health. These activities constitute the economic base for any society, regardless of variables associated with climate, geography, and other demographics.<sup>22</sup> The proper functioning of this system that protects against what FM 3-07 refers to as, "the reoccurrence of systematic failure,"<sup>23</sup> and thus targets the Drivers of Instability.

This Economic System is made up of smaller Cycles that produce specific outputs essential to meeting basic needs, allowing for the specialization of the labor force. The exchange of goods and services provides specialists with compensation for the needs-satisfiers they produce, which allows them to procure other satisfiers they do not produce themselves.<sup>24</sup> The goods and services produced by the group must meet the needs of all members. If this fails to happen, whether due to incompetence, laziness, poor skills, or

calamity, the whole cohort suffers until that need satisfier is again produced, or an alternative resource is found.

Each cycle, involves elements of security, education and training, and rules.<sup>25</sup> This ensures standards are followed and provides consumers and producers alike with a level of confidence in the system. Such legitimacy is essential to the smooth function of the Economic System.

The Security Cycle provides an environment where specialists can concentrate efforts and resources without fear of physical attack (that would cause a subsequent drain as they struggled to compensate for this lack of protection). Security allows for the safe transport of all resources and products, whether specialists traveling to work, raw materials transiting to factories, finished goods traveling to markets, or information moving through cyberspace. Security also enables specialists to trust that they will receive appropriate compensation for their efforts. Failure to do so means they will siphon resources and effort from their primary specialty to other areas in order to compensate for this fear and ensure sufficient resources for needs-satisfying procurement (or move to another specialty altogether).

The Education and Training of specialists cycle maintains and/or improves knowledge in a particular area. Specialists must receive this training and pass on these skills to others who can improve the output of such specialization or inherit the responsibility altogether. This transfer of knowledge is critical in ensuring a baseline of legitimacy, and allows consumers to approach a specialist, whom they have no previous relation with, and conduct business. This training and education typically occurs through

apprenticeship and/or formal schooling, which teach skills specific to the economic cycle and related to business management.

“Rules” dictate how such skills can be employed for the collective needs-satisfaction of the group, such as the Posse Comotatus Act and its effects on internal security, or the FDA’s control of the Commissariat. “Rules” establish standards of conduct for all members throughout the economic system that leads to legitimacy and confidence. These must be abided by and enforces when necessary.

The following four cycles in figure 2 are essential to the survival of the society itself, as they address the Drivers of Instability and ensure needs-resource availability for all. These are vital to any properly functioning Economic System of Needs-Satisfier Production: Security, Commissariat, Thermoregulation, and the Reproduction and Training of New Members. Other Cycles may emerge as perceived need and demand requires, especially in post-conflict situations. This information provides prioritization to which Cycles of the Economic System (depending of which Drivers of Instability they address) are in the most urgent need of attention in post-conflict situations. Demographics particular to the conflict may adjust this prioritization, but in situations where all needs-fulfillment is vulnerable, this information provides stability operators with a start point for action.




Figure 2. Overview of the Economic System of Needs-Satisfier Production  
 Source: Major Harding's U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Master's Thesis at: [cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?...2589](http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?...2589)

In short, an individual's need to safeguard himself shrinks when specialists provide *security* for the group as a whole. As a result, individual resources previously dedicated to self-security are available for other activities that increase one's ability to meet their other basic needs. This adaptation ensures not only Physical Security (protection from attack), but Physiological (the ability to care for those whose health is degraded) as well, as depicted in figure 3.






Figure 3. Economic System (Security Cycle)

Source: Major Harding's U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Master's Thesis at: [cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?...2589](http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?...2589)

The idea of collective Physical Security, provided by a select group of individuals who make this their focus, allows other members to specialize in other areas, making crop yields larger, shelter more stable, medicine more effective, etc.

The individual need for access to Medical Care is included under the Physiological Security heading, as it reestablishes the constant of health which is essential for basic needs fulfillment. Lack of access to such corrective measures also effects Social Control, as it has the potential to delegitimize leaders in the same way a lack of physical security does (as seen in the 2009 U.S. medical care debates). Without

the ability for a society to protect its population from the effects of disease, people will live in constant anxiety.

Malinowski's concept of "Commissariat" best explains why food is a basic need and how cultures adapt to ensure sufficient quantities of it. Food chains are dependent on a length of factors that upheavals can occur when a single link is affected. One only has to look at famines of the past half-century to comprehend the fragility of this chain. Famines occur when the food distribution network or market system is disrupted by social, environmental, and/or economic upheaval and affects a significant amount of the population.<sup>26</sup> Rarely is it as simple as a lack of food.

As noted in figure 4, functioning societies possess rules and knowledge that mitigate these risks at every step.




Figure 4. Economic System (Commissariat Cycle)

Source: Developed by the author with information from Branislav Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), 96-99.

This function is also linked with other needs-fulfilling sub-cycles (as noted in figure 2). Security enables producers, transporters, merchants, and consumers to remain free from harm at all stages of the chain, allowing the cycle to function effectively.<sup>27</sup> If any of the enablers fail to exist, the function breaks down and depravity ensues, potentially leading to harm on a variety of scales.

An example of such a breakdown is the 2009 famine in Ethiopia. A five year reduction in rainfall (and a “green drought”) effected agricultural output, which drove food prices up 64 percent.<sup>28</sup> This forced many people to sell off livestock in order to

generate food-procuring revenue, flooding the livestock market and driving prices down. This loss of value further degrades individuals' ability to meet their needs. The delicate nature of the cycle, especially in areas that lack complex protections against "shocks" like drought and other environmental issues, is further complicated by issues external to the immediate area. The internal turmoil from the 2008 election crisis in Zimbabwe resulted in land seizures and farmers being evicted from their plots, while fertile lands were given to workers who lacked proper agribusiness knowledge. These events cascaded to cause Zimbabwe, a country that used to produce vast excesses of food for distribution throughout Africa, to import food to keep supplies at minimum levels. This indirectly effected on overall food prices on the African continent, further limiting Ethiopians' ability to meet their basic needs.

The "Thermoregulation" Cycle, depicted in figure 5, ensures products are available for people to use in their efforts to maintain a constant bodily temperature. One example is the harvesting of energy-producing natural resources, which are transported directly to the user (fire wood) or to central facilities for the production of electric (coal). This powers household appliances that regulate temperature in appropriately constructed buildings, like furnaces or air conditioning.<sup>29</sup>




Figure 5. Economic System (Thermoregulation Cycle)

Source: Major Harding's U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Master's Thesis at: [cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?...2589](http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?...2589)

Rules that govern this industry focus on areas like resource-preserving harvest limits, building codes, and commodity market regulations which relate to prices. Cultural rules are also present in this cycle, as we see the acceptance of skin exposure in Western female fashions that are unacceptable in other areas of the globe. Safety standards exist that regulate the presence of early warning systems that detect fire and/or other hazards that relate heating systems; this also ties into the Security Cycle.

Education and Training also has its place in this Cycle. Adults train children. Tradesmen learn their business through apprenticeship that teaches proper techniques and

business skills that lead to appropriate compensation for services. Individuals learn how to heat or cool their body through the ingestion of appropriate foods and/or liquids.

Each society must “Reproduce and Train New Membership” in sufficient quantity to assume the place of those who can no longer fulfill their duties and roles. This does not mean that every member must produce offspring. However, since the majority of humans consider reproduction and nurturing a significant part of the human experience, society will devote a significant amount of capital and effort on producing goods and services that relate to the satisfaction of this need.<sup>30</sup> This, in of itself, develops a needs-fulfillment production cycle (as seen in figure 6). Consequently, many people who are unable or unwilling to personally reproduce may find themselves involved in the process simply because of the need for employment so they can satisfy their individual basic needs.<sup>31</sup> Participation in the satisfaction of this group need allows them to do just that.




Figure 6. Economic System (Education and Training of New Members Cycle)  
 Source: Major Harding's U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Master's Thesis at: [cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?...2589](http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?...2589)

The cohort must ensure its members are healthy enough to continue the reproductive process;<sup>32</sup> this involves the need for preventative and curative medical care, whether neo-natal, post-natal, and/or pediatric. If reproductive capabilities are degraded (as is the case with communities who experience high birth defect rates due to environmental conditions-India's fertile valley as an example),<sup>33</sup> society will either not survive, or it will incur the burden of individuals who cannot properly contribute to needs satisfaction. This issue cascades by inhibiting the needs-fulfilling capabilities of those forced to care for and produce for the less-productive members of the group.

Socialization is a function of education and recreation, as it provides a setting where new members can learn to act within socially acceptable boundaries which are designed to prepare them for success later on in life.<sup>34</sup> Next, new members are trained for roles they will inherit in society, which prepares individuals for specific societal roles in which they are expected to participate in order to be considered a productive member of the group.<sup>35</sup> This can be in the form of an apprenticeship<sup>36</sup> or additional education above and beyond that which is normally associated with the socialization of youth. From participation in such a finishing system, one gains the transmission of skills and techniques learned by previous generations, thereby alleviating that person from having to relearn past lessons stagnating society's ability to progress. They additionally gain an understanding of what appropriate compensation is for the goods and services they produce,<sup>37</sup> allowing them to specialize, rather than produce their own needs satisfiers for fear of poor compensation and resulting failure to achieve basic needs satisfaction.

One important portion of this cycle relates to the conflicts that arise as generations compete for the optimal satisfaction of their needs in areas where there is competition for limited resources. Corning argues that the cohort must ensure that it does not sacrifice the future needs satisfaction of the younger generation to satisfy the wants of the generation in power.<sup>38</sup> If this does occur, the future needs-satisfaction potential of the younger generation, and its overall economic and physical health, is placed in jeopardy.<sup>39</sup> This will cascade to affect the overall stability of the society.

As older generations age and can no longer produce and procure the same volume of needs-satisfiers, younger generations must fill this void. If sufficient quantities of younger members have not been produced, the younger generations will be unable to



produce needs-satisfiers in sufficient quantity for all, including the offspring they are responsible for and the older generation who is no longer producing.

For the protection of a society's future, one generation must ensure that the next generation, who will eventually be called upon to provide for them in old age, is produced in sufficient quantity to ensure that this societal responsibility is not a burden. A "productive member" is not just biological offspring, but children of other group members who cannot or will not provide this upbringing, or are émigrés to the group from somewhere else. The responsibility for reproduction and training may have to occur at the expense of the "old age" generation's wants, for if this fails to occur, the generation who assumes responsibility for provision of needs-satisfiers will either be permanently burdened, or will pass the burden to subsequent generations (or both).

Another critical effect on maintaining a proper ratio of needs-satisfier producers to consumers within a society is protection from disease. Under normative conditions, societies should be able produce enough children to offset the decreased production of older generations. However, societies ravaged by disease not only lose critical producers from the labor pool, but other producers must devote resources and time to the care of the sick, further diminishing overall output. Many African nations, affected by Malaria and HIV/AIDS, endure this draining cycle, which in turn forces increased birth rates in rural communities in an effort to get above the wave-top of disease-related losses to the community labor force.

A compounded version of this effect is found in Uganda, where the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is siphoning children from villages near the Sudanese border to fill their ranks. This has a multi-tiered effect on villages already living with the threat of

Malaria and at the edge of government services for basic needs. When children are taken from these villages, it not only drains future manpower from the labor force, but it also presents a conundrum to the parents of those remaining: escort children to school, risk losing them while they travel to and from school unescorted, or take them out of school altogether. Escorting children may be safer, but it creates a labor shock to the economic system when those who previously were specialists in other cycles are forced to become *security* specialists for a portion of time each day, effecting overall resource output and availability. Taking children out of school does not completely protect them from being swiped, as the LRA may conduct manpower raids into rural areas, and it also breaks down the Reproduction and Training of New Members Cycle. This further affects the future of the economic system as future generations lack the proper schooling to assume roles within the village. The third option, status quo, isn't much better. Living in constant fear of a child being taken, only to have those fears realized, deprives families of Emotional Safety. This further decreases productivity in respective cycles of the economic system, leading villagers to lose trust in their leadership and act out in unstable ways.

The Cycles detailed here are not a complete model. Rather, they are the minimum needed for the society to function in a stable manner. If these cycles are not regulated by the government, they will be by another organization (whether legal or illegal), as reciprocal individual specialization cannot occur without such controls. What drives the amount of cycles in a particular system is the society's perception of what their needs are,

or more importantly, what their wants are.<sup>‡‡</sup> If you can convince someone that your service/product is a need, you've created a demographic and an industry. This allows for stability when goods and services are equitably produced, distributed, accessed, and bought. There is a critical interconnectedness to economic system. The sub-systems mentioned above cannot exist alone. Instead, each enables the other to perform better through specialization of individuals. Furthermore, physical security and clear standards of individual behavior with the ability to enforce such rules push the economic system to even higher levels of efficiency. When people can truly specialize because they are secure in the understanding that they will be appropriately compensated for their goods and services, they can produce more needs-satisfying resources. This further ensures availability of particular resources, allowing others to better focus on their production specialties. This security in the availability of needs-satisfying resources is enabled by social control.

2. Social Control (Governance and Rule of Law). Governments exist to ensure the availability of needs-fulfilling resources and the individual's ability to satisfy their basic needs. They do this by fostering an environment favorable to the efficient functioning of the Economic System, and individual participation within it. Such fostering is done through a concentration on "Rules" through four "Essential Elements" aided by two "Enablers."

Every community, regardless of how primitive or advanced, has a system of "Essential Elements" headed by recognized leadership that makes and/or validates rules.

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<sup>‡‡</sup>This is where electricity and other "enablers" come in. While not a true "need" or an adaptation essential to needs satisfaction, it does make the overall process of fulfillment and adaptation more efficient.

This system also has mechanisms that instruct its members on rules for acceptable behavior and possesses the ability to correct deviations and reestablish such structures.<sup>40</sup>

When rules are broken or questioned, the system has the ability to interpret rules and adjudicate issues. The established rules that allow for the fulfillment of basic needs must be followed, or the group will suffer when such critical structures breaks down.<sup>41</sup>

This legal framework allows for standards in day to day life and aids in the achievement of safety (from physical harm or deficiencies in needs fulfillment) for the group. The rules set forth primarily regulate the conduct of the Economic System of Needs Satisfier Production and establish baselines for behavior that enables trust. Without this, specialization of labor breaks down because individuals are never able to fully concentrate on developing their expertise. Rather, they continually worry about appropriate compensation for goods and services they provide that allows them to procure the needs-satisfiers that they cannot produce. Consequently, specialists are forced to meet their needs without help from others, taking a resource-producing individual out of a particular production pool. This cascades to other specialists who now lack sufficient availability of needs-satisfying resources. Rampant violation of the rules that govern society leads to inefficiency in, and possibly shortages of, needs-satisfying output, causing calamities associated with voids in needs-fulfillment. In this case, people will either perish or be incorporated into other systems.<sup>42</sup> Historical examples such as the French and Russian Revolutions, the Great Leap Forward, and the rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia document this. In each case, individual basic needs satisfaction was hugely interdicted as established rules were broken and governments who were supposed to uphold such structures were overthrown. This upheaval resulted in the loss of life on a

massive scale because the social change that propelled it interrupted the established cycles of needs-satisfying production. Once the cycles, that the population had adapted to depend on regardless of their efficiency, were non-functioning, individuals were forced to satisfy needs themselves or within new cycles (like Collectivization) with far less success.

Inside of the Economic System, formal and informal rules control each Cycle as well. Physical Security has rules that guide personal interaction and rules of engagement for security specialists. Physiological Security is governed by many layers of rules. Primitive societies developed rules regulating health-related behavior because of a lack of understanding of how disease spreads. The “unsanitary” left hand in many Middle Eastern areas is an example of this. The Hippocratic Oath doctors take is another example. Modern medicine is full for formal and informal rules, from washing one’s hands to toxicity awareness with certain drugs. Thermoregulation has rules that establish building codes, while certain cultures establish rules dictating how much skin one may show in their dress. This ranges from Sharia Law’s effects on women’s clothing options, to “No shirt, no shoes, no service” (this also has ties to culturally accepted standards of dress and fear of disease). The Commissariat is also governed by many formal and informal rules. This ranges from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) establishing standards for transportation and storage of meat, to passing food containers to someone instead of using one’s hands to pass the food itself.

The efficient establishment of social control and rules involves Elements and Enablers, as depicted in figure 7 below. Essential Elements of Social Control are those bodies that must exist for the efficient implementation of rules, leading to control of the

group. They consist of: Rule Makers, Rule Teachers, Rule Interpreters and Adjudicators, and Rule Enforcers.



Figure 7. Essential Elements and Enablers of Social Control

Source: Major Harding's U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Master's Thesis at: [cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?...2589](http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?...2589)

Rule Makers are typically the leadership of any group. In the western world, these are typically voted officials or those who are appointed into rule making positions. In a primitive model, rule makers could be a chieftain or a tribal elder who makes rules as part of a group. Regardless, these groups make and adjust rules, as necessary, to ensure conditions are set that allows for the most efficient and productive satisfaction of basic needs.

