Writings of Saeed Obeid
al-Jamhi: A Fresh Yemeni Attack on al-Qaida Ideology
by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN
As a member of the United States Armed Service given the
privilege to be involved in counter-terrorism, I have been an advocate of
highlighting and using direct Arabic materials written by terrorists or Arabs
involved in countering terrorism to educate America's next generation of
counter-terrorism analysts, counter-insurgency specialists, foreign area
officers, and investigators. This Columbus Day weekend, I was reading the work
of Saeed Obeid al-Jamhi, a Yemeni intellectual and social commentator who offers
a fresh ideological attack on al-Qaida. His 2008 book is entitled, "Al-Qaida
fee al-Yemen: Al-Nash'ah, al-Khalfiyah, al-Imtidaad," or "Al-Qaida in Yemen:
Its Origin, Ideology, and Future." The book was published in 2008 by Maktaba
al-Hadarah (Modern) Press in Sanaa, the Yemeni capital. It contains a different
and purely Yemeni perspective on al-Qaida that is worth discussing among
America's counter-terrorism specialists. First and foremost, reading and
studying an Arabic book, allows you an immersion into the language and concepts
of militant Islamist groups. Al-Jamhi begins be asking what makes al-Qaida
different from other militant Islamist groups? He responds by proposing that
al-Qaida considers jihad (as fighting) is their first and last means of change,
and the only formula for restoring the caliphate (an Islamic political
institution that existed after the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. until
its abolishment in 1924 by Kemal Ataturk). Other Islamist groups from those who
advocate change through proselytizing to those who have engaged in violent
direct action have compromised and taken a gradualist approach to achieving the
restoration of the caliphate. This tension between resorting to al-Qaida's
methods of violence on the one end to like-minded Islamists who resort to a more
grassroots campaign exists to the point, that al-Qaida has issued condemnations
against those who do not embrace their violent formula.
Al-Jamhi writes that al-Qaida strives to control the means of
obedience to its leaders, spends much energy preventing controversy, doubt and
schisms within the group, and uses arbitration to resolve internal disputes, not
always successfully. Regrettably he does not provide examples in his book, but
his view is in keeping with al-Qaida's history of creating a caste system in
which Egyptians form the inner circle of Bin Laden, and those who are Sudanese
or African are discriminate against and paid less. Al-Jamhi's description of
al-Qaida controlling the means of obedience to its leaders mirrors what Imam al-Sherief
(aka Dr. Fadl) who was a mentor to al-Qaida deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri and an
important ideologue of al-Qaida who now has ideologically turned against the
group, who describes al-Qaida as the cult of Bin Laden and Zawahiri.
The author also distinguishes between Jihadi Salafi and non-Jihadi
Salafi to describe the tension between those who wish to proselytize radical
intolerance and create a society based on this, and those like al-Qaida who
partake in direct violent action to achieve the same result. This distinction
between the two, begins the process of understanding the tensions and
frustrations of the Jihadi Salafi towards the non-Jihadi Salafi, which leads the
latter to cooperate with authorities to undermine the violent factions operating
in their midst.
Al-Jamhi discusses another peculiarity of al-Qaida,
the removal of the requirement for self-education or the cultivation of iman
(personal piety) before waging war, something advocated by many radical Salafi
groups and made popular by the Muslim Brotherhood during its violent phase
(1938-1970). Al-Qaida has no patience for cultivating personal piety as they
have a constant need for foot soldiers to propagate the cult of Bin Laden and
Zawahiri. In addition, al-Qaida has no patience for discussions on jihad (as
fighting) being defensive or offensive, yet it is compelled to enter this debate
to recruit from amidst fundamentalists and transforming them into militants.
Al-Jamhi argues that since al-Qaida has no clear strategic statements he scoured
their statements, writings, and declarations to reduce them into ten points.
These ten points are reductionist and pseudo-intellectual and offers a clear
distinction between Islam, Islamist, and the Militant Islamist theories of
al-Qaida. Here are the ten overarching al-Qaida strategies al-Jamhi
identifies.
- Islam cannot ascend without jihad.
- The Islamic community is a fighting community.
- A Muslim cannot be excused from jihad (as fighting) except through
disability.
- Tarbiah (preparation and education) is not among the requirements
for jihad
- The natural state between Muslim and non-Muslim is war.
- It is an obligation to kill Arab Muslim leaders because of their
apostasy.
- Shirking the responsibility of jihad (as fighting) is the greatest
betrayal.
- Jihad is the only way to address Muslim humiliation.
- Corruption within the Muslim community can only be purged by jihad (as
fighting).
- Confronting the oppressor who is alive is more important that
confronting the oppressor who is dead. This requires explanation, by dead
oppressor they mean those whose ideas and ideologies have weakened Islam.
What these ten points demonstrate is al-Qaida's need to impose
its version of Islam upon other Muslims, and a sanction to kill (Muslims and
non-Muslims) who stand in the way of this objective. Their ideology is naí¯ve
and pseudo-intellectual, as it attempts to force one form of Islamic belief upon
1.57 billion people who call themselves Muslims. They refuse and will never
accept the diversity within Muslims, and therein lay the seeds of their own
ideological marginalization. This aspect of the Quran is problematic for
al-Qaida, "Those who believe (in the Quran), and those who follow the Jewish
(scriptures), and the Christians, and the Sabians, any who believe in God and
the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord,
on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve" (Quran 2:62). In essence,
no individual or group can claim monopoly of God's mercy or deny it to others,
the antithesis of al-Qaida ideology. I hope this introduction al-Jamhi's work
will cause debate among America's counter-terrorism colleagues, and demonstrate
the need to highlight Arabic works critical of or about al-Qaida to our leaders
involved in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. My only critique of al-Jamhi
is that his book focused mainly on al-Qaida ideology and the title of the volume
is al-Qaida in Yemen. The title was misleading, as only about 20 percent of the
book discussed al-Qaida in Yemen.
Commander Aboul-Enein is a Medical Service Corps and Foreign
Area Officer. He is author of "Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the
Global Threat," published in 2010 by Naval Institute Press. Aboul-Enein is
Adjunct Islamic Studies Chair at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and
teaches an elective part-time at the college. He wishes to thank the National
Defense University Library for providing access to Arabic works through
inter-library loan.