| Small Wars Journal

Battalion Level Intelligence: An S-2's Perspective by Captain Robert C. Schotte, USMC, at MIL INT. BLUF: Capt Schotter is an instructor at the Navy Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center and an experienced combat veteran having served most recently as a battalion S-2 in Afghanistan. The blog post at the link are his insights into battlaion intelligence operations and how they might be improved.

Update: Apparently the original MIL INT post is blocked by elements of ISAF. By request, and by permission of MIL INT, here is a SWJ server copy of Intelligence at the Battalion Level -- An S2's Perspective by Captain Robert C. Schotter. MIL INT is a new blog covering a wide spectrum of military intelligence issues.

Defence Minister Fox on the U.K.s Strategic Defence and Security Review

Here is a transcript of the speech given by the U.K. Defence Minister Liam Fox yesterday at Chatham House in London. The speech sets out comprehensively the goals and achievements of the U.K.'s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) completed last October and aimed at restructuring the British Ministry of Defence to take into account current and future threats while reducing costs.

Minister Fox states, "The SDSR has ensured that we will remain in the premier league of military powers. It is not an agenda for retrenchment; it's an ambitious agenda for transformation over time. It is not an agenda for the next general election; it's an agenda for the next generation."

Read more about Defence Minister Fox on the U.K.s Strategic Defence and Security Review

This Week at War: The Milosevic Option

Why NATO may soon break out the Kosovo playbook in Libya.

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) NATO wants to get 'more aggressive' against Qaddafi. But how exactly?

2) How to get policymakers to understand tradeoffs -- and then remember them later

NATO wants to get 'more aggressive' against Qaddafi. But how exactly?

Over the past two week, the rebels fighting Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi have achieved some modest gains. Rebels in the western city of Misrata have apparently halted Qaddafi's artillery bombardment of the city center. More cracks may have developed inside the leader's inner circle. But some NATO military leaders, concerned that the overall military stalemate remains in place, are looking for ways to be "more aggressive" with the air power at their disposal. The task for NATO policymakers is to figure how to bomb Qaddafi and his forces more aggressively without taking more risks with the civilian population NATO explicitly pledged to protect.

According to the BBC, the rebel militia in Misrata has pushed back government forces a few kilometers in several directions. The bombardment of the port area and downtown has ceased as the modest rebel advance was enough to push pro-Qaddafi artillery and rocket launchers out of range. NATO airstrikes against eight Qaddafi warships -- some of which had mined Misrata's port -- will also provide some relief to the population. As welcome as these developments are for the residents of the city, this local tactical success does not seem to have affected the larger strategic stalemate throughout Libya. The eastern frontline south of Benghazi remains roughly unchanged and Qaddafi's forces remain in control of Tripoli and most of the western half of the country.

With rebel ground formations static and incapable of offensive maneuver, the NATO air campaign appears increasingly focused on attacks against government command-and-control and leadership targets. Foremost among these are repeated nighttime strikes against Qaddafi's sprawling compound in Tripoli. It is hard to imagine the military utility of these return visits to Qaddafi's compound -- Qaddafi himself long since decamped to residential areas or other obvious "no go" areas for NATO bombing. Subordinate commanders who might have once used the compound also must have long since established alternate command sites.

NATO's bombardment strategy is now likely more focused on applying political and psychological coercion against the regime rather than inflicting battlefield damage against military forces. Repeated attacks against the compound are designed to erode Qaddafi's prestige. NATO strikes on the compound and other possible leadership locations may also be aimed at frightening Qaddafi's inner circle. This intimidation, combined with legal carrots and sticks now offered by the International Criminal Court, are intended to induce more defections from those around Qaddafi. This strategy may have notched a success; Libya's oil minister has gone missing and may have defected.

But it may not be working fast enough for some NATO leaders. Gen. David Richards, Britain's top military commander, called for expanding the list of acceptable targets. Richards wants to add "infrastructure" targets to NATO's lists. Traditionally, attacks on classic infrastructure targets such as bridges, roads, power plants, and telecommunication systems are designed to isolate an adversary's ground forces, making them more vulnerable to defeat on the battlefield. But attacks on such targets are simultaneously devastating to the civilian population, which is why they have been avoided thus far in the Libyan campaign.