Once rules are established by the leading body, these guidelines are passed on to group members by Rule Teachers. This function typically occurs inside the Reproduction and Training of New Members cycle. Rule Teachers ensure that those about to join the collective labor pool are equipped with an understanding of what their roles with the society are and acceptable behavior is. Members of this group include parents, teachers, coaches, mentors, religious figures, and masters of apprentices. Rule Teachers can also include those who simply alert other to changes in the rules, such as modern media personnel, or a “town crier.”

Rule Interpreters and Adjudicators provide analysis and decisions regarding existing rules when conflicts arise regarding the abiding by and enforcement of such guidelines. Typically, these individuals are well-respected and possess a volume of knowledge regarding the importance of rules, precedence, and fairness.

Rule Enforcers ensure that laws are followed by the group, and bring individuals who are suspected of not following rules before those who can produce a decision. Rule enforcement is embedded within the Security Cycle of the Economic System.

These four Essential Elements must exist in any society where social control is exerted and the FSS are fulfilled. They are enhanced by the existence of the three Enablers of Social Control: Generation of Revenue, Information Management and Legitimacy, and Neighborly Relations.

Social Controlling elements must generate resources to compensate the Essential Elements for their services. These resources are usually gained in the form of a tax, and are paid in currency or commodity (food, manpower, supplies, crops, etc.). Social controlling groups must monopolize this ability to gain revenue, as competitors who

generate revenue not only increase their ability to compensate and strengthen parallel Essential Elements of Social Control, but they siphon potential taxes away. This takes resources out of circulation within the legitimate Economic System, and further weakens needs-satisfying ability of the now additionally burdened tax base. Revenue is also a critical enabler in attaining and/or maintaining good relations with neighboring regimes, as many controlling elements have averted conflict with potential competitors or co-opted support in conflicts through payments (as witnessed in the United States' ability to pay for smaller nations' participation in the War on Terror). No element seeking to establish and maintain social control can do so without monopolizing the ability to generate revenue.

A critical element of ensuring Legitimacy in the eyes of the population is Information Management. If any of the individuals within that chain are viewed as unworthy, corrupt, ignorant, or any combination thereof, their guidance will be viewed as illegitimate. Consequently, the rules set forth will not be respected and potentially violated, regardless of their viability in ensuring needs fulfillment. This “art of the sale,” regardless of how far-fetched it may be, is critical to the concept of Legitimacy. A group's ability to sell their actions to the population, as well as vilify rival organizations, is vital to the level to social control they can exercise. This is true in democratic societies, as seen in the onslaught of political ads during election seasons, as well as primitive societies, where songs and chants frequently refer to a group's past accolades as well as current strength; all meant to put fear in their enemies and attract new followers. In the developing world, Hamas rose to power in this decade due to their ability to advertise the “good” they did for Palestinians, as well as their ability to paint the Palestinian National



Authority (PNA) in a negative light. A social controlling elements' ability to manage information can even prevent unstable behavior when the population's needs are severely threatened, as long as the message convinces the population that their sacrificed needs are temporary and worthy of the overall cause. This phenomenon is seen in the study of popular reaction to voids in needs-satisfaction during the Russian and French Revolutions, the Great Depression, and during the Nazi's rise to power in Germany.

While it is possible for ruling group to achieve stability within an area without being viewed as legitimate, this will surely come at the expense of the populations Social Freedoms, thus failing to abide by the FSS, and endangering long-term stability.

Part of social control is Neighborly Relations, or the ability to control one's boundaries and maintain stable relations of mutual existence with other regimes. When this breaks down, social control is endangered. This cycle is commonly referred to when international relations practitioners discuss "bad neighborhoods." Examples include Hamas' inability to maintain Gazan sovereignty in the face of Israeli military actions during Operation Cast Lead, South Vietnam's inability to resolve their issues with North Vietnam or control their external borders, or the Khmer Rouge's inability to gain international legitimacy and approval for their internal social upheavals.

### Drivers of Instability

Little empirical data exists that supports direct causal links between deprivation of a particular need and unstable behavior that achieves satisfaction. However, there is significant evidence of indirect causal links related to voids in needs-satisfaction and instability. The critical part to analyze is how individuals and groups react to voids in needs-fulfillment: do they accept depravity and incur harm, appeal to social controlling

elements for help, resort to unstable behavior (theft, seizure, uprising, etc.), or change the paradigm (migrate, search for alternate methods of fulfillment, pursue education, etc.)? It is the decision(s), or lack of, to fulfill basic needs that will potentially lead to instability.

Accepting depravity and harm is typically not an option for individuals, unless they have exhausted all other legal and illegal options. In situations where depravity reaches this level, the social controlling element likely has questioned legitimacy.<sup>43</sup> In many cases, such voids in needs-satisfaction (like famine) result in outside organizations intervening and fostering needs-fulfillment, further demonstrating the government's ineptness. Indirectly, this decision may lead to unstable behavior as well, as witnessed by government upheavals in Ethiopia following some of their more severe famines in the 1970s and 1980s.

Appealing to social-controlling elements for help in achieving needs-fulfillment is not typically associated with instability. However, when the social controlling element is unable to satisfy these needs, they experience decreased legitimacy in popular opinion for their inability to provide basic services.<sup>44</sup> By extension, this action of asking for help, and not receiving it, can lead to unstable behavior when the government is viewed as illegitimate and unable to foster basic needs-fulfillment.

Unstable behavior, designed to fill a void in needs-satisfaction, is what most think of when they associate voids in basic needs-fulfillment and instability. Individual theft, food riots, political coups, armed rebellion, and intra-state violence driven by competition for scarce resources are some of the more typical examples. People will react in this manner if they believe legal and acceptable means will not achieve needs-satisfaction

(leaving unstable actions as the only viable option) or illegal actions taken to gather needs-fulfilling resources are worth the consequences of being caught.

Changing the paradigm of the needs-satisfaction problem involves many options. In famine situations, people may choose to adjust their means of food production (plant different crops), build food stocks, adjust their dietary habits (eat less or different food), roam in search of food, or migrate to food-abundant areas.<sup>45</sup> Roaming or migration likely cause instability as encroachment on other areas, which usually experience stress in resource availability as well, will cause competing groups to react unfavorably. This resource competition is a major unstable byproduct of reactions to voids in needs-fulfillment.<sup>46</sup> In less-dire situations, others may choose to seek a better education in order to gain better access to employment, and by extension, needs-fulfillment. However, in most under-developed areas where people experience the potential for void-related harm, options for personal improvement and subsequent upward mobility are limited. Although, if these options are available, they are less-likely to cause instability; while some may argue upward mobility can cause instability as rival groups react to new competition, studies show a correlation between overall increased education levels and decreased potential for instability.<sup>47</sup>

Since each option for action can directly or indirectly result in instability, stability operators must instead understand which voids in needs-fulfillment force the deprived to make a choice soonest. Knowing this hierarchy of decision-making urgency allows stability operators to focus resources on solving the most critical voids in needs-satisfaction before decisions must be made.

“Primary Drivers of Instability” (PDI) are a failure to satisfy the Individual Basic Needs of Air, Food,<sup>48</sup> Water, Thermoregulation,<sup>49</sup> Safety, and Medical care.<sup>50</sup> Voids of these needs will cause physiological harm the quickest, forcing at-risk individuals and groups to make timely decisions on how to address these voids before they incur harm. For PDIs, immediate emergencies related to physiological harm may limit the options available to the individual. For example, one cannot get a better education, which enables higher paying employment, to solve their food insecurity--they must possess sufficient food first.<sup>§§</sup>

“Secondary Drivers of Instability” (SDI) are a failure to satisfy the Individual Basic Needs of Social Freedoms and Social Participation. Unmet voids in these areas do not cause harm in the same timeframe that PDIs do, because these voids do not directly result in physiological harm.<sup>51</sup> The decision to pursue satisfaction of these needs may occur within days of gaining awareness of the void(s), or wait generations before it is addressed.

“Tertiary Drivers of Instability” (TDI) are a failure to satisfy Perceived Needs<sup>52</sup> or wants.<sup>53</sup> While not truly a basic need for individual survival, these voids are important enough to drive individuals or groups to participate in unstable behavior in order to achieve satisfaction if the need is not eventually addressed or discredited. Addressing these specific “wants” acknowledges the desire by poor and developing groups to raise their living standard and emulate other more advanced nations.<sup>54</sup> This is a main reason why the BNA failed in the 1980s; it was perceived to only focus on fulfilling the basic

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<sup>§§</sup> One who experiences voids in Metabolism-related needs likely lack the resources needed to gain an education anyway. Fred Cuny stresses that famine is more a cause of a lack of resources to procure food, rather than a shortage of food to buy.

needs of individuals, at the expense of socio-economic aspirations of individuals and societies.<sup>55</sup>

A contemporary TDI example is electricity. In Afghanistan, many parts of the country have never enjoyed reliable electric, if any at all. Consequently, a failure to provide power to a newly secured village is unlikely to cause instability. However, in Iraq, the majority of the population enjoyed electricity prior to the 2003 invasion. When under the early days of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) it was no longer reliably available, Iraqis began to protest that their conditions were “better under Sadaam,” eroding the legitimacy of the CPA and the fledgling attempts to establish legitimate Iraqi governance.

Safety, as depicted in Figure 8, lies on the cusp between a PDI and SDI. Physical Safety is considered a PDI, as voids in this area directly relate to physiological harm. Spiritual, Emotional, and Economic Safety are considered SDIs, as voids in these areas do not directly link to physiological harm. An important consideration is the intangibles that trigger some, whose Physical Safety is vulnerable, to react, where others do not. This is the same with Spiritual, Emotional, and Economic Safety. A critical element in what conditions trigger a response is ambivalence. When a population loses confidence or hope in a situation improving, they may no longer struggle to achieve basic needs. Likewise, a population pushed by the actions of one group into another competing group’s sphere of influence (or is won over by a group’s competency in fostering the fulfillment of basic needs) may accept voids in needs-satisfaction if they believe their sacrifice is in their long-term best interests. These phenomena are witnessed in many of

the mass killings, purges, and genocides of the 20th Century, as well as the study of population behavior during counterinsurgencies.

|       | Need                                 | Cycle within the <i>Economic System</i> that provides for the need                                |
|-------|--------------------------------------|---|
| PDI's | Air                                  | Directly from <i>Social Control</i> (establishes clean air standards)                             |
|       | Water                                | <i>Commissariat</i>   |
|       | Food                                 | <i>Commissariat</i>   |
|       | Waste Elimination                    | <i>Commissariat &amp; Thermoregulation</i>  |
|       | Safety (physical)                    | <i>Security, Thermoregulation, Reproduction and Training of New Members</i>                       |
|       | Safety (emotional)                   | <i>Security (protects against anxiety) and Reproduction and Training of New Members</i>           |
|       | Safety (spiritual)                   | <i>Reproduction and Training of New Members (religion)</i>  |
|       | Safety (economic)                    | <i>Social Control and the Economic System (worker protection laws and social welfare)</i>         |
| SDI's | Medical Care (preventative)          | <i>Security (physiological)</i>   |
|       | Medical Care (palliative)            | <i>Security (physiological)</i>   |
|       | Medical Care (curative)              | <i>Security (physiological)</i>   |
|       | Thermoregulation                     | <i>Thermoregulation</i>   |
|       | Social Freedoms (mobility)           | <i>Reproduction and Training of New Members &amp; Social Control (laws that protect freedoms)</i> |
|       | Social Freedoms (choice)             | <i>Reproduction and Training of New Members &amp; Social Control (laws that protect freedoms)</i> |
|       | Social Freedoms (access)             | <i>Reproduction and Training of New Members &amp; Social Control (laws that protect freedoms)</i> |
|       | Social Participation (education)     | <i>Reproduction and Training of New Members &amp; Social Control (laws that protect freedoms)</i> |
|       | Social Participation (socialization) | <i>Reproduction and Training of New Members &amp; Social Control (laws that protect freedoms)</i> |

Figure 8. How the Economic System affects Individual Needs Fulfillment  
*Source:* Major Harding's U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Master's Thesis at: [cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?...2589](http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?...2589)

Identifying the Drivers of Instability, and the urgency with which to address them, provides stability operators with a better ability to focus efforts and resources in constrained environments. This, paired with an understanding of what group adaptations exist to ensure available resources for the fulfillment of particular needs (depicted in the right-hand column of figure 8), provides stability operators with an idea of where to focus timely resources in order to address Drivers of Instability.

The FSS are analogous to the Stability Operations Framework in FM 3-07. Like each subset of the Framework, each Fundamental can be viewed as a line of operation in course of action development. What differentiates the Fundamentals from the Framework is how each was derived. The FSS are derived the Functionalist study of individual needs and how societies adapt to ensure these needs are met. This rooting in social science,

instead of historical specifics, focuses the FSS on needs and societal functions common to all, regardless of demographics. The Stability Operations Framework is derived from recent historical lessons learned throughout the 1990s and this decade, which predisposes their use to be appropriate only in situations that are analogous to those used in the development of the Framework itself.

This difference in foundation does not mean the Stability Operations Framework is invalid. To discount the expertise, research, and collaboration that went into the development of FM 3-07 is foolish. However, the Framework contained in Stability Operations is operationally and tactically employed by individuals with less background knowledge on the subject of needs and societies; most civil affairs personnel have not received advanced formal education in these areas. To bridge this gap in knowledge, stability operators need context and purpose to go with the tasks listed in FM 3-07. The FSS provides this context of societal interrelatedness, allowing stability operators to understand why they need to execute particular tasks. Furthermore, social science understanding through the FSS allows them to recognize cultural and conflict uniqueness, and deviate from existing doctrine while still comprehending the end-states needed for stability.

At this point, the identification of the Fundamentals of Social Stability establishes a framework to analyze how other groups and organizations approached post-conflict stabilization. This is our Social Doctrinal Template (DocTemp), establishing what individual basic needs are, and possibility and probability for how groups and societies foster fulfillment of those needs. This enables operators to then develop a Social Situational Template (SitTemp), pairing the Social DocTemp context and demographics

specific to the area. In turn, this Social SitTemp drives course of action development to solve the problem.

In the Smart Practices of Stability Operations we will use this Social DocTemp, the FSS, as a lens to measure needs-satisfaction success in historical examples and the methods in which stakeholders attained such fulfillment.

### The Smart Practices of Stability Operations

As depicted in figure 9, once the FSS are identified, they are then used as a framework to analyze how effectively needs-satisfaction was met in each historical case study and international development strategy. We conduct this analysis to identify “fixes” applied to those particular situations, and then decide if they are still valid for contemporary application. However, we must apply discretion when identifying “best practices” from other stability operations, which are demographically specific, and do not apply everywhere.<sup>56</sup> Such focus blinds leaders to real causes and solutions pertinent to a particular situation. Instead, the Pillars of Stability Operations gleam “Smart Practices”. This focuses more on the mechanisms and processes that counteract the tendency of public sector political, organizational, and technical systems to perform unsatisfactory while adapting during volatile periods,<sup>57</sup> requiring an understanding of social science. These Smart Practices derive lessons from previous historical experiences and adjust them to the specific contexts of contemporary operations and exclude previously successful practices that only apply to a specific situation.<sup>58</sup> In short, the difference between “Best Practices” and “Smart Practices” is perspective. The previous is focused on solution analysis while the latter is focused on problem analysis. Those fixes that do



have contemporary applicability in fostering FSS-fulfillment become part of the Pillars of Stability Operations.




Figure 9. Pillars of Stability Operations Methodology

Source: Major Harding's U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Master's Thesis at: [cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?...2589](http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?...2589)

Historical analysis of stability operations focuses on 20th Century interventions in post-conflict societies (and failed states) with an active insurgency. This excludes the post-World War II nation-building experiences in Japan and Germany. \*\*\* The timeframe

\*\*\* This document also excludes experiences in Iraq, as the results are still inconclusive, and the opinions and analysis of the data vary across a wide spectrum.

chosen is largely due to the development of technological, social, and political phenomenon we still live with today.

The selection of each case study provides a varied perspective on how needs were fulfilled by different intervening forces. Analysis of the Philippine Insurrection is useful due to its similarities with the recent experience in Iraq. Both insurgencies started after a regime change and the end of major combat operations, while both intervening forces endured mid-operation presidential elections amid significant domestic opposition to the military campaigns themselves. The CORDS portion of the Vietnam War provides an understanding of a successful method of population-centric pacification in concert with major combat operations. The analysis of the Somali population's adjustment to prolonged instability provides understanding of how societies within failed states adapt to ensure needs-fulfillment. Hamas' rise to power in Gaza and subsequent attempt to govern the area, amid an embargo and invasion by the Israeli Army, allows us to view how a group intervenes from within to provide stability. Analysis of the international aid community's response to the fallout from Israel's most recent invasion of Gaza allows us to view how aid organizations attempt to satisfy gaps in needs-fulfillment in the interest of achieving stability. This is unique because aid organizations have no guns or legitimate indigenous authority. The study of the Taliban's rise, defeat, and resurgence in Afghanistan is analogous to the situation in Somalia: long duration of conflict, warlord infighting after the defeat of a communist backed regime, lost credibility for tribal leadership, and the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism.

