| Small Wars Journal

The U.K. released two national security related documents yesterday and today. The first is A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy and the second is A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review. Issues include an 8% reduction in defense spending over four years, a personnel reduction in the Royal Air Force and Navy of 5,000 each, 7,000 in the British Army, and a civilian personnel reduction in the Ministry of Defence of 25,000. The Comprehensive Spending Review is set to be released tomorrow. BBC News has a good review of the major items.

Read more about Britain and National Security

A disturbing repot on Baghlan province in today's Wall Street Journal

An article in today's Wall Street Journal discussed the deteriorating security situation in Baghlan province, north of Kabul. According to the article, Taliban popularity is increasing because the movement, although still unpopular, compares increasingly favorably with the government. In addition, anti-government resistance in the north is now multi-ethnic and effectively tailors its political strategy and tactics to local conditions. Some excerpts:

"People don't love the Taliban—but if they compare them to the government, they see the Taliban as the lesser evil," said Baghlan Gov. Munshi Abdul Majid, an appointee of President Hamid Karzai.

As a result, the Taliban are winning support beyond the Pashtun community, their traditional base. In Baghlan, where Pashtuns account for less than one-quarter of the province's 804,000 residents, the insurgency is now drawing ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks and other minorities previously seen as unsympathetic to the rebel cause.

"It's clear that the insurgents concentrate their efforts on those areas where they can hope to reach a significant impact," explained Maj. Gen. Hans-Werner Fritz, the German commander of 11,000 coalition troops across Afghanistan's nine northern provinces. "The northern part could become the game-changer for all of Afghanistan."

Baghlan is of strategic importance, Gen. Fritz added, because most supplies from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan pass through, including most of the coalition's fuel. The power line from Uzbekistan, the main source of Kabul's electricity, also runs through here.

ISAF established the Northern Distribution Network to reduce its logistical dependence on its supply routes through Pakistan. A corollary aim was to reduce Pakistan's strategic leverage over the military campaign in Afghanistan. Increased Taliban activity in Baghlan and other northern provinces may be designed to put the northern supply routes under threat, reestablishing Taliban and Pakistani leverage.

I recommend reading the whole article.

Yemen, 10 Reasons to Worry

More on Yemen, complementing the prior post on the

Yemeni perspective on Al Qaida. Here's a 3 minute video outlining 10 of Yemen's

significant internal problems. The video is part of the

NATO Review edition 05/2010 titled: "Yemen:

danger ahead?". See also Why al Quaida chose Yemen for Faris Sanabani's analysis.

