Small Wars Journal Book Review

SEAL Target Geronimo:

The Inside Story of the Mission to Kill Osama bin Laden

It is ironic that the most famous military operation of the Information Age – the SEAL Team Six raid on May 1st that killed Osama bin Laden – remains a mystery to some degree. Despite the instantaneous connectivity provided by cell phone cameras, communications satellites, and Twitter, the details of what happened on that cloudless night in Abbottabad, Pakistan, remain obscured by the fog of war.

In part, this uncertainty is the result of the ham-handed nature by which the Obama administration released information on the raid, with some officials speaking to the media before all members of the assault team were debriefed; leading to subtle shifts in detail that created suspicions something was being covered up or hidden. In part, the uncertainty is purposeful. Members of “Tier One” special operations units – such as SEAL Team Six and its Army counterpart, the Delta Force – are bound by strict non-disclosure rules necessary to protect operational security as well the personal security of U.S. commandos and their families.

Although Kimberly Dozier’s reporting for the Associated Press was detailed and informative, it was inevitably an incomplete first draft of history.  Nicholas Schmidle’s New Yorker piece was riveting, but quickly revealed to be based on hearsay.  Consequently, the Abbottabad raid has lacked a definitive account equivalent to Mark Bowden’s retelling of the 1993 “Battle of Mogadishu” in Black Hawk Down.

Hoping to fill this void is Chuck Pfarrer’s SEAL Target Geronimo: The Inside Story of the Mission to Kill Osama bin Laden, purportedly the first account of “Operation Neptune Spear” based upon interviews with the SEALs who actually conducted the raid. A former member of SEAL Team Six in the 1980s, Pfarrer’s pre-publication publicity derided previous accounts of the operation as “fairy tales,” and hinted at numerous revelations to set the record straight.

Pfarrer’s account of the raid is compelling, building up the tension from the helicopter flight through Pakistan heading towards Abbottabad. The SEALs entered the compound from the main house’s roof, Pfarrer claims, rather than working from bottom-to-top as previous accounts assert. Bin Laden was quickly discovered on the third-floor, and subsequently killed in his bedroom 90 seconds into the raid as he reached for the AK-47 that had appeared in numerous video appearances. Pfarrer says that it was only after the Saudi was killed that the “Stealth Hawk” helicopter crashed in the compound’s courtyard due to a “million-to-one” mechanical failure, rather than the air vortex previously reported to have caused the bird to lose its lift capability.

Pfarrer’s account is tactically plausible, and would explain why bin Laden did not get a shot off despite a helicopter crash and a firefight in his yard and explosions in his house as SEALs blew the gates separating the floors. Yet Pfarrer does not offer an explanation for why the prevailing story took hold or why despite the relative innocuousness of the details they were never subsequently corrected (as if potential targets don't know by now that U.S. commandos can fast-rope onto a target). Additionally, although Pfarrer expertly recounts the technical aspects of the raid, especially the capabilities of the SEALs’ equipment, he pays little attention to the thoughts and emotions of the men who conducted the mission. Given that the primary objective of the raid – killing or capturing bin Laden – was achieved in less than two minutes, the inattention to the human dimension of the mission gives the second half of his account an anti-climactic feel.

But in reality, this is the least of SEAL Team Geronimo’s problems. Because Pfarrer does not offer any citations, even to distinguish which anonymous source provided which detail, there is absolutely no way to verify whether anything he says is true. (Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the Department of Defense and U.S. Special Operations Command have dismissed Pfarrer’s account as inaccurate). Although Pfarrer sneeringly says this complete lack of attribution “may be a passing annoyance to historians,” it requires the reader to take everything the author says on faith, which is problematic when he also admits “it has been necessary to obscure, rather than clarify certain aspects of the mission at Abbottabad.”

More problematic is the slipshod nature of the remainder of SEAL Team Geronimo, less than a quarter of which actually deals with the Abbottabad raid. At the book’s outset, Pfarrer offers a retelling of the operation that killed al-Qa’ida in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi on June 7, 2006. Specifically Pfarrer claims:

The capture of an al-Qa'ida in Iraq courier in late May produced the intelligence that led U.S. forces to an AQI safehouse in Baghdad.  (Every other account says it was the capture and subsequent interrogations of a mid-level AQI operative in April that eventually lead U.S. forces to Zarqawi's spiritual advisor).

Two SEAL Team Six snipers observed the target, and when Zarqawi's phone call from the house was intercepted, they lazed the target.  (Every other account says an unmanned aerial vehicle followed the spiritual adviser after he got in a blue car that stopped at a house in Hibhib, a small village in Diyala Province, to meet with Zarqawi).

A Predator drone subsequently delivered a Hellfire missile that destroyed the safehouse, killing Zarqawi.  (Every other account says it was an F-16 that bombed the house).

In other words, Pfarrer directly contradicts the accounts of Mark Bowden, Dexter Filkins, interrogator “Matthew Alexander,” and SOCOM’s own official history, all cited as sources in Benjamin Runkle’s account of the operation in Wanted Dead or Alive.  Pfarrer could be right, and all those other authors could be wrong.  But to believe him is to believe that two of the premier military correspondents were duped and that two participants in the Zarqawi manhunt (Alexander, and General Stanley McChrystal, the Joint Special Operations Task Force Commander and Filkins' primary source) were complicit in perpetuating a lie.  This is possible, albeit extremely unlikely, and Pfarrer's lack of citations does not bolster his case.

More damning is Pfarrer's claim that the Hellfire strike triggered secondary explosions that sent “pieces of men” falling to the ground.  If so, then how were U.S. forces able to recover Zarqawi’s corpse intact, an image famously captured in the photos released after the terrorist’s death was announced.  Thus, Pfarrer begs the question: who are you going to believe, his anonymous sources, or your lying eyes?

The rest of the book is riddled with poor editing and factual errors that belie its rush to publication:

• The time elapsed between the 1970 raid on Son Tay prison in North Vietnam and the formation and the formation of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in December 1970 is described as “almost two decades.”
• The October 23, 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut is depicted as having taken place after the October 25 invasion of Grenada in the space of a single page.
• Bin Laden is reported to have been “introduced” to the writings of Sayyid Qutb both while in high school, and then three pages later again in college.
• The British military defeat in Afghanistan is cited as having occurred in 1820 when the First British-Afghan War did not begin until 1839.
• Tora Bora is mistranslated as meaning “Black Rock” rather than its actual meaning, “Black Dust.”
• Pfarrer recounts the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Mombassa, Kenya, when the attack actually occurred in Nairobi.
• The date for an alleged AQI nerve gas attack in Iraq is alternatively given as May 2003, May 2007, and then in May 2003 again over the course of one chapter.
• Pfarrer claims that both Zarqawi and bin Laden’s voices were captured by signals intercepts despite both terrorists being notoriously vigilant about not using cell phones or other means of electronic communications.
• Pfarrer places Admiral William McRaven’s nomination for command of the JSOC in 2011 rather than when he actually assumed command in 2009, and worse, misspells his name the first time he is mentioned.