As Social Control is a vital portion of ensuring FSS-fulfillment, special attention is given to how "Rules" were serviced by analyzing the existence of the Essential

Elements and Enablers of Social Control in each case study. Other measures of FSS-fulfillment are viewed in terms of initial issues preventing their satisfaction, what was done to correct them, and any consequences of these actions.

The analysis of these military, organizational, and societal approaches to needs fulfillment sheds light to the common practices and goals which are essential in stability operations and applicable to contemporary implementation by western military forces. By studying relevant historical experiences, we acknowledge that certain TTPs may possess enduring utility, as evidenced by current success in post-Surge Iraqi capacity-building. This study focuses on how respective groups and organizations did so within an operational context. As depicted in figure 9, after identifying “smart” practices through the lens of the FSS, we then deduce whether these solutions are situation-specific or have enduring validity; if they are the latter, we include them as part of the Pillars of Stability Operations.

### The Philippine Insurrection

The stability operations experience during the Philippine Insurrection is analogous to the American involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Both started as a regime change, experienced a short operational lull after the fall of the previous governing power, and then quickly transitioned to a counterinsurgency. The American involvement in the Philippines was hotly contested domestically by anti-imperialists, while many in the United States opposed the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. Both experiences involved a mid-operation presidential election closely watched by insurgent leadership. Finally, both operations clearly demonstrate a number of “how to” as well as “what not to do” for future stability operations.

The United States took a progressive approach to pacifying the Philippine Insurrection. Unique to this situation was the decision by the U.S. Government to retain the islands as a protectorate rather than grant them independence, in an attempt to keep them from falling under the reign of the fledgling German or Japanese Empires.

Drivers of Instability in the Philippines focused around Tertiary causes related to two indigenous groups' (Filipino Insurrectos and the Moros) claims to social control. In this case, after the defeat of the Spanish, the Insurrectos under Emilio Aguinaldo believed they would become independent, only to have the American Government under President William McKinley choose otherwise. This issue of perceived colonialism could be considered an SDI related to Social Freedoms. However, with the capture of Aguinaldo and McKinley's reelection in 1902, the Insurrecto movement significantly lost effectiveness.

The Moros were a semi-autonomous Muslim society under the Spanish. Moro leadership was also driven by Tertiary causes, mainly the desire to exert autonomous control over their territory. Accordingly, they attempted to persuade their population to revolt, claiming that American-enacted reforms were attempts by the U.S. to "Christianize" them. This propaganda campaign was intended to create a PDI within the Moro population related to violations of Spiritual Safety, and an SDI related to Social Participation in a desired religion. This misinformation was quickly refuted as the Americans overtly professed they were doing nothing of the sort.

Figure 10 depicts how these themes enabled needs-fulfillment of the population in the course of the operation against the Filipino Insurrectos.

| Need   | Issue preventing fulfillment  | How did intervening forces fix the void?   | Long-term consequences effecting fulfillment  | Additional fixes... and consequences  |
|--|---|--|---|---|
| <b>Metabolism (needs 1-4)</b>                        | Urban areas have squalid living conditions  | Public health projects in urban areas focused on sanitation.   | Zones of protection threatened popular health with increased pop. density and decreased sanitation in urban areas. Attacks on Insurrecto food sources effect population as well. <i>Zones</i> disrupt Commissariat cycle and food sources.  | Moro crops destroyed during punitive expeditions under Wood.  |
| <b>Safety</b>  | Only security apparatus that existed to fill the void left by the Spanish was Insurrecto-led. Populations were vulnerable to rule of insurgents when U.S. forces were not present.  | Policy of "Chatizement": Development of "zones of protection", attacks on insurgent infrastructure, combat operations against Insurrecto columns, development of native constibulary, population relocated and consolidated in secure areas.   | Allegations of abuse by U.S. personnel. <i>Zones</i> threaten wellbeing as illness is spread rampant in camps. Villagers moved from cultural base to <i>zones</i> , effecting spiritual safety. Moros see compliance with Wood's reforms as anti-Islamic.   | Women & children killed due to proximity to Moro fighters. Destruction of social fabric and Moro leader illegitimacy results in large loss of life at Bud Dajo in 1906. U.S. disavowal of efforts to "Christianize" calms Moros. Bliss' growth of native security forces increases safety.            |
| <b>Thermoregulation</b>                              | Fulfilled by population   | Fulfilled by population  | Villages burned when move to "zones" occur - deny supplies to enemy.  | Wood's punitive expeditions burn Moro houses  |
| <b>Medical Care</b>                                  | Instability reduces ability of inhabitants to access medical care in urban areas  | Public health projects in urban areas: vaccination campaigns, hospitals built.   | Limited and primitive health care system in rural areas overwhelmed by problems caused by moves to <i>zones</i> .   | U.S. immunization efforts in <i>zones</i> to combat disease outbreaks. Efforts to improve Moro health care.   |
| <b>Freedom of Mobility, Choice, and Access</b>       | Legacy of Spanish colonialism created a caste system and lack of mobility. Slavery still allowed.   | Social mobility is hindered when U.S. turns to native elites to fill leadership voids. Slavery abolished under Wood.   | Abolishment of slavery and legal codes considered archaic opens some additional options for MAMs.   | Effects of haves and have-nots still felt in region today.  |
| <b>Social Participation</b>                          | Lack of education opportunities for average Filipinos   | Schools built and manned by U.S. civilian volunteers   | Movement of population to <i>zones</i> uproots social fabrics; education and other interactions disrupted.  | Non-interference with Islam preserves some assemblance of social participation and order.   |
| <b>Adaptation</b>                                    |   |  |   |   |
| <b>Economic System of Needs-satisfier production</b> | Disruption of agricultural growth cycles and ability to transport goods to and from market.   | Infrastructure improvements and road networks. Security provided along major LOCs  | Relocation of population to zones of protection further disrupts Economic System.   | Infrastructure improvements positively effects trade and movement of goods. Bliss grows constibulary & Philippine Scouts.   |
| <b>Social Control</b>                                | Lack of central authority after defeat of Spain. Insurrecto parallel gov't. structure controls rural areas. U.S. forces fail to gain effective support because they cannot secure areas long-term, negating the effects of population-centric projects. Moro legal code deemed "uncivilized". | Customs and duties collected by U.S. forces. Soliders run local/regional governments until elections are held. Existing cultural apparatus is leveraged to produce government leaders. Attacks on Insurrecto social control infrastructure. Moro legal code replaced by American-style model. Spanish-era tax reinstated for Filipino gov't revenue. | Insurrecto infrastructure critically damaged. Native-led governance spreads to rural areas. Courts prosecute Insurrectos and criminals - legitimizing the Filipino government. Abolishment of slavery and Moro legal code strikes at power base of <i>datus</i> - many Moros take up arms against Americans. Other Moros see social changes as attempts to "Christianize". U.S. frequently disavows efforts to convert Muslims. | Wood's punitive expeditions against Moros. Targeting of Moro leaders breaks down Moro social order. Other Moro groups respond to rumor of punitive expeditions; Mindinao largely pacified by 1906. Demonstration of willingness to use force supresses indigenous urges to resist further after 1911. |

Figure 10. FSS-Fulfillment in the Philippines

*Source:* Developed by author with information from Charles Byler, "Pacifying the Moros: American Military Government in the Southern Philippines, 1899-1913," *Military Review* (May-June 2005): 42-45; Donald E. Klingner and L. R. Jones, "Learning from the Philippine Occupation: Nation-Building and other Institutional Development in Iraq and Other High Security Risk Nations," *Public Administration and Development* 25, (2005): 151; Robert D. Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1901-1902*, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 24. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2007, (reprinted 2008), 133-4, 121.

Critical themes from The Philippine Insurrection were a dedicated focus on fulfilling the basic needs of the population and improving the indigenous capacity to do so long term, as filling this void of governance was seen as or more important than tactically defeating the enemy.<sup>59</sup> This occupied a significant amount of U.S. resources

throughout the campaign.<sup>60</sup> Complimenting these precursors to today's stability lines of operation were lethal operations against Insurrecto formations. These had a combined effect of tactically defeating insurgent forces while denying them the critical civilian infrastructure (access to population centers for recruiting and food<sup>61</sup>) needed to reconstitute.

An essential aspect of this synchronization is the importance of “near simultaneity” in the execution of lethal efforts designed at defeating insurgent forces and population-focused tasks to improve quality of life and governance.<sup>62</sup> Intervening forces must possess the ability to quickly follow the tactical defeat of insurgent forces with stability-driven actions to gain the favor of the population (or deny them to the enemy, at a minimum).<sup>63</sup> Driving the tempo of this “Cycle of Counter-insurgency Operations”<sup>64</sup> allows forces to eventually access intelligence that enables the further destruction of insurgent infrastructure, which in turn allows for further execution of stability tasks in newly secured areas. This cycle is depicted in figure 11.




Figure 11. The Cycle of Counterinsurgency Operations

Source: Developed by author.

Another enduring theme of this operation is the use of existing indigenous institutions to achieve social control and stability in a timely fashion. While this technique leveraged cultural leaders and elites formerly aligned with the Spanish and may have actually perpetuated the lack of fulfillment of the average Filipino's need for Social Freedoms, it led to quicker stabilization in the areas it was employed in. The Filipino Aristocracy's familiarity with governance decreased the chances that attempts at governance were poorly executed and viewed as illegitimate and/or forced on the population (as today's attempts at democratization are viewed in many fledgling areas).

Because the lack of Social Freedoms fulfillment is an SDI, improvements in the satisfaction of this need (through democratic elections and other forms of representation) can be instituted gradually. In short, effective indigenous governance immediately following social upheaval trumps individual socio-economic mobility, choice of one's life path, and access to resources that enable both. These can be pursued after good governance is established.

Also critical to the mission was the ability to manage information. In this, the Americans (especially J. Franklin Bell) utilized emerging communications technology, like the telegraph, to issue and reinforce guidance. These communications show a commander driven to ensure his forces acted with restraint.<sup>65</sup> While it didn't prevent allegations of heavy-handedness and abuse, it did significantly decrease their probability. This effort to manage information flow proved especially important in a confusing operational environment that was constantly scrutinized by a skeptical media. Communications were also used to provide an element of transparency to the indigenous population, regarding clear expectations and requirements for their behavior and how they were expected to interact with suspected insurgents.<sup>66</sup>

The theme of restraint in handling the population was reinforced by most higher-level commanders (even if it was not always followed at the lowest echelons). This was reflected in General Otis' initial strategy of "Benevolent Assimilation/Pacification",<sup>67</sup> developed from his experiences in pacifying the Plains Indians.<sup>68</sup> Bell also understood<sup>69</sup> the importance of balancing population protection and control with restraint while defeating insurgents. This was not only vital to gaining and maintaining popular support,



but reflected some of the more progressive ideals emerging in the United States at the time.

An example of “what not to do” is the use of forced population movements into “Zones of Protection.” While securing the population from insurgent influence (and denying population infrastructure to the insurgent) is vital to the fulfillment of needs, forced uprooting and relocation has an extremely disruptive effect on the Economic System of Needs Satisfier Production. Such extreme measures particularly effect the Commissariat sub-cycle, as well sacrificing the Physiological portion of the Security Cycle in an attempt to benefit the population by geographically separating them from insurgent influence.

Another example of “what not to do” was the punitive expeditions against the Moros led by Major General Leonard Wood. In response to renewed resistance, Wood’s forces killed hundreds of Moros (including women and children), burned villages, and destroyed crops. Additionally, the losses incurred by the Moro leadership effectively eroded their social order. This led to the vastly one-sided battle of Bud Dajo in 1913, where Moro leadership was unable to persuade the defenders of Bud Dajo to leave in an effort to save their families.<sup>70</sup> This failure stemmed from Moro leaders losing legitimacy in the eyes of younger Moro Military-Aged Males (MAMs), after a series of edicts and rulings from the American occupational government undermined their effectiveness.

Although Wood’s desires to restructure the Moro legal code were progressive in nature, he should have considered the overall effect on Moro social order. In this case, the Filipino government did not have control over all portions of the islands, and Wood could have leveraged Moro leadership to add a layer of control and overall stability. Once

Wood enacted his reforms, he lost the chance to leverage Moro elders, and more importantly, opened the door for unstable behavior on the part of younger Moro MAMs, who saw their elders as illegitimate and incapable of preserving Moro autonomy and way of life. This spiraled the uprising that ended with the failed Battle in Bad Dajo. This situation demonstrates the importance of appreciating the delicate balance of transitioning from one social control apparatus to another.

U.S. Army officers served as primary Rule Makers from the defeat of the Spanish until their turnover to civilian personnel in 1913, with the exception of William Howard Taft, who was appointed military governor in 1901.<sup>71</sup> During this time, military leadership from Otis to Arthur MacArthur, Wood, Tasker Bliss and John J. Pershing, enacted a large volume of reforms.<sup>72</sup> These reforms undermined the Moro social structure<sup>73</sup> that emerged to fill the gap left by the defeat of the Spanish without another social controlling element ready to fill the void. This breakdown of the Moro social fabric defeated a potential rule-making apparatus that already existed, and was eventually replaced by Filipino local government with the election of local leaders.

The military government and civilian population in the Philippines were able to serve as one layer of Rule Teachers and alert the population to the changes in social rules. Upon defeating the Spanish, the military government immediately began building schools and revamping educational curriculum.<sup>74</sup> Additionally, many American civilians came over to the Philippines to teach. Finally, military leaders operated with relative transparency, using leaflets and telegraph to alert the population to rules and regulations (MacArthur's General Order 100) they were expected to abide by.<sup>75</sup>

To establish an apparatus for Rule Interpretation and Adjudication, American forces established various legal reforms designed to aid in the transparent processing of criminal issues, including courts. The Moros also had existing legal systems, but were undermined by the legal reforms enacted by Wood, and U.S. officials overturning legal decisions by the Moro Datus (leaders). This paired with an inability to enforce legal rulings, eroded Moro legitimacy.<sup>76</sup> Again, this erosion of a competing social controlling element is a successful practice, as long as another apparatus is ready to fill the void left by the discredited group.

Rule Enforcement started out as a heavily American responsibility. However, as the American forces quickly realized they could not secure the whole area themselves, they quickly began recruiting and training native forces. These units included a large Philippine Constabulary and the U.S. Army's Philippine Scouts. Eventually, U.S. leadership recognized that expanding the coverage of native forces, in addition to their tactical integration with U.S. units, was vital to demonstrating Filipino government reach into rural areas and defeating any claims to legitimacy that Moro leaders had.<sup>77</sup>

## Vietnam

This study of needs in the Vietnam War starts with the status of South Vietnamese needs-fulfillment in the wake of the Tet Offensive, and how the U.S. and Republic of Vietnam (RVN) addressed this through the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC).

Drivers of Instability in Vietnam were Tertiary, centered on Viet Cong (VC)/Viet Cong Infrastructure's (VCI) desires to overthrow the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and

install a communist state attached to North Vietnam. In fact, no significant violations of individual basic needs were prevalent until the VC began increasing their operations in the south. Much of their propaganda and attempts at cajoling the population into an uprising were unsuccessful, as referenced by the large amount of popular ambivalence and inaction seen in the south after the Tet Offensive.<sup>78</sup>

Earlier pacification efforts undertaken by the U.S. and GVN include the Agroville and Strategic Hamlet Programs. Both were largely ineffective. In many cases, especially due to the habit of the GVN to uproot populations and move them into areas easier to secure, these efforts served the VC propaganda effort more than any other goal.<sup>79</sup> This inability to protect the population from VC terror and provide basic services perpetuated an overall ambivalence amongst the population; many swayed with whatever force currently occupied their area.<sup>80</sup>

These programs were followed by the Rural Development Cadre (RD) program, which sought to reestablish the link between the rural areas and GVN governance, in addition to dramatically increasing infrastructure and overall quality of life. However, the laundry list of tasks assigned to RD teams and the inability to secure areas from VC attacks resulted in minimal effects on pacification.<sup>81</sup> This failure led to the establishment of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO), which sought to oversee and coordinate all civilian-led pacification programs in South Vietnam. While a step in the right direction, the OCO lacked authority to control respective agencies and came into frequent clashes with the CIA and Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV) on the subject of who controlled overall pacification.<sup>82</sup>

In the spring of 1967, in response to the disjointedness that plagued efforts in South Vietnam and special advisor to the President Robert Komer's recommendations, President Johnson instituted National Security Action Memorandum 362. This effectively created Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS),<sup>83</sup> coordinating military and civilian operations. With CORDS, MACV sought to integrate traditional and ongoing pacification efforts with major combat operations in the South Vietnamese countryside.