19 October SWJ Roundup

Afghanistan

Iran Sends Delegate to International Meeting on Afghanistan - New York Times

Iran Joins Talks on Afghan Strategy - Washington Post

Iran Joins U.S. for Meeting on Afghanistan's Future - BBC News

Holbrooke: No Problem With Iran Presence at Afghan Meeting - Voice of America

Afghanistan Tosses Out Thousands of Votes Amid Fraud - Los Angeles Times

Al-Qaida Returning to Afghanistan for New Attacks - National Journal

U.S. Seeks a Larger Village Police Force - Los Angeles Times

Canada Poised for 2011 Withdrawal From Afghanistan - New York Times

Cracks Emerge in Australian Unity on Afghan War - Associated Press

Gunmen Kill 8 Private Security Guards in Afghanistan - Voice of America

Afghan, Coalition Troops Find Insurgent Weapons Factory - AFPS

Advisers Help Afghan Police to Become Self Sufficient - AFPS

NATO Service Member Killed in Southern Afghanistan - Associated Press

Petraeus Rewrites the Playbook in Afghanistan - Washington Post opinion

Time to Talk to the Taliban - New York Times opinion

Pakistan

Bin Laden, Henchman Reported in Pakistan - Washington Times

Meeting Pakistanis, U.S. Will Try to Fix Relations - New York Times

Indian Report: Pakistan Spies Tied to Mumbai Siege - Associated Press

Iraq

Iraqi PM Visits Iran to Bolster Candidacy - Voice of America

Maliki Meets with Iran's Leaders, Seeking Support - Washington Post

Khamenei Calls for 'Speedy Formation' of New Iraqi Gov. - Los Angeles Times

Iraq PM in Tehran on Key Political Visit - Associated Press

Roadside Bomb Kills Baghdad Official - New York Times

Bombing Of Police Official's Home Kills 11 In Iraq - Reuters

Iraq Bomb Kills Policeman's Baby Nephew, 3 Others - Associated Press

Iran

China Firms 'Evade Iran Embargo' - BBC News

China Says Committed to U.N. Sanctions on Iran - Reuters

WikiLeaks

Pentagon Bracing for New WikiLeaks Release - Agence France-Presse

Pentagon Calls on Media Not to Carry WikiLeaks Material - Voice of America

Pentagon Asks Media Not to Publish War Leaks - Associated Press

Pentagon Cautions News Media on WikiLeaks Documents - Reuters

U.S. Department of Defense

Obama May Opt for New Military Advisers - Washington Times

Spending Reforms Top Defense Priorities, Lynn Says - AFPS

Lynn: Cyberspace is the New Domain of Warfare - AFPS

Military Must Reduce Its Use of Fossil Fuels - AFPS

Mullen: U.S. Military Needs More Diversity - AFPS

United States

U.S. Election Results Could Impact Foreign Policy - Voice of America

Four Men Convicted in Plot to Bomb Synagogues - New York Times

Supreme Court to Decide Whether Ashcroft Can be Sued - Washington Post

Justices to Hear Appeal Over Liability for Detention - New York Times

U.S. Pushes to Ease Technical Obstacles to Wiretapping - New York Times

CIA Sues Ex-agent for Book's Breach of 'Secrecy' - Washington Times

United Kingdom

U.K.'s Cameron Announces Military Austerity Plan - Associated Press

U.K. Foreign Secretary Says Military to Stay Strong - Associated Press

Canada

Canadian Commander Pleads Guilty - New York Times

Africa

Somali Government and Allies Attack Insurgents - New York Times

Killings in Nigeria Are Linked to Islamic Sect - New York Times

Int'l Court Rejects Ex-Congo VP War Crimes Appeal - Associated Press

Congo: Hague Court to Proceed With Bemba War Crimes Trial - Reuters

Ethiopia 'Swapped Aid for Votes' - BBC News

Niger Junta Head Sacks Spy Chief - BBC News

Americas and Caribbean

Threat Grows as Mexican Cartels Beef Up U.S. Presence - Washington Post

105 Tons of Marijuana Seized in Tijuana - Washington Post

Marijuana Seized in Mexican Raid - Associated Press

Venezuela: Chavez in Iran for Talks on Boosting Oil, Gas Ties - Associated Press

Cuba: Diplomats Discuss Jailed American - Associated Press

Weary of Debris, Haiti Finally Sees Some Vanish - New York Times

Asia Pacific

Chinese VP Receives Key Appointment - Voice of America

China's Vice President on Track to Become Next Leader - Washington Post

Chinese Promotion Puts Official on Track for Presidency - New York Times

U.S. Justice Head Asks China to Release Nobel Winner - Associated Press

U.S. Diplomat Praises Chinese Premier's Reform Talk - Associated Press

Powerful Typhoon Hits Philippines - Reuters

After 10 Dead in Philippines, Storm Heads to China - Associated Press

Europe

At Deauville, Europe Embraces Russia - New York Times

Russian Leader Pushes for Better Access to Europe - Associated Press

Agents Deported by U.S. Are Honored in Moscow - New York Times

Gunmen Attack Parliament in Chechnya - New York Times

Rebels Stage Suicide Attack on Chechen Parliament - Reuters

Gunmen Storm Chechen Government Buildings - Associated Press

French Authorities Report Fuel Shortages - Voice of America

In France, Labor Strikes Head for Showdown - New York Times

Germany: Merkel Government Split By Debate Over Immigration - Reuters

Gates: U.S.-Turkish Alliance Strong Despite Differences - Washington Times

U.S-Turkish Alliance in Good Shape, Gates Says - AFPS

German President to Speak Before Turkish Parliament - New York Times

Middle East

Israel Pushes Palestinians to Acknowledge Jewish Character - Los Angeles Times

Israeli PM Wants to Change Oath - BBC News

Arab League Urges Boycott of OECD Conference in Israel - Washington Times

Israel Claims Hamas Has Anti-Aircraft Missiles - Associated Press

Turkish PM Says Will Not Talk With Netanyahu - Reuters