Informed readers can likely find other examples of such sloppiness, which at best are an annoyance.  More importantly, the errors make it difficult to accept two of Pfarrer’s more incendiary claims: that al-Qa’ida’s number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, intentionally betrayed bin Laden; and that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate knowingly shielded both bin Laden and Zawahiri.  Again, as with the raid itself, this scenario could be true, but Pfarrer offers no citations to support such explosive charges.

American forces have been deployed to target individuals for more than 125 years.  In 1886, U.S. cavalry troops plunged 230 miles into Mexico in pursuit of Geronimo.  More than a century before SEAL Team Six travelled 130 miles into Pakistan by helicopter to capture or kill bin Laden, Brigadier General Frederick Funston led a ninety-man patrol 100 miles on foot behind enemy lines through the Philippine jungle to capture insurgent leader Emilio Aguinaldo.  Both operations (as with the subsequent hunts for Pancho Villa and Augusto Sandino) were conducted by conventional forces, many of whom became legends for their courageous exploits.

Now, strategic manhunts are primarily conducted by various special operations forces such as SEAL Team Six, and the professionalization of the commando trade has led to the anonymization of the men who undertake these dangerous missions. Although these “Quiet Professionals” embrace this anonymity, SEAL Team Geronimo ultimately represents a lost opportunity.  Pfarrer admirably wants to set the record straight against various accusations that the Abbottabad raid was actually a “kill mission,” and that therefore the SEALs were little more than assassins rather than the noble warriors they indisputably are.  But Pfarrer’s sloppiness and vitriol towards almost every actor besides SEAL Team Six (especially the Central Intelligence Agency) renders this book little more than “Special Forces porn,” an occasionally interesting read that may or may not have some relation to the truth.

This morning, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission released its annual report. The 414-page study, the result of commission research trips, interviews, open hearings, and staff investigations, discusses China’s economy and its trade relationships, its foreign policy, and the development of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This year’s report made note of China’s increasing assertiveness in East Asia and discussed a military doctrine that appears to emphasize offensive action and surprise. But the report also described a Chinese leadership struggling with deep economic imbalances, inflation, social instability, and perhaps declining political legitimacy.

Repeating a theme from its past annual reports, the Commission discussed China’s expanding use of cyber-warfare techniques for industrial espionage, intelligence-gathering, and disruption. The Commission noted that China is now one of the world’s top few space powers, with comprehensive space access and counter- access capabilities.

The Commission described an emerging Chinese military doctrine that remarkably resembles the doctrine developed by the Soviet Union. The report noted China’s work on “reconnaissance-strike” capabilities, which it seems to be integrating with its space/counter-space plans. The report discussed China’s potential to use cyber attacks to disrupt adversary C4ISR networks. The Commission asserted that “the PLA is acquiring capabilities that allow it to conduct surprise attacks aimed at degrading a superior military’s advantages” and that the PLA has a “heavy focus on offensive operations.” I will leave to readers to discuss in the comments whether this is an accurate description of a doctrine that descends from a long Chinese pedigree or whether it is a misperception by U.S. analysts who believe they have rediscovered their old Soviet nemesis. In any case, the Commission called on Congress to investigate whether the U.S. military can accomplish its missions with its C4ISR nets degraded and whether it adequately trains under conditions that simulate destroyed U.S. space assets.

While the PLA keeps itself busy, China’s leaders are struggling to maintain tight control over a country that may be cracking under pressure. To those who think the Federal Reserve has been reckless with the U.S. money supply, the report notes that China’s money supply has mushroomed by 434 percent over the past decade and is now ten times larger than the U.S. money supply, even while the Chinese economy is one-third the size. The result is accelerating inflation inside China, which has been especially painful for the rural poor and migrant workers. China has its own version of “Occupy Wall Street,” migrant workers and unemployed college graduates (called the “ant tribe”) who have been forced into slum-like communal quarters. They have migrated from city to city to seek work but many lack documentation, leaving them without social benefits, which many local governments cannot, in any case, pay for.

The challenge for Chinese leaders is to maintain political legitimacy and social control. Economic contradictions will make this increasingly difficult to pull off. China’s leaders have counted on rapid economic growth to provide jobs for the rural migrants and the college-educated “ant tribe.” But rapid growth is now stoking accelerating inflation, which has been a reliable spark for social rebellion. Added to this is a housing bubble ready to deflate, over-indebted local governments and state-owned enterprises, and a banking system stuffed with smelly loans. Caught between unemployed masses and inflation, the regime is resorting to repression to maintain control; indeed the report notes that the government is now spending more on domestic security than on the PLA.

The Soviet empire collapsed when the regime lost both its legitimacy and its will to forcibly repress the population. China is not there. But its leaders are riding a tiger and are straining to hold on.

Reacting to deadlocked U.S.-Russian missile defense talks, Moscow has stated that it is readying “simple but effective” “retaliatory military measures” in response to the planned U.S.-NATO missile shield.  These measures are focused on upgrading the penetrating capabilities of its strategic nuclear missiles and deploying tactical nuclear missiles along Russia’s western border.  These measures do not serve Russia’s interests.  Rather, missile defense cooperation presents a better opportunity to reduce NATO-Russian tensions and radically transform U.S.-Russian relations.

Notwithstanding the “reset” in relations between Washington and Moscow, Russian and American officials have conceded that bilateral talks aimed at resolving significant issues in the missile defense dispute have deadlocked.  Moscow alleges that the planned missile shield is intended to undermine Russia’s nuclear arsenal.  Washington maintains that the shield, parts of which will be deployed in Romania, Poland, Spain and Turkey, is focused on thwarting a missile attack from the Middle East.

