| Small Wars Journal

It may be time to figure out what the MOOSEMUSS acronym would turn into with the addition of a “C” for cooperation. The big lesson the International Community should draw from the last ten years in Afghanistan is that cooperation must be a key principle of war if they hope to achieve peace. The author argues that in addition to the traditional principles of war and the American Joint principles of war one more principle should be added. The lack of cooperation among the nations and organizations involved in Afghanistan has multiplied the difficulties found there; but in areas where cooperation has existed progress has been visible. Legitimacy and Unity of Effort are two of the most complicated aspects of modern war and to better achieve them all the actors on the battlefield must cooperate.

The Nine Traditional Principles of War

The nine traditional principles of war are sound. They were learned by trial and error over centuries and mastered by only a handful of great commanders. Knowledge of their meanings does not mean a leader will be successful in battle and choosing not to follow them likewise does not ensure defeat. Readers of this journal are surely familiar with them but for the sake of others here they are.

Maneuver ~ Objective ~ Offensive ~ Security ~ Economy of force ~ Mass ~ Unity of command ~ Surprise ~Simplicity

The observation that many Soldiers operating on the modern battlefield make is that there is something missing from this list. In order to be effective today, leaders at the strategic, operational and tactical level, must figure out how to get all the different actors on the battlefield to work together. That is where cooperation comes in. Before moving to cooperation two more lists of principles are examined. Once the military started to think in terms of Joint Operations the United States learned that the nine principles needed to be augmented

The Principles of Joint Operations

The US Military based on years of experience in irregular warfare added three additional principles that when combined with the traditional nine creates the Principles Joint Operations.[i] The three additions are:

Restraint ~ Perseverance ~ Legitimacy

To irregular war historians it is clear that without these three additions it is difficult to keep a force in the field. Many historians of general war would likely argue that legitimacy, restraint, and perseverance are the cornerstone of all military interventions if the goal is to see peace take hold among the population after the major battles have ended. Legitimacy is arguably the most critical principle on this list but is often the most neglected concept. It is certainly one of the most vulnerable areas for any force involved in modern war. Next we look at the final traditional principle of the U.S. Military.

Unity of Effort

All of the principles of Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) are included in the Principles of Joint Operations except for Unity of Effort. This term points us towards the importance of cooperation in war zones where unity of command is not possible because of the diverse character of the actors present. The concept goes hand-in-hand with Unity of Command, which is focused on clearly conferring one commander the authority to get things done. The purpose of unity of command is to extract every bit of combat power out of a force so that it can be applied at the right place at the right time. In other words in order to achieve unity of effort, coordination, and synchronization one single commander needs to be in charge.[ii]

Unity of Effort

According to Joint Publication 3-07 (MOOTW), “Unity of effort in every operation ensures all means are directed to a common purpose.”[iii] So, while military units achieve unity of effort through unity of command, to get the myriad of non-military actors involved in modern war to work together something else is needed. This article calls for the achievement of unity of effort by applying the principle of cooperation.

Cooperation

The author is not alone in calling for something beyond Unity of Command. The new U.S. Army doctrine emphasizes the need for integration, coordination, and synchronization of elements inside and outside the military chain of command in order to achieve its desired effects.[iv] This emphasis recognizes that the U.S. Army not only needs the other U.S. military services to win wars but also the cooperation of other governmental and non-governmental organizations. This concept of getting all the rowers to pull on the oar at once is called unified action.[v]

Cooperation

Why is cooperation the right concept to achieve unity of effort and unified action? Whereas coordination, integration and synchronization imply that a leader has the authority to organize and harmonize the organizations in his area of operations cooperation denotes that no such authority exists. Cooperation is synonymous with working together, coming to an agreement, and/or give and take.[vi] These latter three terms more aptly describe what is needed to accomplish missions on today’s battlefield. Cooperation augments unity of command and creates the legitimacy needed to underwrite a mission. The final section of this article describes a case where a mission was accomplished by applying the principle of cooperation in Afghanistan.

Cooperation success in Kabul

In order to assist the Afghan government in achieving its desire to begin the Reintegration of low-level anti-Afghan Government fighters and Reconciliation with Insurgent Leaders the ISAF forces under General McChrystal developed an organization to enhance cooperation of the numerous stakeholders involved with the concept. Under the leadership of Lieutenant General (retired) Sir Graeme Lamb a diverse team of people from a variety of military and civilian organizations cooperated to transform the concept of reintegration and reconciliation from a vague idea into international policy in less than one year. This organization was known as the Force-Reintegration Cell or F-RIC.

The keys to success were creating a shared understanding among the stakeholders involved in the process, providing them with a clear purpose, and developing the appropriate incentives to get them to cooperate. Some of the stakeholders in this enterprise included military personnel, Afghan leaders, lawmakers, presidents and prime ministers, diplomats, intelligence officers, non-governmental organizations, think-tanks, the media, universities, regional and international organizations, government aid organizations, neighboring and regionally concerned nations, and the myriad of anti-Afghan Government fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The first step towards cooperation was to correctly identify who all the stakeholders were inside and outside the military and government. To achieve the necessary cooperation among this diverse group required that the people assigned or volunteering at the F-RIC be drawn from among of these stakeholders. Additionally the F-RIC spent a large amount of its time studying the problem and gaining an understanding of the motives of the stakeholders. Finally the F-RIC learned to give and take with each of the stakeholders until they reached a workable agreement. This is a very simplified version of events but serves to highlight the complexity of the tasks given to the military and the need for the concept of cooperation on today’s battlefield.

