| Small Wars Journal

After spending last month in Afghanistan on my fourth trip this year, the situation can best be described as a glass half full. A multifaceted effort in the south, led by a "surge" of U.S. and Afghan troops, has increased security in the southern Pashtun heartland this year. But a steady drumbeat of high-profile attacks, including a brazen assault on the U.S. embassy and assassinations of key Afghan officials, has had an outsized impact on the population by eroding already weak confidence in the Afghan government and the forces supporting it…

A Shift in the Afghanistan Strategy by John Nagl, Foreign Affairs.

In what time it has left, the United States can do more to prepare Afghans for the formidable challenge ahead. Rather than have U.S. and NATO forces clearing areas of insurgents and then handing them off to the Afghans, it is time for Afghan forces to take the lead, with the help of U.S. advisers, in clearing and holding Afghan territory. The United States will not officially leave Afghanistan until 2014. But given the rate of troop withdrawal outlined by the Obama administration, U.S. commanders in Afghanistan must begin recalibrating their strategy now…

3 December SWJ Roundup

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Real Clear World - RCP

Afghanistan

Afghanistan Says Needs Billions Long After Troops Go - Reuters

ISAF Transfers Parwan Province Security to Afghan Forces - AFPS

Pentagon Will Teach Afghans to Prospect for High-Tech Minerals - S&S

2.6 Million Afghans at Risk of Hunger From Drought - AP

Kabul's Poor Demand Attention of Bonn Delegates - Reuters

Afghan Woman, Jailed for Being Raped, Wins Pardon - Reuters

Afghan Rape Victim 'Need Not Marry' - BBC

Suicide Bomber Kills Civilian, Injures 60 Near US Base - LAT

NATO Says 3 Troops Killed in Eastern Afghanistan - AP

Pakistan

Pakistan to Respond ‘Instantly’ to Any Border Aggression - VOA

Pakistan Refuses to Help as US Sorts Out a Fatal Attack - NYT

Pakistani Model's Nude Photo Causes Fury - NYT

Iraq

After an Explosion, Competing Ideas About the Target - NYT

Iraq PM: Green Zone Bomb Was Assassination Attempt - AP

Iraq Says PM Possible Target in Green Zone Bomb - Reuters

US Hands Over Former Military Hub to Iraq - VOA

US Hands Over Camp Victory to Iraq - WP

US Hands Camp Victory to Iraqis - BBC

Biden Expresses Gratitude to US, Iraqi Forces - AFPS

Logisticians Position State Department for Success in Iraq - AFPS

Iran

Attack on UK Embassy in Iran 'Had Support of the State' - BBC

British Ambassador Describes Mob Attack in Tehran - LAT

Expelled Iranian Diplomats Leave London - VOA

Expelled Iran Envoys Return Home - BBC

France to Bring Home Staff From Embassy in Iran - AP

Egypt

Egypt Announces Record-High Voter Turnout - VOA

Egypt Announces 62% Poll Turnout - BBC

Egypt Election Turnout 62 Percent, Protesters Honor Dead - Reuters

Egypt's Islamists' Success: A Sign of Nation's Future, or Past? - VOA

Ultraconservative Party to Push for Islamic Egypt - AP

Egypt Islamists Tell Rivals to Accept Vote Result - Reuters

Syria

UN Says Action Needed to Prevent Civil War in Syria - NYT

UN Human Rights Council Condemns Syria - VOA

UN Rights Chief Seeks 'Urgent' Measures to Protect Civilians - LAT

UN Passes Tough Syria Resolution - BBC

Rights Body Condemns Syria; Shell Pulls Out - Reuters

Syrians Say They Are Feeling the Grip of Sanctions - NYT

Syria Bans iPhone to Stop Flow of Protest Footage - WP

French-Based Syrian Opposition Threatened - VOA

Syrian Activists: 18 Dead in Fresh Violence - AP

Fifteen Dead After Syrian Army Clashes With Rebels - Reuters

Sanctions Force Shell to Leave Syria - WP

Israel / Palestinians

Panetta Chides Israel Over Stalled Peace Process - WP

Defense Chief Says Israel Must Mend Arab Ties - NYT