Moscow seeks legally binding guarantees from Washington that U.S. missile interceptors in Europe will not threaten Russia’s nuclear arsenal in exchange for its participation in the missile shield.  This is an unrealistic request and one that will not be accepted by the U.S. Senate even if the Obama Administration were to agree.  But Moscow has long known this but insists upon unrealistic demands because the missile shield is widely used domestically to argue that Russia is threatened, encircled and its arsenal constrained.

The most Moscow can hope for –which is the most palatable option to NATO members– is separate but coordinated missile defense systems that would not be integrated. 

As time passes and Russian intransigence grows, it is increasingly obvious to Moscow that the United States will not heed to Russian demands, and ever more clear to Washington that it will have to move forward with the missile shield without Russia’s blessing.  Indeed, Russian officials have stated that even with a legal commitment, the next U.S. president could very well abandon it.  Hence, even with legally binding guarantees, Moscow is unlikely to be a cooperative missile shield partner because Russia ultimately distrusts the United States.

Prepared years ago, Russia’s unfolding military response to the missile shield also demonstrates that Moscow is not interested in being a genuine partner.  While Russia has joined the United States in reducing the quantity of their strategic nuclear arsenals, Moscow has at the same time focused on improving the quality of its arsenal.  As such, Moscow has dedicated itself to modernizing its ballistic missiles and upgrading their capacity to penetrate missile defenses.  For example, Russia is boosting its striking potential by developing new warheads for its intercontinental ballistic missiles, stepping up efforts to deploy the Bulava sea-based missile, and is resolved to build an air and space defense system.

Another key component of Russia’s asymmetrical measures is the deployment of tactical missile along Russia’s western border.  For example, the missile brigade of Russia’s Western Military District has recently obtained Iskander theater missiles which, as stated by the Russian military, have an “ability to overpower the existing and future missile defense shields of foreign states.”  In other words, these missiles would ostensibly be used in operations against ground-based targets, namely missile defense components in Poland, Romania and Turkey.

Because Russia is unlikely to ever use nuclear weapons against NATO, its military response to the missile shield instead aims to call America’s bluff on its ability to provide legal assurances and drive a wedge between NATO Allies on the issue of missile defense.  While one can hope that this is part of a Kremlin ploy in a pivotal election year, if Russia’s past behavior is indicative, Moscow’s asymmetric response is serious.  Indeed, Russia has in the recent past threatened to deploy Iskander missiles and radio jammers in Kaliningrad, just north of Poland and The Baltics, in response to  the missile shield.  Russia scrapped its plan only after the Obama Administration –in great part driven by a need to obtain Russian support on Afghanistan– decided to replace the Bush Administration’s missile defense plan with a more flexible sea-based system farther from Russia’s borders.  Moscow hopes that its current threats will catalyze another American concession in exchange for Russia’s support on missile defense and other issues of interest to the United States.

Ultimately, Moscow’s threats represent a Cold War throwback and serve only to undermine the important advances made in U.S./NATO-Russian relations in recent years.  As NATO’s military engagement in Afghanistan winds down, missile defense and the growing threat posed by Iran will emerge as the uniting issue among Allies at a time when the Alliance increasingly seeks a post-Cold War raison d'être.  Hence, notwithstanding prohibitive costs or a radical shift in policy, NATO will move forward with the missile shield with or without Russia’s blessing.

Russia has much more to gain from cooperating on missile defense.  Russia should use this opportunity to influence the development of the missile shield, and see it as a process to forge strong, enduring U.S./NATO-Russian ties that will survive future challenges.  But to advance, Russia and NATO must first reconcile the purpose of a cooperative arrangement beyond just a single third-party threat.  The way forward is to build trust through technical cooperation which will help surf the ebbs and flows of subjective estimates of future capabilities, mercurial bilateral relations, and respective electoral cycles.

First, shared efforts on a threat assessment on Iran, a joint data exchange center, and joint missile defense exercises are important building blocks.  Second, the dispute over what cooperative missile shield arrangement to build might be resolved by allowing each side to defend its own territory, but with allowances for double protection for some countries near the boundary.  Third, it should be agreed at the highest levels that the missile shield will deploy in light of the progress of Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  This is important because Russia is most concerned by the latter phases of the planned missile shield, in part because it is yet not clear how exactly they will develop. 

But Russian demands for a joint missile shield and binding U.S. guarantees are a nonstarter.  At core, cooperation must satiate Russia’s desire to be viewed as a partner with the United States and NATO.  Indeed, real missile defense cooperation and Western concerns for Iran’s nuclear program are secondary to Moscow’s interest in Russia being recognized as a power to be reckoned with.  While it is not yet clear how the missile shield will evolve or how Russia will respond, it is likely that Russia will continue to strike a balance between being viewed as an equal and opposing missile defense as long as possible in order to gain concessions in exchange for its support on issue important to the West.

Moscow’s dangerous missile defense game only serves to undermine the “reset” and be deleterious for Russian interests and NATO-Russian relations.  The Kremlin still has time to change course.  Let us hope it does so before its retaliatory measures make it politically untenable for NATO Allies to accept a cooperative missile defense arrangement with Russia.

Here are the latest posted articles from Armed Forces Journa:.

Slow Learners by Captain Andrew Betson: “How Iraq and Afghanistan forced Britain to rethink COIN.”

The Danger of Military Success by Colonel Robert Killebrew: “Planners cling to battle-tested doctrine, but the world is changing.”

NATO after Libya by Dominik Jankowski and Colonel Tomas Kowalik: “Campaign burnished Europe’s leadership yet underscored spending shortfalls.”

What Academia Can Do for DoD by Chris Rohlfs: “With access to data, outside researchers can help guide cost-cutters.”

Lessons from Rhino LZ by Major James Young: “How the Afghanistan invasion changed combat airlift.”

Polyglot Dragon by Major Scott Henderson: “What the PLA’s language school says about China’s strategic direction.”

