Small Wars Journal

CTC Sentinel on the Death of Usama bin Ladin

Thu, 05/12/2011 - 6:30pm
West Point's Combating Terrorism Center has released a Special Issue of the CTC Sentinel on the death of Usama bin Ladin. The new issue can be found here.

The Special Issue contains the following articles:

- Bin Ladin's Killing and its Effect on Al-Qa`ida: What Comes Next? By Bruce Hoffman

- Special Operations Forces and the Raid Against Bin Ladin: Policymaker Considerations in Combating Terrorism by Michele L. Malvesti and Frances Fragos Townsend

- How Bin Ladin's Death Will Affect Al-Qa`ida's Regional Franchises by Camille Tawil

- The Impact of Bin Ladin's Death on AQAP in Yemen by Gregory D. Johnsen

- The Impact of Bin Ladin's Death on AQIM in North Africa by Geoff D. Porter

- Bin Ladin's Death Through the Lens of Al-Qa`ida's Confidential Secretary by Nelly Lahoud

- Bin Ladin's Location Reveals Limits of Liaison Intelligence Relationships by Charles Faddis

- What the Experts Say... With Juan C. Zarate, Mark Kimmitt, Elliott Abrams, Michael F. Walker, Frank Taylor, Rohan Gunaratna, Dell L. Dailey and Thomas W. O'Connell

Don't Kill Gaddafi

Thu, 05/12/2011 - 3:27pm
Don't Kill Gaddafi

by Patrick McKinney

In the early hours of April 15, 1986, American and allied aircraft launched raids against Libyan military targets and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's compound. In the early hours of April 25, 2011, American and allied aircraft launched raids against Libyan military targets and the Gaddafi compound. Air strikes followed again on April 30, and appear to have killed Colonel Gaddafi's son. President Ronald Reagan ordered the first strikes as punitive action in retaliation to the terrorist bombing of American servicemen in Germany, and to prevent future attacks. The Obama administration authorized strikes as an escalation of force to resolve an emerging political and military stalemate. Once a decisive military act, targeted killings are descending the slippery slope of acceptance for conflict resolution.

On March 17, 2011, the United Nations passed Resolution 1973, authorizing the international community to establish a no-fly zone and short of foreign occupation, protect civilians. It did not approve regime change. President Barack Obama then ordered the United States military to lead airstrikes against the Gaddafi regime to halt an expected massacre of Libyan rebels and civilians. Allied missiles and bombs halted the Libyan offensive, but have not ended the urban fighting and continued shelling of rebel Libyan cities. The United States intended to transition the burden and leadership of the campaign to NATO, but fiscal, technological and capability realities have kept the United States in the fight. American military leaders announced that American Predator drone aircraft now patrol Libyan airspace, and many experts suggest their ultimate mission is the assassination of Colonel Gaddafi.

On November 3, 2002, the United States began its current campaign of targeted killings with a drone missile strike on an al Qaeda leader in Yemen. Following the Israeli model of killing terror suspects and targets off the direct battlefield, the United States exploited its advantages in technology, intelligence, and military reach to target and kill individual targets. The policy continued with shock and awe strikes during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and with continued drone attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. These strikes are vetted and cleared by military personnel, intelligence officials, lawyers, and if appropriate, the political chain. They target al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their allies who are at war with the United States and its allies. Colonel Gaddafi is a dictator and a killer, but until Operation Odyssey Dawn, he was no longer at war with the United States.

President Reagan's bombings in 1986 worked. Colonel Gaddafi halted his explicit and covert support of terrorism. In response to the Iraq invasion of 2003, he renounced the Libyan WMD programs and attempted to open channels to the international community; and in 2008, he compensated the families of the Lockerbie bombing and other Libyan sponsored terror attacks. He continued his repressive dictatorial rule, stirred controversy, and created spectacle in the international political scene, but he ceased his support of terrorism against the United States.