Conclusion

It is likely that the current principles of war will continue to influence leaders in combat. If the world learns the lessons of modern war it may add the principle of cooperation to this short list of valuable ideas. On the other hand militaries may fall back to the advice a seasoned Sergeant Major once gave to a future British Chief of the Imperial General Staff when he was just a cadet. According to the NCO who watched Cadet Slim furiously studying the principles of war:

“Don’t bother your head about all them things, me lad, there’s only one principle of war and that’s this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts the most, when he ain’t lookin!”[vii]

But then again if you have ever tried this Sergeant-Major’s theory out with a village elder, a United Nations employee, a diplomat, or a human rights worker you probably found that it was not very successful. In summary cooperation can help leaders achieve unity of effort when unity of command is not an available option. Cooperation enhances legitimacy and helps to build a shared understanding of the problem and the achievable solutions. Finally cooperation is a principle that can be applied at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

[i] Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, Headquarters Department of Defense, Washington D.C., 11 August 2011. p 1-2.

[ii] Ibid. p GL-18

[iii] Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War, Headquarters Department of Defense, Washington D.C., 16 June 1995. pp viii, II-1 to II-3.

[iv] Army Doctrine Publication Number 3-0, Unified Land Operations, (formerly FM 3-0) Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, 22 September 2011. Page iv.

[v] Joint Publication 3-0, pp xi and 1-8 to 1-12.

[vi] Stein, Jess, Ed. The Random House Thesaurus, Random House, New York: 1984.

[vii] Slim, Field-Marshal Viscount William. Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945. Cooper Square Press Edition, New York, 2000, Page 551. Field-Marshal Slim believed his success during WWII was based on adherence to the Sergeant-Major’s single principle of war.

Abrupt change may be coming to China – and soon

Two items on China, an essay and a book review, caught my attention. Contrary to the common Western portrayal of China as a rising Colossus, the two items describe a China with many deep problems. Both imply abrupt change coming to China, perhaps soon. Needless to say, disruptive social convulsion this decade inside China very likely runs counter to the assumptions incorporated into the vast majority of Western economic, financial, and military planning documents.

First is an essay written by Henry Rowen and published in the latest edition of Policy Review from the Hoover Institution (Rowen is professor emeritus at Stanford and an Asian scholar). In China: Big Changes Coming Soon, Rowen discusses the substantial economic, financial, political, and social pressures building inside China. He then discusses the possible international effects that could result from disruption inside China, including effects to global trade, finance, and the security situation in Asia.

Next, yesterday’s Wall Street Journal featured a book review of China in Ten Words a book by Yu Hua, one of China’s most acclaimed novelists. Yu’s book describes street-level China from the Cultural Revolution through today, with each chapter organized around a single word such as people, leader, revolution, and bamboozle, words not yet banned by Party censors. Reviewer Melanie Kirkpatrick describes Yu’s very dire take on today’s China:

As awful as the Cultural Revolution was, in Mr. Yu's telling its horrors sometimes pale next to those of the present day. The chapter on "bamboozle" describes how trickery, fraud and deceit have become a way of life in modern China. "There is a breakdown of social morality and a confusion in the value system of China today," he states. He writes, for example, about householders around the country who are evicted from their homes on the orders of unscrupulous, all-powerful local officials.

Mr. Yu's portrait of contemporary Chinese society is deeply pessimistic. The competition is so intense that, for most people, he says, survival is "like war." He has few hopeful words to offer, other than to quote the ancient philosopher Mencius, who taught that human progress is built on man's desire to correct his mistakes. Meanwhile, he writes, "China's pain is mine."

Is China in another “pre-revolutionary moment”? And if social convulsion occurs, what will be the consequences for the global economy, the financial system, and the strategic situation in Asia and elsewhere?

China’s heady rise over the past three decades has made such an abrupt change seem laughable. It is likely not given much weight in most planning documents. Yet it might turn out to be the most important story of the decade.

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An Insurgency Overlooked: India and the Naxalites

The future economic success of the west depends to a considerable degree on its ability to establish firm ties with states around the Indian Ocean Rim. The two main actors that constitute the best hope for global growth are obviously India and China. Of the two, India is in many ways the better bet. The country’s ‘bottom-up’ economic model (enabling it to better withstand systemic shocks), its demographic composition and its democratic system provide it with a future outlook that is brighter than China’s. Also, it is impressive that, despite endemic corruption, poor infrastructure, and a currently weak and directionless Congress Party-dominated government, India’s economy maintains a growth rate of 6%. Moving into an era of multipolarity, the importance of enhancing ties with a rising power like India is of great strategic importance for the West. At the same time, though, India is facing internal security pressures, albeit largely unknown to many investors and policy makers. Large swaths of Indian territory are plagued by conflict between the state and the long-running Maoist insurgency group known as the Naxalites. If not dealt with effectively, the Naxalites might prove to be too much for New Delhi and turn out to be India’s Achilles heel imperiling its phenomenal global rise.

