Travels with Nick # 6: The Big Picture
His argument focused on the following points:
- The core political strategy in Afghanistan is flawed because the constitution focuses power in the central government — in violent contrast with Afghan's history of resistance to government from the center.- The strategy is further destroyed because Afghan politicians are primarily focused on extracting billions of dollars from the US in the form of assistance and contracts.
- A population-centric COIN strategy thus will fail because even if you successfully clear, hold, and build at the local level (as it is in some areas — see my previous post on Helmand), these local successes will crumble when you try to connect them to the corrupt central government.
He makes an interesting and impassioned case... Similar to arguments I heard from another mid-level State official in RC-East 18 months earlier. That earlier official, Matt Hoh, later resigned over US policy.
I challenged my State Department colleague on his analysis on two fronts. First, those criticisms may be valid but he didn't articulate an alternative approach. What is it? Second, if you assume Pashtunistan is ungovernable, how do you keep conflict, narco-criminality, and Islamic militancy from weakening Afghanistan and Pakistan and empowering al Queda and associated Islamic militant terrorism? His answer was Biden-esque: downsize the mission to counter-terrorism and the narrow goal of disrupting terrorist networks in Pashtunistan. Let Afghanistan be Afghanistan otherwise, whether that means corruption, civil war, or some political evolution to stability.
The hard truth is there is no obvious or easy strategy in Afghanistan. The clarity of 9/11 and the fast toppling of the Taliban and al Queda's sanctuary slowly evolved into an overambitious and under-resourced nation building project. In late fall of 2001, an historic coalition joined American in responding to a particularly clear and horrific attack. After almost a decade of missteps, neglect, and strategic ambiguity, President Obama and his team struggle with damaged credibility and a war-weary coalition and domestic audience. There is no denying the continuing dangers of extremism on both sides of the AfPak border, but the strategic logic and promise of our presence is almost lost.
In many ways, US strategy is now more about leaving as winners than any particular political or military goal. After nine years, our surge efforts will push the needle a bit in Karzai's direction, but AfPak will remain unstable and fraught with extremism for decades. In the next few years, we will transition to a counter-terrorism strategy. Although not stated as such, the strategy now is for a final COIN push to set up that transition with slightly more favorable conditions for the Afghan government and with the scent of victory for the US mission.
Looking at it another way, if we were NOT in Afghanistan today, do any of us think President Obama order up 150,000 troops to bolster a weak and corrupt regime in such a far, desolate, and uncertain place? I don't think so. Rather, the slow transition to counter-terrorism is driven by political credibility — the interest in credibly declaring victory rather than just declaring exit.
And this primary objective of political victory is not a bankrupt sentiment. Demonstration of resolve and leaving with a narrative of victory has important long term strategic value for future credibility. It is in our interest for allies, enemies — and US -- to see American hard power as resolute and unchallengeable and not transient, degradable, or even defeated. The victory narrative strengthens America's ability to deter future challenges to American power and our ability to muster new coalitions for the next fight. And we also carry the honor of giving Afghanistan the best possible chance at a sustainable peace.
Thanks to the many leaders, soldiers, Marines, and civilians who took time to speak with me on my visit to Kabul, Kandahar, and Helmand. We are indebted to your service.
SWJ Editors' Note: Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and "soft power" types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.