On May 2, 2011, American forces raided a compound in Pakistan and killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. The media coverage and domestic jubilation of the mission's success have led to demands for the similar targeting of Colonel Gaddafi. Newspaper editorials, American politicians, and political commentators across the spectrum support have called for Gaddafi's death to resolve the crisis. al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden declared a war on the United States that continues today. A non-state international terrorist network, al Qaeda lacks the legitimacy and structural institutions for peaceful or diplomatic resolutions of their conflict. America must meet al Qaeda's demands, or continue the fight; and bin Laden was a casualty of this war he initiated. Gaddafi's regime is not innocent, but it does exist in the international community, and can respond to political and diplomatic means. Killing bin Laden does not justify killing Gaddafi.

Some argue that killing Gaddafi is justified by his alleged war crimes against the Libyan people, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) is pursuing investigations for these acts. Gaddafi has killed innocent civilians, but he has also killed rebels fighting his regime. If the international community intends to continue to justify its actions through international institutions, then it must follow due process and await fair proceedings. The Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, was found guilty for war crimes by the ICC, but he remains free. Does the international community or America have an obligation, or right to kill al-Bashir? If so, where does this obligation end, and how does America decide when to act? The world would be a better place if certain leaders were removed, but American strikes are not a panacea.

The United States banned political assassination in 1976, but has since used targeted killings for defense. The United States Congress has not declared war or authorized escalated military action in Libya, so the assassination of Colonel Gaddafi enters questionable territory. I served in the United States Army field artillery, where the intended target is miles away and receives volleys of high explosive; and was in Balad, Iraq, preparing a convoy when they announced the targeted killing of the al Qaeda in Iraq leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. I clapped my hands when I heard the news, and I still support the killing of legitimate targets.

For his past crimes abroad and at home, I would not shed a tear if Colonel Muammar Gaddafi were tried in an international court and then executed, but his assassination would set a dangerous precedent. On March 28, the American Deputy National Security Advisor stated, "... we don't make decisions about questions like intervention based on consistency or precedent." If the administration does not intend to use precedent for judging intervention abroad, it should not criticize or object if another state relies on assassination to resolve a future stalemate. If the United States intended to intervene and force regime change, it could have done so when decisive action would have turned the tide against the Libyan regime. Targeted killing now, to resolve a political and military stalemate, is inadvisable. A missile strike may seem the easy answer, and it may be easy, but it is the wrong choice. Americans must not be seduced into resolving or salvaging every international dispute by killing the opposition's leaders.

Patrick McKinney served as a United States Army officer and deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom IV. He now resides in Alexandria, VA. The opinions and views expressed in this piece are his own.

12 May SWJ Roundup

Thu, 05/12/2011 - 2:35am
Keep the Roundup (the Journal, the Blog and the Council) Going AND Get a Nifty Coin to Boot