The current manifestation of Maoist-inspired violence in India can be traced back to the period immediately following the country’s independence in 1948. The term Naxal or Naxalite is derived from the Indian village of Naxalbari (West Bengal) where the movement has its roots. The stated goal of the Naxalites was, and remains to this day, to free the poor from the clutches of the landlords, to implement land reforms and destroy the oppressive feudal order in India. A central part their strategy to achieve this goal has been a guerrilla war against government forces in the underdeveloped rural and tribal regions of India. Although the nature of the movement makes it difficult to estimate the group’s size, recent estimates by The Research and Analysis Wing, the Indian intelligence service, have placed the numerical strength of the Naxalites at some 20,000 armed fighters, with access to about 6,500 firearms. These numbers would suggest that the Naxalites are almost twice as big as the FARC movement in Columbia, which numbered around 11,000 operatives in 2009. The Naxalites’ organizational structure includes an elaborate hierarchy with a Central Committee at the top, followed by Regional Bureaus, Zonal or State Committees, and District or Division Committees. Following a period of internal strife and fractional splits, in 2004 the a merger occurred to create an umbrella organizational structure for the Naxalite insurgency. This reunification was followed by an upswing in the level of violence.

Like all successful or enduring insurgent groups, the Naxalites follow a two-tiered strategy, using violence against their opponents as well as engaging in socio-economic initiatives to win the support of the population. With regard to the latter, it is important to note that the Naxalite insurgency puts much effort into addressing the grievances of the marginalised poor, who are disappointed in – or even hostile towards – the Indian government. For instance, Naxalite fighters have campaigned for women’s rights, have tried to improve the housing situation of those in need, have organised railway strikes, and have run irrigation projects to help farmers increase their harvests. The violent actions that make up the other second pillar of he Naxalite strategy are mostly aimed against the police, Indian government officials and transnational corporations. These attacks are intended to shield the population from capitalist influence. The Naxalites are quite successful in this regard, as the group has managed to take control of certain regions, especially in the Red Corridor, where state power has been eroded or has collapsed altogether.

Several factors account for the Naxalites’ ability to pull off tours de force of this kind. First, the manpower that the Indian insurgents brings to bear, gives them the organisational clout needed to wage a large-scale campaign. Second, although the Naxalites are geographically dispersed and not centrally led, the group shows a remarkable commitment to the overall strategy. Although the group’s operatives occasionally lash out at the local population, Naxalite actions generally fit the ambition to create Naxalite-controlled areas to encircle the cities and eventually take over the country. The third explanation of the insurgency’s sustainability is the fact that many Naxalite operatives are active in their native areas. From this, they derive knowledge of the terrain, crucial in irregular warfare, as well as familiarity with the local population and its plight, which makes it unlikely that they will be perceived as interlopers.

Another factor that makes it unlikely that the Naxalite insurgency will soon be a thing of the past is the inadequacy of the Indian government’s response. While it is clear that discrimination and poverty of the rural population provide the Naxalites with a support base and a pool of potential recruits, the government’s measures to alleviate the living conditions of the rural poor are generally half-hearted and poorly implemented. Rather, the government tries to quell the insurgency by taking a hard approach with a central role for law enforcement agencies. Thus far however, this hard line has not yielded the desired results. The number of police forces deployed against the Naxalites was recently increased to 76,000, but the insurgency is still alive and kicking. And even regardless of the effectiveness of the government line, it remains to be seen whether it is sustainable. India is one of the most underpoliced countries in the world, and there is little chance that the government will deploy the army, reluctant as it is to start a long and messy campaign and to take forces away from Jammu and Kashmir. It appears that the Naxalites are here to stay.

All too often, analyses of India are based on the assumption that its rise is inevitable and effortless. For a long time, the western view was that the rest of the world held little allure to the west, but now, the received wisdom on India at business and international relations conferences is an overcompensation of earlier neglect and underestimation. This overly sunny view is as misguided as the prior arrogance. What is needed is a sober analysis of India’s economy and internal security situation. The goal of this article has certainly not been to denigrate the future potential of India or to engage in fear mongering. Rather, we have tried to draw attention to an important actor on the Indian scene that until now has received only minimal international attention. Adding this dimension to current thinking about India will allow investors and policy makers to make informed decisions on when, how and where to invest their money in India. If India is serious about defeating the Naxalites, they will need to deal with the root causes of the group’s appeal in the Red Corridor, which will require addressing poverty, corruption and tribal inclusion issues. Only by doing so can India retain the domestic stability that is a prerequisite for its continued phenomenal rise.

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8 December SWJ Roundup

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Real Clear World - RCP

Afghanistan

Report: Allen Backs Pause in Withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2013 - S&S