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Real Clear World - RCP

Afghanistan

Karzai Convenes Elders to Debate US Ties, Taliban Talks - Bloomberg

Karzai Pushes Partnership With US as Afghan Elders Convene - NYT

Afghan Elders Fear Tragedy if US Leaves Too Soon - USAT

Afghan Conference of Elders to Discuss US Role - AP

End Night Raids Before Afghan Deal, Karzai Tells US - Reuters

Intense Security in Kabul for Elders' Meeting - BBC

Afghans Question Karzai's Motives in Calling Loya Jirga - CSM

Survey Indicates Security Concerns, Decline in Taliban Support - VOA

IMF Approves New Credit Program for Afghanistan - AP

IMF Renews Afghan Ties, Approves Loan Deal - Reuters

US, Afghan Officials Forge Olympic Partnership - AFPS

ISAF Operations Summary - AFPS

EU Suppresses Its Own Film on Afghan Women Prisons - AP

Pakistan

Pakistan's Former Foreign Minister Seeks New Party - LAT

Pakistani Girls Defy Taliban School Bombings - Reuters

Pakistani Officials: Suspected US Missiles Kill 16 - AP

Iran

Powers Make 'Progress' on IAEA Iran Resolution - Reuters

Iran's Stance on Nuclear Technology Tied to National Pride - USAT

Turkey Says No Plans for Nuclear Cooperation With Iran - Reuters

Ahmadinejad Goes on the Offensive - WP

Iranian Official Thinks No Israeli Attack Imminent - Reuters

Iran 'Influenced' Iraq Over US Exit - BBC

Saudis Seek UN Condemnation of Iranian Plot to Kill Envoy - Reuters

How to Stop Worrying and Live with the Iranian Bomb - WPR opinion

Syria

Syria's Homs Pays Heavy Price in Uprising - VOA

Syrian Activists: 83 People Killed in Anti-Government Uprising - VOA

Death Toll Mounts in Syria, Along with Outside Pressure - NYT

Syrian Military Base 'Attacked’ by Army Defectors - BBC

Syrian Army Defectors Attack Security Complex - Reuters

Syrian Soldiers Killed as Crisis Accelerates - AP

Turkey’s Erdogan Delivers Blunt Message to Syria - LAT

Erdogan Steps Up Turkey Pressure on Assad - BBC

Turkish PM: 'Syria on a Thin and Dangerous Line' - TT

Arab League Holds Syria Talks in Rabat - BBC

Arab League FMs to Formalize Suspension of Syria - AP

Arab League Meets Assad Foes After 69 Die in Syria - Reuters

Syria Boycotts Arab Meeting - Reuters

Russia Un-Swayed by Syria Appeals - BBC

Syria Releases 1,180 Prisoners - WP

For Refugees From Syria, Visit With No Expiration Date - NYT

Lead from Behind in Syria - WT editorial

Why Turkey Turned Away From Syria - NYT opinion

Iraq

Panetta and Senators Clash Over Iraq - CNN

GOP Senators Rip Iraq Pullout Plan - WT

Defense Chief Clashes with Senators Over Iraq - Reuters

Pentagon Leaders Defend Withdrawal of US from Iraq - AP

Panetta Defends US Decision to Break Off Talks with Iraq - LAT

Leon Panetta Defends Obama on Iraq - Politico

Panetta: Iraq Ready to Fight Extremism - Bloomberg

Iran 'Influenced' Iraq Over US Exit - BBC

Panetta, Dempsey: US-Iraq Partnership Will Continue - AFPS

Some Troops to Stay in Iraq as Trainers, Top Officer Says - NYT

Village in Iraq Falters With Exit of US Troops - NYT

Did US Troops Bring Democracy? Iraqis Have Doubts - Reuters

State Department Could Buy Local Food for its Workers - WP

Cabinet Approves Royal Dutch Shell’s Natural Gas Contract - NYT

Bomb Kills 2 Iranian Religious Pilgrims in Iraq - AP

Israel / Palestinians

Israeli Official Warns of New Military Action in Gaza - NYT

Gaza Militants Fire Rockets After Israeli Threat - AP

Abbas to Call for Formation of Palestinian Unity Gov't - JP

Palestinians Will Keep Knocking on UN's Door - Reuters

Palestinians Board Settlers' Bus - BBC

Palestinian Activists Arrested on Israeli Bus - AP

Middle East / North Africa

Yemen’s Saleh: I’ll Step Down in 90 Days, Maybe - WP

Change Square Seeks to Be Genesis for a New Yemen - AP

Blast at South Lebanon Hotel Popular With UN Staff - AP

A Joyful Awakening for Libya’s Berbers - WP

Spared in War, Libya’s Oil Flow Is Surging Back - NYT

Egypt Army Kills Hope - Reuters

Rights Group Calls for Release of Egyptian Blogger - AP

Tunisian Parties Pick Rights Activist as President - AP

Niger: Gaddafi Son Stays Until UN Lifts Travel Ban - Reuters

Egypt’s Elections - NYT editorial

Al Qaeda

Austrian Returns, Unrepentant, to Online Jihad - NYT

Al-Qaida Head Recalls 'Human Side' of Bin Laden - AP

Qaeda's Zawahiri Praises Bin Laden's Loyalty, Morals - Reuters

US Department of Defense

Pentagon: Offensive Cyber Attacks Fair Game - WP

Panetta Tells Senators Sequestration Would Devastate DOD - AFPS

Pentagon Monitors Air Force Review of Dover Mortuary - AFPS

United States

Senate Committee, White House Differ on Detainee Rules - WP

Senators Strike Deal on Interrogations of Terrorism Suspects - WT

Obama: Cities Must Make Own Decisions on Occupy Protests - AP

Other Occupy Sites Hope NYC Raid Will Energize Cause - NYT

Jolted, OWS Protesters Face Uncertain Future - NYT

OWS: Where to Go from Zuccotti Park? - LAT

Occupy Movement Itself Becomes the Issue - WP

California, Texas Land Federal Funds to Jail Illegal Immigrants - LAT

Agents Seize Cocaine Haul Off US Virgin Islands - AP

NYC Mayor Confronts the Protesters - NYT

Is it Time to Rethink Nuclear Weapons Strategy? - WP opinion

Australia

Obama's Australia Visit Focuses on Regional Security - VOA

Global Position Puts Us on US Map, Says Kim Beazley - TA

US and Australia Seal Expanded Military Ties - NYT

US Marines to Deploy to Australia - BBC

Obama Boosts US Military in Australia, Reassures China - Reuters

China Leery of US-Australia Military Pact - AP

China Questions US-Australia Military Cooperation - Reuters

World

Groups Say Cluster Bombs Remain in 69 Nations - AP

Africa

Predictions of War Haunt Sudan's Southern Border - AP

UN: Sudan Rebel Alliance 'Counterproductive' - Reuters

Security Lapses Threaten Kenya's Dadaab Refugee Complex - VOA

Blast at Kenya Refugee Camp, Somali Child Deaths Up - AP

6 Somali Pirates on Trial in Paris - VOA

Troubled Vote May Tie Liberian President's Hands - AP

Americas

Mexico Nun is Crusader for Rights Amid Drug Violence - LAT

Fiery Leftist Will Again Run for Mexican President - AP

Mexico Holds Knights Templar Cartel Boss - BBC

Mexican Newspaper Attacked by Armed Men - AP

Colombia's FARC Rebels Pick Hardline New Leader - Reuters

Colombia FARC Rebels Name 'Timochenko' as New Leader - BBC

Venezuela’s Opposition Debates Presidential Issues - WT

Venezuela’s Kidnapping Problem - WP

Guatemala's New Leader Faces Questions - Reuters

War, Tight-Knit Class Define Guatemalan Leader's Rise - Reuters

Guatemala Leader Authorizes US Extradition of Ex-Pres - AP

Canada Questions Haitian Gov't Plans for New Army - AP

Asia Pacific

As US Looks to Asia, It Sees China Everywhere - NYT

US, Pacific Nations Deepen Military Ties as China Asserts Will - AP

US Lawmakers Scrutinize US Foreign Aid to China - AP