Panetta: Israel Must Get to the 'Damn' Peace Table - Reuters

Israel Urged to End 'Isolation' - BBC

US Jewish Outcry Over Israeli Expat 'Return' Ads - BBC

Israel Ends Ad Campaign Aimed at Expatriates - NYT

Middle East / North Africa

In Turkey, Biden Talks About Iran and Syria - NYT

Panetta to Speak on Strategic Challenges in Middle East - AFPS

'New Wave of Repression' in Saudi Arabia - LAT

Saudi Report Claims Women at Wheel Will Have Sex - AP

Bahrain Hires US Ex-Police Chief - BBC

Yemen’s Opposition May Be Caught by Its Own Double Game - NYT

Two Dead as Shelling of Yemeni City Continues - Reuters

Troops and Tribesmen Battle in Central Yemen - NYT

Libyan Hospital Offers Refuge for Wounded Gaddafi Loyalists - WP

UN Mission in Libya Extended by 3 Months - AP

Islamists and Secularists in Tunisia Stand-Off - Reuters

The Arab Winter - WP opinion

United Nations

Preserving UNESCO - WP opinion

US Department of Defense

6th Fleet to Get Four Destroyers to Build Missile Defense System - S&S

The Risks of Military Cutbacks, The End of COIN - WP opinion

Hanging Up My Uniform to be a High School Teacher - WP opinion

United States

Police Officers Find Dissent on Drug Laws May Come With Price - NYT

VA Takes Heat for Suicide Prevention Struggles - S&S

Veterans Unemployment Rate Drops Again - S&S

The True Meaning of American Exceptionalism? - LAT editorial

The American Century: That Was Then - LAT opinion

Africa

Firebrand Attracts Votes in Congo, Dismaying West - NYT

Congo's Kabila Leading in Early Results - AP

DRC: Kabila Guards 'Shot Protesters' - BBC

Protect Our Vote, Congolese Plead - Reuters

ICC Seeks Sudanese Official’s Arrest in Darfur Violence - NYT

ICC Seeks Sudan Minister's Arrest - BBC

Ex-Police Chief Loses Appeal of Conviction in South Africa - NYT

Americas

Mexico's Ex-Ruling Party Leader Quits Amid Scandal - AP

Mexico Activist in Juarez Women Killings Wounded - AP

Venezuela’s Chavez Opens Summit of Regional Leaders - VOA

Venezuela’s Chavez Hosts Summit Minus US - BBC

New US Call to Cuba to Free American Citizen - BBC

Asia Pacific

US Experts Question Report on China Nuclear Arsenal - VOA

Clinton Ends Burma Trip With Pledge of Support - VOA

Clinton, Suu Kyi Discuss Burma’s Road to Democracy - WP

Burma's Suu Kyi Embraces US, with a Nod to China - LAT

Dissident Leader in Burma Endorses US Overtures - NYT

Suu Kyi Hopeful on Burma Progress - BBC

New Burmese Law Allows Protests - BBC

Japan's Defense Minister Faces Growing Calls to Quit - Reuters

Rights Group Says Thai Monarchy Laws Need Reform - AP

US Strikes Right Tone on Burma - WP editorial

Will China Stumble? Don’t Bet on It - NYT opinion

Europe

US Official Says Missile-Defense Shield Will Move Forward - NYT

Merkel: Solving Europe Crisis will Take Years - WP

Merkel Seeks Swift Action to Save the Euro - NYT

German Bank Chief Sticks to Hard Line on Euro Support - NYT

Europe's New Rules will be Mostly Made in Germany - LAT

Germany's Merkel Fights for Euro, Cameron for UK - Reuters

Italian Prime Minister Is Set to Unveil New Austerity Plans - NYT

Russia Election Widens Crack in Putin’s Power - WP

As Putin Plans to Stay, Many Russians Want Out - AP

Russian Chief Poll Monitor Held - BBC

Russian Court Fines Election Monitor $1,000 - NYT

France: Sarkozy Launches Reelection Bid - WP

Serbia Agrees to Kosovo Border Deal - BBC

FRY: Mladic Charges Cut to Speed Trial - BBC

South Asia

The New Face of India’s Ruling Dynasty - WP

India's Population Hurtling Toward the Top - LAT

Indian Police Charge 12 in Journalist's Murder - AP

Read more about 3 December SWJ Roundup

Hanging Up My Army Uniform to be a High School Teacher

Hanging Up My Army Uniform to be a High School Teacher - Paul Yingling, Washington Post.