NATO Commander Pushes for Year Pause in Troop Drawdown - TT

Afghans Uneasy Despite Security Gains Made by US Troop Buildup - LAT

Rare Attacks on Shiites Kill Scores in Afghanistan - NYT

Afghan President Vows to 'Confront Pakistan' Over Holy Day Terror Attack - VOA

Pakistani Group Claims Role in Deadly Suicide Attack on Shiites - WP

Afghan Leader Seeks to Discuss Attacks on Shiites With Pakistan - NYT

Karzai: Attack Plotted in Pakistan - WP

Afghan President Says Attack Came from Pakistan - AP

Afghanistan's Karzai Blames Pakistan Group for Attacks - Reuters

Attacks on Shiites in Afghanistan: Why this is Different than Iraq - CSM

Bombing Sets Back Efforts to Stabilize Afghanistan - AP

Afghan Bombs Kill 78 in Two Days - Reuters

Mine Attack Kills 19 Civilians in Afghanistan - NYT

At Least 19 Civilians Killed by Roadside Bomb - BBC

US Rerouting Some Afghan War Supplies - AP

DOD Helps Afghans Develop Mineral Enterprise - AFPS

ISAF Operations Summary - AFPS

Pakistan

Pakistani President's Dubai Trip Spurs Rumors - VOA

Pakistani President’s Trip Abroad Sparks Rumors - WP

Rumors of 'Silent Coup' - CSM

Pakistani President's Medical Trip Fuels Rumors - AP

Pakistan's President in Hospital - BBC

Virginia Man Accused as Pakistani Agent Pleads Guilty - WP

US Citizen in Pakistan Lobbying Case Pleads Guilty - Reuters

Iraq

Commander: Success of Iraq Security Forces Remains to be Seen - S&S

General Calls Iraq Operations ‘Worth It’ in Final News Briefing - AFPS

US Base a Funnel for Troops and Equipment Heading Out - LAT

Signs of Looming US Troop Drawdown Abound in Iraq - AP

US Warns Iraq Against Eviction of Foes of Iran - WT

Iran

Use of Surveillance Drones Reflects Tougher US Strategy - WP

Drone Crash in Iran Reveals Secret US Surveillance Effort - NYT

Experts Argue Over Iran Nuclear Bomb Timeline - Reuters

Iran Blocks American ‘Virtual Embassy’ - NYT

Virtual US Embassy in Iran is Blocked - AP

Iran Says US 'Virtual' Embassy Will Fail - AP

Global Media Accuse Iran Over Signal Jamming - AP

GOP Lawmakers Want Iranian Group Off Terrorism List - NYT

What to Do About Iran - WS opinion

Egypt

General Reasserts Military’s Power in Post-Election Egypt - NYT

Military to Appoint Council to Oversee Drafting of Constitution - TT

Egypt's Islamists Claim Most Seats in Run-Offs - Reuters

Egyptian PM Receives Some Presidential Powers - VOA

Cabinet Sworn In, Calls to Curb Military Power Continue - LAT

Egypt's New Cabinet is Sworn In - BBC

Egypt's Rulers: Parliament Won't Be Representative - AP

Democracy Dial-Back? - CSM

Out of Protest, an Anthem for Egypt's Revolution - NYT

Mubarak Trial Set to Resume After Appeal Rejected - Reuters

Amnesty Criticizes US Arms Shipments to Egypt - AP

Joining a Dinner in a Muslim Brotherhood Home - NYT opinion

Syria

Assad Denies Responsibility for Syrian Protest Deaths - VOA

No Guilt Over Crackdown, Says Assad - BBC

In Rare Interview, Assad Denies Ordering Crackdown - NYT

Assad Denies Ordering Crackdown - WP

Syria's President Denies Ordering Crackdown - AP

Assad Says Only 'Crazy' Leaders Kill Own People - Reuters

Syria, Under Siege Inside and Out, Does Not Budge - NYT

Algeria: Arab League Only Way to Syria Transition - Reuters

Hamas Reduces Presence in Syria Amid Violence - LAT

Giving Cover to Assad - WS opinion

Obama Must Consider Bolder Intervention - CSM opinion

Yemen

Yemen VP Forms New Unity Government - VOA

Yemen Vice President Sets Up Unity Government - Reuters

Unity Government Created in Yemen - BBC

Rights Group Urges Yemen to Ban Child Marriage - Reuters

Libya

US Reaches Out to Help Rebuild Libyan Military - USAT

Libya: Plot to Smuggle Qaddafi’s Son Into Mexico Disrupted - NYT

Mexico Says it Foiled Plot to Sneak in Gaddafi Son - LAT

Libya: Gaddafi Son 'in Mexico Entry Bid' - BBC

Mexico Says Gadhafi Son Tried to Enter Country - AP

Libyan Civilians Hold on to a Deadly Legacy - NYT

Middle East / North Africa

Palestinians' Statehood Bid Part of Christmas - AP

Avowing Innocence, Israeli Ex-President Enters Prison - NYT

Israel Attorney General Won't Back Funding Limits - AP

Violence Feared Over Repairs at Jerusalem Shrine - AP

Vandals Leave Burning Tire at West Bank Mosque - AP

Moroccan Justice: Sold to Highest Bidder - AP

Obama’s Israel Problem - WT editorial

Obama’s Unlikely Turkish Alliance - WP opinion

United Nations

Rumors of the UN’s Benefits Have Been Greatly Exaggerated - WS opinion

US Department of Defense

Pentagon: Al-Qaida Sympathizers Pose Threat to Troops in US - S&S

Terrorists Said to be Infiltrating Military - WT

Remains of Hundreds of Troops Left in Landfill - WP

Brutality of 1994 Panama Fight Still Resonates with US Troops - S&S

The Mark Center: The Defense Department in Their Midst - NYT

Inside the Ring - WT

The USS Karl Marx - WT editorial

United States

US Pauses to Remember Pearl Harbor - BBC

Pearl Harbor Survivors Group Says it will Disband - AP

To State Dept., WikiLeaks or Not, Secrets Are Secrets - NYT

Gingrich: John Bolton will be My Secretary of State - WT

Dozens Arrested at Occupy DC Protests - WP

Occupy San Francisco Camp Cleared by Police - TT

Blagojevich Sentenced to 14 Years in Prison - NYT

New Orleans Struggles to Stem Homicides - NYT