Richards may be hoping to reprise the strategy used effectively against Slobodan Milosevic during the 1999 Kosovo air campaign. As I discussed in an earlier column, NATO faced a similar stalemate during its bombing campaign against Serbia. It then expanded its attacks against Milosevic's lieutenants and the economic assets inside Serbia valued by those lieutenants. This change in tactics created enough pressure inside the ruling inner circle to force Milosevic to succumb. Richards' definition of "infrastructure" may have these regime leadership assets in mind.

Libya's rebels and NATO should be mildly encouraged by the perceptible erosion suffered by Qaddafi over the past two weeks. But it hasn't been enough to break the stalemate. NATO may now be —to double down on the coercive air campaign it is aiming at Qaddafi. Whether it can do that without increasing the suffering of the broader population is another question.

How to get policymakers to understand tradeoffs -- and then remember them later

Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn went to the Intrepid Museum in New York City on May 11 to discuss how he and his colleagues are preparing for the coming lean years at the Pentagon. Lynn described what he and his staff have learned from the five previous episodes of defense drawdowns that have occurred since World War II. Lynn declared the previous drawdowns failures that left future policymakers unprepared for the security challenges they eventually faced. Lynn and his colleagues hope to do better this time.

Echoing comments Defense Secretary Robert Gates made this week, Lynn made clear that President Barack Obama's call for an additional $400 billion in security cuts over the next decade will create risks for future policymakers by limiting the military options available to them. In order to meet Obama's defense cut number, policymakers today will have to choose between acquiring certain future capabilities (such as new systems designed to address emerging threats) or having the capacities (enough soldiers and equipment) needed to accomplish some security objectives around the world. Lynn, Gates, and, presumably, Leon Panetta -- Gates successor -- hope to make sure that Obama and other top officials understand these trade-offs and consequences.

In his speech, Lynn discussed the importance of maintaining a substantial research and development program during the drawdown. He noted how policymakers during the 1970s drawdown maintained research into stealth technology, an investment that continues to pay off today. For the future, Lynn wants to continue research bets on long range strike systems, unmanned aircraft, and cyber capabilities. The purchase of these capabilities will presumably come out of the hide of forgone capacities - such as fewer ground combat brigades or legacy warships and aircraft.

It is here that top policymakers will have to make agonizing choices that risk possibly dramatic future consequences. Peer competitors like China will soon possess military research and technical capabilities that will nearly match those of the United States. Given the rapid advance of technology, it will be far too risky to forgo the development of leading capabilities such as those listed by Lynn. The long lead times required for fielding leading-edge systems will likely make it impossible to fill in a vulnerable technology gap during an emerging crisis.

But the price of paying for capability insurance may mean that top policymakers may not have the soldiers, warships, and airplanes to respond to politically urgent developments. For example, Harvard professor Sarah Sewall and retired general Anthony Zinni recently wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post urging the Pentagon and military commanders to prepare plans for stopping mass atrocities anywhere in the world. Their piece appeared just a few weeks after Obama, European leaders, and others intervened in Libya for exactly this purpose. Beyond Libya, the world affords many more opportunities for similar humanitarian interventions by military forces. But a very real consequence of the tighter budget cap on the Pentagon may be to cause Obama or a future president to have to explain why he can only watch while some humanitarian disaster takes place because military capacities have already been committed elsewhere. Indeed, a lack of available military capacity in the Western powers leading the campaign against Qaddafi partly explains why the coalition is unable to resolve the Libyan conflict.

Sewall and Zinni explained that one reason for preparing such military plans is to inform policymakers of the implications of intervention before they make any commitments. Lynn, Gates, and Panetta have a similar goal in mind for the new defense review. What remains to be seen is whether down the road the policymakers who ordered defense savings will remember the constraints they previously created.

Terrain has hindered 101st Airborne in ensuring Afghan security

Terrain has hindered 101st Airborne in ensuring Afghan security

by Kristin M. Hall

The Leaf Chronicle

BLUF The challenge the military faced was growing government in eastern regions that have been traditionally resistant to outside influence, said Maj. Gen. John F. Campbell, outgoing commander of NATO forces in eastern Afghanistan and commander of 101st Airborne Division.