I’m a colonel in the U.S. Army, and next summer I will retire to teach high school social studies. My friends think I’m crazy, and they may have a point…

The Risks of Military Cutbacks

The Risks of Military Cutbacks - David Ignatius, Washington Post.

… As COIN has fallen out of fashion, there’s a new bubble of enthusiasm for the counterterrorism tactics used by the special forces in their “night raids” against Taliban targets. But Petraeus, the intellectual architect of modern Army doctrine, has long argued that it is a mistake to juxtapose the “population-centric” and “enemy-centric” approaches as if they were alternative strategies. Instead, according to Petraeus, they are mutually reinforcing parts of a broad counterinsurgency campaign…

Read more about The Risks of Military Cutbacks

This Week at War: The Pakistan Equation

In my Foreign Policy column, I explain why Pakistan's leverage over the United States won't last much longer. I also discuss why the U.S. Marine Corps is in a hurry to its next assignment.

Pakistan flexes its leverage -- while it still can

U.S.-Pakistan relations are once again in a deep freeze after a recent nighttime border clash that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan responded to the death of its soldiers, killed by U.S. airstrikes during the battle, by shutting down the supply lines that run through Pakistan to NATO bases in Afghanistan. Although the United States and Pakistan will likely repair this latest breach, as they have in the past, the nature of the conflict ensures that there will be more such incidents and more periodic breakdowns in the relationship, even after the United States reduces its military presence after 2014.

According to the Washington Post's account of the incident, a joint Afghan-U.S. special operations patrol, attempting to raid a suspected Taliban camp very near the border, came under fire from a nearby Pakistani army outpost. The patrol then called in air strikes. Pakistani officials are upset that the air strikes continued for well over an hour, even after Pakistani officers contacted their NATO counterparts to call them off. Some Afghan officials, frustrated by Pakistan's alleged support for the Afghan Taliban, apparently have scant remorse for the Pakistani casualties.

The 140,000 NATO soldiers in Afghanistan receive 48 percent of their supplies through Pakistan, with the remainder coming from the north through several Central Asian republics or by cargo aircraft. Pakistan's control over its portion of the NATO supply network is its best leverage over the United States; some new assistance package to Pakistan will likely get the trucks rolling again. While the Pakistani routes remain shuttered, Russia did not miss its opportunity to wield leverage of its own. According to the Wall Street Journal, Moscow is now pressing for more concessions on U.S. missile defense plans in exchange for keeping the northern supply routes into Afghanistan open.

Although U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani officials will attempt to improve coordination to prevent a repeat of this incident, more such episodes are inevitable. There will be more fights along the border because that is where the Taliban maintain their camps and assembly areas. Afghan and U.S. commandos believe their raiding tactics against the Taliban are effective and thus will continue to employ them. For their part, Pakistani officials are under political pressure to show that they are protecting Pakistani sovereignty, which will lead to an active defense on its side of the border. Finally, as long as the United States maintains a large force in Afghanistan requiring long supply convoys through Pakistan, Islamabad will perversely have an incentive to maintain a certain level of friction with the United States, since past blow-ups have usually resulted in the arrival of new gifts.

But the pending wind-down of the U.S. role in Afghanistan will change the current structure of these relationships and the leverage available to the players. By 2015, the U.S. military headcount in Afghanistan may be down 80 to 90 percent from its current level. That will reduce U.S. need for supply routes, and with it, Pakistan's leverage over U.S. policies.

By 2015, U.S. policymakers hope that Afghanistan's government and security forces will be leading what remains of the fight against the Taliban. Some Afghan officials, with perhaps an expanded security relationship with India, may prefer a more aggressive strategy than the U.S. has thus far employed against Afghan Taliban sanctuaries inside Pakistan. The United States will have to adjust to more self-reliant Afghan counterparts and likely a much larger Indian role in the country.

The location of the Taliban's camps and the perverse incentives that result from U.S. dependency on Pakistan ensure that more incidents of this type are likely. But by 2015, the game in Afghanistan will have a new rulebook.