Lebanon: U.S., UK And France Urge No Meddling In Hariri Tribunal - Reuters

Saudi Says It Warned on Al-Qaida Threat From Yemen - Associated Press

South Asia

Kashmiri Separatist Leader Held - BBC News

Read more about 19 October SWJ Roundup

A Fresh Yemeni Attack on al-Qaida Ideology

Writings of Saeed Obeid

al-Jamhi: A Fresh Yemeni Attack on al-Qaida Ideology

by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN

As a member of the United States Armed Service given the

privilege to be involved in counter-terrorism, I have been an advocate of

highlighting and using direct Arabic materials written by terrorists or Arabs

involved in countering terrorism to educate America's next generation of

counter-terrorism analysts, counter-insurgency specialists, foreign area

officers, and investigators. This Columbus Day weekend, I was reading the work

of Saeed Obeid al-Jamhi, a Yemeni intellectual and social commentator who offers

a fresh ideological attack on al-Qaida. His 2008 book is entitled, "Al-Qaida

fee al-Yemen: Al-Nash'ah, al-Khalfiyah, al-Imtidaad," or "Al-Qaida in Yemen:

Its Origin, Ideology, and Future." The book was published in 2008 by Maktaba

al-Hadarah (Modern) Press in Sanaa, the Yemeni capital. It contains a different

and purely Yemeni perspective on al-Qaida that is worth discussing among

America's counter-terrorism specialists. First and foremost, reading and

studying an Arabic book, allows you an immersion into the language and concepts

of militant Islamist groups. Al-Jamhi begins be asking what makes al-Qaida

different from other militant Islamist groups? He responds by proposing that

al-Qaida considers jihad (as fighting) is their first and last means of change,

and the only formula for restoring the caliphate (an Islamic political

institution that existed after the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. until

its abolishment in 1924 by Kemal Ataturk). Other Islamist groups from those who

advocate change through proselytizing to those who have engaged in violent

direct action have compromised and taken a gradualist approach to achieving the

restoration of the caliphate. This tension between resorting to al-Qaida's

methods of violence on the one end to like-minded Islamists who resort to a more

grassroots campaign exists to the point, that al-Qaida has issued condemnations

against those who do not embrace their violent formula.

Al-Jamhi writes that al-Qaida strives to control the means of

obedience to its leaders, spends much energy preventing controversy, doubt and

schisms within the group, and uses arbitration to resolve internal disputes, not

always successfully. Regrettably he does not provide examples in his book, but

his view is in keeping with al-Qaida's history of creating a caste system in

which Egyptians form the inner circle of Bin Laden, and those who are Sudanese

or African are discriminate against and paid less. Al-Jamhi's description of

al-Qaida controlling the means of obedience to its leaders mirrors what Imam al-Sherief

(aka Dr. Fadl) who was a mentor to al-Qaida deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri and an

important ideologue of al-Qaida who now has ideologically turned against the

group, who describes al-Qaida as the cult of Bin Laden and Zawahiri.

The author also distinguishes between Jihadi Salafi and non-Jihadi

Salafi to describe the tension between those who wish to proselytize radical

intolerance and create a society based on this, and those like al-Qaida who

partake in direct violent action to achieve the same result. This distinction

between the two, begins the process of understanding the tensions and

frustrations of the Jihadi Salafi towards the non-Jihadi Salafi, which leads the

latter to cooperate with authorities to undermine the violent factions operating

in their midst.

Al-Jamhi discusses another peculiarity of al-Qaida,

the removal of the requirement for self-education or the cultivation of iman

(personal piety) before waging war, something advocated by many radical Salafi

groups and made popular by the Muslim Brotherhood during its violent phase

(1938-1970). Al-Qaida has no patience for cultivating personal piety as they

have a constant need for foot soldiers to propagate the cult of Bin Laden and

Zawahiri. In addition, al-Qaida has no patience for discussions on jihad (as

fighting) being defensive or offensive, yet it is compelled to enter this debate

to recruit from amidst fundamentalists and transforming them into militants.

Al-Jamhi argues that since al-Qaida has no clear strategic statements he scoured

their statements, writings, and declarations to reduce them into ten points.

These ten points are reductionist and pseudo-intellectual and offers a clear

distinction between Islam, Islamist, and the Militant Islamist theories of

al-Qaida. Here are the ten overarching al-Qaida strategies al-Jamhi

identifies.

Islam cannot ascend without jihad.

The Islamic community is a fighting community.

A Muslim cannot be excused from jihad (as fighting) except through
disability.

Tarbiah (preparation and education) is not among the requirements
for jihad

The natural state between Muslim and non-Muslim is war.

It is an obligation to kill Arab Muslim leaders because of their
apostasy.

Shirking the responsibility of jihad (as fighting) is the greatest
betrayal.