"In a lot of these areas, they don't care about a central government and they don't care about Kabul," Campbell said.

Under his command, the units in the east were redirected for counter-terrorism missions like large air assaults and operations to kill and capture insurgents. Pulling coalition troops out also directed attacks away from the bases, Campbell said, such as Forward Operating Base Blessing in Kunar province, where Afghan units remain.

"At FOB Blessing, in the month of February, they got hit 35 times," Campbell said. "Since March 1, since we came out of it, it's been hit twice."

Much more at The Leaf Chronicle

Read more about Terrain has hindered 101st Airborne in ensuring Afghan security

Today's SWJ Helpful Map Graphic

A picture, annotated with distance, is worth a thousand words.

Is War Over?

Is War Over?

by A.E. Stahl

It appears that war, that is to say, 'interstate industrial war' or 'regular war', is coming to an end, or so we are led to believe. Rather, we are now challenged with a multitude of hotspots around the world containing "confrontation, conflict and combat". We even have a glut of names and taxonomies for current war and warfare: population-centric counterinsurgency, network-centric warfare, new wars, asymmetric wars, compound wars, netwar, twenty-first century warfare, and even an "actor-centric theory of war." The idea that interstate industrial war has been on the decline and that war has transformed is not new. Scholars such as Martin Van Crevald had persuasively but unsuccessfully already brought this non-Clausewitzian perspective to our attention as early as 1990, which was followed up by a number of other academics that attempted the same feat. However, even newer speculations are being drawn up in order to help place both war and warfare in its proper context -- for example, General Rupert Smith's "War amongst the people". Smith states that war amongst the people "...is the reality in which people in the streets and houses and fields -- all the people, anywhere -- are the battlefield." Interstate industrial war or regular war, where two or more sovereign nation-states face off in a physical competition of force to ultimately impose political will on one's opponent, backed by tank and airpower, artillery and infantry, with aims of decisive battles, no longer exists. That's the speculation, at least. On the surface it would seem that Smith's musings, among others, holds water. After all, post-1945, the world has been witness to more state versus non-state fighting than at any point since the inception of the modern state system. Moreover, many claim that globalization -- that seemingly unstoppable force responsible for our global interconnectedness on all levels -- has begun to diminish the boundaries of the nation-state. That is, the artificial borders that once clearly demarcated a state are becoming blurred, some think soon to the vanishing point and, hypothetically, if states were to become irrelevant, so too would national armies with it, regular war. While these speculations may have some validity, it ultimately leads to the great strategic question: so what?

While so-called regular war — which is nothing more than a title of a specific category — has in fact been on the decline, it is still very much alive. Moreover, a decline in prevalence of "state on state" does not automatically infer that the pattern will not at some point reverse itself. It is a possibility, and not a far fetched one — we could very likely see an increase in state on state war in the future. As such, it is something that states must continue to consider and prepare for. While modern warfare has mainly consisted of irregular fighters engaged with a state, the list of regular wars is far from shabby: the Bosnian War; First and Second Chechen Wars; First and Second Congo Wars; Kosovo War; 2001 War in Afghanistan (against the Taliban); 2003 War in Iraq (at least the first 3+ weeks of combat), and now NATO in Libya. One could argue that these are all "hybrid" or "asymmetrical" wars and not truly regular war. But, hasn't all warfare throughout history been hybrid or asymmetrical or both? That is, even the wars we refer to as "regular" have almost always contained irregular elements.

In other words, regular wars do have irregular participating actors, such as a supporting guerilla organization, mercenaries, or even criminal networks -- this is currently witnessed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. The use of irregular elements for the support of conventional forces is not a new concept. Clausewitz spoke of their support for the army, though playing minor roles (irregular detachments, not criminal networks). Even earlier, mercenaries, slaves and prisoners played major roles in the armed forces of Carthage, Rome and Greece. The difference is that today, irregulars clearly play a much greater and independent role in waging warfare. So much so that it is being predicted that regular war (state versus state) will cease to exist.