The Marine Corps wants a head start on its future

According to an Associated Press story, the U.S. Marine Corps is planning for a large drawdown of its contingent in Afghanistan. On a Thanksgiving visit to an outpost on the Helmand River, Gen. James Amos, the Marine Corps Commandant, called on his men to "savor being out here together, because it's going to be over [soon]."

The Afghan surge that President Obama ordered in December 2009 increased the Marine contribution to Afghanistan to 19,400 troops, 900 of whom are leaving by the end of this month. During his visit, Amos promised that the Marine contingent in Afghanistan will drop "pretty dramatically" in 2012. Obama has ordered 23,000 U.S. troops out by next October, 10,000 of which could be Marines, more than half of the U.S. force in Helmand Province.

Whether Afghan security forces in the province will be ready to pick up the slack remains to be seen. In any case, the Marine Corps, which since the surge has continuously rotated two of its nine infantry regiments to Helmand, will get a head start on the planned 2014 wind-down of America's combat role in the war. Offered Amos: "Am I OK with that? The answer is 'yes.'"

As an institution, the Marine Corps has an interest in getting on with its future. This will mean cutting the Marine Corps to conform to current fiscal realities inside the Pentagon, while simultaneously refocusing the Corps on preparing for crisis response and expeditionary contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region.

Last March, a Marine Corps force structure review group produced a plan for restructuring the Corps after Afghanistan. The plan called for reducing the service's headcount from 202,000 to 186,600 and reducing some of the Corps's infantry, tank, artillery, and fighter-jet squadrons by 10-20 percent. North Carolina's Jacksonville Daily News recently listed some impending cuts to the II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF), the Marine Corps's East Coast establishment, which happens to be located outside the Corps's new Asia-Pacific priority region. Disbanded units in II MEF will include an entire infantry regiment, another regimental headquarters, numerous aircraft squadrons, and a long list of support units. As perhaps the best indication of where II MEF will soon rate compared to its two Asia-Pacific brothers, its commander will be downgraded from a three-star general to only two.

If Amos and his colleagues seem eager to a get a jump-start on the post-Afghanistan future, bureaucratic positioning inside the Pentagon may be a motivation. By seizing the initiative over both its downsizing plan and its future roles and missions, Marine leaders may believe they will have more control over the outcome. If Marine Corps leaders can sell politicians on the Corps's new Asia-Pacific mission and quickly adjust the Marine Corps to that role, these leaders may believe they stand a better chance of fencing off the Marine Corps from further cuts after 2014. The Army, by contrast, may not be so able to control its own fate. Should the Pentagon budget face further downward pressure after 2014, the post-Afghanistan U.S. Army, presumably only then done with fighting, could face the brunt of the cuts.

The Marines also took early exits from Iraq and Vietnam. This time, it has a specific plan to restructure itself to support the Obama administration's explicit "pivot" toward the Asia-Pacific region. Getting a head start on the future seems like smart maneuvering. But whether it will actually put a hard floor under the Corps's budget cuts over the rest of the decade remains to be seen.

Read more about This Week at War: The Pakistan Equation

Do Two Wrongs Make a Right?

As the Arab world continues to heat up, the United States draws down from Iraq, and Afghanistan remains contested, the much needed debate continues on modern counterinsurgency.

Ucko is Wrong (Mostly)

by Carl Prine

I worry that one of our brightest scholars is defending an increasingly dubious position, toil made even more annoying by his constant need to pose as a neutral observer in these increasingly shrill debates over COIN, the Iraqi “Surge” and the “strategy” in Afghanistan. And he’s most certainly not.

Prine Is Wrong (Mostly): a Reply to a Critic

by David Ucko

I didn’t care for Prine’s review of this article, but Prine remains a vital voice in the debate on counterinsurgency. His passion in challenging the conventional wisdom and detailed understanding of the topics on which he writes usually provide for breaths of fresh air in a debate too stodgy, insular and self-referential. His wide area of expertise, stretching far beyond Iraq to large parts of sub-Saharan Africa and probably beyond, allows him to draw from a far wider canvas than most others.

