What to Do About Iran
There are four clear challenges that the United States faces regarding Iran: (1) Iran controlling the Strait of Hormuz; (2) Iran’s missiles and drones; (3) Iran’s terrorist proxies; and (4) Iran pursuing a nuclear weapon. This article looks to outline these four challenges as well as potential policy solutions. For good or ill, the US entered the kinetic phase of confrontation with Iran. This means that urgent and unpalatable policies have to be pursued.
The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow passage that separates Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. By the end of June 2026, Iran announced that it had sole operational control over the Strait. In 2025, about 34% of global crude oil passed through the Strait. Most of this oil is destined for Asia. The alternative oil routes can only handle about one fifth of the available capacity combined. Qatar and the UAE comprise 20% of global natural gas production, and there is no means by which to transit natural gas from Qatar or the UAE without transit through the Strait. Closure of the Strait will create a shortage, and the supply shock will create price volatility in the market. Therefore, the IRI’s control of the Strait of Hormuz is a clear challenge facing the global economy and thus the United States.
Allowing Iran to control the Strait and thereby controlling who is able to successfully traverse the Strait means control of the oil trade. Iran has allowed its allies to move their ships through the Strait. This has several potential outcomes: (1) price spikes due to oil shortages; (2) economic crisis in non-allied countries; (3) oil-rich countries move toward Iran in order to move oil; and (4) China increases power. Problems 1-3 are self-explanatory. Potential outcome 4 requires explanation. China, as an ally to Iran, can potentially be the big winner, increasing power and influence. China has been able to utilize the Strait of Hormuz while non-allies of Iran have not been able to. Without an American naval blockade, China could either directly purchase oil from Persian Gulf littoral states and resell it, or Chinese ships could transport such oil and natural gas for fees. This would place China in control of a large portion of the global oil and natural gas, therefore making China more powerful. These potential outcomes illustrate the importance of the United States securing the opening of the Strait of Hormuz or, at a minimum, keeping the naval blockade until a final resolution of the conflict. Iran has used mines, small high-speed boats, and drones and missiles to secure control of the Strait.
The second challenge the US faces in the Middle East is Iran’s use and potential use of ballistic missiles and drones. According to United Against a Nuclear Iran, since the early 1980s “Iran has been developing ballistic missile capabilities based on Russian, North Korean, and Chinese technology or weapons systems.” Iran has at least 20 different types of ballistic missiles. Iran has developed drones like the Mohajer 6, which was the first in its class able to be armed with bombs and guided weapons systems. According to United Against a Nuclear Iran, per Iranian state media, the latest version, the Mohajer 10:
has double the payload capacity of the Mohajer-6, featuring air-to-ground strike, intelligence, and electronic warfare capabilities. Allegedly, it can deliver a 300 kg payload up to 2000 km, with a flight endurance of 24 hours, an altitude of up to 7000 meters, and a speed of over 200 km per hour. Its range puts Israel and U.S. military installations in the Middle East within striking distance.
Iran has also converted the Ababil 3, or Atlas, into a combat-capable drone with the ability to carry precision-guided bombs. The IRI has developed numerous other UAVs like Karrar and the Shahed. The Shahed is a line of low-cost suicide drones that the IRI is able to mass-produce and use to drive up the US cost of war. The US has a limited number of interceptor missiles, and their cost far exceeds that of the Shahed 191 that Iran has been using in the current war. Iran has been able to successfully hit US bases in Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, Jordan, and Kuwait. If the US is unable to stop these attacks, the US would have to rethink its policies regarding these bases.
Iran has successfully utilized these missiles and drones to strike all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. According to Clarke et al., Iran has hit airports, oil tankers, ports, refineries, utilities, and even residential areas, particularly in the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait. The IRI has struck key areas in Saudi Arabia and Oman, potentially nullifying alternative oil transportation routes. Additionally, Iran’s strikes on Qatar’s natural gas site Ras Laffan have led to a decrease in production that is estimated to take 3-5 years before pre-strike production volume is resumed. Because the UAE has developed closer ties with Israel, Iran has targeted UAE more than any other state in the 2026 wars. Diplomatic deterrence has failed, and even GCC states that publicly did not support a US and Israeli attack against Iran and would not allow their territory to be used in attacks against Iran have not been spared from Iran’s missile and drone strikes.