While warfare does change, it is the view that if war in the state-on-state model declines, then war will no longer be 'war' — it will become (as some already believe) some new type of war or "confrontation, conflict and combat" -- as if they are not the same. This is problematic mainly for four reasons. First, as others have stated, it is impossible to truly know where war will end up. We simply cannot know the future and prognosticating borders on the "waste of time". No matter how confident an assessment of future war may seem, it will always be extremely unreliable. Moreover, if we are to accept the notion that war is transforming, then we must not view transformation as equivalent to something that changes in only one direction. As easily as war has taken on an irregular bent, there is no reason to exclude the notion that the opposite may result. The second reason, and perhaps the most important, is that war and warfare are still affairs of the state, managed by political animals. There is no reason to believe that the state is quickly losing legitimacy as the main political actor. There may be more nonstate or irregular actors than in the past, but there are also more states today than ever before in history. Even if the state were to cease to exist, new political entities would likely be formed, as that is part of human nature, and war would continue amongst and between these new entities, as violence regarding the distribution of power is also an inescapable element of human nature. The third reason is that "war is war is war". Despite the various characteristics it espouses, the diverse forms it adopts, and the differing labels applied to it, all organized violence for political aims represents "war". War will continue shifting and shaping society, influencing great and small powers, creating new communities and aiding in the fall of others, destroying peace only to usher in an even better era than previously existed, all through the use of force for the ends of policy, as this has always been war's purpose. The evidence for such comments lies in over 2,500 years of the history of warfare. Lastly, there is no reason to purport that the nature of war or warfare will alter. This is not to say that it is not possible. This is to say that in over 2,500 years, the nature of war and warfare has never changed. It remains the realm of passion, chance, and reason and there is nothing, at least not in the foreseeable future that can remove these ever-present elements from conflict.

Is regular war over? Definitely not but it does not matter even if state-on-state combat were to cease because war in other forms would still be taking place; it would not be "new war" or "something other than war". While we may be facing "confrontation, conflict and combat", that is just a fancy way of saying "war" and "warfare". War and warfare, in its many forms and diverse characteristics, are occurring at this moment in various parts of the world and one will be hard pressed to find one period in human history when warfare was not taking place. States, tanks, artillery, and technology are not the cause of war and warfare: that belongs to people and politics. We must not confuse the lack of a state-on-state character with a decline in war. Trends express that non-state actors will continue to be the primary opponent in wars against states -- but those are still wars, albeit with the application of violence carried out by a mix of regulars and irregulars. It is the same for any irregular-versus-irregular conflict as well -- it is still warfare. It would be wise to always keep in mind the near-perfect definition of war proffered in the 19th century: "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." War is not about states. War is the risky and unsavory business rooted in politics, both of which have existed since the rise of human civilization.

As regards the future, no one knows and no one will know how things will unfold. New speculations (dare we say "theories" or "paradigms") about war and warfare may be helpful but they are not concrete and therefore, can only assist us to a certain degree. We can attempt to use (and should use) other tools, such as our deductive reasoning and of course history to offer insight into what may happen -- but that is all we can do. What we must ensure, simultaneously, is to never write-off anything, to prepare for everything, to avoid being seduced by fashionable words or slogans, and most importantly, to never forget the fundamentals of war and strategy.

A.E. Stahl is the co-founder and publisher of Infinity Journal and a Research Fellow at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT).

20 May SWJ Roundup

Keep the Roundup (the Journal, the Blog and the Council) Going AND Get a Nifty Coin to Boot