Al Qaeda

Al-Qaida Warns of More Attacks - Voice of America

Evidence: Bin Laden Worked Like a Crime Boss - Washington Post

Journal Contains bin Laden's Thoughts on Killing Americans - Los Angeles Times

Diary: Bin Laden Eyed New Targets, Big Body Count - Associated Press

Couriers Enabled bin Laden to Hide - Washington Times

U.S. Militant Vows to Avenge bin Laden's Death - Associated Press

Saudi Police: 3 al-Qaida Members Surrender - Associated Press

Bin Laden Photos Available to Some Lawmakers - Associated Press

Pakistan

Pakistani Is Seeking Inquiry On U.S. Raid - New York Times

Pakistani Intelligence: Friend or Foe? - Associated Press

U.S. Terrorism Trial May Raise Tensions With Pakistan - Reuters

Demanding Answers From Pakistan - New York Times opinion

Now's the Time to push Pakistan - Washington Post opinion

Afghanistan

Weak Afghan Army Raises Doubts Over Readiness - Washington Times

Taliban Resistance 'Under-estimated' by Britain - BBC News

Syria

Activists: Syrian Tanks, Troops Kill 19 People in South, West - Voice of America

Syrians Report Shelling of City and Mass Arrests - New York Times

Syrian Security Forces Kill at Least 18 - Washington Post

Syria Tanks 'Shell' Protest City of Homs - BBC News

Syrian Shelling Kills 18, Evokes 1982 Crackdown - Associated Press

Syria Loses Spot For U.N. Rights Panel - New York Times

Syria Sent Missing Al Jazeera Journalist to Iran - New York Times

Syria 'Deports al-Jazeera's Dorothy Parvaz to Iran' - BBC News

Libya / Operation Odyssey Dawn

Libyan Rebels Seize Control of Misurata's Airport - New York Times

Libyan Tebels Make Gains in Misurata - Washington Post

Libya Rebels 'Capture Misrata Airport' - BBC News

Rebels: Gadhafi Forces Pushed Back From Misrata - Associated Press

First Gaddafi Footage in Two Weeks - BBC News

U.N. Secretary-General Calls for Libya Cease-Fire - Voice of America

Lawmakers: Why Not Consulted Before Operation? - Stars and Stripes

IOM: Migrants Fleeing Libya Overwhelm Niger - Voice of America

Yemen

At Least 9 Dead, Dozens Wounded in Violence Against Yemen Protesters - VOA

Forces Fire on Yemeni Protesters in 3 Cities - New York Times

Yemeni Forces Open Fire on Protesters - Washington Post

Yemeni Security Forces 'Kill Five at Protests' - BBC News

Witnesses: Yemeni Forces Fire on Protest March - Associated Press

Egypt

Egyptian Islamist Calls for Tolerance of Coptic Christians - Voice of America

Egypt Moving to Reopen 48 Closed Churches - Associated Press

A Clash of Faiths in Egypt - Washington Post editorial

Iraq

Iraqis to Talk About Asking Some U.S. Troops to Stay - New York Times

Maliki Seeks Consensus on U.S. Troops - Washington Post

PM Opens Door to Longer U.S. Troop Presence - Associated Press

Iraqi Unity Deal Looks Shaky Amid Feuding - Los Angeles Times

Al Qaida Jailbreak Attempt Was Inside Job - McClatchy Newspapers

Iran

New Signs of Power Struggle at Top Levels in Iran - Associated Press

Iran Tries to Circumvent Sanctions - Washington Post

Big Powers, Iran Spar Over Nukes - Associated Press

American Hikers Trial Unexpectedly Delayed - New York Times

Iran Delays Trial of U.S. Men Accused of Spying - Associated Press

Bahrain

Bahrain Fires Workers, Rights Group Says Detainee Tortured - Reuters

Israel / Palestinians

Palestinians' Fayyad Could Keep PM Job - Associated Press

U.S. Department of Defense

Beloved New Warriors on the Modern Battlefield - New York Times

Lawmakers U.S. Military Plans in Japan Unaffordable - Associated Press

SEAL Sleuths Expose Those Who've Faked Service - Associated Press

United States

Obama to Deliver Mideast Policy Address - Voice of America

Obama Seeks Reset in Arab World - New York Times

Measure Extends War Authority - Washington Times

Congress Urged to Increase Oversight of Peace Corps - New York Times

Families May Get to Visit Guantanamo - Washington Post

Why Torture Damages Us - Washington Post opinion

World

U.N. Cites More Groups Using Child Soldiers in Report - BBC News

Africa

Sudan: U.N. Peacekeepers Attacked in Abyei - BBC News

Fighting in S. Sudan Oil Area Kills 85 - Associated Press

Congo Study Sets Estimate for Rapes Much Higher - New York Times

DR Congo: '48 Rapes Every Hour' - BBC News

Nigerian Army Clashes With Militants in Oil Delta - Reuters

Americas

Reputed Drug Kingpin Makled Arraigned in Venezuela - Associated Press

Honduras ex-President Zelaya Wants to Return - BBC News

Ousted Leader Is Set to Return to Honduras - Associated Press