Jihad is the only way to address Muslim humiliation.

Corruption within the Muslim community can only be purged by jihad (as
fighting).

Confronting the oppressor who is alive is more important that
confronting the oppressor who is dead. This requires explanation, by dead
oppressor they mean those whose ideas and ideologies have weakened Islam.

What these ten points demonstrate is al-Qaida's need to impose

its version of Islam upon other Muslims, and a sanction to kill (Muslims and

non-Muslims) who stand in the way of this objective. Their ideology is naí¯ve

and pseudo-intellectual, as it attempts to force one form of Islamic belief upon

1.57 billion people who call themselves Muslims. They refuse and will never

accept the diversity within Muslims, and therein lay the seeds of their own

ideological marginalization. This aspect of the Quran is problematic for

al-Qaida, "Those who believe (in the Quran), and those who follow the Jewish

(scriptures), and the Christians, and the Sabians, any who believe in God and

the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord,

on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve" (Quran 2:62). In essence,

no individual or group can claim monopoly of God's mercy or deny it to others,

the antithesis of al-Qaida ideology. I hope this introduction al-Jamhi's work

will cause debate among America's counter-terrorism colleagues, and demonstrate

the need to highlight Arabic works critical of or about al-Qaida to our leaders

involved in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. My only critique of al-Jamhi

is that his book focused mainly on al-Qaida ideology and the title of the volume

is al-Qaida in Yemen. The title was misleading, as only about 20 percent of the

book discussed al-Qaida in Yemen.

Commander Aboul-Enein is a Medical Service Corps and Foreign

Area Officer. He is author of "Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the

Global Threat," published in 2010 by Naval Institute Press. Aboul-Enein is

Adjunct Islamic Studies Chair at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and

teaches an elective part-time at the college. He wishes to thank the National

Defense University Library for providing access to Arabic works through

inter-library loan.

Read more about A Fresh Yemeni Attack on al-Qaida Ideology

Book Review: The Junior Officers Reading Club

Book Review:

The Junior Officers Reading Club: Killing Time and Fighting Wars by Patrick

Hennessey. Published by Riverhead Trade; reprint edition (September 7, 2010),

336 pages. ISBN 1594484791

Reviewed by Michael Gates

After nearly nine years of conflict, the grandchildren of the "Greatest Generation"

have earned the right to tell their story from the frontlines of the Long War. This

generation of junior officers and soldiers from more than forty countries has experienced

persistent conflict, irregular threats, and unpredictable futures. Combat

tours have not ended in victory parades, but in training to prepare for the next

scheduled deployment. Numerous contemporary authors have struggled to articulate

the experiences of this new generation of warriors; however, former British Grenadier

Guards Captain Patrick Hennessey has definitively captured the voice of the newest

generation of veterans. Hennessey's remarkable memoir, The Junior Officer's

Reading Club: Killing Time and Fighting Wars, is likely to stand the test of

time as a brilliant and cathartic perspective from one of the young leaders of the

conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond. If you are looking for classical and

polished prose you will not find it here; this book does well by keeping the rugged

structure and tone of the conflicts that served as its' inspiration. The language

is brilliantly gritty and harsh, yet this work exquisitely frames the true essence

of the experiences, realities, and wisdom of the young Digital Age veterans fighting

in distant corners of the world.

Hennessey's solid contribution to the history of contemporary conflict demonstrates

how interconnected the modern world has become as nations have partnered to counter

common threats. This firsthand account of a young officer bouncing between conflicts

could easily represent the story of a young soldier from any of the coalition partners

serving in contingency operations around the world. The individual events

of this narrative only serve a secondary role to frame the most important aspect

of this memoir, the evolution and maturation of a modern soldier forced to grow

wise beyond his years in the complex and uncertain environments of modern conflict.

Hennessey's combat chronology traces the history of modern coalition warfare from

the relative simplicity of Balkan peacekeeping missions, to the stark intricacies

of Iraq and Afghanistan. The detailed accounts vividly describe his four year

journey from an optimistic Sandhurst cadet, boredom as a lieutenant during deployments

to Bosnia and Iraq, and his christening under fire in Afghanistan as the "youngest

captain in the army."

In the opening pages of his book Hennessey describes his formative early development,

seeking to live up to the legacies of his grandfathers. One was a career military

officer and veteran of the Normandy invasion, the other a respected college professor.