At the MACV staff-level, CORDS' greatest accomplishment was the integration of military and civilian personnel, achieving a unity of command and effort within the staff construct. This mix of personnel was also pushed down to provincial and district advisory teams, achieving a synergistic effect similar to that at MACV and enabling greater success in overall pacification.<sup>84</sup> The benefits of this combined military and civilian approach were founded in the recognition that the solution to South Vietnamese instability was not just a military issue, but one of GVN capacity as well. Although the security situation had to improve before other infrastructure and societal development could be sustained, military operations, governance initiatives, and humanitarian improvements could not be "stove-piped." Instead, CORDS recognized that they must be executed in conjunction, not in sequence.

CORDS achieved this jointness by consolidating existing programs from previous military and civilian pacification efforts, and combining them with new initiatives under one over-arching headquarters. This combination fostered improvements in rural infrastructure, social welfare, education, agro-business, the reach of national and provincial governance, and the effectiveness of GVN and local security forces. CORDS

also recognized the struggle between the GVN and VCI amongst the South Vietnamese population for who could best exude a perception of FSS-fostering competence. This led to the empowerment of the “Open Hands” movement, designed to turn VC with defection appeals, and the implementation of the Phoenix program, which targeted the VCI.<sup>85</sup>

In response to the pacification losses incurred during Tet,<sup>86</sup> the MACV staff recognized that VC propaganda gains and personnel losses must be met with a renewed offensive and implemented the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). The APC sought to regain all of the previous years’ results under CORDS by focusing on the improving local security and infrastructure through the expansion of Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF), police, and local self-defense groups. CORDS also reinvigorated Phoenix and “Open Arms,” resettled refugees, and fostered GVN and local government provision of services in rural areas.<sup>87</sup> These efforts resulted in major gains, including an additional 4 million personnel added to local area security forces, and reduction of monetary, food, and manpower taxes taken from villages by the VCI.<sup>88</sup> Additional GVN improvements like the Land to Tiller Act, which put land under the ownership of those who farmed it, led to at least 93 percent<sup>89</sup> of South Vietnam being considered “pacified” by the end of 1970.<sup>90</sup> More importantly, improvements under the APC demonstrated GVN competence and VC/VCI inability to foster FSS-fulfillment. This competence directly attacked the problem of population ambivalence regarding which socially controlling element South Vietnamese nationals preferred and supported.

However effective CORDS, and the programs it oversaw, were under the APC, the gains were short-lived. The destruction of the VCI and resulting pacification panicked the North Vietnamese into launching the 1972 Easter Offensive. While the Army of the

Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was successful, in part due to the help of U.S. advisors and airpower, it became obvious that rampant corruption in the GVN and ARVN hierarchy were undoing all the competence the programs under CORDS could demonstrate.<sup>91</sup> Additionally, the U.S. trained and equipped an army that was not correctly developed to meet the hybrid internal and external threats posed by the VC and North Vietnam, as both the Pentagon and the GVN expected continued U.S. support after the completion of Vietnamization. This problem was exacerbated by the GVN's inability to maintain such an expensive and highly technical military without external aid.<sup>92</sup>

CORDS itself didn't really add any new programs other than Phoenix and "Open Arms," but it did provide the near-simultaneity between lethal and non-lethal actions that multiplied the effects of existing efforts and operations. In terms of effecting South Vietnamese social control, CORDS leveraged the following essentials of *social control*:

CORDS attempted to leverage RVN Rule Makers by placing governance advisors down to the provincial level.<sup>93</sup> This structure allowed for close collaboration between U.S. governance advisors and provincial chiefs, as well as synchronization between U.S. governance and military advisors within a respective area. At the national level, the Land to Tiller Act, overall increased security and other improvements led to increased GVN influence and credibility with the rural population.<sup>94</sup> However, other reform opportunities were not undertaken that could have further eroded the Communists' political agenda.<sup>95</sup> This, paired with the continued corruption of those who were supposed to make and enforce rules within South Vietnamese society served to undermine the social fabric itself,<sup>96</sup> eventually undoing all CORDS-related gains, spanning the RVN government to regional leadership and from the ARVN to the RF/PF. At the time that the North

Vietnamese invaded in 1975, this decay meant that the military operation was simply a fait accompli. In the end, no effort by stability operators could overcome the fact that those who were supposed to make the rules were among the most frequent violators of those rules.

In other situations where corruption leads to the illegitimacy of a ruling group, a traditional authority will usually emerge to reestablish some form of order. This did occur in many areas of Vietnam, as other forms of control (religious or family) were typically targeted by the VCI and replaced with communist personnel<sup>97</sup> in their efforts to eliminate competition.

To affect the capability of Rule Teachers, USAID undertook the increase of school construction in the Vietnamese countryside during previous pacification operations. With the advent of CORDS, this was done in conjunction with security operations as well, enabling better protection for Rule Teachers. Additionally, the interconnectedness of CORDS saw improvements in education curriculum in addition to an increase in the volume of schools.<sup>98</sup>

Official GVN courts, or Rule Interpreters and Adjudicators, received mixed reviews. Transparently, the GVN established special laws called An Tri that protected against false accusations and arrests.<sup>99</sup> Conversely, in some instances the legal system proved unable to process the volume of arrests made under the Phoenix program, demonstrating ineptness on the part of the GVN in their failure to offer speedy trials and adjudicate wrongful and just arrests. Those who remained in jail without trial for long periods were easily poached by the Viet Cong,<sup>100</sup> who promised better fulfillment of individual basic needs. Additionally, when the system did adjudicate an arrest, convicted



VCI were out in no more than six years, and sometimes as little as two.<sup>101</sup> Regardless, this ability to target VC/VCI suspects, detain, and subsequently process them under an established rule of law was better for the pacification effort than the large-scale sweeps conducted by regular military units that tended to alienate the population.<sup>102</sup>

CORDS sought to affect Rule Enforcement as much as any other area. The South Vietnamese security apparatus was increased at the local, provincial, and national levels.<sup>103</sup> As noted above, this dramatic increase in resources, manpower, and instruction from U.S. advisors had significant effect until 1972, when the effects of Vietnamization and continued ARVN corruption eroded the security system from within.

The other FSS-fostering measures incorporated under CORDS, and their corresponding effects, are listed in figure 12.

| Need   | Issue preventing fulfillment  | How did CORDS address the void?  | 2nd and 3rd order effects on fulfillment   | RVN corruption consequences  |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| <b>Metabolism</b>                                    | Lack of central government control interdicts information flow; agrobusiness remains largely unchanged from centuries prior. VCI taxes crop yields to feed VC.  | CORDS coordinates USG efforts to improve food production: introducing large-yield rice varieties, improved agro-techniques, fish ponds. GVN implements Land to the Tiller Act; more farmers now own their farms. Farmer credit made available.   | Agro output increases with pride and incentive from ownership. New technologies injected into S. Vietnamese agrobusiness. Fertilizers and pesticides made available. Food takes from VCI decrease as GVN expands protection into rural areas and eliminates insurgent grip.  | Agro-sector cannot compensate for effects of Dutch Disease during Vietnamization. Long term: Industrialized agro-sector victimized by 1975 loss and subsequent collectivization.   |
| <b>Safety</b>  | Intimidation used to coerce local populations away from the GVN and into the sphere of VC/VCI influence. Threats keep population fearing the "next phase of attacks".   | US/GVN embarks on the APC, capitalizing on the weakened VC/VCI and populations who were brutalized during Tet. RF/PF force improvements and increased GVN force presence means better safety for locals.   | "Secure" hamlets seized during Tet back under GVN control. By 1970, over 1,000 contested hamlets secured; 93% of RVN considered "pacified". RF/PF increase by 50% from '66-'71. Nat'l Police increase by 66% from '67-'71.   | National Police Force undefunded, undertrained, understaff, and corrupt. ARVN is only credible security force.   |
| <b>Thermoregulation</b>                              | Significant displacement of population in Tet-affected areas.   | APC focuses on resettlement of refugees. USAID continues aid for IDPs.   | Refugees resettled. Increased security of villages protects infrastructure. Corruption in ARVN hierarchy marginalized "peasant" troops.  | No gov't housing for ARVN families effects desertions; soldiers worry about families safety during times of crisis.  |
| <b>Medical Care</b>                                  | Effects of Tet restricts access to clinics and care.  | APC (USAID) revitalizes improvements in rural medical treatment / development.   | USAID-led improvements in rural care. GVN fails to provide preventative health care to troops.   | Long term: as GVN loses war in 1975, social fabric unravels.   |
| <b>Freedom of Mobility, Choice, and Access</b>       | Civilians conscripted to serve as fighters, porters, and laborers.  | Peoples Self-Defense Corps reduces draft deferments & extends terms of mil. service.   | Decreased amount of recruiting by VC as GVN control expands into rural regions.  | GVN cronyism creates a closed & incompetent caste system.  |
| <b>Social Participation</b>                          | VC checkpoints interdict urban area movement during Tet. Teachers in "secure hamlets" targeted by VC. Many stay in homes fearing neighbors' leanings towards the VC/VCI; this cuts many off from any information.   | APC provides emphasis on information coordination between GVN and population. Damaged road and electric networks repaired and expanded. USAID continues efforts in improving education infrastructure; works with GVN in curriculum modernization.   | Road networks repaired and expanded. School enrollment increases. Curriculum modernized. Teachers made available to rural areas in need. Implementation of new curriculum and new school construction managed by USAID. Improved information and media dissemination from Saigon to population.  | Opportunity to legitimize GVN education minister lost. Phoenix quota system for neutralized VCI, set by GVN, drives some provincial and district chiefs to make indiscriminate arrests.  |
| <b>Adaptation</b>                                    |   |  |  |  |
| <b>Economic System of Needs-satisfier production</b> | GVN officials and security forces targeted by VC during Tet; many fail to return to work and hide. Interdicted infrastructure effects transport of goods. Many residents of "secure hamlets" stay home instead of returning to work for fear of VC. VCI tax newly seized areas for food, money, manpower. | APC focuses on measures designed to revitalize the economy; and programs under it inject money into the development sector. Elimination of VC/VCI threat increases economic possibilities due to lack of security threat.  | Reduced VCI presence = reduced taxes on populations. RF/PF increase 50% from 1966-71. Nat'l Police increase 66% from 1967-71. Huge U.S. force presence and development aid creates unsustainable "bubble cycles" in the Econ. System. These have the effect of "Dutch Disease"; lure of money draws those in less lucrative professions away from other cycles of the Econ. System, decreasing their vitality. | S. Vietnamese economy unable to recover from bubble burst of Vietnamization when U.S. force presence and \$ leaves the Econ. System. Vital cycles in the Econ. System cannot absorb influx of newly unemployed labor. GVN corruption and GDP cannot sustain size of security forces. |
| <b>Social Control</b>                                | Actions during Tet are focused on destroying GVN ability to govern the populace in cities and surrounding areas. VC/VCI live among population, enabling them to separate the people from GVN control. GVN ID cards destroyed. RF/PF forces sustain losses.  | "New Life Development". APC improves RF/PFs, reforms local gov't, and implements "Open Arms". GVN institutes General Mobilization Law; all men 18-38 are eligible for military. Peoples Self-Defense Corps reduces draft deferments & extends terms of service. Phoenix targets VCI. GVN conducts local gov't elections. | General Mobilization Law gives priority of recruitment to ARVN - at expense of Nat'l Police. CORDS / Phoenix leveraged RF/PF, Nat'l Police, PSDF, and PRU, in addition to regular U.S. forces, adding to GVN legitimacy and minimizing collateral damage in villages. By 1970, APC secured 1,000 contested hamlets; 93% of S. Vietnam considered "pacified".   | GVN failed to address primary grievances of insurgency; maintaining a perception of illegitimacy. Police corruption compromises pacification gains. Courts fail to speedily adjudicate trials. GVN forces never wear off U.S. firepower.   |

Figure 12. FSS-Fulfillment in Vietnam under CORDS

Source: Developed by author with information from Dale Andrade and LtCol James H. Willbanks, U.S. Army (Ret), Ph.D., "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future," *Military Review* (March-April, 2006): 15-17, 20-22; Matthew D. Pinard, "The American and South Vietnamese Pacification Efforts During the Vietnam War" (Master's thesis, Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 2002), 58-61, 113; Victoria Pohle, "The Viet Cong in Saigon: Tactics and Objectives During the Tet Offensive" (Monograph, Rand, January 1969), 21-25, 32; Angela Rabasa, Lesley Anne Warner, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko, and Paraag Shulka, "Money In the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations" (Monograph, Rand, 2007), 31, 34-37; Major Gordon M. Wells, U.S. Army, "No More Vietnams: CORDS as a Model for Counterinsurgency Campaign Design" (Monograph, U.S. Army School for Advanced Military Studies, 1991), 21-23.

Interestingly, as the GVN were trying to exude a perception of FSS-fostering competence, so was the VC/VCI.<sup>104</sup> Prior to the 1968 Tet Offensive, the VCI exerted influence in lieu of the GVN by building schools and free clinics, implementing land reform, lowering taxes, and securing the local population against non-political crime. In

combating the GVN's efforts to extend their reach,<sup>105</sup> and during the Tet Offensive, the VC/VCI showed restraint in many areas by using selective intimidation methods designed to coerce those who needed it without alienating the rest of the population.<sup>106</sup> This restraint shows an appreciation for a population's "tipping point" where brutality in rule enforcement and the exertion of control can push a population away from one group and into their enemy's sphere of influence. In a further attempt to win legitimacy, the VC/VCI even held elections in some of their newly "liberated" areas.<sup>107</sup>

A detrimental effect of such a mammoth and long U.S. presence in South Vietnam was how it affected the native Economic System of Needs-Satisfier Production. By 1970, the large amount of U.S. defense-related spending<sup>†††</sup> amounted to close to 30 percent of South Vietnam's GDP (adjusted).<sup>108</sup> This huge volume of demand caused by aid-related construction and individual spending caused the creation of a new cycle in the Economic System, with spinoff industries and related employment as well. However, this lucrative new cycle in the economic system was an artificiality, as it was only related to the Security cycle in the Economic System, and was not sustainable after the departure of U.S. personnel and aid. This was a result of the lure of defense-related spending profits; instead of entrepreneurial Vietnamese nationals staking their efforts in a more sustainable (and potentially less lucrative) sector like the Commissariat, masses of labor and merchants were drawn into the Security-related Economic Cycle. This stunted growth in other Cycles and created a large bubble of taxable labor that could not be absorbed into other areas of the Economic System after America's departure from Vietnam.

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<sup>†††</sup>On pg. 310, Hoan explains "defense-related spending" as money injected from individual U.S. military, U.S. civil, and contracted personnel spending, purchases of services from Vietnamese nationals, and purchases of local goods.

## Somalia

Somalia provides insight into how traditional structures morph to fill the void of social control left by the state after it collapses, or when it is weak or ineffective. Interestingly, Somalia is frequently referred to as a “lawless” state. In fact, it enjoys law and enforcement at both the clan and warlord level. Unfortunately, both have legitimacy issues and neither is powerful enough to consolidate control. Regardless, Somali society has still adapted to ensure basic needs fulfillment within this construct, to the point where Somalia is now a major trade force in the region.<sup>109</sup>

This study focuses on the actions of clan-based society in South-Central Somalia between 1995 and 2006, illuminating how a “stateless” society<sup>†††</sup> leveraged traditional social control structures to ensure FSS fulfillment. This portion of the study is analogous to the situation in Afghanistan, as both countries are largely agrarian, pastoral, and rural, with layers of social control that exist through tribes/clans, warlords, a weak central government, and Islamic fundamentalism. Interestingly, many academics with human rights perspectives talk despairingly about the situation in Somalia, while those that focus on stateless economics have a more favorable outlook.

After the departure of U.S. and U.N. forces in 1994, warlord infighting continued in Somalia until the death of Mohammed Farah Aidid in 1996, the subsequent ousting of his tribe from Mogidishu, and their final defeat in 1999.<sup>110</sup> However, as no one group was able to eliminate opposition and consolidate power, the situation in the southern and central part of the country quickly congealed to expose the ever-present clan-based social

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<sup>†††</sup>This study excludes the study of Puntland and Somaliland, as they established state-like regimes after the Somali Civil War.

control network of rules, known as the “Xeer.” This baseline of order existed through the colonial rule of the Italians, Said Barre’s regime in the 1980s and ‘90s, and the chaos of the Somali civil war.<sup>111</sup> Somali social structure was able to establish order amid this chaos because it was possessed the Essential Elements and Enablers of Social Control.