Hobbling the Fight Against Terrorism - NYT editorial

United Kingdom

Britain Suffers as a Bystander to Europe’s Debt Crisis - NYT

Combat Boots that Deflect Blast of Roadside Bombs Being Designed - TT

New Arrest in British Phone Hacking Scandal - NYT

Private Eye Arrested in UK's Newspaper Hacking Probe - Reuters

Bring the Iron Lady Back - NYT

Africa

Kenya to 'Join AU Somalia Force' - BBC

Official: Explosion in Central Nigeria Kills 7 - AP

South Sudan in Withdrawal Demand - BBC

Congo on Edge While Election Results Delayed - VOA

After Vote, Congo Braces for Expressions of Discord - NYT

Partial Results Give Kabila 14-Point Lead in Congo - AP

Nine Fugitives Sought by Rwanda Genocide Court - AP

More Than 550 Ivorian Refugees to Repatriate - AP

UN: Russia Air Firms' Staff Guilty of Africa Sex Abuse - Reuters

Americas

Brutality of 1994 Panama Fight Still Resonates with US Troops - S&S

Gunmen Attack Ambulance in Mexico, Kill 4 People - AP

Peru's Shining Path Admits Defeat - BBC

Peru Guerilla Leader Pledges No More Attacks - AP

US Donation to Help Paraguay Fight Guerrillas - AP

Venezuela Prosecutor: Judge Must Stay in Custody - AP

Honduras Media at 'Growing Risk' - BBC

Noriega to Be Extradited to Panama on Sunday - AP

Brazil Launches Program to Curb the Use of Crack - AP

Asia Pacific

US and China Meet in Annual Military Review - NYT

US Official Says Military Pacts Not Aimed at China - AP

At Climate Talks, Familiar Standoff Between US and China - NYT

China Rescues 178 Children in Trafficking Bust - AP

Donations to Charities in China Plunge After Scandals - Reuters

Lawmakers Concerned over N. Korea's Ballistic Missile Capabilities - S&S

US Envoy Hopes for More Talks With North Korea - AP

Thailand: Fugitive 'Red Shirt' Leader Surrenders in Bangkok - VOA

American Gets 2.5 Years in Prison for Defaming Thai King - LAT

While Burma’s Chinese Businesses Thrive, Competition Worries Locals - VOA

Japan FM Feels 'Deep Emotion' About Pearl Harbor - AP

North Korea's New Course - LAT opinion

Fear of China Pushes Burma Out of Isolation - CSM opinion

Europe

Gorbachev Calls for New Elections, Russian Security Forces Patrol Streets - VOA

Gorbachev Calls for New Vote in Disputed Russian Elections - NYT

Gorbachev Calls for New Russia Election - BBC

Gorbachev Calls for Re-run of Russian Election - TT

Anti-Vote Fraud Protests in Russia for 3rd Night - AP

Russian Police Block New Anti-Putin Rally - Reuters

Russia: Social Media Makes Anti-Putin Protests 'Snowball' - Russia

Russia: Putin Accuses Clinton of Inciting Protests - TT

Putin Accuses Clinton of Encouraging Russian Protesters - AP

NATO, Russia at Odds Over Missile Defense Shield - VOA

NATO Chief Rebuffs Russian Threats to Counter Missile Shield - WP

NATO: Russian Missile Counter-Measures a Waste of Money - Reuters

Reports: Russia to Deploy S-400s in Kaliningrad - AP

Top NATO Official Counters Russia Threat as Waste - AP

S&P May Downgrade European Union, Large Euro-Zone Banks - Reuters

Leaders Gather for Summit to Save the Euro - WP

On Eve of Key Meeting, New Rifts on Euro Emerge - NYT

Germany, France Scale Back Ambitions of Summit - AP

France and Germany Seek Support for Crisis Plan - Reuters

Gangster in Italy Arrested After 16-Year Manhunt - NYT

Italian Police Dig Through Bunker to Arrest Senior Mafia Boss - TT

Swedish Police Give New Details About 2010 Bomber - AP

Europe 2.0? - WP editorial

Putin’s Canny Politics - WP opinion

Obama’s Unlikely Turkish Alliance - WP opinion

South Asia

India Suspends Plan to Let In Foreign Retailers - NYT

India Shuts Door to Foreign Chains - WP

India Police Charge Tibet Holy Man in Money Probe - AP

Read more about 8 December SWJ Roundup

New Unit of Measure: The Lance Corporal Equivalent (LCE)

New Unit of Measure: The Lance Corporal Equivalent (LCE)

by Zacchaeus

I just read a sobering blog post over at the USNI. While some in the business may look at the forthcoming budget reduction efforts as academically stimulating, it’s important to keep in mind the toll end strength reductions will have on the young men and women who’ve done nothing wrong except wanting to serve their country. The navy’s approach to personnel reduction says a great deal about leadership priorities.

During the height of the Cold War smart folks in the defense analysis industry came up with the concept of a standardized unit of measure – the Armor Division Equivalent – as a useful tool to run through sophisticated models to predict the results of attrition warfare engagements that never occurred.

We now face a different form of attrition warfare – attrition of end strength and force structure due to the inevitable reality of budget reduction efforts. Today, a useful tool to make comparisons is to use the Lance Corporal Equivalent. The Lance Corporal is a highly adaptable weapon system used successfully across the full spectrum of military operations from HA/DR to MTW and everything in between.

The LCE is a great tool when examining the budget trade space. Some tradeoffs are acceptable. In many cases it makes perfect operational and fiscal sense to commit funds to an effective weapon system. However, all too often, senior leaders in DoD accept inefficiency at the expense of operational capabilities.