Honduran Police Kill 6 Suspected Drug Traffickers - Associated Press

Honduran Journalist Shot, Killed Outside His Home - Associated Press

Haiti Officials Reverse Contested Vote Results - Associated Press

U.N. Expects Fresh Haiti Cholera Outbreaks With Rains - Reuters

Asia Pacific

U.S., China Reach 'Milestone' Agreement - Washington Post

Japan Ponders Its New Normal - New York Times

N. Korea's Rebuffs S. Korea's Invitation to Summit - Associated Press

The Fallout for Chiding the Royals in Thailand - New York Times

Europe

Tide of Muslims Change E.U.'s Old Order - Washington Times

Panel Urges Germany to Close Nuclear Plants by 2021 - New York Times

Germany Raids Apartments of Suspected Militants - Reuters

Belarus Economic Crisis Deepens as Currency Plunges - New York Times

Enforcing Veil Ban, French Have Stopped 46 Violators - New York Times

South Asia

India Ruling Party Icon Arrested Over Protests - Reuters

'Big Sister' Set to Evict Communists From India - Reuters

11 May SWJ Roundup

Wed, 05/11/2011 - 6:35am
Keep the Roundup (the Journal, the Blog and the Council) Going AND Get a Nifty Coin to Boot

Al Qaeda

Bin Laden's Death Likely to Shatter al Qaeda - Washington Times

Waiting for al Qaeda to Name New Leader - Washington Times

Al-Qaida Likely to Elevate No. 2, Or Name No One - Associated Press

Bin Laden Sons Say U.S. Broke International Law - New York Times

Bin Laden Sons' Anger at Killing - BBC News

Son Says Bin Laden Sea Burial Demeans Family - Reuters

Bad Bargains - New York Times opinion

Why the Hurry to Gloat? - Los Angeles Times opinion

Pakistan

Uproar Over bin Laden Hideout Strains U.S.-Pakistan Relations - VOA

U.S., Pakistan Continue Cooperation on Afghan Border - AFPS

Pakistan to Grant U.S. Access to Bin Laden's Wives, Says Official - VOA

U.S. Still Waits for Access to Bin Laden Widows - New York Times

Pakistan Government Skipping Chance to Weaken Army - Associated Press

John Kerry to Travel to Pakistan Amid Strained Ties - BBC News

What Did They Know? - Washington Post opinion

Afghanistan

After Bin Laden, U.S. Reassesses Afghan Strategy - New York Times

A Push for New Afghan Strategy - Washington Post

No Swift Pullout from Afghanistan, says U.S. Senator - Voice of America

Coming Weeks Will Test U.S. Troop Surge in Afghanistan - Reuters

Murky Identities and Ties Hinder Hunt for Insurgents - New York Times

Review Board Weighs In on Afghan Detainees - Los Angeles Times

Afghan Police: Taliban Attack Northern Village - Associated Press

Afghan Officials: Insurgent Attack in East Failed - Associated Press

Two Insurgents Killed in Attack on Afghan Outpost - Reuters

Coalition, Afghans Get Inputs Right in Taliban Fight - AFPS

Leaders Discuss Afghanistan Redeployment Challenges - AFPS

Indian Premier to Visit Kabul Offering More Aid - Associated Press

Syria

Syria Intensifies Crackdown Amid Calls for New Protest - Voice of America

Troops, Backed by Tanks, Move to Quell Dissent in Towns - New York Times

Syrian Troops Raid Areas of Unrest - Washington Post

Syria Unrest: Crackdown Continues in Homs - BBC News

Syrian Military Tightens Grip in Areas of Unrest - Associated Press

Syrian Elite to Fight Protests to 'the End' - New York Times

Some See Hand of Iran in Syria's Crackdown - Los Angeles Times

Analysis: Syria's Assad Turns to Tanks to Put Down Unrest - Reuters

Kerry: It's Time to Give Up on Assad as a Reformer - Foreign Policy

Kuwait to Replace Syria as Candidate for Human Rights Council - VOA

Kuwait Viewed As Syria's Rival For U.N. Council - New York Times

Libya / Operation Odyssey Dawn

NATO Bombs Strike Tripoli; Rebels Advance in Misrata - Voice of America

NATO Steps Up Bombing in Libya - Washington Post

Killings and Rumors Unsettle Benghazi - New York Times

U.N. Ask Mariners to Aid Libyan Refugees in Mediterranean - Voice of America

Close to 600 May Be Dead on Libyan Migrant Ship - Associated Press

E.U. to Open Aid Office in Benghazi - BBC News

Yemen

Yemeni Opposition Activists Rally as Gulf Leaders Discuss Stalemate - VOA

Tribesmen: Yemen Jets Bomb Anti-Saleh Tribal Areas - Reuters

Iraq

Should U.S. Stay or Go? Views Define Iraqi Factions - New York Times

Iran

U.S., Allies, Consider Iranian Offer for Nuclear Talks - Voice of America

Iran Tells EU Next Atom Talks Must Be Without Pressure - Reuters

Sanctions Slow Iran Nukes Program - Associated Press

Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Plant Begins Operation - BBC News