The Rule Makers of Somali society are the “Oday.” These clan elders primarily exist to ensure needs-satisfying resources for all. They do this by simultaneously acting as legislator (known as the “Diya),”<sup>112</sup> judge, and executor in the application of the Xeer. However, a perception of corruption surrounds the Oday as a whole, as many were corrupted first by the Colonials, followed by the Barre regime, and finally by private financiers after the end of the civil war.<sup>113</sup> In effect, this perceived corruption limits the overall reach of the Oday, allowing other groups (private business, warlords, and radical Islam) to influence society.

In addition to the Rule Interpretation and Adjudication powers resident within the Oday, Islamic Shari’a courts served as a more formal and legitimate layer of law. The layers of law were able to coexist as the Xeer was focused more on dispute resolution between groups, while Koranic law dealt more with issues between individuals.<sup>114</sup> This relationship had a favorable effect on the conduct of business in the region,<sup>115</sup> as it established a recognized method of contract enforcement that facilitated internal and external trade.<sup>116</sup> In addition to Shari’a, some urban centers even have courts funded by private businessmen to speed the adjudication of disputes.<sup>117</sup>

Rule Teaching focused on non-traditional education of the Xeer at the expense of formal education skills valued in western education. As a result of the lack of a central

government, formal education and associated socialization declined steadily with the overall literacy rate.

Rule Enforcement in the Xeer is accomplished through the Oday leveraging leaders of a particular “Mag,” or clan cohort, to police itself in accordance with the rules set forth. The Mag is responsible to abide by rulings and uses its collective resources to compensate victims as required by legal rulings. Belonging to a group is essentially an insurance policy, as one may not be able to pay a victim themselves and thus need others’ resources to help. The deterrent in the system is that an individual does not want to be on the wrong side of the Xeer, for if they frequently are, the Mag will soon tire of paying for their transgressions with their personal resources and will force the individual out; leaving them without any protections and benefits of Mag membership.<sup>118</sup>

Many clans also maintained militias that serve to protect clan members within their designated territories. Rules were also enforced by private sector militias, many of which worked for particular warlords and were later hired in 1999 through Islamic charities to enforce Sharia rulings in Mogadishu.<sup>119</sup> Figure 13 details how Somali society went about fulfilling the FSS after the end of the civil war, and the consequences of these methods.

| Need   | Issue preventing fulfillment  | How did Somali society fix the void?   | 2nd and 3rd order effects on fulfillment  | Oday corruption consequences  |
|--|---|--|---|---|
| <b>Metabolism</b>                                    | Food used as a weapon during Somali civil war. Droughts & return of IDPs in early '90s further effects food supply. Lack of social control disrupts agrobusiness. Oday and warlords control most water. | Remittance-funded and/or clan-based social insurance helps families meet gaps in needs-fulfillment. Islamic charities are able to compensate for the lack of social welfare systems. Reemergence of the Xeer fosters resource cooperation in the pastoral industry. Private sector fills void of central government in managing utilities.                         | Large increase in access to improved sanitation. Increase in overall access through private sector management. Good rains increases overall food security. Large volumes of food aid continue to fill gaps in needs-fulfillment.  | Increased clan corruption restricts farmers' ability to harvest their crops causing instability in food markets. Increased violence effects aid workers and their ability to distribute food aid.   |
| <b>Safety</b>  | Somalis civil war leaves civilians vulnerable as warlords compete for power.  | Xeer outlaws physical harm and emerges as the dispute resolution mechanism for Somalis. Fear of being excluded from a Mag group is primary deterrent of violence.  | Life expectancy increases by five years after fall of Barre gov't. Those who don't belong to the Mag, or only belong to a minority clan experience marginalization.   | As Oday loses legitimacy and Xeer system begins to lose control, instances unresolved of attacks rises.   |
| <b>Thermoregulation</b>                              | Looters in urban areas strip structures bare of resources.  | Xeer prohibits looting & protects property. Sharia provides additional layer of order.   | N/A   | Weakened Xeer-based control causes property insecurity.   |
| <b>Medical Care</b>                                  | Unrest causes 70% decrease in hospitals by 1995. Warlords restrict access to clinics.   | Clan systems ensure children, women, and elderly (in major clans) are given care. 80% of medical care occurs in private sector.  | Those not in major clans must pay for affiliation, allowing access to care. NGO medical interventions largely ineffective due to clans.   | Lack of trained medical specialists limit the quality and effectiveness of care.  |
| <b>Freedom of Mobility, Choice, and Access</b>       | Civil war disrupts all aspects of society, including trade and education, making quality of life improvement next to impossible.  | Reemergence of kinship system under the Xeer stabilizes Somalia for those who belong to clans and/or Mags.   | Patron-client relationship emerges where people at the bottom of society are dependent on membership and/or payments to a clan in order to achieve mobility.  | Reemergence of corruption in the clan-system restricts overall freedoms. Increase in displacement of weak groups.   |
| <b>Social Participation</b>                          | Somali state under Barre attempted to eradicate "clanism", undermining traditional interaction.   | Clan-based society fills void left by central gov't. Large spike in number of media outlets. Clan-based education instituted. Internet and telecommunications industry (free of Barre gov't) rapidly expands. Islamic organizations provide social services.   | Powerful clans and Mags fare well under kinship system. Minority clans and groups are vulnerable to abuse and/or corruption; must pay larger clans for protection and access. Education is non-"traditional"; focuses on Xeer. 7% enrolled in primary, secondary, or tertiary school.   | Literacy rate is one of the worst in Africa - 24% in 2000.  |
| <b>Adaptation</b>                                    |   |  |   |   |
| <b>Economic System of Needs-satisfier production</b> | Barre gov't stifled economic growth. Insecurity during civil war turned economy into one based on looting, rather than trade and compensation. Lack of infrastructure beyond urban areas.               | Lack of central gov't control turns Somalia into a "duty-free" zone. Reemergence of Xeer reestablishes trade based on compensation. Big business thrives and pays-off warlords, clans, and other threats. Informal money lenders emerge. Somalis keep existing currency. Expansion in communications, media, airline, service, and light manufacturing industries. | Corporations reinvest in Somalia (Coke, Sprint, etc.). Emerging private industries (education, health care, water, electric) require specialists; most Somalis lacking appropriate education. Average Somalis live in poverty. Lack of central gov't effects quality standards in livestock business, limiting int'l trade. Clan leadership stifles development. Lack of gov't involvement keep currency relatively stable. Private sector emerges as most powerful element in Somalia. | Lack of centrally established and internationally recognized standards in livestock quality, education, etc. put limits on expansion of the economy. Oday loss of credibility and control of Mag groups breaks down the Xeer system, allowing banditry to go unchecked. |
| <b>Social Control</b>                                | Central gov't dissolves; warlords begin fighting for control of vital revenue-generating areas.   | Kinship-based governance, through the Xeer, reemerges as central controlling aspect in Somalia.  | Kinship-based system not stable enough to dislodge militias. Oday eventually corrupted by warlords and private business; leads to loss of legitimacy and breakdown of the Xeer. Oday begins to lose control of the Mag at the expense of FSS fulfillment.   | Lack of legitimacy in Oday opens door for the UIC, who is legitimized through religious credibility and ability to establish order that does not marginalize by clan.   |

Figure 13. FSS-Fulfillment in Somalia under the Clans

Source: Developed by the author with information from Joakim Gundel and Ahmed A. Omar Dharbaxo, "The Predicament of the 'Oday': The Role of Traditional Structures in Security, Rights, Law, and Development in Somalia" (monograph, Danish Refugee Council, November 2006), 6, 27-8; Ryan Ford, Benjamin Powell, and Alex Nowrasteh, "Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos or Improvement?," *The Independent Institute*, Working Paper no. 64 (November 30, 2006): 19, 21; Peter T. Leeson, "Better Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Collapse" (Monograph, University of West Virginia, 2003), 21, 25; David Leonard, "Recreating Political Order: The Somali Systems Today," *Institute of Development Studies Working Paper* 2009, no. 316 (February, 2009): 2, 18; Bjorn Moller, "The Somali Conflict: The Role of External Actors," *Danish Institute for International Studies Report* no. 3 (2009): 13; Shaul Shay, *Somalia Between Jihad and Restoration* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 73, 77, 79.

As we know now, Somalia is again embroiled in a situation where numerous powers continue to compete for control. This occurred as a result of the corruption of the Oday and a subsequent delegitimization of the clan system and the Xeer. An additional factor in the undermining of the traditional stability mechanism was the changing

economic dynamics. In this case, the economic system formerly dominated by the Commissariat (pastoral), gave way to an influx from the telecommunications, media,<sup>120</sup> light manufacturing, and service industries.<sup>121</sup> This changed the social fabric of the Mag groups, causing a rift between Mag membership and their leaders and eventually reinforcing the loss of confidence in the rulings of the Oday.<sup>122</sup>

### Hamas

The study of Hamas provides a view of how a subversive organization can usurp power and consolidate its new authority by focusing on the Fundamentals of Social Stability. Hamas' stability operation after their success in the 2006 Palestinian elections somewhat parallels the other operations listed in this study. However, the intervening forces mentioned in the other examples either forcibly entered the unstable area, were invited in by the existing government, or existed under a state regime and emerged from state collapse to fill the power vacuum. In Hamas' case, they subverted from within.

Hamas traces the roots of their social programs back to the Muslim Brotherhood and the works of Sayyid Qutb.<sup>123</sup> This established a basis of providing resources to allow disadvantaged Palestinians to fulfill their basic needs. This organizational bedrock, paired with a military wing dedicated to the destruction of Israel, would serve Hamas well in gaining support over the last two decades of the 20th Century.

In the first decade of this century, Hamas moved away from their anti-Israeli rhetoric to one focused on the reunification of Palestine.<sup>124</sup> Additionally, this "softened" platform, developed in preparation for the 2006 elections, focused the outward image of the organization on their social work, rather than their attacks against Israel.<sup>125</sup>



Hamas rose to power by first addressing PDIs related to gaps in individual needs fulfillment. These efforts were largely conducted by the Da'wa in providing resources that allowed for the procurement of food, heating resources, materials to repair homes, and municipal projects to bring clean water and sewage removal to urban areas. Hamas' military wing addressed PDIs related to safety, as Israeli retribution strikes harmed many citizens in Gaza. By striking back, Hamas achieved legitimacy in the eyes of many Palestinians and the Arabs, even though their military actions can be argued as counter-productive. The Da'wa also addressed SDIs by building, staffing, and running schools in areas where existing institutions were over-crowded, or none existed at all. Hamas' campaign against the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was aimed at addressing TDIs related to the desire to control Gaza and overthrow a corrupt government. Their subsequent defeat of Fatah in Gaza led to Hamas finding itself in a unique position: a Sunni fundamentalist organization in charge of territory in the Middle East.<sup>126</sup> Fortunately, the Da'wa, Hamas's social wing, was already well familiar with providing for needs of the populace. Furthermore, their coffers were well stocked with donations gained through increased legitimacy throughout the Middle East.<sup>127</sup> This multi-tiered approach to address the FSS and Drivers of Instability won Hamas control of Gaza, even in the face of international sanctions and a subsequent Israeli invasion in 2009. These efforts are detailed in figure 14.

| Need   | Issue preventing fulfillment  | How did intervening forces fix the void?  | 2nd and 3rd order effects on fulfillment  | Issues after Cast Lead   | Additional fixes   |
|--|---|---|---|--|--|
| <b>Metabolism</b>                                    | Destruction of agricultural areas, loss of fishing area, and restricted access of goods leads to loss of livelihoods and price inflation. | Welfare system established by the Dawa to help those in need.   | After PNA funds are frozen by Western powers in 2006, only Hamas can provide for the basic needs of Palestinians. Due to Hamas' status as a terrorist organization in the eyes of the West, Israel instituted a blockade of Gaza.     | Black market and smuggling economy emerged to bring goods past the blockade from Egypt. Agribusiness shuts down during Cast Lead; farms sustain damage from fighting.                                      | Smuggling economy brings goods from Egypt, taxes to gov't. Hamas helps clear farms; distributes \$65 million in aid.               |
| <b>Safety</b>  | Israeli occupation and continued struggle for land uprooted and killed many Palestinians.   | Struggle vs. Israelis establishes Hamas as only effective force in Gaza. Hamas improves existing security forces after seizing power. Hamas clerics give religious permission to MAMs for suicide missions. Pensions provided to families of "martyrs". | Young men are more willing to join and die for the cause, knowing their families will be taken care of in their absence. MAMs more willing to die for the cause, believing they have religious approval.                              | Nearly one out of every 225 Gaza residents are killed or wounded. Schools, mosques, and clinics targeted during Cast Lead. Displacement and lack of shelter effects mental safety; especially in children. | Gov't police return to patrolling after cease-fire. Hamas' Al Qassam Brigade conduct internal inquiry to improve tactics.          |
| <b>Thermoregulation</b>                              | Israeli actions in the <i>second intifada</i> destroyed approx. 2,500 houses in Gaza. Power plant attacked.                               | Relief and shelter provided to refugees and orphans.  | No Change   | Shelters attacked during Cast Lead. 70% of population displaced. Reconstruction hindered by blockade.  | Homeless moved to homes vacated by Fatah, or are found vacant apartments.  |
| <b>Medical Care</b>                                  | Lack of volume of care and supplies   | Clinics built and stocked in Gaza. Medical capacity ensured by Da'wa.   | No Change   | Clinics and medical workers targeted. Instances of denied access to care by Israelis.  | Aid cannot completely fill gap in medical supplies.  |
| <b>Freedom of Mobility, Choice, and Access</b>       | Israeli checkpoints limit movement in Gaza & from Gaza to Israel. Number of work permits reduced.   | Hamas contributed to this void, through human rights violations and restricted freedom of expression against Fatah.   | No Change   | Majority of businesses shut down due to blockade. Best opportunities lie in smuggling & aid-related employment.  | Rubbed roads cleared. Borders still closed.  |
| <b>Social Participation</b>                          | Living under austere conditions. Many areas lack resources for permanent schools and public meeting places.                               | Establishment of Islamic Center, controlling education and religious activity in Gaza, as well as womens institutions, child care, sports clubs,  | Created a sense of community for Palestinians. Favorable opinion of Hamas led to funding, recruits, and votes. New generations, raised on Hamas-run TV, schools, and social activities, see Hamas as the core of Palestinian society. | Schools & mosques targeted. Burden-reducing efforts on decreased livelihoods: children taken out of school to work; others married-off early to decrease amount of mouths to feed in a family.             | Schools used as shelters cleared, classes resumed.   |
| <b>Adaptation</b>                                    |   |   |   |  |  |
| <b>Economic System of Needs-satisfier production</b> | Destruction of agricultural areas in the "Buffer Zone", restricted fishing access. Restricted movement and access of goods.               | Hamas' Dawa mitigates starvation through handouts. After securing power in Gaza, Hamas begins tax collection and efforts undertaken to improve security forces.   | Blockade restricts access of resources required for the FSS. Gaza has no port or airport; economy depends on access to Israel & Egypt. Smuggling operations begin from Egypt.   | Commissariat broke down due to poor access and farm damage. Prices spiked. Infrastructure damaged.   | Hamas helps farmers clear land. Establish relations with Egypt to allow flow of critical resources?                                |
| <b>Social Control</b>                                | Social control vasclitates between occupying Israeli forces and PNA; Israelis are seen as the enemy, the PNA as corrupt and illegitimate. | Control of Gaza borders established after defeat of PNA. Existing forms of governance assumed; rather than implementing Sharia law.   | Abuses during infighting between Hamas and PNA go unreported. Key personnel in law system replaced with those who are pro Hamas. Hamas' control of Gaza led to an embargo of the area, and subsequent Israeli invasion in 2008-9.     | Hamas now struggles to contain destabilizing groups, like tribes, gangs, and Al Qaeda. Public opinion of Hamas damaged by Cast Lead performance and inability to open borders.                             | Internal crackdowns against dissenters force public opinion largely underground. Smuggling tunnel traffic regulated by Gaza gov't. |

Figure 14. FSS-Fulfillment in Gaza under Hamas

Source: Developed by the author with information from Suzanne Jaspars, Susan O'Callaghan, and Sara Pavanello, *Losing Ground: Protection and Livelihoods in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper (London: Overseas Development Institute, July 2009), 34, 38-42; Congressional Research Service, "Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008-2009)," *CRS Report to Congress* (19 February 2009): 13-15; Michael Keene, "Social Justice Initiatives As A Legitimizing Force As Seen In Hamas And Hezbollah," *Rivier Academic Journal* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 3; Colonel Ben-Zion Mehr, IDF, *Hamas—How has a Terrorist Organization Become a Political Power?* (Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 2008): 14, 17-18, 22-23.