The LCE equates to $25K. It takes into consideration annual salary and incidentals such as chow and living expenses for a single leatherneck living in the barracks. This does not consider ammo, personal weapons, training, etc. It is not a perfect model but it is effective to bring to light the tradeoffs for accepting status quo programs and processes. Here are a few examples:

1 Senior Program Analyst on OSD Staff : 6.2 LCE

1 Graduate of Army War College : 6.6 LCE

1 Schedule C SES at the Pentagon : 7.6 LCE

1 Married set of 0-5s working on acquisition programs at the Pentagon : 10.6 LCE

1 Naval Academy Graduate : 14.6 LCE

Graduating Class at USMA : 16,800 LCE

1 COCOM HQ Staff : 64,000 LCE

Military Personnel doing civilian work – 2.24M LCE

This is a very short list generated with the level of analysis that could be conducted on the back of an MRE box. I am not advocating eliminating any of the above items so need to go into the D, I am simply attempting to place the tradespace in perspective. By accepting inefficiency in whatever form within the DoD we are eliminating valuable operational capacity. Framing the issue in LCEs may help reinforce this fact.

Zacchaeus was a Greek tax collector hated by his peers for perceived collaboration with the enemy. It is the pseudonym of a retired Marine, working at the Pentagon. He lives in fear for his children, family pet and automobile should his real identity fall into the hands of status quo thinkers in the Marine Corps.