Iran Nuclear Plant Operates at Low Level in Key Step - Reuters

Iran to Try U.S. Hikers on Wednesday, U.S. Says - Reuters

Israel / Palestinians

Give Unity Deal a Chance, Palestinian PM Urges - Reuters

Middle East / North Africa Unrest

Bahrain: In Political Unrest, a Cultural Blow - Washington Post

Tunisia Arrests Nearly 200 After Protests - Reuters

Egypt's Former Tourism Minister Jailed for 5 Years - Reuters

Egypt Tries to Erase Hosni Mubarak's Name - Los Angeles times

Egypt's Course Change - Washington Post editorial

WikiLeaks

WikiLeaks' Assange Gets Australian Peace Prize - Reuters

U.S. Department of Defense

Naval Special Operations Forces Added to AFRICOM - Stars and Stripes

Army Sergeant's Defense Opens in Ga. Court-martial - Associated Press

Navy Halts Move to Allow Chaplains to Perform Gay Unions - Associated Press

United States

Obama: Border Secure Enough to Begin Legalization - Washington Times

Court Orders Overhaul of Vets' Mental Health Care - Los Angeles Times

Peace Corps Volunteers Speak Out on Rape - New York Times

FBI Arrests Long-Sought Puerto Rican Militant - Associated Press

Africa

Crisis Group: Sudan at 'Tipping Point' Over Abyei Clashes - Voice of America

More Than 80 Killed in Southern Sudan Violence - Associated Press

4 U.N. Peacekeepers Wounded in Southern Sudan - Associated Press

Opposition Leader 'Barred From Uganda' - BBC News

Uganda Opposition Leader Barred From Flight - Reuters

Ex-President of Niger Released - Associated Press

Americas

Mexican Drug Cartel Builds Its Own Tank - Gizmodo

Police Finds Heads, 4 Bodies in Mexican Town - Associated Press

Files From Colombia's FARC Rebels Show Ties to Chavez - Reuters

Guatemalan Court Acquits Former President of Embezzling - New York Times

Report: Ecuador's Correa Directly Sought FARC Cash - Associated Press

Haiti's Continuing Cholera Outbreak - New York Times editorial

Asia Pacific

U.S., China Conclude Talks on Currency, Rights, Trade - Voice of America

More Hopes Than Gains At U.S.-China Meetings - New York Times

Taiwan to Postpone Purchases of U.S. Weapons - Associated Press

Japanese PM Pledges Full Review of Energy Policy - Voice of America

Japan to Cancel Plan to Build More Nuclear Plants - New York Times

Debate Rages About Food Aid to North Korea - Associated Press

Thai Lawmaker Shot, Fueling Election Violence Fear - Associated Press

U.N. Aide Visits Burma to Meet With New Government - Associated Press

Europe

France Arrests Six Planning to Train With Militants - New York Times

Albania Vote Competitive Say International Observers - Reuters

South Asia

India Ruling Congress May Get Some Respite in State Polls - Reuters

HRW Urges Bangladesh to End Killings by Elite Force -Los Angeles Times

Bangladesh Rejects Rights Group's Criticism - Associated Press

Transitioning to Afghan-Led Counterinsurgency

Tue, 05/10/2011 - 7:03pm
Transitioning to Afghan-Led Counterinsurgency - Prepared statement by Dr. Seth Jones, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan, 10 May 2011. Excerpt follows:

The death of Osama bin Laden and the upcoming tenth anniversary of the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan have triggered several important policy issues. This testimony poses several questions. What should the U.S. objectives be in Afghanistan? Based on these objectives, what are America's military options (and what would the implications be for transition)? Finally, what are the political options, including the possibility of a peace settlement?