Critical to Hamas' seizure of power was their leverage of the Essential Enabler of Social Control, "Information Management and Legitimacy," whether through armed struggle against Israel and Fatah, discrediting the PNA as corrupt and illegitimate,<sup>128</sup> or

social work conducted by the Da'wa.<sup>129</sup> Hamas also used information operations to attract new generations of followers, through the internet and television.<sup>130</sup>

In Gaza, after the defeat of the PNA, Hamas emerged as the primary Rule Makers of the region. Due to their social work through the Da'wa, political victory in 2006, subsequent vilification and defeat of the PNA, and their prowess in fighting Israel, the Palestinian people viewed Hamas as legitimate. Additionally, many clerics (the same who sanctioned terrorist/martyr attacks against Israel) legitimized Hamas with their approval.

Rule Teaching was already firmly in place in Gaza at three levels. The first was at the home, through informal interactions with parents and through watching Hamas run television. The second occurred at schools run by the Da'wa, where social participation taught acceptable behaviors. The third was through Islam itself, where Hamas professed a support for Sharia Law. Because Hamas advocated Sharia Law, the Islamic clergy served as the Rule Interpreters and Adjudicators. However, figure 14 also depicts the difficulties for Hamas as they try to govern Gaza.

After the consolidation of power following the 2006 elections, Hamas and Gaza were physically isolated from the rest of the world (with the exception of those smugglers who are able to evade the Israeli Navy and checkpoints or follow a tunnel across the Egyptian border). This affected the flow of resources and created huge challenges for Hamas as they tried to provide for the needs of the population. The embargo of Gaza restricted vast amounts of resource movement, leaving smugglers and aid workers unable to completely fill the void.

Part of the problem is the way in which Hamas established control. The fallout of the 2006-07 putsch against the PNA was a limit of Gazan rights and freedoms, as Hamas systematically eliminated opposition. However, this attempt at establishing social control only succeeded in restricting the freedoms and mobility of average inhabitants, as various fringe groups (including Al Qaeda), tribes, and warlords all continued to erode Hamas' grip.<sup>131</sup> Shorthanded by geography, Gaza also has no port or airport,<sup>132</sup> requiring all critical resources to come from Israel or Egypt. These issues exist to this day. The poor relations with external neighbors and internal strife listed above had dire consequences on Group Fulfillment Adaptations within Gaza.

The blockade of Gaza caused a major upheaval in Gaza's economic system of needs-satisfier production. Previously, Gaza enjoyed trade between Israel, Egypt, and Europe. Farmers grew and sent seasonal cash crops to Europe and were dependent on the large profit yields to make ends meet.<sup>133</sup> However, when these outlets were no longer accessible, farmers lost the specialty crops they produced in 2008-09, as the same demand did not exist inside of Gaza. In this case, the crops grown in the agricultural sector prior to the blockade reflected the demand inside and out of Gaza. When the blockade denied use of established trade conduits leading out of Gaza, the economic system's nature changed from international to solely internal to Gaza. Farmers were caught one growing season behind, as their plantings reflected the economic demand of the pre-blockade system, causing economic catastrophe for many, and forcing them into the typical in-extremis habits of those desperate to meet individual basic needs. Such measures include selling livestock for food-procuring cash (and driving down the price of livestock in the process).<sup>134</sup>

The issues that ensued since the embargo of Gaza and the Israeli's Operation Cast Lead in 2008-9 (and still exist) serve to weaken the support Hamas built over the past decade through their ability to fill gaps needs fulfillment. Not only are they failing in ensuring the FSS in Gaza, but in many cases, organizations of the international development community are the only ones who can bring in the supplies necessary to fix some of these immediate issues.<sup>135</sup> This further degrades the prestige and support Hamas rose to power through, as they are not able to project the same aura of FSS-fostering competence.

“Shocks” to the Gaza economic system also caused the rise of new cycles. The first, “Smuggling,” the ability to transport in-demand resources past the blockade, created a new occupation niche in Gaza. The second, “Aid,” reflects the necessity aid fills in the Gazan economic system, as the majority of the population now depends on some amount of handout for survival.<sup>136</sup> These are depicted in figures 15 and 16.




Figure 15. Uniqueness of the Gaza Economic System

Source: Major Harding’s U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Master’s Thesis at: [cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?...2589](http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?...2589)




Figure 16. Gaza Smuggling and Aid Cycles in the Economic System

Source: Major Harding’s U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Master’s Thesis at: [cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?...2589](http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?...2589)

These two emergency-response cycles, which do not occupy the same stature in a stable society’s economic system, still interact with more typical and critical cycles of Security and Education and Training inside an environment of rules laid forth by a social controlling element.

Smugglers follow internally established *rules*, as well as guidelines of compensation that exist within a black market atmosphere. They typically abide by the bribing policies of officials who “turn a blind eye” to their activities. Aid workers also follow rules, although theirs are typically viewed as more legitimate. Additionally, they have many more layers of rules to follow. Internally, they set mandates and parameters

that guide the focus of their interventions. In order to implement these plans, they must conform with, or treat with subtlety, the rules of the area they are intervening in. If not, they risk being thrown out of the area and becoming unable to effect the situation at all. Aid organizations must also follow informal rules set by their donors, as they may lose financial support if they engage in activities their donors don't agree with.

Both aid workers and smugglers need Security in order to conduct business. In situations where social control breaks down, smugglers need the ability to protect themselves and their livelihoods, whether through lethal action, or bribes. Aid workers need access for their personnel and supplies in order to conduct their work. Additionally, they need recognition of their neutral status by belligerents and other groups.

Without some combination of informal and formal Education and Training, smugglers and aid workers will be largely ineffective. Smugglers learn techniques for gathering information that enables evasion of authorities and other groups that seek to interdict their activities. There is also a business management aspect to smuggling and operating within the black market that enables one to understand appropriate and feasible rates for compensation and bribery. Without this, a smuggler's business fails the same as a legitimate businessman, with more harmful consequences. Aid workers also learn techniques for information gathering and analysis that enable them to appropriately target vulnerable areas. This is enhanced by formal education (sustainable development, international relations, economics, etc.), experience, and networking.

The existence of a large and lucrative smuggling cycle presents a catch-22 for Hamas. In order to ensure the availability of needs-satisfying resources, Hamas must allow the unchecked and unregulated smuggling of goods until the Israeli embargo is

lifted. However, because smuggled goods are such a valued commodity, a large and wealthy smuggler class has emerged as a new power broker in Gaza. This rising cohort not only gathers large profits, but also competes for control and expanded influence, at the expense of existing social control institutions like tribal leadership.<sup>137</sup> Herein lies the dilemma: Hamas needs smuggling to continue or the ensuing lack of needs-satisfying resources will demonstrate their ineptness at fostering an environment of FSS-fulfillment. If they allow smuggling to continue, they will soon be confronted with a new and powerful (militarily and monetarily) smuggling cohort that seeks to compete for power and influence.

#### International Aid Response in Gaza

Analyzing the international development community in Gaza in the wake of Operation Cast Lead in 2009 provides a different perspective on how a non-state, unarmed community focuses on the fulfillment of individual basic needs. International organizations are no stranger to the various areas inhabited by Palestinians. Some, like the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine, have worked with Palestinians since 1949.<sup>138</sup> The international aid community increased their presence in Gaza after Operation Cast Lead and addressed PDIs related to food and clean water insecurity, damaged waste removal infrastructure, an overwhelmed medical care apparatus, and the threat of exposure from damaged homes, shelters, and camps.<sup>139</sup> Some aid personnel even found themselves addressing the PDI of safety when they used media (cameras and the ability to post on the internet) to deter Israeli abuse against Gazans.<sup>140</sup> Additionally, other aid agencies addressed SDIs related to social participation.



Since Hamas was considered by most to be a terrorist group who simply won an election, aid organizations had to tread softly in Gaza rather than be viewed as helping Hamas exude a perception of FSS-fostering competence. As aid workers learned during the blockade and Israeli invasion in December 2008, striking a balance between their donors in the West, Hamas, and the Israelis, while providing for the needs of Palestinians is no simple matter. Figure 17 depicts how they attempted to strike this balance.

| Need   | Issue preventing fulfillment   | How did intervening forces fix the void?  | Long-term consequences effecting fulfillment  | Additional fixes   |
|--|--|---|---|--|
| <b>Metabolism (needs 1-4)</b>                        | Blockade of Gaza causes spike in prices, although there are adequate supplies of food. Difficulty in establishing distribution points due to damaged infrastructure, buildings, and lack of operational vehicles.  | UNRWA provided limited assistance to Palestinian refugees (70% of Gaza residents) on top of standard hardship allowances. WFP distributes aid to over 1 million.  | Hamas interdicts / harrases aid distribution; they want to be seen as facilitator (if not distributor) of aid. This brought them to power in 2006. Some aid orgs forced to give names of recipients, with consequences to FSS fulfillment. <i>Providing aid has stigma of helping Hamas and relieving Israel of responsibilities of an occupying power.</i> | Joint protection & livelihood approach targets at risk areas with water and food aid; attempting to stave off displacement.  |
| <b>Safety</b>  | Any area suspected of housing Hamas personnel attacked. Areas of refuge targeted. Displacements of civilians during Cast Lead are common; leads to physical and psychological dangers.   | Int'l aid organizations use modern communications connectivity to monitor and report abuses. Limited effects seen at local and tactical levels. Community-protection committees emerge.   | Presence of cameras and westerners tends to deter violence, if for no other reason than fear of "CNN Effect". Int'l community recognizes ineffectiveness of aid without relative safety of those receiving it.  | Aid orgs recognize effectiveness of joint protection & livelihood approach; establishes links between effected peoples and advocate outlets. "Protection Communities" established. |
| <b>Thermoregulation</b>                              | Damaged houses from the effects of Cast Lead. Restricted access of building supplies. Widespread displacements.  | UNRWA payed damage payments to some homeowners. Aid handouts allow some to rent rooms.  | Continued blockade restriction of building supplies (concrete) hinders reconstruction activities.   | Aid orgs interested in progress are forced to "unwittingly" contract with tradesmen who use smuggled materials.  |
| <b>Medical Care</b>                                  | Access of medical centers during Cast Lead is restricted due to fighting and internal checkpoints established by Israelis.   | Some instances of tactical-level health care interventions by aid workers. Programs started to provide artificial limbs to those in need.   | Israel allows direct delivery of medical aid only. LOCs inside of Gaza damaged, effecting ability to get those in need to care facilities.  | Joint protection & livelihood approach targets at-risk areas with health aid.  |
| <b>Freedom of Mobility, Choice, and Access</b>       | Schools used as shelters. Young girls and sons married off early. Children taken from school to work. Blockade & Cast Lead further limits job prospects.   | Livelihood interventions; vocational training, micro-credit/finance, alternate income-generating strategies.  | Most programs exist on a 12-18 month funding cycle, limiting long-term effectiveness. Overall effectiveness: people still dependent on some aid.  | Joint protection & livelihood approach targets at risk areas with educational services.  |
| <b>Social Participation</b>                          | Fighting and blockade causes displacement and closing of schools and workplaces.   | Aid devoted to helping people cope with effects of exposure to violence through psycho-social activities.   | Damaged Gazan infrastructure and internal checkpoints inhibit people's ability to get to program locations.   | Joint protection & livelihood approach prevents displacement and retains access to lands.  |
| <b>Adaptation</b>                                    |  |   |   |  |
| <b>Economic System of Needs-satisfier production</b> | Commissariat (agriculture, grazing, & fishing) uprooted due to blockade, 2006/8 droughts, and effects of frost and snow. Prices spike. Econ. system now internally-based and augmented by smuggling instead of int'l free trade.   | Emergency job creation schemes enacted (short-term) for cash and/or food. Vocational training and micro-credit programmes offered. WFP distributes vouchers to urban poor and unemployed to offset high prices. Drought responses distribute water, seed, and fodder. | Smuggling and Aid cycles emerge in the Econ. System. Hamas regulates tunnel traffic. Aid recipients sell handouts; some "double dip" from different aid orgs. Aid response does little to address long-term concerns of unemployment and economic decline.  | Aid organizations moving from status-based aid targeting to needs-based targeting. Larger aid orgs recognize effectiveness of intergrating protection and livelihood programs.     |
| <b>Social Control</b>                                | The international aid community did not engage in measures to improve social control, as this conflicted with the already tenuous situation of aid in Gaza possible helping Hamas. Other aid measures had unintended effects on social control, as these efforts deligitimized Hamas by showing their difficulty in ensuring the population could meet its basic needs. This effect is what Israel and the western diplomatic community hoped for with the blockade of Gaza. |   |   |  |

Figure 17. FSS-Fulfillment enabled by the International Aid Community in Gaza  
*Source:* Developed by the Author, with information from Congressional Research Service, "Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008-2009)," *CRS Report to Congress* (19 February 2009): 13-15; International Crisis Group, "Gaza's Unfinished Business," *Middle East Report* no. 85 (23 April 2009): I, 9; Suzanne Jaspars, Susan O'Callaghan, and Sara Pavanella, *Losing Ground: Protection and livelihoods in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper (London: Overseas

Development Institute, July 2009), 38-42, 50.

An enduring lesson is the importance of viewing protection and livelihood courses of action as one in the same, known as the “Joint Protection and Livelihoods Approach.”<sup>141</sup> On the ground, smaller uni-issue organizations in Gaza were not seeing the same results that larger organizations were, due to the deteriorated security situation. These larger multi-issue organizations, like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), CARE, and Oxfam, had many different programs in both the protection and livelihood realms. Because they were all under the visibility of one organization, leaders within these groups could synchronize efforts and ensure these projects were working in a symbiotic manner, rather than in a vacuum or against each other.<sup>142</sup> This near-simultaneity in planning and execution is important as it ensures a unity of effort, especially since most livelihood-related problems are ones that link directly to a lack of security.<sup>143</sup>

The international aid community did not establish themselves as Rule Makers in Gaza after Operation Cast Lead. However, because of the perceptive power associated with reconstruction and its demonstration of FSS-fulfilling competence, the aid community was presented with a quandary: The Hamas government in Gaza insisted that all aid go through them before delivery to those in need. By agreeing to this measure, the international aid community would be “putting a Hamas face” on their aid operations, allowing Hamas to exude a perception of FSS-fostering competence, and indirectly reinforcing Hamas’ role as Rule Makers in Gaza.<sup>144</sup> For those organizations that considered Hamas a terrorist organization, this was a bitter decision: allow Hamas to

leverage aid for their power consolidation, or allow the Gazan people to suffer. In the end, many aid organizations chose to provide aid, even if it helped Hamas.<sup>145</sup>

No aid organizations specifically focused on Rule Teaching, but aid was requested for the repair of over 30 schools, thus fostering subsequent schooling run by Hamas.<sup>146</sup> Additionally, no portion of the aid community focused on the establishment of a rule interpreting or adjudicating body.

Ironically, although international aid agencies tried to remain neutral and unarmed,<sup>§§§</sup> they were able to serve as Rule Enforcers in situations where Israeli forces were violating the rights of Gazans. Aid workers found that the threat of their documenting and reporting abuses and atrocities was sometimes enough to deter the violence before it occurred.<sup>147</sup> Aid workers began to realize that advocacy in the global media could far outrange lethal weapons, and was an effective way they could protect those who were vulnerable.

### The Taliban

The Taliban's rise to power in 1994, defeat in 2001, and subsequent resurgence in 2008-09 provides an example of how an organization fills a power vacuum, and adjusts its methods of social control depending on the strength and weaknesses of its competitors. This evolution is depicted in figure 18.