Cold War in the Tropics: China, India Vie for Maldives - Reuters

China: Ai Weiwei Say Feels Like Just Paid $1.3M Ransom - AP

81-Year-Old Chinese Sets Self on Fire in Protest - AP

US, Philippines Boost Alliance Amid Row With China - AP

Philippines Navigates Rocky Relations With China - NYT

Arroyo Stopped From Leaving Philippines - AP

North Korea Opens its Door a Crack - WP

Despite Political Reform, Indonesia Abuses Persist - AP

Thailand Army Turns Flooding Into PR Opportunity - NYT

Obama Pivots to Asia - WP editorial

The Chinese Century - WT opinion

Why China Won’t Listen - NYT opinion

A New Era for Burma - WP opinion

Central Asia

Kazakhstan Dissolves Parliament, Calls Election - AP

Europe

Financial Crisis Hits NATO Funding - VOA

Europeans Have Deep Doubts About Euro - VOA

Europe’s Markets Fear More Crisis - WP

France Draws Fire After 'Alarm Bells' Warning - Reuters

Monti Due to Present New Italian Government - Reuters

Greek Government Set to Win Confidence Vote - Reuters

Russia: For Putin, Peace Prize for Decision to Go to War - NYT

Germany Searches for Neo-Nazi Helpers - AP

UN Official Calls Bosnia Politically Stagnant - VOA

US Aid Flows for Turkey Earthquake Relief - AFPS

South Asia

Cold War in the Tropics: China, India Vie for Maldives - Reuters

Tibetan Exiles Hold Anti-China Protest in India - AP

Nepal Court Convicts 19 Villagers in Mass Slaying - AP

Mexican Cartel Tactical Note # 6:

Cross Border Incursion with SWAT Teams Responding: 15 Cartel/Gang Gunmen Cross into US Near Escobares, Texas

Key Information:

Via The Monitor [1]:

ESCOBARES — Gunmen crossed the Rio Grande into the United States near a shootout between where the Mexican military and a group of gunmen was taking place.

Several area SWAT teams responded about 1:30 p.m. Tuesday to a ranch near Escobares, just across the U.S.-Mexico border, where a shootout broke out south of the Rio Grande.

The shootout reportedly began shortly after noon but details were not immediately available. Residents on the U.S. side reported seeing members of the U.S. Border Patrol and Starr County Sheriff’s Office securing the area near the border.

Border Patrol spokeswoman Rosalinda Huey said agents had been tracking a suspected drug load near La Rosita and pushed it back to Mexico.

Border Patrol alerted Mexican authorities of the suspected load and then found an injured Mexican national on the U.S. side of the Rio Grande, Huey said. Emergency crews rushed the man to an area hospital. His condition remains unknown.

The man, a suspected cartel gunman, had been shot by Mexican authorities, a separate U.S. law enforcement official said.

The official confirmed a group of as many as 15 gunmen had crossed the Rio Grande, though it remained unclear whether they were Mexican soldiers or cartel gunmen.

“We don’t know who they are,” the official said. “We haven’t gotten that information yet.”

Local authorities in Hidalgo County provided backup support along the Rio Grande as Border Patrol dispatched additional agents from the McAllen area to the incident in rural Starr County.

The experience was a bit unnerving for Ricardo Guerra, whose brother owns La Prieta Ranch in La Rosita. Guerra was overseeing the ranch hands shortly after noon when they noticed that the roads near the property became quickly swarmed with authorities.

“Yeah, you worry when that happens,” Guerra said. “We all went back inside the house. It looks like there was something going on over there (Mexico); we heard four or five shots from the helicopter. It looks like the (Mexican military) helicopter was shooting at the people on the ground over there.”

While he heard the shots, Guerra’s property soon swarmed with more than 100 law enforcement officials from various agencies.

“We saw them take one guy in an ambulance,” Guerra said. “He looked in bad shape.”

Additional information was solicited from the Border Patrol spokeswoman, one of the original reporters of the above newspaper story, and the Starr County Sheriff’s Office who have investigative authority over this incident. No further information was provided.

Who:  15 gunmen— elements of a cartel/drug gang.

What: Armed incursion on US soil by criminal combatants from the Mexican drug war.

When: Tuesday 8 November 2011 at 1:30 PM (13:30).

Where: A ranch near Escobares, Texas, just across the U.S.-Mexico border, north of the Rio Grande. See map [1].

Why: Bringing a drug load into the US and escape and evasion by elements of a cartel/drug gang from the Mexican military. 

Tactical Analysis: The most plausible explanation concerning the identity of the 15 gunmen is that they belong to a Mexican cartel/drug gang. The drug load had been pushed back from the Texas side over the border in a coordinated effort by US federal and local law enforcement and the Mexican military who had been alerted by the Border Patrol. Further, it would make no sense for the Mexican military to openly risk an international incident, or the possibility of a friendly fire event, by crossing the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) in hot pursuit when they were actively coordinating with US law enforcement assets. For the responding US SWAT teams, this incident poses a potentially dangerous situation. It is more of a military operation on a “movement to contact” than a conventional SWAT operation in the US. SWAT teams are trained and equipped to contend with criminals in barricade and hostage type situations and are accustomed to stacked (bunched together) movement and entry tactics. Typically the criminals encountered are found in small numbers— usually one or maybe two— and may or may not have a shotgun, semi-automatic rifle, and some form of body armor. It is the intent of such criminals to flee from responding police forces and only put up a fight if corned out of desperation—even then such criminals typically surrender to responding SWAT units. A group of 15 cartel/drug gang gunmen represents an entirely different threat—it essentially contains a reinforced squad of opposing force personnel. These cartel/gang foot soldiers will be proactive in their actions—not reactive like most criminals encountered— and therefore represent an opposing (enemy) force the US SWAT teams are unaccustomed to. Besides the potentials for ambushes and fires and movement being conducted by the cartel/gang gunmen, their semi-automatic (and full auto) assault weapons and the great likelihood of the presence of grenade-launchers and fragmentation grenades makes for a military-like engagement scenario that is beyond present SWAT capabilities to effectively respond. Under these circumstances, standard SWAT operating procedures—such as the use of stacked movement tactics— could be disastrous in their implementation.