I argue that U.S. objectives in Afghanistan should be tied to narrow U.S. national security interests, and the U.S. military strategy should transition to an Afghan-led counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy would involve decreasing the U.S. military footprint and relying on an increasingly prominent role of U.S. Special Operations Forces to help Afghans conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. It would require assisting Afghan national and local forces degrade the insurgency and target terrorist leaders. Implementing this strategy would require decreasing the U.S. military footprint to perhaps 30,000 or fewer forces by 2014 and surging Afghan National Security Forces and Afghan Local Police. It would also include leveraging U.S. Special Operations Forces, CIA, and some conventional forces to conduct several tasks: train, equip, and advise Afghan National Security Forces; assist local communities improve security and governance from the bottom up (especially the Afghan Local Police and Village Stability Operations programs); conduct direct action operations against high value targets; provide a range of "enablers," such as intelligence, civil affairs, and military information support operations.

There are several ways for the United States to achieve its limited objectives in Afghanistan. The first is if al Qa'ida is destroyed in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and no longer poses a serious threat to the U.S. homeland. The second is if the Taliban breaks ties with al Qa'ida. The third is if Afghan National Security Forces and local allies (such as Afghan Local Police) can sufficiently degrade the insurgency and prevent the return of the Taliban with minimal outside assistance. At the moment, the United States should pursue all three means simultaneously -- targeting al Qa'ida and its allies, political negotiations, and Afghan-led counterinsurgency -- until one of them, alone or in combination with the others, adequately achieves core U.S. objectives.

Transitioning to Afghan-Led Counterinsurgency - Prepared statement by Dr. Seth Jones.

The Lawfulness of Killing Bin Laden

Tue, 05/10/2011 - 7:01pm
The Lawfulness of Killing Bin Laden

by Butch Bracknell

Much has been made of the recent revelations that Osama bin Laden was unarmed at the moment he was killed by U.S. special operations forces in close quarters battle. Let us put this issue to rest with dispatch, once and for all: Killing bin Laden was not an extrajudicial execution, a murder, or a war crime. It was a combat engagement lawful under U.S. and international legal authority -- full stop.

Two rationales undergird the lawful killing an enemy combatant, including an unlawful combatant such as the transnational terrorist bin Laden: self-defense and jus in bello.

- The self-defense justification usually permits a "friendly" combatant to engage an opponent with deadly force when the combatant believes his or her life, or the life of other members of his or her unit or other authorized protected persons (for example, certain noncombatants present in the area, such as ordinary citizens, children, aid workers, or missionaries), is endangered by the hostile acts or intent of an opponent. Whether the opponent is armed is relevant to the self-defense analysis, but does not solely settle the issue. The key factor is whether a combatant reasonably believes his or her life (or the life of a protected person) to be in danger; for example, an enemy combatant may appear to have a weapon, even though he is unarmed. If the friendly combatant reasonably fears for his life or that of a protected person, deadly force is permitted and the defensive killing is not unlawful.

Even so, discussion of the location of bin Laden's weapon and whether he might have been wearing a suicide vest are utterly irrelevant: engaging bin Laden with deadly force is most appropriately viewed as grounded on the second rationale: jus in bello.

- The law pertaining to the conduct of hostilities (jus in bello), which has developed since antiquity and includes certain provisions of the modern Geneva and Hague conventions, permits the sanctioned killing of an opponent in an armed conflict, regardless of whether he is armed at the moment he is engaged. So long as the opponent meets the minimum criteria to be regarded as a combatant (even an unlawful combatant), he may be engaged with deadly force, even if he is separated from his weapon. He may be killed while sleeping, eating, taking a shower, cleaning his weapon, meditating, or standing on his head. It is his status as an enemy combatant, not his activity at the moment of engagement, which is dispositive.