See Also

Counterinsurgency Doctrine: In Context

by Frank Hoffman

Counterinsurgency after Afghanistan: A Concept in Crisis

by David Ucko

COIN is Dead: U.S. Army Must Put Strategy Over Tactics

by Gian Gentile

Book Review: Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis

Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis

by Sarah Phillips

Published by New York: Routledge, 167 pages, 2011. ISBN: 978-0-415-69574-9 Paperback $14.44

The winds of the Arab Spring have blown from Tunisia and Egypt to Yemen’s shores, and have left Yemen’s President Saleh in the cold. Sarah Phillips’ timely new book, while succinct, provides considerable insight into the complex nature of internal Yemeni politics, and especially the motivations of its beleaguered president. Most importantly, however, it convincingly argues that the type of support provided by outside donors exacerbate the crisis rather than address the causes of tension and strife. The main focus of the book is the internal machinations of the Saleh regime, and not a detailed description of the actual crises themselves. For those looking for a full accounting of Yemeni problems, they won’t find it in this book. However, Sarah Phillip’s contribution is invaluable not only for those who wish to learn more about Yemeni politics and the crises in Yemen, but for policymakers looking for a better understanding of how to secure their interests in the region.

Phillips begins her book with a brief description of the path the country has taken to its current state of affairs. The Saleh regime faces dangers from the Houthi rebellion in the north, the Southern secessionist movement, and increasing power of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. These crises, coupled with rapidly dwindling resources and an unmanaged economy, threaten to cause state failure in Yemen. Moreover, the Arab Spring movements and President Saleh’s harsh response to the demonstrations within his borders have brought into sharp relief the disdain he feels for the non-elite in his country. As Phillips points out, “As Arab uprisings have illustrated, beliefs and perceptions of risk can shift much faster than the playbooks of ageing autocrats.”

The playbook to which Saleh turns to time and again are two-fold: First is the systemic practice of neo-patrimonialism, which has been part and parcel of Saleh’s 33 year rule over Yemen. This system has served to solidify his power and weaken potential contenders. Phillips spends much of her time on this subject. She gives an in-depth description of the regime and the powerbrokers within it, including the Hashid and Bakil tribal confederations and the military elite. She also points out that some who receive payouts from the government (such as tribal sheikhs) have only limited, transient power within Yemen. The nature of the patrimonial system ensures that no group gains sufficient power to pose a threat to the regime, and that many of those who receive largesse from the government are buying it with their loyalty. As soon as their loyalty is questioned, the well dries up. Furthermore, due to the weak economy, they have nowhere to turn but the Saleh regime for survival.

Secondly, Saleh has used the crises within Yemen as an excuse to call for outside aid. Yemen has received hundreds of millions of dollars in aid from its two main donors – Saudi Arabia and the United States. There are many, including Phillips, who argue that the Saleh regime uses the crises as a call for aid. What is quite troubling, however, is that the effort Saleh puts toward resolving the problems is uneven at best. Despite the huge amounts of aid transferred to Yemen, Saleh has done little to nothing to prepare Yemen for the future. At worst, the regime is complicit in the escape of dozens of known terrorists from their jails, but of assassinating peaceful demonstrators in Sana’a during the recent Arab Spring protests. In short, Saleh focuses only on the future of his regime, and not the future of Yemen.

Unfortunately, there are two minor areas where her book falls a bit short. First, the descriptions of the crisis areas within Yemen are limited. While the problems facing Yemen are discussed, a full accounting of their origins and how they have been handled by the Saleh regime is not included. On a positive note, there is a substantial body of literature, including works from Phillips herself, which goes into much more detail on this matter. Furthermore, her discussion of the problems is sufficient to bolster her argument that the type of aid being given – which is geared toward ‘stabilizing’ the regime, is quite misdirected.

The second shortcoming of the book is the short section at the end dealing with the Arab Spring. In this instance, it seems that Phillips decided that delaying the book in order to give a full account of the Arab Spring in Yemen was less important than immediate publication. This is a smart move, as her book can be used by policymakers to make immediate changes to misguided support for the Saleh regime.

Despite these minor shortfalls, Sarah Phillips has given us a book that provides keen insight into Yemen, but is immediately useful to anybody who is interested in the country. The book is particularly relevant given the resurgence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in recent months, and will help U.S. strategists craft a more nuanced policy that recognizes the waning power of the Saleh regime.