Significance: Cross Border Incursion; Officer Safety; SWAT Tactics

Source(s):

1. Ildefonso Ortiz and Jared Taylor, “SWAT teams dispatched as gun battle unfolds near Escobares.” The Monitor. 9 November 2011, http://www.themonitor.com/articles/escobares-56422-swat-teams.html.

The RAND Corporation plans to publish a series of reports on small unit operations in Afghanistan. The purpose of its project is to improve the performance and reduce the risks to small units that are tasked to operate independently in ambiguous or hostile battlefield environments.

RAND chose the now-famous 2008 battle at Wanat in Afghanistan’s Nuristan Province, as a case study for its first report in this series. This battle, which involved a surprise Taliban assault on a platoon-sized temporary and unfortified vehicle patrol base, resulted in nine U.S. soldiers killed and 27 U.S. and Afghan soldiers wounded. The combat outpost was abandoned soon thereafter.

RAND’s report has used computer-aided design and mapping software to redraw the terrain around Wanat in order to study lines of sight and direct fire available to both sides, identify dead space, display routes of Taliban approach to the objective, indicate the reach and limits of U.S. sensor systems, and other important tactical considerations of the battle. In future reports, RAND hopes to explore how better sensors, improved external support, and modified combat outpost tactics could improve performance and reduce risk for these and other distributed small unit operations.

Like all battles, the Wanat engagement had many idiosyncratic factors. However, the study of this battle, and engagements at other platoon and company-sized combat outposts, will be important for Army and Marine Corps leaders well after Afghanistan. Both services will likely count on small unit distributed operations not only during future stabilization missions, but also during offensive and defensive operations. For example, the Marine Corps will likely plan to use air and ground mobile distributed infantry units during extended advance force operations prior to the surface landing phase of amphibious assaults.

The Battle of Wanat and similar engagements show that independently operating small units require reliable ISR support and local security. Distributed units will count on reliable and responsive fire and logistics support. They will need organic sensors that can survive under fire. Technological developments will bring rapid changes to mobility, electronic warfare, direct and indirect fire, situational awareness, and many other factors. The development of modern distributed capabilities is likely just beginning and there will be much opportunity for interesting experimentation in the years ahead.

Click here to access the RAND report.

Spec-Ops Command: SEAL Raid Book 'a Lie' by Kimberly Dozier, Associated Press.

The U.S. military is denouncing a former Navy SEAL's book that claims to describe the "real" version of the raid that killed Osama bin Laden.

"It's just not true," U.S. Special Operations Command spokesman Col. Tim Nye said. "It's not how it happened."

Laden with conspiracy theories and attacks on the Obama White House, Chuck Pfarrer's "SEAL Target Geronimo" claims an alternative version of the raid…