The third challenge the United States faces is terrorism. Iran is the number one state sponsor of terrorism. Iran provides financial assistance and military weapons to Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, and pro-IRI Iraqi Shia. Although US and Israeli attacks on Hamas and Hezbollah have greatly diminished both terrorist groups’ members and key leaders, the IRI’s perceived success in surviving the onslaught of bombing provides an effective recruitment tool for the IRI and its proxies. The IRGC, particularly its Qods Force, can function at times like a terrorist organization as well. According to Matthew Levitt, the IRGC and Hezbollah have developed extensive networks spanning the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Europe, transporting narcotics. One might speculate that such networks could simply transport a nuclear weapon the same way they have with their extensive drug trade.
According to Kazemzadeh, Iran began its clandestine nuclear weapons program in the mid-1980s. The death of Ali Khamenei and his son Mojtaba as his successor has drastically increased the power of the IRGC. The IRGC has been the main entity promoting the acquisition of nuclear weapons. IRGC Gen. Mohsen Rezaei, who was appointed Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in August 2026, has publicly stated that there are no reasons for Iran not to go for nuclear weapons.
Mojtaba has lost his father, mother, and wife; he has publicly called for revenge. Mojtaba is a hardliner like his father, yet much more extreme.
It is unlikely that all nuclear facilities in Iran are known. Moreover, there are facilities that are hidden deeply, like the Pickaxe Mountain that is in close proximity to Natanz. It is possible that the regime has dug or would dig tunnels connecting the two sites. Deep sites like Pickaxe and Taleghan 2 require either a boots-on-the-ground approach or a nuclear weapon to penetrate. However, if the United States uses a nuclear weapon, then Putin would no longer restrain himself from using nuclear weapons against Ukraine.
Although Iran does not have the ability to launch a traditional nuclear missile like the US, once Iran has enriched the uranium sufficiently, there are still other ways to deploy it. A nuclear weapon can be loaded into a cargo plane and flown over a target city as the US did with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It could also be detonated on the plane itself. According to Kazemzadeh, “For short-term emergency use, the IRI may use non-conventional methods of delivery such as transport aircraft or passenger airplanes to deliver clandestinely crude nuclear bombs”.
Policy Proposals
The United States cannot allow Iran to control the Strait of Hormuz. If the US bombs any existing missiles located along the coast of Iran and places troops all along the coast, it would seem that the US could, along with US military vessels in the Persian Gulf, gain control. The presence and military might of US soldiers along the coast would be able to prevent the launching of the asymmetric warfare initiated by Iran’s “Mosquito Fleet,” as well as any other small tactical assaults. The presence of the US in the Persian Gulf would further be able to counter Iran’s sea attacks if they managed to evade the shore-bound troops.
However, this is not as easy and as clear-cut as it may seem. Iran’s missile and drone capabilities are extensive. Their missiles are not confined to military bases or any location but rather are transportable and can be located anywhere and launched from anywhere, even from locations far away from the target sites. Therefore, placing US troops along the shores of Iran would be catastrophic. US military troops would be easy prey for Iran’s missiles and drones. The thousands of US troops that it would take to secure the region around the water could be eliminated in what would be Iran’s finest hour and President Trump’s humiliating defeat. In other words, ground troops should not be placed along the shores without first destroying Iran’s missile and drone capabilities.
The first step in countering Iran would be to degrade the IRGC greatly. This means not only killing the top leaders but destroying many IRGC stations throughout the country. Iran has long prepared for a US invasion and has created a system where decisions can be made locally rather than top-down. Therefore, simply taking out the main IRGC headquarters is not sufficient. The regime in Iran is fragile and has support from less than 20% of the population. However, if the regime falls, it is highly likely that anyone who replaces the regime would kill members of the IRGC and IRI supporters. Because of this high-stakes outcome, the regime supporters have remained loyal to the regime. Therefore, prior to attempting to secure the Strait, the US and Israel must first greatly degrade the IRGC bases. This opens up several options: (1) the US then distributes weapons to Iranians for them to self-liberate in a revolution; (2) the US then secures the Strait and opens shipping lanes; and (3) the US and Israel then deploy troops to overthrow the regime.
