Every so often Small Wars Journal receives master theses or articles based on a master thesis written at our professional military education institutions. We recently received three of particular interest and share them with you here. Hat tips to Colonel David Anderson (USMC ret.) and Colonel David Maxwell (USA) for bringing these to our attention.
Inducing alignment: The Dynamic Impact of Repression and Mobilizing Structures on Population Support -- Thesis by Major Brian E. Decker (USA) and Major Philip W. Thomas (USA) -- Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009.
This thesis provides an alternative to the surge theory as a basis for understanding the dramatic change in the security situation in Anbar, Iraq. Typological theory is used to develop a conceptual framework of strategic interaction that explains how different combinations of government and insurgent repression types lead to the alignment of the affected population. Process tracing is used to test our hypotheses of population alignment, to make inferences about how the population reacted to the repression tactics of the government and the insurgent, and ultimately, to construct an explanation for the defeat of AQI through the alignment of the tribal population in the Anbar province of Iraq. Game theory compliments process tracing by verifying the internal logic of the typology and observations.
In addition, the development of an agent based model (ABM) verifies the internal logic and extends the external validity of the author's substantive theory. The model replicates and reproduces the dynamic history of mechanisms and processes by manipulating the parameters that alter the affects of the interaction of repression tactics on population alignment. Then, theoretical predictions are tested against observations from the case study of the Anbar Awakening to assess the degree of congruence between the projections of the conceptual framework and the longitudinal variation of observations. The docking procedure of this research design confirms the utility of channeling for the counterinsurgent against insurgent coercion. However, the findings suggest that this dynamic is heavily dependent on intermediating mechanisms, such as the insurgent's social embeddedness and the population's incentive structures. Lastly, the feasibility and potential areas of applications for the models is provided.
Identifying the Pillars of Stability Operations: Using Social Science to Bridge the Gap Between the Principles of Joint Operations and the Stability Operations Framework -- Article based on a master thesis by Major Ethan H, Harding (USMC) and Dr. David A. Anderson (Colonel, USMC Ret.) -- U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 2009.
In the past, the U.S. military engaged in stability operations as an afterthought to traditional lethal operations. Still, such equality and integration between combat missions and stability operations does not always materialize, leading to diminished returns. This ineffectiveness is due to a myriad of issues ranging from poor synchronization to unit leadership lacking confidence in the benefits of executing stability tasks. Even when stability operations enjoy command and unit support, poor analysis and course of action (COA) development results in actions that minimally effect a situation, while other critical issues are not addressed. Even with the advent of FM 3-07, Stability Operations and the newly published U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and United States Institute for Peace (USIP) Guiding Principles for Stability and Reconstruction, these problems continue to manifest themselves in "cookie-cutter" solutions that are improperly taken from one situational context and placed on another.
In 2005, NSPD-44 tasked the Department of Defense (DoD) with making the conduct of stability operations as one of their "core missions." Additionally, it established the Department of State (DoS), specifically the Department of State/Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), as the lead agency for all stability-related activities abroad.1 This document propelled stability operations to the status of core mission, rather than an afterthought in military planning.
Causes of Improvement in the Security Environment of Iraq, 2006-2009 -- Thesis by Major Seth A. Wheeler (USA) - Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009.
Popular consensus exists that the 2007 surge of U.S. forces in Iraq led to an improved security environment. The surge was designed to reduce violence and improve security by protecting the Iraqi population—a change in strategy. According to the consensus, the security environment improved due to the surge, measured by the decreasing number of attacks.
For this thesis, the security environment consists of the number of attacks and their lethality, supported by data from U.S. Department of Defense reports to Congress. This thesis compares the timelines of the surge forces with the numbers of attacks, the lethality of those attacks, and with factors other than the surge that may have improved the security environment. This thesis argues that the surge and associated strategy may have hastened improvement to the security environment, but they were neither necessary nor sufficient for the improvements in the security environment.
Several theories and conflict models offer insight into how improvement in the security environment occurred: through efforts that countered insurgent sanctuary and social support, and consequently decreased the lethality of insurgent attacks. This analysis reveals that the political efforts of the Iraqi government and grass roots movements were the necessary and sufficient conditions for improvement.