Obama Middle East Speech / N. Africa and Reactions

Obama: Status Quo Unsustainable - Washington Post

Obama Sees '67 Borders as Starting Point - New York Times

Obama Makes Blunt Push for Mideast Peace - Los Angeles Times

Obama Sees Door for U.S. Influence in Middle East - Washington Times

Obama and Netanyahu Are Facing a Turning Point - New York Times

Barack Obama Presses for Middle East Reform - BBC News

Obama: U.S. Stands with Middle East Nations Open to Reform - AFPS

Obama: Palestine-Israel Solution Must Be Based on 1967 Borders - VOA

Obama: US Supports Political, Economic Reform in Mideast, N. Africa - VOA

Obama Slams Bahrain, Host of 5th Fleet - Stars and Stripes

Speech Fails to Resonate in Arab World - Washington Post

Reaction in Arab Capitals Is Muted and Mixed - New York Times

Israel Objects to Obama Remarks on Borders - Voice of America

Netanyahu Responds Icily to Obama Remarks - New York Times

Netanyahu Rejects Obama 1967 View - BBC News

Israel Calls on Obama to Stick to Peace Terms - Washington Times

Netanyahu at White House after Obama Challenge - Associated Press

Obama Speech: Cairo Reflects Egypt's Disillusionment - BBC News

Al Qaeda Releases bin Laden Message Before Speech - Washington Times

A New Mideast Policy - Washington Post editorial

Peace and Change - New York Times editorial

The News in Obama's Speech - Washington Post opinion

Obama's Mideast Policy Looks Good, on Paper - Washington Post opinion

Obama's Mideast Peace Gaffe - Washington Post opinion

What About Saudi Arabia? - Washington Post opinion

Afghanistan

New Test for Taliban and al-Qaeda Ties - Washington Post

Village Destroyed at Hands of Men Who Vowed Peace - New York Times

Troop Morale in Afghanistan Plummets, Report Says - Associated Press

35 Killed in Afghan Road Construction Attack - Voice of America

Insurgents Kill at Least 35 in Attack on Road Crew - New York Times

Afghan Road Workers Killed in Taliban Ambush - BBC News

Afghan Reintegration Efforts Grow, Official Says - AFPS

Forces Kill 60 Enemy Fighters in 3-day Operation - AFPS

Stryker Soldier will Fight New Charges - Associated Press

Pakistan

U.S., Pakistan Continue Push to Repair Ties - Voice of America

Anger Simmers in Pakistani Army over bin Laden Raid - Washington Post

Pakistani Dies From Attack on U.S. Vehicles - New York Times

Bomb Hits U.S. Vehicle in Peshawar - BBC News

Taliban Bomber Attacks U.S. Vehicles in Pakistan - Associated Press

China Gives Pakistan 50 Fighter Jets - New York Times

Syria

Obama Tells Syria's Assad to Lead Transition or Leave - Voice of America

Obama Hints at Shift on Syria - Los Angeles Times

Syria Condemns U.S. Sanctions on Assad - New York Times

Syrian Troops, Tanks Ease Grip on Defiant Border Town - Voice of America

Libya

Libya Offers to Pull Out of Cities if Rebels do Same - Washington Post

NATO Expects Regime to Eventually Collapse - Los Angeles Times

Libya Revolt Sidelines Women, Who Led It - New York Times

NATO Reports Gains in Libya, Gadhafi Supporters Rally - Voice of America

NATO Warplanes Attack Libyan Ships in 3 Ports - New York Times

NATO Strikes Hit Libya Warships - BBC News

A Deadline on Libya - Washington Post editorial

Iraq

Deadly Bombings Add Fuel to Debate Over U.S. Departure - McClatchy

Deadly Blasts in Kirkuk Hit Iraqi Security Forces - New York Times

Bomb Kills Iraqi Police, Firefighters - Washington Post

Triple Bombing Kills 27 at Iraqi Police Station - Associated Press

Iran

Court Filings Assert Iran Had Link to 9/11 Attacks - New York Times

Iran's President to Lead Next OPEC Meeting - New York Times

Israel / Palestinians

Harsh West Bank `Honor Killing' Brings Tougher Law - Associated Press

Middle East / North Africa

Arab Uprising Disturbing Flow of Anti-terror Intel - Associated Press

Piracy

Attack Pirate Bosses on Land, Chinese General Says - Reuters

China to Pirates: All Your Base Are Belong to Us - Danger Room

U.S. Department of Defense

Secretary Urges Careful Thought in Spending Reductions - AFPS

Military Bands to Cost Pentagon $50B - The Hill

Challenges Lie Ahead for Army, Gates Says - AFPS

Gates Shares Views on Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan - AFPS