7 December SWJ Roundup

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Real Clear World - RCP

Afghanistan

Afghans Uneasy Despite Security Gains Made by US Troop Buildup - LAT

Twin Bombings Tear Through Afghan Shi'ite Holy Day - VOA

Rare Attacks on Shiites Kill Scores in Afghanistan - NYT

Dozens Dead in Suicide Bombing of Shiite Mosque in Kabul - WP

Fears of New Afghan Sectarian War as Shrine Attacks Kill 59 - TT

Attacks on Afghan Shiites Raise Specter of Iraq-like Violence - CSM

Death Toll Rises: Nearly 60 Killed in Rare Attacks on Afghan Shiites - AP

Carnage in Kabul Sparks Fear of Sectarian Strife - AP

Karzai Flies Home after Deadly Blast - BBC

Afghan President Cuts Short Trip After Bombing - AP

Five Key Afghan Security Forces Officers Visit California - LAT

ISAF Operations Summary - AFPS

Not Just Afghans' Shame - LAT opinion

Bonn II: Seeking a Secure Afghanistan - WT opinion

Afghanistan Field Guide: Nine Essential Tips - CSM opinion

Pakistan

Mission Impossible for Pakistani Progressives? - Reuters

Pakistani President Travels to Dubai for Tests - AP

Iraq

Despite Deadly Attacks, Pilgrims in Iraq Mark Holy Day - AP

Cav Troops Help Ensure Security as US Winds Down Mission - S&S

Iran

Iran Explosions Prompt Speculation of Secret Attacks - McClatchy

Wary US Uncertain of Israel's Iran Plans - Reuters

Drone Belonged to CIA, Officials Say - WP

Malfunction Likely Put US Drone in Iranian Hands - Reuters

Experts: Iran Capture of Stealth Drone No Worry - AP

After Drone Went Down, CIA Tried a Head Fake - WP

US Opens ‘Virtual Embassy’ in Tehran - WP

US Launches 'Virtual' Embassy for Iran - AP

'Virtual' US Iranian Embassy Open - BBC

Egypt

Egypt's Islamists Compete for Votes in Runoff Elections - VOA

Muslim Brotherhood Says Does Not Seek Struggle with Military - AP

Egypt's New PM Says Army to Give Him Extra Powers - Reuters

Hard-Line Islamist Gains Surprise in Egypt Vote - AP

Egypt, the Beginning or the End? - NYT opinion

Egypt’s Christians Deserve a Democratic Future Too - TT opinion

Syria

Sharp Spate of Killings Traumatizes a Syrian City - NYT

Reported Killings in Homs Spread Fear of Sectarian War - LAT

Turkey Border Clashes Push Syria Towards Open Warfare - TT

As US Ambassador Ford Returns, Syria Deteriorates - CSM

Hezbollah Leader Backs Syrian President in Public - NYT

Clinton Meets Syrian Opposition as US Ambassador Returns - VOA

US Says Opposition Must Build 'Free, Tolerant' Syria - Reuters

Ambassador Robert Ford Heads Back to Syria - WP

US Ambassador to Return to Syria - BBC

Middle East / North Africa

IMF Chief: ‘Arab Spring’ Is at Critical Juncture - Reuters

Nervous Gulf Stresses Unity Amid Iran Tensions - AP

Prince Hints Saudi Arabia May Join Nuclear Arms Race - AP

Australian Sentenced to 500 Lashes in Saudi Arabia - AP

Hezbollah Chief in Rare Appearance - BBC

Hezbollah Leader Backs Syrian President in Public - NYT

UN Condemns Civilian Toll in Yemen Fighting - VOA

Yemen PM Says Gov’t Imminent, UN Warns on Civilians - Reuters

Hamas MP Expelled from Jerusalem - BBC

UN Constructing Green Schools in Gaza - VOA

Israel Raid 'Kills Gaza Militant' - BBC

Gaza Militant Killed in Clash With Israel - AP

Libya: Tripoli Militia 'to be Disarmed' - BBC

Arab Spring Tops Twitter's 2011 Top Stories - BBC

US Department of Defense

Pentagon's Budget War Games - WT

Hotspots: You Might Deploy Here Next - MCT

United States

Pearl Harbor Still a Day for the Ages, But a Memory Almost Gone - NYT

Pearl Harbor Veterans Remember Paradise Suddenly Turned Into Hell - WT

Republican Candidates Aim at Obama Foreign Policy - NYT

Director of Federal Drone Program Targeted in Ethics Inquiry - LAT

Senators Want Investigation into VA Wait Data - S&S

US Will Use Foreign Aid to Push Gay Rights - NYT

US Speaks Out on Global Gay Rights - WP

FAA Chief Leaves Job After DUI Arrest - NYT

Remembering Pearl Harbor - NYT editorial

Remembering Pearl Harbor - WT editorial

Bipartisan Angst over Obama Foreign Policy - WP opinion

National Security Lessons Never Learned - WT opinion

Africa

Congo Residents Apprehensive While Awaiting Election Results - VOA

Congo President Wins in Kind of 'Coup d'Etat' - WT

Congolese Protesters Say Election Fraudulent, Clash with Police - WP

DR Congo Election Results Delayed by 48 Hours - BBC

Congo Delays Election Results by 48 Hours - AP

Nigerian Militant Islamist Jailed - BBC

After a Break to Run Somalia, Back at His Cubicle - NYT

Somalia Car Blast 'Kills Police' - BBC

Swedish Journalists Deny Supporting Ethiopia Rebels - VOA

South Africa Under Fire For 'Dirty Energy' - VOA

UN Toughens Sanctions on Eritrea - BBC

Americas

Despite Army Takeover, Fear Strong in Mexican Town - AP

Colombia Stages anti-FARC Rallies - BBC

Colombians March Against Rebels for Hostage-Taking - AP

Venezuela: China May Surpass US as No.1 Trade Partner - AP

Dip in Consumer Spending Slows Growth in Brazil - NYT

Brazil's Economic Growth Stalls - BBC

Honduran Journalist Shot, Killed Outside Her Home - AP

A Western Hemisphere, Minus the US - LAT editorial

Falklands Warning for the UK - TT editorial

Asia Pacific

Economic Troubles in Europe and US Start to Affect Asia - NYT

China Navy in 'Warfare' Warning - BBC

Chinese, US Defense Officials Meet in Beijing - AP

US, China Defense Officials Meet Despite Tensions - Reuters

Outrage Grows Over Air Pollution and China’s Response - NYT

Amnesty Protests Pending Chinese Execution - VOA

US and S. Korea Renew Talks on Nuclear Technology - NYT

Japan Split on Hope for Vast Radiation Cleanup - NYT

Japan: Tsunami Fund 'Used for Whaling' - BBC

Philippines, Rebels Renew Truce Monitors' Stay - AP

Using Islam to Counter Jihad in Southern Thailand - CSM

Thais Test Taboos as War on Royal Slurs Heats Up - Reuters

Villagers Become Refugees in Burma as Rebels Clash With Troops - NYT

Will China Become the Next Major Global Power? - CSM opinion

Europe

Troops Patrol Moscow to Prevent Election Protests - VOA

Russia Cracks Down on Antigovernment Protests - NYT

Protests Erupt in Moscow, Activists Arrested - VOA

Opposition Leader Held as Russia Beats Back Protests - TT

Moscow Protesters Defy Rally Ban - BBC

Russian Police Crack Down on Anti-Putin Protests - Reuters

Protests over Russian Elections Spread to More Cities - VOA

In Protests, Two Russias Face Off - WP

Clinton Raises Russian Election Concerns at OSCE - VOA

US Works Quietly to Help Europe with Crisis - WP

Euro Rules Could Change without Treaty - BBC

S&P Threatens Downgrade for Europe Bailout Fund - VOA

Germany: Merkel’s Path Brinkmanship for Debt Crisis - NYT

France: Sarkozy Faces Criticism at Home - WP

Greece Passes New Austerity Plans - BBC

Plan for Online Freedoms Stalls at European Meeting - NYT

Europe's Radical Right Focuses on Fighting Islam - AP

Three Charged in Sweden With Conspiring to Kill Cartoonist - Reuters

The Wrong Fix - NYT editorial

South Asia

Violence Wanes in Kashmir, India Maintains Tight Military Grip - WP

India Targets 'Blasphemous' Web - BBC

Online Uproar as India Seeks Social Media Screening - Reuters

Sri Lanka Under Fire Over PR Firm - BBC

Read more about 7 December SWJ Roundup

Bringing the State to the Slum

Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America by Vanda Felbab-Brown, The Brookings Institution.

Public safety is increasingly determined by crime and security in urban spaces. How the public safety problem in urban spaces is dealt with in the 21st century as urbanization intensifies will determine citizens’ perceptions of the accountability and effectiveness of the state in upholding the social contract between the citizens and the state. Major cities of the world, and the provision of security and order within them, will increasingly play a major role in the 21st century distribution of global power. In many of the world’s major cities, law enforcement and social development have not caught up with the pace of urbanization, and there is a deep and growing bifurcation between developed and reasonably safe sectors of economic growth and social advancement and slums stuck in a trap of poverty, marginalization, and violence. Addressing the violence and lifting the slums from this trap will be among the major challenges for many governments.

There are many forms of urban violence. This article presents some of the key law enforcement and socioeconomic policy lessons from one type of response to urban slums controlled by non-state actors: namely, when the government resorts to physically retaking urban spaces that had been ruled by criminal or insurgent groups and where the state’s presence had been inadequate or sometimes altogether nonexistent. Its focus is on Latin America—specifically Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Jamaica; but its findings apply more broadly and are informed by similar dynamics between non-state actors and state policies in places like Karachi, Pakistan, and Johannesburg, South Africa...