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<sup>§§§</sup>With the exception of protection elements hired by aid agencies in situations of extreme danger.

| Need   | FSS voids from the Afghan Civil War and how the Taliban fostered FSS-fulfillment   | 2nd and 3rd order effects of Taliban controlled Afghanistan  | FSS-fulfillment issues during competition between IROA/ISAF/Warlords and Taliban  | New Taliban approaches to regain control - reflected in July 2009 "Book of Rules"  |
|--|--|--|---|--|
| <b>Metabolism</b>                                    | Orchard industry crippled by neglect during 1980s. Damaged infrastructure & Opium Cycle affects food availability.   | Shomali plain irrigation system destroyed; most fertile farm area in country turns to dust.  | Over-taxation inhibits needs-fulfillment capacity, results in increased food insecurity. Limited agro-development.  | Forbidding commanders to tax local citizenry theoretically preserves food stores.  |
| <b>Safety</b>  | Civilians fall victim to warlord-sanctioned violence against competing tribes. Systematic rape common. Taliban pledge to protect villagers from corrupt warlords, bandits, and open highways.  | Harsh punishment rulings under Sharia. Afghans live under constant fear of brutal Taliban reprisals.   | Taliban fighters unable to re-assimilate into society due to threat of arrest and/or lack of jobs. Many Afghans come to hate ISAF forces after incidents of collateral damage, further effecting IROA legitimacy.   | "Rules" stresses Taliban "are bound to take best possible steps to ensure safety and security of civilian's life and property." Forbids house searches w/out presence of Imam and village elders   |
| <b>Thermoregulation</b>                              | Many urban centers severely damaged; many Afghans displaced. Taliban eventually secures most urban areas, driving warlords into the northeast.   | July 2000 poppy ban leaves many farmers heavily indebted on farm loans.  | Displacement of many villagers in areas retaken by the Taliban. Over-dependence on opium trade causes scarcity of Thermoregulation-related resources.   | Rules promotes respect for personal property. Tax forbiddance on Mujihadeen (theoretically) insures availability of heating and building resources.  |
| <b>Medical Care</b>                                  | Medical relief convoys looted by Mujihadeen. Civil war and Soviet occupation creates "brain drain".  | Many women denied medical care.  | Increased amount of medical care (provided by non-Afghans) for females. Immunization campaigns throughout.  | Taliban approves distribution of specific immunizations in 2009, regardless of the provider (legitimizes Taliban).   |
| <b>Freedom of Mobility, Choice, and Access</b>       | Urban society, schools, and employment falls prey to infighting. Most males caught up in fighting. Taliban pledges security and order under Sharia Law.  | Women now unable to work outside the home, most are unable to travel unescorted. Schools closed down.  | Numerous girl schools built. Insecurity centered on opium economy leaves farmers with little aid or IROA-driven alternatives to earning a wage.   | "Book of Rules" stresses amnesty and reintegration of previous IROA personnel, and avoidance of discrimination due to tribal, ethnic, or geographical reasons.   |
| <b>Social Participation</b>                          | Afghan society torn apart from effects of Soviet invasion and civil war; volumes of displaced persons, widows, and orphans. Villages isolated due to danger posed on roads and leftover war ordinance.   | Prohibition of "Un-Islamic" entertainment and restricted access to information. Female education and employment severely restricted.   | Increased amount of education for boys and girls, various adult education and retraining programs instituted (depending on area security). Sports programs initiated in secure areas.   | "Rules" establish how Taliban will interface with population. Forbids Mujihadeen commanders from interfering with local population affairs. Clearly states desire to rule by Sharia Law.   |
| <b>Adaptation</b>                                    |  |  |   |  |
| <b>Economic System of Needs-satisfier production</b> | Economy destroyed by years of communist rule and civil war. Only shadow economy keeps resources flowing. Taliban promise to root out corruption. Safe and bandit-free highways increase commerce (legal and illicit). Taliban strikes deals with opium power brokers; allow the growth and trafficking of opium in exchange for backing and financing the Taliban. | Taliban realize opium-related money is essential to revenue generation. July 2000 poppy ban severely effects farmers; int'l prices skyrocket. Narco-terror activities contribute to GDP income. UN bars int'l flight travel for Ariana Airlines. | Initial Taliban attacks focus on the Aid Cycle, IOT discourage Western support of the Karzai gov't. Opium Cycle lure creates drain on Commissariat Cycle. Over-taxation of villages and farmers by Taliban and traffickers distorts compensation received for goods and services, inhibiting the buying power (and needs-fulfilling capacity) of individuals. | Rules establish baselines and requirements for participation in a Mujihadeen group. Sets limits on who within a group gets "war booty". Limits taxation to "donations", and forbids other forms of income generation by individual commanders /groups. Stresses time set aside for "jihad training".                             |
| <b>Social Control</b>                                | Social Control collapses as no warlord is strong enough to destroy competing groups. Taliban rise to power pledging to eliminate corrupt warlords and bring peace to the country. Taliban utilize combat, intimidation, propoganda, and bribery to win control of over 90% of country. Sharia Law implemented, seen as legitimate due to Islamic ties.             | Harsh punishment rulings under sharia Law attracts outrage of Western nations. Bribery funded by Bin Laden; sanctuary, offered in return. Taliban refuses to give Bin Laden up, leads to 9/11 and U.S. invasion.                                 | Financing of military force reconstitution comes through reestablished opium ties. ANP establishes a shadow taxation apparatus at local levels, contributing to disillusionment with IROA. Opium revenue enables social control and robs the IROA of money if opium lands were used in Commissariat.  | Rules establishes how Mujihadeen military gov'ts administer newly seized areas. Emphasizes restraint, and forbids extortion of money; only voluntary "deposits" accepted from populace. Stresses importance of image as role models to general public. Clearly establishes who the Rule Makers, Adjudicators, and Enforcers are. |

Figure 18. Competition for Perception of FSS-Fulfillment Fostering Competence in Afghanistan

Source: Developed by the authors with information from Major Shahid Afsar, Pakistan Army, Major Chris Samples, US Army, Major Thomas Wood, US Army, "The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis," *Military Review* (May-June 2008): 58-70; Gilles Dorronsoro, "The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan," *The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (2009): 9-30; Najibullah Lafraie, "Resurgence of the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan: How and Why?" *International Politics* 46 (2009): 103-111; Major Andrew A. Merz, USMC, "Coercion, Cash-Crops, and Culture: From Insurgency to Proto-State in Asia's Opium Belt" (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008), 34-41; David Loyn, *In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian, and American Occupation*, (New York: Palgrave/MacMillan, July 2009), 184; The NEFA Foundation, "Taliban: 'A Book of Rules'," [http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa\\_talibanconduct.pdf](http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa_talibanconduct.pdf) (accessed 10 November 2009): 1-6; Parliamentary Information and Research Service, "Afghanistan: The Taliban," *Infoseries* 07-27E (5 December 2007): 1-4; Gretchen Peters, "How Opium Profits the Taliban," *Peaceworks* (August 2009): 7-35.

When the Taliban arrived in Kandahar in 1994, they preached a return to order and security<sup>148</sup>, something many Afghans craved after years of deprivation under

communist rule and warlord infighting. This message resonated well within the population, allowing the Taliban to secure some areas without shots being fired.<sup>149</sup> The Taliban were also aided by a critical decision where their leadership softened its stance on the growth, production, and distribution of opium.<sup>150</sup> While the Taliban initially pledged to rid the country of this scourge, they realized the importance of revenue generated from this Economic Cycle (see figure 19 below), as well as the need for additional allies rather than enemies.<sup>151</sup>




Figure 19. The Taliban's Shadow Economic System

Source: Developed by the authors.

This decision, paired with the Afghan population's hope for something better than continued warlord infighting, led to the Taliban controlling 95 percent of the country by

1997.<sup>152</sup> The Taliban also eliminated or delegitimized competing groups. They succeeded in not only defeating opposing warlords, but local tribal leaders as well.<sup>153</sup> In this case, they were aided by the ineffectiveness of both groups to consolidate power and provide a stable way of life after the fall of the Soviet-backed government.

Upon seizing new areas, the Taliban implemented their distorted version of Sharia Law. With this, native populations soon realized their miscalculation in hoping for a better quality of life.<sup>154</sup> The Taliban established social control making Mullah Mohammed Omar the principal Rule Maker, aided by the Supreme Taliban Shura. Most members of this group were also military commanders or advisors. Regional commanders made decisions under the Supreme Shura, and also served as a conduit for edicts from the top to local-level commanders.<sup>155</sup> Rules emanating from Mullah Omar and the Supreme Shura were not open to interpretation. Violations were adjudicated in Sharia Law courts by rural judges.<sup>156</sup>

Rule Teaching occurred initially in extremist madrassas along the Afghanistan – Pakistan frontier. These newly trained Taliban served multi-function roles for the organization: fighters, Rule Teachers, and Rule Enforcers.<sup>157</sup> Rule Teaching occurred after the seizure of areas, typically through local leaders who would round the population up in a central area and alert them to new standards of conduct. If necessary, examples would be made of non-conformists to coerce the population. The Taliban would also use “night letters”,<sup>158</sup> posted in public areas, to provide “reminders” of these standards of conduct and the consequences of inappropriate behavior. Rules would be enforced by the Taliban themselves. The brutality of punishments under the Taliban helped enforce these new rules.<sup>158</sup>

The Taliban’s decision to tolerate the existence of the Opium Cycle provided multiple benefits. Their tiered system of taxation on the production, transportation, and sale of opium (see figure 20) produced vast quantities of revenue for the conduct of their “jihad”.<sup>159</sup> Additionally, it created a strange alliance of sharecroppers,<sup>160</sup> landowners, local mullahs, and traffickers, all of whom recognized the benefit of a thriving Opium Cycle. This also aided the Taliban’s security situation, as this strange alliance saw to it that the Taliban received timely intelligence<sup>161</sup> on the maneuvers of anti-Taliban forces.<sup>162</sup> However, poor neighborly relations (paired with not turning over Bin laden) led to the Taliban’s defeat in 2001.<sup>163</sup>




Figure 20. Opium Cycle – From Seed to Sale

*Source:* Developed by the authors with information from Major Shahid Afsar, Pakistan Army, Major Chris Samples, US Army, Major Thomas Wood, US Army, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis,” *Military Review* (May-June 2008): 58-70; Gilles Dorronsoro, “The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan,” *The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (2009): 9-30; Najibullah Lafraie, “Resurgence of the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan: How and Why?” *International Politics* 46 (2009): 103-111; Major Andrew A. Merz, USMC, “Coercion, Cash-Crops, and Culture: From Insurgency to Proto-State in Asia’s Opium Belt” (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008), 34-41; David Loyn, *In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian, and American Occupation*, (New York: Palgrave/MacMillan, July 2009), 184; The NEFA Foundation, “Taliban: ‘A Book of Rules’,” [http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa\\_talibanconduct.pdf](http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa_talibanconduct.pdf) (accessed 10 November 2009): 1-6; Parliamentary Information and Research Service, “Afghanistan: The Taliban,” *Infoseries* 07-27E (5 December 2007): 1-4; Gretchen Peters, “How Opium Profits the Taliban,” *Peaceworks* (August 2009): 7-35.

However, the decision by the U.S. and its allies to adopt a “light footprint” strategy to defeat the Taliban and establish the Karzai government resulted in a security vacuum across many parts of the country. In keeping with the FSS, elements rose to fill this void and established social control where the fledgling Afghan government and Western military forces could not. Unfortunately, many of these social control elements were newly empowered warlords (in most cases co-opted for support against the Taliban and Al Qaeda) or the Taliban themselves.<sup>164</sup> In this role, warlords saw this opportunity as a chance to leverage western involvement to gear-up for the next stage of the civil war – when the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IROA) collapses. This quickly undermined government legitimacy, as the population saw corruption similarities reemerge from pre-Taliban days,<sup>165</sup> paired with the problem of ever-growing income disparity.<sup>166</sup> The inability to provide governance and basic services down at local levels, along with empowered warlords exercising their own parallel social control actions (taxation and justice) has the compounding effect of delegitimizing the Islamic Republic of



Afghanistan (IROA) and legitimizing the Taliban's claims of superiority in providing stability.<sup>167</sup>

Another critical factor that eventually gave rise to the Neo-Taliban was the inability for former Taliban fighters to fully assimilate back into Afghan society. Regardless of calls for amnesty by the Karzai government, warlords and other forces continued to hunt those previously associated with the Taliban. At a minimum, former fighters were unable to scrape out a livelihood, driving them to the criminal sector in search of wages needed to procure needs-fulfilling resources, and eventually back to the Taliban.<sup>168</sup>

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/IROA forces also contributed to pushing the population back towards the Taliban through collateral damage incidents,<sup>169</sup> and public perception debacles like the allegations of wrongful imprisonment and torture at Bagram Air Base.<sup>170</sup> These, paired with a stagnating reconstruction situation<sup>171</sup> exacerbated by rampant corruption through the international aid apparatus, caused further dissolution within the population.<sup>172</sup>

The Taliban also sped the process of delegitimization by killing local-level government and tribal officials, eliminating adversaries' ability to compete for FSS-fostering competence.<sup>173</sup> This is paired with a campaign of information management aimed at continually alerting the population to the failings of the IROA and ISAF. Ironically, many of the tools used in this campaign are the media the Taliban outlawed in the mid-1990s.<sup>174</sup> By most accounts, the Taliban dominate their opposition in occupying popular opinion.<sup>175</sup> The end result of this media use is the Taliban being considered in many areas the least-bad of social control options.<sup>176</sup> However, this undercurrent of

ambivalent public sentiment that supported “none of the above”<sup>177</sup> led the Taliban to slightly alter its tactics.

The Neo-Taliban, with its ranks expanded by additional groups, recognized the flaws of the Government of Afghanistan (GoA)/ISAF/Warlords’ attempts to control Afghanistan and instituted “Book of Rules” changes in 2009. These emphasized restraint in dealings with the civilian population and its enemies,<sup>178</sup> in order to capitalize on the Afghan popular perception that ISAF is too heavy-handed. Smartly, the Taliban recognized and leveraged the last widely-respected institution in Afghanistan – Islam<sup>179</sup>, using the religion as a means to co-opt social control.<sup>180</sup> Frequently in *Rules*, they emphasize the final authority for various decisions and punishments resting with “the Iman and his deputy”.<sup>181</sup> These changes in standards of conduct for Taliban forces facilitate the establishment of a social control apparatus similar to the pre-2001 Taliban government,<sup>182</sup> only with more restraint and consideration of popular perception<sup>183</sup> in its implementation.

In newly seized areas, or areas void of IROA control, the Taliban still implements shadow social controlling apparatuses.<sup>184</sup> These serve the dual purpose of establishing Taliban control (and the ability to facilitate revenue generation) and demonstrating the IROA inability to provide stability.<sup>185</sup> However, *Rules* indicates a change in Rule Interpretation and Adjudication, as well as the interaction between Rule Enforcers and the population. These are noted below:

As was the case in the mid 1990s, the Taliban still establishes Sharia-based courts in newly seized areas in order to facilitate their version of justice and further delegitimize the IROA.<sup>186</sup> In some areas where the IROA does not extend control, the

population increasingly turns to Taliban Sharia-based courts. Many see these courts as more legitimate, due to their religious grounding, than the notoriously corrupt IROA courts.<sup>187</sup> Although punishment rulings are still harsh by Western standards, *Rules* establishes standards of evidence,<sup>188</sup> and emphasizes the “Imam and his deputy” as the final authorities for judgment. Furthermore, *Rules* forbids lower-level Taliban from exercising justice in newly seized areas.<sup>189</sup> These measures indicate a desire to move away from a reputation of vigilante justice<sup>190</sup> under the guise of Sharia Law.

There is brilliance in the Taliban Leadership’s recognition of the importance of restraint and legitimacy in fight for the Afghan population. The remaining question is whether or not forces on the ground will abide by these new edicts.

#### THE PILLARS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

*Stability operations are a race between competing groups to see who can exude a perception of FSS-fostering competence within the population they seek to control.*

The information in the previous sections synthesizes existing research from the social science arena and identifies individual needs and group adaptations that apply to all stable societies, regardless of demographics. It uses this knowledge to identify and prioritize drivers of instability. Taken together, this information results in a doctrinal template that expands the scope of stability operations analysis past selected historical examples to include possible and probable needs, adaptations, and drivers of instability. This theoretical framework, the FSS, provides a baseline for analyzing case studies of historical interventions that produce parameters for the unique conduct of stability operations.

This knowledge becomes increasingly important as the four services within the DoD expand their capacity to conduct stability operations and seek to train new operators. The theoretical base this study provides enables new personnel to better understand societal interrelatedness and why certain stability tasks are executed at certain times. By arriving in theater with this understanding intact, stability operators will experience more execution and success rather than the trial and error experienced by many new stability operations personnel thus far in the War on Terror.

The *Pillars of Stability Operations* (see figure 22) are conditions and functions essential to success in stability operations. They are applied based on analysis of what FSS voids exist in a given area, which in turn drives conflict, and characterize the methods used to foster FSS-fulfillment, thus defeating Drivers of Instability. In execution, stability operators take the Social DocTemp (The FSS) and apply context from a specific area to produce a Social SitTemp that drives COA development. Courses of action are formulated to ensure they incorporate adherence to the Pillars, which accounts for the uniqueness of stability operations currently missing in Full-spectrum and Joint doctrine.

The Pillars of Stability Operations nest into the Principles of Joint Operations, and add additional parameters that account for the uniqueness of stability operations when compared to other lethal operations. They apply regardless of demographics and compile theoretical basis with enduring lessons learned from historical operations. This may or may not mean that military forces must accomplish these tasks. What is important is that they are accomplished and appropriate conditions are set, regardless of who completes them. The Pillars of Stability Operations are listed below:

1. Ensure fulfillment of the Fundamentals of Social Stability. See the expanded list in figure 21.




Figure 21. The Fundamentals of Social Stability (obviated)  
Source: Major Harding's U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Master's Thesis at: [cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?...2589](http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?...2589)

Critical to proper FSS-fulfillment is *how* such satisfaction is accomplished. In order to maintain legitimacy, ruling groups must ensure people have access to needs-satisfying resources, or subject themselves to discredit within popular opinion. This can easily be accomplished with handouts, which may have to occur in the immediate wake

of conflict or social upheaval<sup>\*\*\*\*</sup>. However, this technique (while typically the most expeditious option for intervening forces) tends to create a phenomenon known as “aid dependency” at the expense of the area’s economic system.

