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-- Joseph Stalin
“For Dave Dilegge and Bill Nagle, founders and editors of Small Wars Journal. They gave the counterguerrilla underground a home, at a time when misguided leaders banned even the word ‘insurgency,’ though busily losing to one. Scholars, warriors, and agitators, Dave and Bill laid the foundation for battlefield success: our generation owes them a debt of gratitude.”
-- David Kilcullen ('Counterinsugency' Dedication)
"Slow is smooth, smooth is fast."
-- Old MOUT Adage
"In 1991 the Gulf War showed everyone how not to fight us, but the 2003 invasion of Iraq showed everybody how to fight us."
-- David Kilcullen
“With no other security forces on hand, U.S. military was left to confront, almost alone, an Iraqi insurgency and a crime rate that grew worse throughout the year, waged in part by soldiers of the disbanded army and in part by criminals who were released from prison.”
-- John Spratt

"Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation."

— Small Wars Manual, 1940

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Journal

Strength and Wisdom in the Middle East

by John Nagl, by Kelly “Curly” Ihme | Fri, 06/21/2024 - 6:27am | 0 comments

The ”superpower” of the Army War College, as in most professional military education institutions in the United States, is the presence of international officers from allied and partner nations around the globe. Each year, some 75 countries send their most talented senior officers to spend a year in Carlisle with their families studying, learning, and living among their American peers. This immersion often leads to forming lifelong personal, as well as professional, bonds that reap rewards for the entire international system for years to come

The Art of Irregular Warfare Campaigning: A Job for Which Headquarters or Agency?

by Paul Burton | Tue, 06/18/2024 - 9:54pm | 0 comments

Irregular Warfare (IW) Campaigning is the art of using available resources by the Department of Defense and other Agencies in a series of linked actions, over an extended period, to eventually gain a marked advantage over your adversary, who will also be referred to as peer competitors. This long-term strategy requires continuity of desired end states through both political administrations and military command rotations. This was done by and large during the Cold War, albeit with course adjustments; the key was that the majority of America never questioned that the Soviet Union was our number one enemy. This basic common focus during the Cold War helped facilitate a unity of purpose and effort from different organizations, if not a unity of command and priority of tasks. So, the question is what agency or headquarters should take the lead in IW campaigning in the present multi-polar complex world?

Assessment of the Turkish-Kurdish Conflict, 1984-1999

by J. Connor Williams | Tue, 06/18/2024 - 9:37pm | 0 comments

The ancient struggle between insurgents and counterinsurgents has grown in significance and frequency since the end of the Second World War, leading to increased attention and study of the subject. Guerrilla warfare has become the most prevalent form of warfare in the world. Insurgents have fought to remove imperialist powers to gain independence, while revolutionaries sought to implement Marxist societal change and the redistribution of resources in alignment with their ideological preferences. The United States has fought protracted insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan to support fledging governments, typically prevailing on the battlefield but frustrated by the political challenges. There are dozens, if not hundreds, of historical examples to evaluate when attempting to understand and appraise this type of warfare.

Fortune's Workings and Virtue's Contribution: How a Chance Meeting in a Miami Restaurant Influenced the Course of the War in Ukraine

by Joerg Stenzel, by Wayne Culbreth | Tue, 06/11/2024 - 5:03pm | 0 comments

This narrative explores how a chance meeting in a Miami restaurant shaped Rice's involvement in securing vital military support for the Ukrainian Army, while also acknowledging the broader context of the conflict and the collective efforts of various stakeholders in the largest war in Europe in 80 years, and the 3rd largest war in Europe in 150 years, behind World War II and World War I.

Defence diplomacy in the war in Ukraine – cooperation and challenges

by Lech Drab, by Marzena Żakowska | Mon, 06/10/2024 - 11:36pm | 0 comments

The central focus of this article revolves around conducting a comprehensive analysis of the role played by defense diplomacy in the intricate context of the Ukraine war. By doing so, it seeks to specifically focus on cooperative endeavors between Western nations and the Ukrainian government. Furthermore, the article strives to highlight the challenges faced in the process. By examining these aspects, we aim to address a pivotal question: What were the profound and consequential domains of cooperation in defense diplomacy between Western states and Ukraine that significantly shaped the trajectory of the war's development? The findings show that the crucial areas of this cooperation encompassed military support, military education, intelligence sharing, as well as legal and legislative collaboration.

Reflections on America’s Military Recruiting Crisis: A View from the Edge

by Al Dhobaba | Mon, 06/03/2024 - 2:21pm | 0 comments

A "quasi-outside observer" with tremendous insights into military issues, offers a critique that focuses on US military recruiting but actually does a deeper dive into a variety of service leadership issues with some proposed solutions.

Perspective: Türkiye Forges New Routes for Latin American Cocaine Destined for Europe

by Mahmut Cengiz | Tue, 05/28/2024 - 5:16pm | 0 comments

SWJ−El Centro Fellow Mahmut Cengiz provides insight on the rise of Türkiye as a key hub in the global cocaine trade in this assessment of emerging illicit flows.

SWJ El Centro Book Review – CJNG: A Quick Guide to Mexico's Deadliest Cartel

by John P. Sullivan | Sat, 05/18/2024 - 7:36pm | 0 comments

Review of Chris Dalby's "CJNG: A Quick Guide to Mexico's Deadliest Cartel" by SWJ−El Centro Senior Fellow John P. Sullivan.

Understanding Support for the Mexican Military and Its Role in Combating Organized Crime

by Jonathan D. Rosen | Thu, 05/16/2024 - 2:42pm | 0 comments

This article examines the role that the Mexican military has played in combating drug trafficking, organized crime, and violence. It highlights the security policies and utilization of the military during the Felipe Calderón and Peña Nieto administrations. While President Andrés Manuel López Obrador criticized the militarization of the drug war, he created a national guard, which consist primarily of the military, and deployed them to strategic locations. The article then examines the public opinion data, which shows the high levels of trust in the military. It then turns to regression analysis based to analyze factors that may influence trust in the military. Ultimately, this article concludes that the military remains better trusted than other institutions, but the armed forces have been overutilized in recent decades for a litany of internal security issues.

Post-insurgencies and Criminal Subcultures: The influence of Colombian organized crime in Ecuador’s Armed Conflict

by Jorge Mantilla, by Renato Rivera | Thu, 05/16/2024 - 1:00am | 0 comments

What is the influence of Colombian organized crime in Ecuador’s Armed Conflict? Building on the concepts of post-insurgencies and border effect, this paper assesses the security crisis in Ecuador by studying criminal learning and subcultures among Criminal Armed Groups (CAGs). While analysts and pundits often highlight the impact of Colombia’s criminal world in the Ecuadorian context, few fathom it. Focusing on the trajectories of CAGs, the paper gathers different lessons resulting from Colombian counterinsurgency over the years and what they mean to Ecuador. The paper zooms in on the criminal learning between CAGs in borderland regions of Nariño (Colombia) and Esmeraldas (Ecuador). It argues that criminal learning is fundamental in how Ecuadorian CAGs, particularly Tiguerones, understand and engage in criminal wars. Furthermore, Tiguerones’ case shows how subculture and symbolic power remain important in post-insurgencies and criminal learning. The authors use official data from law enforcement and secondary information from Colombia and Ecuador.