Kurds are known to be effective fighters, and Trump has expressed a desire to use the Kurds in the war against Iran. Arming Iranian Kurds is an option only under certain conditions. Kurds have their own culture and identity. Kurdish nationalism has grown, and many Kurds who reside in Turkey (the largest population), Syria, Iraq, and Iran would like their own Kurdish state. There is concern that if armed, the Kurds would use those weapons to fight for their own independence, and the conflict would span these four countries in the Middle East. The Iranian people do not wish to see Iran divided. If the Iranian Kurds agreed to fight against the current regime and unite with the Iranian people rather than wanting to divide Iran into ethno-sectarian regions, then the Iranian people would support arming the Kurds. Dividing Iran into ethno-sectarian regions should be avoided, as it would likely create future conflict and wars amongst these groups that could spread to a push for ethno-sectarian divisions of other countries in the MENA region. If the current countries were redesigned around ethnicity or religion (Kurds, Sunnis, Shia, Balochis) it could create ethnic cleansing of any group that did not move to its new designated land.
Another potential solution is what I will term semi-regime change. In this policy option, the US would engage in a Venezuela-style model, replacing Mojtaba Khamenei with a non-hardliner Islamic fundamentalist leader who is more pragmatic, like Ayatollah Hassan Rouhani. The United States could kill Mojtaba Khamenei and the handful of other clerics who are candidates for the position of Supreme Leader. This would clear the path for Rouhani’s ascension to the position of Supreme Leader. Rouhani is willing to engage in trade with the West and allow for a more open market in Iran. He could be a successor who would be viewed as legitimate and could assume office without civil war or a military junta. The Iranian people have long been underemployed and highly educated. Establishing Rouhani as Supreme Leader would bring jobs and trade into Iran. Opening up Iran to an international market will bring jobs and financial security. Rouhani, who is a pragmatic reformist, would likely not pursue nuclear weapons or sponsor terrorist groups for a time. This is not a long-term guarantee for halting terrorism, but perhaps if the IRI under Rouhani or another such leader was able to prosper financially and have legitimacy, they would no longer seek to export the revolution abroad. At a minimum, it kicks the can down the road, providing a short-term solution to the current dangers of the IRI.
However, the optimal long-term solution is total regime change. Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, Iran has had a democratic history. Democratic aspirations of the Iranian people go back to at least the 1905 Constitutional Revolution. Such experiments failed in large part due to military interventions of Czarist Russia, colonial Britain, and the United States.
In 1953, the United States overthrew Mohammad Mossadegh, who had been democratically elected. Iran has long longed for democracy and has had it. They have the preconditions necessary to acquire and maintain democracy. If the United States bombs the IRGC headquarters and bases throughout Iran, then the US military could put boots on the ground to remove Mojtaba and other key members. The US could work in conjunction with Iran’s Army (Artesh), who are not necessarily loyal to the regime but instead are Iranian nationalists who would be willing to overthrow the regime. Unlike many countries in the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain) that became a nation-state after World War I, Iran has been an independent state on and off since at least 500 B.C. The current borders were established in 1501 A.D. Thus, the sense of nationhood has deep roots among Iranians. Despite occupation by foreign troops during WWI and WWII, Iran has more or less kept the same borders.
If the regime is overthrown, the main source of funding and weapons for terrorist groups in the region will be gone. Additionally, this has broader impacts, as proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran are ongoing but would likely cease after the fall of the regime. Without IRI influence over its proxies, Saudi Arabia would have no reason to continue supporting its Sunni proxies.
Although regime change at this stage of the war will be more costly in terms of blood and treasure than it would have been earlier in the war, the long-term benefits will have positive global effects. Regime change is a risk. It is possible that Iran devolves into civil war, with many groups vying for power and no one group able to obtain a majority in order to rule. However, it is perhaps a case where the rewards outweigh the risks. Just as civil war is a possibility, so too is democracy. With a major military action as described above, the US might succeed in Iran’s long history of pro-democracy struggles and constituencies, preconditions that were absent in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. If democracy is contagious, then Iran could become the key to democracy in the Middle East.