Osama bin Laden was an enemy combatant -- again, full stop. His status as a virtual enemy of the United States is grounded on several factors: his declaration of war (fatwa) by Al Qaeda, of which he was the nominal chief, against the United States; the Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) of September 18, 2001 (Public Law 107-40); and, most likely, declaration of a state of hostilities (essentially, a state of "war") by the President against an opposing belligerent: Al Qaeda, its footsoldiers, and its leaders. The qualifier "most likely" indicates that if the President has, in fact, declared Al Qaeda to be a hostile, belligerent force, the designation probably would be classified and non-public. It is also superfluous, as Congress supplied the necessary authority in the AUMF to make combat actions against Al Qaeda lawful. They described a category of combatants who may be targeted by U.S. forces, and Osama bin Laden fell squarely into that category more precisely than any other person in the world. Targeting bin Laden was based on bin Laden simply being bin Laden: his conduct as he stared down the wrong end of an MP-5 was immaterial.

Once designated a hostile enemy combatant, there are only two ways a combatant can be exempted from lawful targeting: by manifesting a clear and unequivocal intent to surrender, and by becoming wounded or otherwise incapacitated and incapable of resistance (hors d'combat). There is no evidence bin Laden was wounded prior to administration of the lethal force which ended his life. Moreover, U.S. forces engaged in armed conflict are under no obligation to give an enemy combatant a chance to surrender; the enemy combatant must practically force his surrender on the U.S. force by manifesting it clearly, timely, and in a manner which enables U.S. forces to discontinue the use of lethal force. At this instant, a shield of legal protection descends around him, and U.S. forces are obligated to treat him humanely and consistent with the laws of armed conflict pertaining to detainees. Until the shield is present, triggered by manifest surrender, it is absent. Without the shield that only he could initiate through his surrenderous conduct, bin Laden remained a legitimate target and was treated so by the assaulting U.S. force.

Bin Laden's death was a triumph for the American intelligence community and the armed forces and provides, at long last, some solace to the victims of 9/11 and Al Qaeda's other terroristic acts. His death will likely prove to be a strategic gain, and it eliminates a continuing threat to Americans at home and her citizens and forces abroad. It also was completely sanctioned under U.S. and international law. The intellectual energy spent obsessing and hand-wringing over bin Laden's death would be better spent on less clear-cut law of armed conflict issues facing the nation and the international community.

Butch Bracknell is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps. A career military lawyer with tours in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, he is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington, DC.

Transition in Afghanistan

Tue, 05/10/2011 - 6:38pm
Transition in Afghanistan - Prepared statement by Dr. David Kilcullen, President and CEO of Caerus Associates, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan, 10 May 2011. Excerpt follows:

I would like to focus narrowly on the question of what, specifically, needs to happen on the ground in Afghanistan in order to enable a transition in 2014. The answer to this question depends on whether you believe the insurgency in Afghanistan is the problem, or is a symptom of a wider set of problems. My work in and on Afghanistan over the past seven years suggests the latter - that is, the insurgency arises from a wider set of causes, and just dealing with active fighters will be insufficient for effective transition.

In particular, I see the war as arising from a four-part cycle of instability:

- Corruption and criminality, arising in part from the drug economy and in part from the international presence and the contracting bonanza associated with it, creates a flood of illicit cash into the hands of elites, power brokers, local warlords and certain corrupt officials;

- This corruption enables and incentivizes abuse, in the form of expropriation of resources, denial of justice, physical abuse and violence, against ordinary members of the Afghan population;

- These abuses create popular rage, cynicism and disillusionment with the Afghan government, but also with the international community, whom many Afghans hold responsible for the behavior of abusive officials and elites;

- This empowers and enables the insurgents, who are able to pose as clean, just, incorruptible, and the defenders of the people, and can exploit popular rage to build support; and the insurgency in turn creates the conditions of instability, violence and lack of accountability that drive the cycle onward.

As I have previously testified, we have seen this cycle deepen and worsen over the past decade of the war, and our focus (at various times) solely on destroying the main forces of the enemy has been ineffective in addressing the wider drivers of the conflict, or has even made things worse.

To address this overall instability dynamic, we need four things: an anti-corruption campaign, a governance reform campaign, a process of political reconciliation at the district and local level, and a robust security campaign to suppress the insurgency while these other elements have time to take effect.