A better way of ensuring FSS-fulfillment is to leverage resources against the appropriate Cycle within the Economic System of Needs-Satisfier Production (as depicted in figure 8) to ensure sufficient and sustainable supply for existing demand. This will build and exercise the mechanisms within the economic system that must exist after the departure of intervening forces in order to sustain stability.

2. Implement Contextually-Appropriate Capacity-building Approaches. This involves developing COAs that leverage existing capabilities within the area, rather than implementing western “cookie cutter” solutions. For instance, many officials and pundits emphasize “spreading democracy.” While this is a noble ideal, the United States may not possess the patience for the successful execution of this “best practice.” Instead, in order to implement a culturally-acceptable, stable government, stability operators are better off executing the “smart practice” of focusing on an inclusive government that leverages existing social power structures;<sup>191</sup> democracy can come later. Similarly, many leaders and pundits mistakenly refer to stability operations as “nation-building”. However, nation-building is a long-duration (decades) operation that focuses on building stability by changing culture and forging a national identity amongst the population. Conversely, State-building is a short-duration (years) operation that focuses on building stability through leveraging existing institutions.<sup>192</sup> When comparing the two to contemporary

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<sup>\*\*\*\*</sup> As seen with the desperate need of “life’s essentials” (food, water, sanitation, shelter, and medical aid) after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

operations, the previous is a “Best Practice,” where the latter is a “Smart Practice” and more applicable. This is especially true given the resources and time available to America and its allies, and the ability for utilizing existing institutions to gain indigenous buy-in due to their familiarity with such systems and structures.

A poor example of respecting this Pillar is the United States’ build-up of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, which was built to be a technological force capable of large-scale combat, and thus inappropriate to the contextual problem. More importantly, the equipment utilized by the ARVN could not be maintained without extensive aid, which was also pulled under Vietnamization. Another poor example is the United States and the IROA’s leveraging of Afghan Warlords to serve in leadership positions following the defeat of the Taliban in 2001. Although this did leverage an existing power base (in keeping with Pillar #2), this power base was already discredited within the Afghan population, which led to the rise of the Taliban in the first place. Turning to, and empowering, these brokers gave the IROA legitimacy problems from the start. While existing, they were not culturally palatable.

3. Manage Information Flow. Stability operations are a race between competing groups to see who can exude a perception of FSS-fostering competence within the population they seek to control. Because each competitor will seek to discredit the other, no two groups can be simultaneously perceived as competent. Because of this, the ability to project messages of competence, along with evidence of an opponent’s incompetence, is vital to stability operations success. This critical thread is witnessed in the case studies presented, specifically Bell’s use of the telegraph in the Philippines, Hamas’ leverage of the Da’wa’s work prior to the 2006 Palestinian elections, the International Aid

Communities' use of media to deter Israeli abuses during and after Operation Cast Lead, and the Taliban's promise of stability prior to 2001. In many cases, SDIs and TDIs may go unresolved if the populace believes their sacrifice is justified, and the social controlling element is competent in seeing their struggle is rewarded with stability.

As the management of information flow and reputation is directly linked to legitimacy of both the intervening force and the regime they seek to strengthen, so is expectation management amongst the population. While it is tempting to promise quick and grand improvements on the path to securing a reputation of FSS-fostering competence, if the promises are not backed with action, a force's reputation will be greatly tarnished amongst the population.

4. Near-Simultaneity. This is the symbiotic relationship between lethal and non-lethal operations, depicted in figure 11. Case studies, specifically CORDS in Vietnam, Hamas (prior to the 2006 Palestinian elections), and the International Aid Community in Gaza, show how successful intervening forces quickly demonstrate a reestablishment of the physical safety, and follow that with fulfillment of the other FSS. The reestablishment of physical safety must be offset with non-lethal measures in the form of aid and development projects<sup>193</sup> (this related to voids in individual basic needs-satisfaction), so the population can see tangible results of progress that directly relate to the stability operator's presence. Doing so, and advertizing one's proficiency in this area, wins popular trust and support. This combination of lethal operations, capacity-building, and information operations eventually yields actionable intelligence that leads to betterment of overall FSS-fulfillment. Failure to do so leaves the population viewing intervening forces, and those they are trying to legitimize, as oppressive.<sup>194</sup>



5. Restraint. The preceding case studies, mainly J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines and the VC/VCI during Tet, show a theme of forces enjoying success by demonstrating restraint when encounters with the enemy had the potential to endanger those civilians they were trying to secure/control. These case studies also demonstrate examples where a lack of restraint inhibited a group's ability to exert control, as seen with the Taliban prior to 2001, and the IROA and ISAF after. This does not discount the importance of winning lethal engagements, as doing so is vital to gaining/maintaining legitimacy within the population and exuding the perception of competence in fostering FSS-fulfillment that is so critical in stability operations. Instead, *Restraint* advocates that leaders may have to better choose the "civilian terrain" they engage the enemy on. Much like past commanders in combat surveyed the aspects of terrain when choosing to engage an enemy or maneuver to a more advantageous position, today's combat leaders must analyze the cost and benefit of fighting within proximity of the population; will this engagement make more insurgents than it destroys?

6. Know and Avoid Population "Tipping Points." During a pacification, stability, or counterinsurgency operations, the intervening force must protect against the tendency for the population to lose faith in the legitimacy of its leadership and military. Lack of restraint (heavy-handed use of firepower, upheaval of social life and livelihoods, etc.) can cause the population to become ambivalent towards which side wins the contest for control, choosing instead to "ride it out" and "see who wins."<sup>195</sup> Worse, corruption can cause a lack of faith in the legitimacy of leaders that drives the populace towards the side of the adversary. The importance of such restraint was recognized by General Bell in the Philippines, some Viet Cong elements during Tet,<sup>196</sup> and ignored by many regular

combat units during operations in South Vietnam.<sup>197</sup> Also, Al Qaeda in Iraq's heavy-handedness drove the Sunni tribes of Anbar Province to their "awakening" inside the American sphere of influence. The previous case studies also show the debilitating effects of corruption in driving a population into the influence sphere of a competing group. Loss of legitimacy undermined the GVN and ARVN in their final struggle against the VC/VCI and North Vietnam, the Oday in their attempt to maintain authority over the UIC, and the IROA after they leveraged Afghan warlords following the defeat of the Taliban in 2001.

To protect against this, there must be a symbiotic balance of security improvements, destruction of insurgent capability and capacity, and an increase in basic services and quality of life for the population. Additionally, stability operators must leverage the use of information management to convince the population that any existing voids in needs-satisfaction are temporary and that their sacrifice is for a legitimate cause.

7. Secure the population where they are, not where you want them to be. While it may be tempting to move populations from areas that are hard to secure to ground more defensible against insurgent influence, the stability operator must resist this. Catastrophic effects of such actions were witnessed in the Philippines, and in Vietnam during the early pacification efforts prior to the implementation of CORDS. While security is a critical aspect of stability operations, security through relocation causes more PDIs than it solves.

A better measure is the sealing off of access to areas of interest. This requires establishing checkpoints, documentation of inhabitants, and a resilient security presence. Such measures will cause SDIs related to *social participation* and will disrupt the labor and transportation portions of the *Economic System*. However, balancing these protective

restrictions with other quality of life and capacity-building improvements demonstrates progress to the effected population and keeps them away from the “Tipping Point.”

8. Transitions. Engaging in stability operations requires intervening military forces to provide an initial surge of security, governance, and economic resources until the indigenous population and state are able to assume these responsibilities. The large question is, when do we execute this transfer? Failure to correctly time the withdrawal of respective resources will increase the likelihood of subsequent infighting amongst competing entities when the dominating faction departs the area.<sup>198</sup> This void and its fulfillment will be quickly contested by groups who seek to control the area by demonstrating their competence in fostering FSS-fulfillment. Three critical areas of transition require attention: security, governance, and the economy.

Once capable, security responsibilities can be slowly transitioned to indigenous forces, with intervening forces serving as a backup, and eventually transiting from theater. However, the timing is critical. The ARVN's assumption of primary security responsibility under the Vietnamization program was premature, as evidenced by the debacle associated with their 1971 invasion of Laos. In this case, a transition that should have legitimized their capabilities (and those of the GVN), only served to undermine the ARVN's reputation more. Contrast this with Pershing's increased use of Filipino forces to extend government reach in the rural island areas,<sup>199</sup> which increased their legitimacy and demonstrated government reach and overall ownership.

The transfer of responsibility to credible indigenous Essential Elements of Social Control is difficult as well. A failure to do so in a timely manner may result in SDIs related to Social Freedoms, as the population may see the intervention as a veil for

imperialism. However, a timely transition when native personnel and agencies are not ready will delegitimize them as capable fosterers of FSS-fulfillment. Contextually, the U.S. in the Philippines struck an effective balance in their decision to leverage some aristocratic legacy personnel from the Spanish colonial regime.<sup>200</sup> While this did expose a Social Freedom-related SDI, the U.S. was able to utilize the administrative skills of the Filipino elites to better establish stability. In this case, the perceived slight at Social Freedoms was worth the capability in governance. When possible, intervening forces should leverage existing social structures to enable social control. A poor example of leveraging existing indigenous power brokers while transferring control is the use of Afghan warlords in the IROA. In this case, many of those, whose greed and personal ambitions during the Afghan Civil War led to the rise of the Taliban in the mid-1990s, were selected for leadership roles simply because they were anti-Taliban and we didn't want to fight their influence as well. When placed in power, many resorted back to the ways that delegitimized them in the first place and used their billets as a means to gather resources for the possibility of renewed inter-Afghan hostilities in the event of the fall of the IROA. This predatory behavior served to delegitimize the IROA, rather than enable stability in Afghanistan, and eventually gave rise to a renewal of Taliban influence.

Although not a perfect solution, a better answer would have been the utilization of tribal leadership and Afghan intelligencia that was living abroad at the time. Since there was no central unifying leader after the death of Ahmad Shah Massoud, these leaders could have filled-out the posts within the IROA. While the exclusion of Afghan warlords would have presented an additional security dilemma, it would have prevented the legitimacy issues we currently see with the IROA (most recently seen with the rejection

of Ismail Khan from President Hamid Karzai's list of new Aghan political positions). These problems have only served to drive the Afghan population closer to the Population Tipping Point and enable the Taliban's resurgence.

Transfer of the economy from post-conflict to peacetime requires an inoculation against "Dutch Disease." As was the case with South Vietnam, an intervening force cannot both create jobs and reconstruct a post-conflict area without creating some artificial cycles in the Economic System. If the intervening force fails to inject large amounts of capital, it will fail to create enough jobs, leading to unemployment, which leads to masses of MAMs who are vulnerable to extremist rhetoric and/or employment. If the force pulls resources from an area too quickly, the indigenous Economic System will be unable to absorb the vast amount of newly unemployed who previously worked in the artificial security-related cycle.

To protect against the effects of post-conflict Dutch Disease, an intervening force must incorporate a balanced approach. This requires a strengthening of the other vital<sup>††††</sup> cycles of the Economic System with development aid that will build their infrastructure and capacity<sup>201</sup> to absorb additional labor when artificial security-related jobs depart with intervening forces and their aid. This is critical, as Security Cycles in post-conflict Economic Systems are typically too big for the country's GDP to support over the long-term.<sup>202</sup> Additionally, to allow the indigenous government to compensate for the temporary loss of a large and taxable labor force, the intervening (and now withdrawing) force must include some stabilization aid to ease the transition of the labor market from

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<sup>††††</sup>The four vital Cycles within the Economic System that must exist and function correctly in order to avoid societal catastrophe are the Commissariat, Thermoregulation, Education and Training of New Members, and Security.

one that grew around the artificial (and lucrative) security-related spending cycle, to one where that cycle is more reflective of a peacetime economy.<sup>203</sup>

Failure to correctly time Transitions will result in failures within respective economic Cycles. This will cascade to a loss of revenue, government legitimacy, and allow the enemy to win the battle of perception in FSS-fostering competence.

**THE PILLARS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS**  
Using Social-Science to Fill the Gap Between the Joint Operating Principles and the Stability Operations Framework  
*The Pillars: rooted in social science, applicable across demographics*

**Analysis of respective case studies through the lens of the FSS deduces the following Pillars:**

- 1. Ensure FSS-fulfillment... and let people know about it**
  - *Stability Operations are a race to exude a perception of competence in fostering FSS-fulfillment.*
- 2. Contextually-Appropriate Capacity-Building Approaches**
  - Make sure courses of action have native buy-in and address the Drivers of Instability.
- 3. Manage Information Flow**
  - Tell the population how good your allies and you are doing (be honest) and vilify the enemy.
- 4. Near-Simultaneity of Lethal and Non-lethal Operations**
  - Symbiotic relationship of lethal operations and non-lethal actions.
- 5. Restraint**
  - The fine line between fostering FSS fulfillment & doing too much.
  - Ensure the actions of forces to not make additional insurgents.
- 6. Know and Avoid Population “Tipping Points”**
  - Effected by legitimacy and restraint, does the population think the intervening force and native government act in their best interests; *are they perceived as the most competent fosterer of FSS-fulfillment?*
  - Operational difficulty increases exponentially when the population becomes ambivalent to who controls the area, or openly supports the adversary.
- 7. Protect the population where they are... not where you want them to be**
  - As tempting as relocation to more defensible terrain may be, the violations of other FSS are too costly
- 8. Transitions**
  - Security, Governance, and Economy; ensure transition timings legitimize the institutions assuming responsibility

Figure 22. The Pillars of Stability Operations

Source: Major Harding’s U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Master’s Thesis at: [cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?...2589](http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?...2589)

## Effects on Existing Doctrine

Taken as a whole, the frameworks and stability-related tasks contained in *Counterinsurgency*, *Stability Operations*, and *Guiding Principles* are a comprehensive list for post-conflict situations. What is needed is an understanding of *why* these are correct. Recognizing aspects of basic needs and societal interrelatedness on the ground allows stability operators to expand their analysis past the binding limits of historically-based doctrine. This allows operators to put purpose to respective tasks, decide resource prioritization against recognized PDIs, SDIs, and TDIs, and generally formulate contextually-appropriate COAs that defeat root causes of conflict. Failure to do so promotes the continued dogmatic execution of tasks because “the manual says so” or “they did it this way in [insert historical situation].”

While many of the “Pillars of Stability Operations” relate to and validate some of the “Cross-cutting Principles,” “Post-conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks,” and “Stability Operations Framework,” the understanding gained by the theoretical basing of the “Pillars” in social science that gives them utility regardless of changing dynamics. This knowledge will greatly enable future stability operators’ ability to affect new interventions by providing them with an “example of right” for any stable society.

This study identifies foundational gaps in current stability operations-related doctrine. Eventually, when subsequent rewrites of existing doctrine are undertaken, the theoretical information from this study needs to be incorporated. Specifically, this information is valid for FM 3-0, *Operations* and FM 3-90, *Tactics*. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* needs to incorporate the FSS and the Drivers of Instability in chapter 3, as a lead-in to understanding aspects of society. Additionally, it can incorporate and

understanding of the Pillars of Stability Operations as an appendix, for better understanding of how the tactics contained FM 3-24 effect other related operations. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* needs to incorporate the FSS in chapter 1 prior to “Strategy for Stability Operations” as a foundation for future understanding in chapter 2. *Guiding Principles* needs to incorporate the FSS prior to section 2 as a theoretical baseline for stability operations.

To compensate for this limited scope and applicability, *Counterinsurgency*, *Guiding Principles*, and *Stability Operations* need rooting in social science, to ensure applicability regardless of changing demographics. Contemporary lessons-learned are valuable, but only if they are viewed through a lens of common social behaviors, needs, and adaptations. This need for globally applicable doctrine will manifest itself as new generations of stability operators, who lack the fruits of trial and error in Iraq and Afghanistan, embark on new interventions that require quick problem framing, solutions, and adjustments along the way. Rooting stability operations doctrine in social science fosters successful execution in future operations, as compared to the trial and error experienced in the past.

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<sup>15</sup>*Ibid*, 1-28, 2-12, 3-15.

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<sup>25</sup>Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays* (New York: Oxford University Press: 1960), 104-5.

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<sup>194</sup>Byler, 45.

<sup>195</sup>Wells, 22-23.

<sup>196</sup>Pohle, 21.

<sup>197</sup>Angela Rabasa, Warner, Chalk, Khilko, and Shulka, 33.

<sup>198</sup>Klingner and Jones, 154.

<sup>199</sup>Byler, 44.

<sup>200</sup>Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 115.

<sup>201</sup>Hoan, 316.

<sup>202</sup>Ibid, 319.

<sup>203</sup>Ibid, 316-317.