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Real Clear World - RCP

Afghanistan

Questions Cloud Meeting of Afghan Elders Called by Karzai - NYT

Spokesman for Taliban Denies Report of His Arrest - NYT

Poll: Afghan Support for Taliban Declining - AP

Afghans Tentatively Seek a Voice After 30 Years of Conflict - Reuters

Taliban Claims to Have Afghan Jirga Security Plans - VOA

Taliban 'Has Jirga Security Plan' - BBC

Taliban Publishes “Security Plan” for Afghan Assembly - McClatchy

ISAF Operations Summary - AFPS

Pakistan

On Afghan-Pakistan Border, Suspicions Reign - WP

Pakistani Journalist Given US Asylum - WP

Suspected US Missiles Kill 7 Militants in Pakistan - AP

US Tries 'Hip Hop' Diplomacy in Pakistan - Reuters

Iran

Obama: Russia, China United With US on Iran Nuclear Issue - VOA

New Reports Link N. Korean, Iranian Nuclear Programs - VOA

High Emotion and Intrigue After Iran Blast - NYT

Did Israel Assassinate Iran's 'Missile King'? - CSM

Iran Says Duqu Hack 'Controlled' - BBC

Attack on Iran Could Risk Gulf Oil Supplies - WT

Before We Bomb Iran, Let's Have a Serious Conversation - NYT opinion

Syria

Syria Faces Growing Isolation for Crackdown - VOA

Dozens Killed in Syria as Jordan King Tells Assad to Go - BBC

Jordan's King Abdullah Calls for Assad's Resignation - VOA

Jordan’s King: Syria's Assad Should Resign - BBC

King of Jordan Calls for Syria’s Leader to Step Down - NYT

Jordan’s King Suggests Assad Resign - WP

Jordan's King on Syria's President: 'I Would Step Down' - CNN

Pressure Mounts on Syrian Leader Amid Crackdown - AP

Assad Under Pressure as Iran Holds Talks with Opposition - TT

Jordanian Embassy in Damascus Attacked - AP

Iraq FM Insists Not Pressured Over Syria Vote - AP

US Senators Press for Answers on Syria - WP

No Let-up in Unrest Across Syria - BBC

Activists: More Than 50 Killed in Syria in 1 Day - AP

Activists: 69 Killed in Syria on Monday - Reuters

Isolating Syria's Assad - LAT editorial

Turning the Screw on Assad’s Ailing Regime - TT editorial

Libya

Libyan Factions in Deadly Clashes - BBC

Forerunner of Libyan Army Deployed in Militia Feud - AP

US Official: Most Looted Missiles Still in Libya - Reuters

NATO Countries May Face War Crimes Inquiry - AP

Iraq

Logistical Drawdown Progressing Smoothly in Iraq - AFPS

FM Insists Iraq Not Pressured Over Syria Vote - AP

Yemen

UN Envoy: Yemen President Should Transfer Power - AP

Yemen's Saleh Says Ready to Step Down in 90 Days - Reuters

3 French Aid Workers Freed in Yemen - AP

Egypt

Fears of Mubarak’s Outlawed Party Loom Over Vote - NYT

No Poll Ban for Mubarak Backers - BBC

Deadly Protest in Northern Egypt - BBC

Israel / Palestinians

International Negotiators Meet, Little Progress on Mideast Peace - VOA

Obama Expresses 'Disappointment' on French Palestinian Vote - VOA

Israel and Kenya in Security Pact to Fight Somalia’s al-Shabab - BBC

Middle East / North Africa

Qatar Wields Outsize Influence in Arab Politics - NYT

Lebanese Politicians Fight Over Syria on Live TV - AP

Saudi Arabia, South Korea in Nuclear Cooperation Deal - Reuters

US Department of Defense

HASC Readiness Chair Pushes Panetta for AirSea Info - AOL

Troops Feel More Pity than Respect - WP

United States

Far From Washington, Obama Defends His Policies - NYT

Terrorism Top Concern at Justice - WT

Immigration from Mexico in Rapid Retreat - LAT

Occupy Encampments Face Wave of Shutdowns - USAT

Police Clear Occupy Camp at NYC’s Zuccotti Park - NYT

New York Police Evict Occupy Protesters - LAT

Police Clear Occupy Oakland Encampment, Protesters Return - NYT

The Torture Candidates - NYT editorial

Torture and Exceptionalism - NYT opinion

Focus on Foreign Policy - WT opinion

United Kingdom

PM: Euro Crisis 'an Opportunity' - BBC

UK: Missiles Could be Used to Protect Olympics - AP

Missiles 'May Protect 2012 Games' - BBC

Four Held in Birmingham Terror Raids - TT

Passport Checks Were Relaxed at 28 Ports - BBC

Fighter Deal 'May Save BAE Jobs' - BBC

Morale the First Casualty of the MoD’s Bungling - TT editorial

Could We Meet the Eyes of the Fallen? - TT editorial

Australia

Obama Expected to Announce Boost in Australia Defense Ties - S&S

Africa

Sudan, S. Sudan Trade Blame for Deteriorating Security - CSM

Israel and Kenya in Security Pact to Fight Somalia’s al-Shabab - BBC

Residents Flee Somali Rebel Enclave After Air Attack - Reuters

Tensions High with Congo's Election on Horizon - CSM

Swaziland Needs 'Regime Change' - BBC

Americas

Drug Cartel Plot Aimed at US-Owned Targets - WT

Mexico's PRI Retakes Michoacán, Eyes Presidency - CSM

Mexico President's Sister Defeated in Michoacan Vote - LAT

Ex-Ruling Party Wins Violence-Scarred Mexican Race - AP

Peru VP Chehade 'Steps Aside' Over Scandal - BBC

2 More Arrested in Ramos Kidnapping in Venezuela - AP

Asia Pacific

Willard Details Pacific Command’s Mission, Scope - AFPS

Obama Closes APEC, Cites Progress Toward 'Seamless' Economic Zone - VOA

US, Asia Deepen Security Ties Amid China Challenge - AP

China Rebuffs Obama’s Criticisms on Trade, Currency - VOA

New Reports Link N. Korean, Iranian Nuclear Programs - VOA

Social Critic Captivates Voters in South Korea - NYT

Suu Kyi Backs Burma President - TT

Suu Kyi Positive on Burma Reform - BBC

Burma Monks Hold Rare Protest Over Prisoners, War - Reuters

Land Mine Explodes at Burma House, Killing 10 - AP

Philippines Seeks Summit on Sea Row; China Cool - AP

Philippine Court Allows Arroyo to Travel Abroad - AP

Chapter and Verse on China's Moral Predations - WT opinion

Obama: China’s Stooge - WT opinion

China: We Hate Americans - WT opinion

China Roils Not-so-Pacific Pacific - WT opinion

Central Asia

New Kyrgyz President to Take Office in December - AP

Europe

Fleet of US Drones Now Based in Turkey - WP

Germany’s Merkel Lays Out Plan to Save the Euro - NYT

German: A Disturbing New Dimension of Far-Right Terror - DS

Germany’s Merkel Appalled by 'Neo-Nazi' Murders - BBC

German Intel Criticized for Overlooking Neo-Nazi Group - LAT

German Intel Agencies Puzzled by Far Right Terror - AP

US Airman Describes Shooting at Germany’s Frankfurt Airport - S&S

Italy’s NEW PM Mario Monti Gets to Work - WP

Italy’s New PM Monti 'Aims to Stay Until 2013' - BBC

Norway Terrorist Admits to Camp Massacre of 77 People  - CSM

Norway Shooter's Cold-Blooded Court Appearance - DS

Norway Killer Claims Mantle of Resistance Leader - AP

Russians Leaving the Country in Droves - LAT

South Asia

Indian State’s Roads Become a Protest Tool - NYT

What is war? The answer to this deceptively simple question is more elusive than one might think. Coverage of armed conflicts, revolutions, and various other struggles inundates media outlets and affects defense spending, foreign aid, and our lives. However, do we really understand what fuels these conflicts? Is the answer political, social, or is there a scientific theory we can use to better understand this phenomenon. Do such scholars as Carl von Clausewitz provide a comprehensive theory of war, or should we also look to the writings of Charles Darwin and others for answers. Modern advances in genetics and evolutionary biology have yielded new insights and powerful tools that allow us to peer beneath war’s anthropocentric veneer and glimpse at the essence of this violent phenomenon, a phenomenon that may very well determine a species’ path toward evolution or extinction.

To examine what I deemed The Nature of War Theory while a student at the U.S. Army War College, I proposed that war is fundamentally a series of violent adaptive behaviors originating from natural selection. When war is considered from this primal level, natural selection serves well to provide the scientific foundation upon which complex military and social theories may build.

In order to appreciate the theory’s most basic application a comparison between the group behaviors relating to the recent Arab Spring uprisings and the behaviors of a researched social species such as lions may prove instructive. To do so, it is necessary to place the uprisings’ two antagonistic groups, the regime and the popular uprising, within the context of natural selection.

Recalling the traditional version of natural selection familiar to most, survival of the fittest drives. For lions, this means a pride that hunts better will eat better and thus will reproduce more than other prides. To remain dominant in an environment characterized by limited resources regimes must similarly display a set of behaviors to out-compete rival groups.