DOD Ramps Up War of Words over Leaks on Raid - Stars and Stripes

Bin Laden Compound Now a Virtual Training Ground - Danger Room

Empire Challenge to Test Military Might - Sierra Vista Herald

Senate Panel Questions Pentagon on F-35 - Washington Post

Estimated Cost of Fighter Jet Troubles Lawmakers - Stars and Stripes

U.S. Sailor Pleads Guilty to Attempted China Spying - Associated Press

Gossip and RUMINT at the Pentagon - Wall Street Journal

United States

Panetta Warns Against bin Laden Leaks - Washington Post

Argument for 'Enhanced' Interrogation Tactics - Washington Times

Top Lawmakers Agree to Patriot Act Extension - Associated Press

Drug, Immigrant Smuggling Ring Busted in Arizona - Voice of America

Australia

Australian Funeral Held for Last WWI Combat Vet - Associated Press

International Monetary Fund

Former IMF Chief Indicted, Granted Bail - Voice of America

NY Court Grants Strauss-Kahn Bail - BBC News

A Shaken Agency Looks to the Future - New York Times

At IMF, Men on Prowl and Women on Guard - New York Times

Africa

Ivory Coast Asks for ICC Probe - BBC News

British Police Warn Rwandan Dissidents of Threat - New York Times

Americas

Cartel Leader, Alleged Police Ally Arrested in Mexico - Voice of America

Ecuador's Correa Wins Referendum - BBC News

Asia Pacific

Taiwanese General Indicted for China Spying - Associated Press

N. Korea's Kim Jong Eun Reportedly in China - Washington Post

Reports Say North Korean Leader's Son Visits China - New York Times

N. Korea Heir Apparent Visiting China - Agence France-Presse

Disasters Send Japanese Economy into Recession - Associated Press

Europe

U.S.-Europe Partnership Faces New Challenges - Washington Times

Queen's Ireland Visit Seen as Significant Advance - New York Times

Thousands Protest in Spanish Cities - Washington Post

South Asia

India Reviewing Most Wanted List - BBC News

New West Bengal Leader Sworn In - BBC News

Sri Lanka Students Fight Military Training Scheme - BBC News

Read more about 20 May SWJ Roundup

Malalai Honored

Malalai Honored by Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.

Malalai ... For our Afghan partners, the name Malalai is a hallowed name of a woman, a wife, a daughter who assumed a position on the battlefield in 1880 just as the Afghans were faltering against their British foe ... she seized the battle flag and led an Afghan unit. A British bullet pierced her body and took her life, but her bravery in the face of danger has shown the mettle of the Afghan people.

From this bravery rises a group of courageous women who dedicate themselves to Afghanistan and their fellow countrymen and women. Today, I was privileged to be with the Afghan Training Command Commander, MG Karim, and the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) Commander, BG Patyani, at the second "Malalai Company" Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduation.

Prior to the graduation, we were honored to hear MG Karim speak to the soon to be newly commissioned Afghan Army Lieutenants. With their shiny gold bars adorning their uniforms, the future lieutenants showed the same pride and honor as their company's namesake, Malalai. As MG Karim reminded them that they are "the future of Afghanistan and they are also the future leaders of the Afghan Army" you could see them smile knowing the honor that comment bestows on each of them.

Just prior to the ceremony for the newest ANA officers, I had the opportunity to speak with five of the pioneer female officers from the first OCS class who had returned to the commissioning ceremony to welcome these 20 daughters of Afghanistan into their sisterhood of arms!

The Malalai namesake OCS is a 20-week training course dedicated to training Afghan women who volunteer to serve in the Afghan National Army. The women follow the same syllabus as the male OCS including basic rifle marksmanship ... of which they are all good shots! During OCS their training focus is on various required courses such as finance, signal, computer studies, and spoken and written English rather than combat training. After graduation, they attend their vocational school that trains them on their specific skills for service in the Afghan Army.

After speaking with these young lieutenants, there is no doubt they will serve their nation, and their fellow Afghans, with the respect and honor that Malalai would expect from each of them!

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