This contrast foreshadowed his later internal conflict as he weighed volunteering

his service at a time of war against his academic and occupational pursuits. Hennessey's

decision to join the military was motivated by shock evoked from the 9/11attacks,

boredom of civilian life, and a desire to tackle student debt. His early expectations

of military service and combat were framed by Vietnam War movies and the tales of

his relatives and neighbors from World War II, the Falkland Islands, and Desert

Storm. During his training at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, Hennessey

bristled with frustration over cadet training in conventional tactics, instead of

the "three-block war" and irregular threats he expected to confront. Following

Hennessey's graduation and commissioning as an infantry officer in the Grenadier

Guards, he conducted a brief deployment to Bosnia in late 2004. Hennessey characterized

this deployment as "the perfect blend of operational realism to sharpen professional

skills without anyone seriously thinking that everyone might not come home."

Following the Bosnia deployment, Hennessey and the Grenadier Guards bristle

in anticipation with the news of a battalion deployment to Iraq in the ongoing conflict

and expanding insurgency. The expectations of the deployment were muted by lackluster

pre-mission training focused on peacekeeping operations, tactics employed in Northern

Ireland, and the persistent shadow of Falkland Islands vignettes. The Iraq

deployment left Hennessey frustrated and bored running a British detention facility

and prompting the creation of the book's namesake "Junior Officer's Reading Club."

Discussions of works like Joseph Heller's Catch 22 and Michael Herr's

Dispatches were punctuated by sounds of combat in the far distance, further

emphasizing the tedium and perceived shame of being assigned a supporting role in

the war. Hennessey unabashedly recounts his unit's frustrations of missing the glory

and excitement of direct combat operations. This portion of the book beautifully

captures the eagerness and naivety of a junior officer who has never experienced

the true horrors of combat. Hennessey next finds his unit back at the Grenadier

Guards' barracks in London performing ceremonial guard duties, embarrassed for his

failure to be involved in "real combat," and anxious for a chance to prove himself

in future deployments.

Hennessey's wishes are realized when his unit is sent to Helmand, Afghanistan

in 2007. In this remarkable portion of this book Hennessey candidly describes his

own transformation as a soldier and leader during his Afghanistan deployment.

Through detailed accounts of intense combat, numbing casualties, and a mixture of

frustrations and admiration for his Afghan National Army comrades, the reader witnesses

the maturation of an officer witnessing the human toll of war. In this section Hennessey

is most effective at truly describing the dualities of modern conflict. Excerpts

range from descriptions of the excesses of Kandahar Airfield food concessions, the

primitive combat outpost of his fearless Afghan comrades, the impact of devastating

casualties within his unit, and whether his element was achieving any long term

gains. Captain Hennessey may have entered Afghanistan an eager young officer searching

for adventure and glory, but returned to ceremonial duty in London a man hardened

and mature beyond his years. Upon his return, Hennessey realizes he has grown increasingly

distant from the civilian world during his participation in several "small wars."

His dispatches poignantly describe the difficulties of his reintegration, and his

debate of whether the progress made abroad was worth the heavy human toll he witnessed.

Hennessy ends his Afghan account with a brilliant, yet ominous quote from the local

Afghan Army commander; "They sicken of the calm, who knew the storm." This prophetic

wisdom foreshadowed Hennessey's candid self introspection, as a young man making

sense of his recent experiences and debating difficult decisions involving his future

military service, and ultimately why he left.

Patrick Hennessey's great contribution to his generation of young officers and

soldiers is his frank and open self-dialogue illustrating the complex web of frustrations,

pride, and honor of coalition soldiers serving on the front lines of the Long War.

This work realistically captures the experiences and emotions that have shaped the

perspectives of modern soldiers, balancing constant communication with loved ones

with stark realities of combat thousands of miles away. These men and women share

bonds that defy international boundaries and language barriers. Veterans of these

conflicts will recognize the authenticity in Hennessey's account, while other readers

will gain great insight into the conflicts that have shaped the perspectives of

today's citizen soldiers and tomorrow's political and societal leaders.

Major Michael Gates is currently assigned to the Defense Analysis Department,

U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He was commissioned a U.S. Army officer in 2000,

with subsequent service in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Fewer good men to defend us....

.... Cutting the Marine Corps would be a risky strategy by Lieutenant Colonel Glen Butler in this morning's Washington Times. "Assuming the enemy will not raise the white flag anytime soon, downsizing now is somewhat akin to cutting much of the starting football team after the first game of the playoffs - but with life-and-death repercussions."

Read more about Fewer good men to defend us....

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