However, recent advances in evolutionary biology demonstrate that natural selection in social species occurs not only at the individual level, but at multiple group levels simultaneously. For the lions, the next level is characterized by adaptive behaviors between prides. In order to prevent extinction, a pride of less skilled hunters must adapt to usurp a dominant pride or perish. Although lions often adapt non-violently (e.g. becoming better hunters) another alternative is combative adaption. The Arab Spring uprisings are characterized by both violent and non-violent adaptations that allow unarmed or lightly armed civilians to compete against government security forces.

The theory continues in complexity by applying additional levels of group adaptation with one of these being adaptation among a group. Consider the violent adaptive behavior between lion prides. Logically all lions should contribute to territorial defense, but research shows not all do. This same trend exists in nearly all social species, including our own. This situation results in an example of the curious paradox of early theories of natural selection. Because defending lions incur higher injury and death rates, this will overtime result in higher reproductive rates from the sedentary lions. If left unchecked, sedentary lions’ genotypes become dominant in the lion population, which is in stark conflict with natural selection. To balance the evolutionary books as it were, natural selection requires an offsetting behavior to keep sedentary behaviors in check.

Returning to Arab Spring, when a regime becomes sedentary and takes individual advantages from the group, natural selection requires the similar offsetting and adaptive group behaviors from among certain members of the group. Without these adaptive behavioral sets, the group will ultimately face extinction. As callous as it may appear, war as a group behavior, when placed in the context of natural selection, plays a vital role for a group, or even a species, by keeping sedentary adaptations in check.

At the most primal level, Arab Spring may be seen as a series of “tug of war” matches both between and among competing evolutionary behaviors. As the environment and the groups become more complex and dynamic the theory continues to pull from natural selection. In doing so, it can be used strategically to characterize other events such as the rise of non-state groups such as Al Qaeda, the co-opting of educated societies such as Nazi Germany, and the fall of great powers such as ancient Rome.

To examine these volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environments, what I deem The Nature of War Theory explores the phenomena of war from the academic middle ground between the hard and soft sciences. With the exception of a few scholarly efforts in the years immediately following World War I by noted authors Quincy Wright and J.F.C. Fuller, most academics considered this middle ground a “no man’s land” and not worthy of study. In general, students of military theory favored the seminal works of such greats as Carl von Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini, Sun Tzu, and others to understand war, while students of natural selection relied on the works of Charles Darwin, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, and Edward O. Wilson to understand evolution.

Through the 20^th Century, leading scientists considered natural selection to occur only at the individual, or survival of the fittest level. Because of this, it was not considered relevant to either military or social theory. However, advances in genetics, sociobiology, and other life sciences are radically transforming traditional interpretations of Darwin’s classic theories and in doing so are yielding potentially revolutionary insights into the causes of warlike behavior in social species. Driving this advance is Wilson and others whose research demonstrates that evolution is both an “individual and a team sport.” As it is for any team, success comes not only from a survival of the fittest mentality, but also from the sacrifice of individuals for the good of the group. Behavioral scientists use the term altruism to describe these self-sacrificing behaviors.

The competing evolutionary behaviors of individualistic and altruistic adaptations form the basis of The Nature of War Theory by suggesting a dual nature of war that aligns with the dual nature of natural selection. The theory presents the conflict between individualistic and altruistic adaptations and respectively aligns these with traditional and irregular warfare. Individualistic war is violent conflict originating from a primacy of individual-level adaptations over altruistic adaptations within a group. For a regime, this leads to violent behaviors that serve to benefit only a portion of a group, but no one outside it. Conversely, altruistic war, like a popular revolution, stems from group-level adaptation and serves as an evolutionary mechanism to ensure success of a larger group and perhaps even an entire species. War is thus two or more separate events corresponding to the behaviors that may be between or among dueling individualistic and altruistic evolutionary groups.

The central idea of natural selection fueling war is not new and literature suggests classic scholars of war conceived this causa bellum, but were unable to contextualize the concept because the science of environmental biology did not yet exist. In fact, many would come very close to describing war by using phrases with remarkably similar counterparts to those used to describe evolution. For example, in the fifth century, B.C., Sun Tzu wrote war is “the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin.” In 1651, Thomas Hobbes wrote wars are “the natural consequence of individual and societal acquisitive appetites.” Clausewitz offered wars “are to be regarded as a blind natural force.”  Indeed, had he not died prematurely, it would have been fascinating to see how Clausewitz would have completed his epic work, On War, after incorporating evolutionary biology in his early chapters. Yet sadly, he would die at roughly the same time the young naturalist Darwin embarked on the HMS Beagle for a five-year scientific voyage. Darwin would later publish two groundbreaking works, On the Origin of Species and The Descent of Man in 1859 and 1871, respectively, which would radically change the course of the human understanding of biology.

More recent publications suggest natural selection is emerging from the murky waters of theoretical biology to take its first steps onto the dry academic land of social theory. Two current examples of this are the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars “A National Strategic Narrative” by Mr. Y and New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman’s recent article, “Something’s Happening Here.” Although Mr. Y offers complex systems of human social behavior will quickly transcend the bounds of evolutionary biology, he recognizes the importance of natural selection as a behavioral process characteristic of social groups. This common ground should suggest to social and natural scientists alike that the something, in Friedman’s “something is happening here,” is natural selection and would place it as a contributing factor fueling such group behaviors as the sweeping Arab Spring revolutions as well as the recent insurgency/counterinsurgency conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The theory also serves to assuage the academic conflict between the dueling groups on both sides of the counterinsurgency argument. It recognizes the writings of Clausewitz serve well to capture individualistic war and the writings of David Galula serve well to depict altruistic war. Rather than applying either theory, or their variants to frame the conflict, it recognizes the phenomenon stems from two fundamentally different evolutionary processes. The theory unifies these theories by expanding the aperture of analysis so one can simultaneously explore both types of evolutionary war: individualistic and altruistic. In doing so, it provides a holistic method that endeavors to provide a degree of symmetry to seemingly asymmetric tactics, perspectives, leadership styles, and objectives.

Sir Isaac Newton once wrote, “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.” This quote serves as a fitting conclusion by illustrating how the Nature of War theory is built on the seminal works of Darwin, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Wilson, and countless other scholars from both the traditional and social sciences. The theory capitalizes on their works and recent advances in evolutionary biology to provide a compelling scientific argument for the unification of traditional and irregular theories of war within a single overarching theory.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.