Transition in Afghanistan - Prepared statement by Dr. David Kilcullen.

Long Term Goals for Afghanistan and Their Near Term Implications

Tue, 05/10/2011 - 5:59pm
Long Term Goals for Afghanistan and Their Near Term Implications - Prepared statement by Dr. Stephen Biddle, Council on Foreign Relations, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan, 10 May 2011. Excerpt follows:

The Afghanistan debate often focuses, understandably, on near-term concerns. Sound policies in the near term, however, require a longer term vision to guide them. And for now, several key components of a long term vision for Afghanistan are absent or underdeveloped. What would success look like? What does the United States require to secure our central interests there? What relationship do we want with Afghanistan or its region after 2014, and what role will that require us to play then -- or now?

I argue below that core American interests in Afghanistan are real but narrow, and center on the security requirements of denying Afghan territory to terrorists as a base for attacking us or destabilizing Afghanistan's neighbors. These limited interests can be realized via a range of possible Afghan end states -- we need not hold out for the highly ambitious political and economic development aims that the United States adopted in 2001. While desirable, these are not strictly necessary to meet our core requirements. But we cannot settle for just anything. There are limits on the acceptable that exclude outcomes such as partition or anarchy, and this limits the viability of approaches such as a counter-terrorism (CT) strategy that would leave us unable to prevent a collapse of the current government. And it is hard to see any feasible, acceptable, Afghan political outcome that could function without sustained American and other international engagement. In the longer term, that engagement need not be primarily military (though some U.S. military presence ought not to be excluded as a possible means to the end of Afghan stability). But financial and technical assistance is likely to be needed on a sustained basis if Afghanistan is not again to suffer the fate that befell it the last time the West disengaged. To realize U.S. interests will require a long term relationship with Afghanistan that accepts the need for continued assistance, albeit at levels far below today's, in the service not just of a better life for Afghans, but of a safer future for Americans.

This longer term vision implies a number of near-term requirements. Among the more important of these is a clear strategy for governance reform; meaningful, measurable progress before 2014 in restraining government predation; and a negotiated agreement with the GIRoA that provides concrete reassurance that our allies will not be abandoned to their fate even as the United States draws down.

To develop this argument I first identify and prioritize America's underlying interests in Afghanistan. I then discuss what these imply for acceptable end states there, and what this in turn implies for the required American role to sustain a stable Afghanistan that can meet our interests in the longer term. I then turn to some consequences of this long-term analysis for several near-term policy issues -- especially the utility of permanent U.S. bases in Afghanistan as a part of a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the GIRoA, the attractiveness of substituting a counter-terrorism (CT) strategy for today's counterinsurgency (COIN) approach in light of bin Laden's death, the attractiveness of negotiated settlement as a means of achieving an acceptable end state, and the appropriate sequencing and prioritization of security improvement and governance reform.

Long Term Goals for Afghanistan and Their Near Term Implications - Prepared statement by Stephen Biddle.

From Roman Legions to Navy SEALs: Military Raiding and its Discontents

Tue, 05/10/2011 - 8:26am
From Roman Legions to Navy SEALs: Military Raiding and its Discontents

by Adam Elkus

The Atlantic

The Osama bin Laden raid has been hailed as the centerpiece of a new style of "collaborative" warfare that leverages intelligence fusion and networked interagency teams to focus precision force on America's enemies. Collaborative warfare, while impressive, is only the latest and greatest in a genre of military operation that dates back thousands of years: the punitive raid. From the days of the Roman Empire through Sunday's raid in Abottabad, Pakistan, governments have relied on punitive raids and manhunts to eliminate challengers to state power without resorting to costly, large-scale occupations.

But a look at the history and evolution of punitive raiding reveals that it is not a substitute for sound strategy -- and can be far more costly than policymakers might suspect and may have political costs that outweigh the strategic benefits. Punitive raids -- whether they consist of a large column of raiders advancing by horseback or an airmobile squad of commandos about to drop into an enemy cross-border haven -- have always been deceptively appealing as low-cost alternatives.

Much more over at The Atlantic