Rethinking Revolution: Introduction

When is a revolution over, completed, fulfilled? Traditionally, we prefer to quantify revolutions as ending in a win, loss, or negotiated settlement.[1] While this framework is helpful for shaping theory, it neglects that reality is often much more complicated and messy. As John Maynard Keynes said, “it is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique for thinking, which helps the possessor to draw correct conclusions.” Simply put, it is only a guide towards understanding history and human nature.

For instance, the American Revolution did not end with an American colonist’s win over the British Empire. Rather, the conflict was the beginning of a long, arduous process that continues today. As Richard Edens notes, “the American Revolution created an imperfect union. In addition to legalized and racialized enslavement in a land of equality and freedom, the limited power state of the 18^th century was inadequate for the dynamism of 19^th century industrial capitalism rather than an economy dominated by agriculture. These unresolved and irresolvable tensions led to the Civil War.”[2]

James McPherson in the conclusion of his book on the Civil War, Battle Cry of Freedom, writes,

. . . when secessionists protested that they were acting to preserve traditional rights and values, they were correct. . . . The South’s concept of republicanism had not changed in three-quarters of a century; the North’s had. With complete sincerity the South fought to preserve its version of the republic of the founding fathers – a government of limited powers that protected the rights of property and whose constituency comprised an independent gentry and yeomanry of the white race undistributed by large cities, heartless factories, restless free workers, and class conflict. … Their secession was a pre-emptive counterrevolution. … ‘We are not revolutionists,’ insisted James B.D. DeBow and Jefferson Davis during the Civil War, ‘We are resisting revolution . . . . We are conservative.[3]

The tensions of an imperfect union continue to this day with a re-revolution and a counter-revolution, an on-going revolution for a changing context and resistance to revolution and a changing context.[4]

In his seminal work, Rethinking Insurgency, Steven Metz challenged our community to rethink the existing assumptions and relearn how to counter insurgencies.[5] Moreover, over the past decade, scholars challenged the accepted military definition that an insurgency is “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.”

Yet, with all the evidence, scholarship, theories, and analysis, we continue to muddle through small wars. Why? Perhaps, we often choose mass over maneuver and speed over subtle influence in attempts to control the problem. Small wars are wicked problems. If we continue to plug and play the latest "new" idea to tame a problem, then we will just muddle along and only make the problem worse.

In the last decade, we jumped from pre-emptive war to counterinsurgency, and we are now moving to Foreign Internal Defense (FID)/Security Force Assistance (SFA) without a serious debate, informed discussion, or collaborative endeavor. There is no imagination. There is no fully formed, holistic, comprehensive strategy. We continue to muddle in tactics bypassing strategy.

Today, we are in a time of unprecedented economic, environmental, technological, and political change. “The Agricultural Revolution was a roughly 3,000-year transition, the Industrial Revolution lasted 300 years, and this technology-led Global Revolution will take only 30-odd years. No single generation has witnessed so much change in a single lifetime.”[6] We could be facing a generation of revolution as changes occur in the Americas, the Middle East, Europe, and Asia.

Before we can hope to distill any lessons learned from this past bloody decade of war and rewrite the existing counterinsurgency manual^{^[7]}^{^[8]} and find a suitable foreign policy for this new century, perhaps we should first seek to better understand the nature of revolution.

We need to start rethinking how we see revolution. One place to start is with the great contributors at Small Wars Journal.

For instance, Col (Ret.) Robert C. Jones’s proposes that we relook our definition and consider,

Insurgency is an illegal political challenge to government, rising from a base of support within some significant and distinct segment, or segments, of the populace; and employing any mix of violent and non-violent tactics.[9]

This is just a primer to help us move past the COIN, CT, FID, and SFA debate in order to start thinking about strategy. Perhaps, if we look at our own history, see that the United States is still a revolution in process, an imperfect union; it can help guide us towards better understanding the world around us. Before we try to change the world around us, perhaps we should first seek self-awareness.

In the upcoming weeks, we will examine recent scholarship that argues that we should consider the Civil Rights Movement as an insurgency.

[1] See Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki’s Rand Study How Insurgencies End, Gordon McCormick and the Naval Postgraduate School’s Defense Analysis Department internal databases, and Mark Safranski’s Do Oligarchies Create Insurgencies? among other notable scholars.

[2] Richard Edens, Second Sunday of Advent Sermon, United Church of Chapel Hill, NC. 4 Dec 2011.

[3] James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, pp. 880-861,

[4] Ibid, Edens.

[5] Steven Metz, Rethinking Insurgency, June 2007, Available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=790

[6] Andy Stern, China's Superior Economic, Wall Street Journal, Accessed on 6 December 2011, Available at http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204630904577056490023451980.html?mod=WSJ_hp_mostpop_read#articleTabs%3Darticle

[7]Carl Prine, Crispin Burke, James Few, Evolving the Coin Field Manual: A Case for Reform. Available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/evolving-the-coin-field-manual-a-case-for-reform

[8] Frank Hoffman, Counterinsurgency Doctrine In Context, Small Wars Journal, Available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/counterinsurgency-doctrine-in-context

[9] Robert C. Jones, “Understanding Insurgency: The Condition behind the Conflict” Small Wars Journal. 1 October 2011. Accessed on 4 December 2011. Available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/understanding-insurgency-the-condition-behind-the-conflict

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