The Infrastructure of Dependence: Starlink, Knowledge, and Sovereignty

Who Controls the Battlefield?

In October 2026, Ukrainian forces encountered a peculiar constraint on their ability to conduct drone operations. A restriction affecting Starshield, SpaceX’s military satellite service, reportedly limited connectivity for drones traveling above roughly 100 miles per hour, forcing Ukrainian operators to alter or abandon certain missions. The restriction was lifted later that month, and Ukrainian officials reported that connectivity had returned at speeds exceeding 400 kilometers per hour, but the episode had already demonstrated how quickly changes made outside of Ukraine could alter the technical conditions under which Ukrainian systems operated.

Ukrainian forces still possessed the drones and retained authority over how they were used, and yet somebody outside of Ukraine could change the technical conditions under which those drones were able to communicate and operate. That is a strange kind of power, and one that is difficult to understand if we think only in terms of who owns what weapon or who gets to decide how those weapons are used.

This was not the first time Ukraine had encountered this problem. Since 2022, Starlink has come to play a major role in Ukrainian military operations, and has been used for everything from frontline communications and drone feeds to reconnaissance and the movement of battlefield information, especially in places where terrestrial communications have been destroyed, disrupted, or remain vulnerable to electronic warfare. Reporting later revealed that access to the network had also been restricted during Ukrainian operations in 2022. Ukraine’s experience with Starlink and Starshield therefore presents a problem of strategic autonomy that is more complicated than simply asking whether Ukraine possesses the military capabilities necessary to conduct its own operations. What happens when a state controls the weapons, personnel, and decisions, but does not fully control the infrastructure through which some of those decisions become operationally possible?

To answer this question and others of the sort, there should be a multidisciplinary approach; one that reaches beyond the horizon of more dominant or canonical strands of International Relations (IR) Theory towards other scholarship that might provide unique insights into the nature of infrastructural and informational power in an increasingly digital world. Of course, traditional IR theories wield plenty of explanatory power. They can tell us much about military capability, coercion, interdependence, state behavior, and even many kinds of soft power. However, some traditional IR theories may be less well equipped to explain the forms of power that operate through control over the technical and informational conditions and apparatuses which shape the perceptions, knowledge, and subsequent judgements and actions of a given state. Three theoretical and conceptual pillars (though there may be plenty more) are especially useful here:

1. Epistemic delegation, defined as states’ reliance on private systems to produce, organize, and interpret the operational knowledge on which military decisions depend, can help us identify how control over key informational functions can become externalized beyond the state.
2. Foucault’s relational conception of power can help us explain why shaping another actor’s field of possible action constitutes power even in the absence of direct coercion.
3. Dependency theory explains how reliance on externally controlled systems can harden into structural vulnerability and, eventually, leverage.

Power Beyond Possession: The Limits of Traditional IR Theory

Can traditional International Relations (IR) Theory account for the kinds of power dynamics, relationships, and asymmetries unfolding between Ukraine, Starlink, and the United States thus far? It can explain much about strategic resources, asymmetric dependence, and coercive leverage; the question here is what an explicit focus on the infrastructure of operational knowledge adds to those explanations. Those who control Starlink’s network settings clearly have some power over Ukraine’s military operations. However, that power does not come from controlling Ukraine’s weapons or military personnel. It comes from their ability to change the technical conditions under which Ukrainian forces can use the network, and in doing so, limit what those forces are able to accomplish. Realist and neo-realist accounts can explain why access to Starlink matters strategically and how dependence on it creates leverage. An epistemic approach directs attention to how the network’s routine operating rules shape what Ukrainian forces can observe, communicate, and coordinate, even before anyone issues a demand or threatens to withdraw access.

While liberal theories complicate realist conceptions of power by shifting focus toward transnational networks, interdependence, and non-state actors, they can still fall short when digital infrastructure is treated primarily as a tangible commodity to be managed by legal contracts and market incentives, rather than recognizing that software-defined parameters can wield a more fluid form of authority capable of unilaterally constraining the operational boundaries of a sovereign state.

What about constructivist theories? They offer a more compelling framework because they reject this shared rationalist materialism altogether, locating power within the realm of ideas, identities, and shared meanings. However, they too can fall short when their focus on intersubjective meaning and norm-building obscures how deeply dependent states can become on private technology providers, and how software parameters can operate as a less visible system of architectural control.

Yes, the streams of power that trickle downward from Starlink onto Ukraine are not intangible in any literal sense. The network ultimately rests on satellites, terminals, servers, and other physical infrastructure. But that power is increasingly exercised through software-defined parameters rather than conventional physical coercion.

A constructivist account focused primarily on socially negotiated ideas and norms might, therefore, understate this form of digital control, overlooking the extent to which it can also operate through a rigid regime of proprietary knowledge and technical authority. When a speed cap is implemented on terminals moving over 100 miles per hour, and that speed cap limits what Ukrainian operatives can access, transmit, and act upon on the battlefield, one cannot help but think that perhaps there may be some truth in the maxim that equates power with knowledge.

What or who, then, can fill in the gaps left between the different clusters of traditional IR theory? What might help us properly classify or explain the kind of power exercised through SpaceX and Starlink in Ukraine? If we are to look for theories that tie power inextricably to knowledge, or that map how structural imbalances lock actors into inescapable traps of asymmetric reliance, then it might prove useful to look beyond the disciplinary boundaries of traditional IR theory or to extend to the digital domain some traditional IR theories that emphasize the crippling weight of economic and material dependency.

Epistemic Delegation and the Infrastructural Layer

On one level, Ukraine’s operational reliance on Starlink’s network represents a form of epistemic delegation because it externalizes control over the infrastructure through which operational knowledge is transmitted and accessed. Previously, I defined epistemic delegation as occurring when states externalize key informational functions by relying on private systems to produce, organize, and interpret the operational knowledge on which military decisions depend. Starlink exposes an infrastructural dimension of that framework that the original formulation did not fully capture, namely dependence on systems that determine whether operational knowledge can circulate, remain accessible, and become actionable at all. Because Starlink can determine whether battlefield data, drone feeds, and communications remain available to Ukrainian forces, control over the network can directly shape what Ukrainian operators are able to know and see in real time. While epistemic delegation names this phenomenon, it does not by itself explain why control over the network transmitting Ukrainian drone feeds, command communications, and battlefield data translates into a relationship of power between Ukrainian officials and those who exercise control over Starlink.

Foucault and the Field of Possible Action

French philosopher Michel Foucault defines power in a way that seems especially relevant to our Starlink-Ukraine case. In fact, what Foucault refuses to reduce power to might be of even greater relevance here. To Foucault, power is not an object that somebody possesses, a top-down force, or a purely repressive rule. Instead, power is “actions upon other actions,” a diffuse, relational network that acts upon the possibilities of human behavior. When Ukrainian operatives depend upon Starlink networks to access communications and data, it might be said that Starlink, regardless of any coercive actions taken to restrict the network or leverage its importance, structures and thus acts upon the possibilities of Ukrainian wartime behavior. There is power in that, and that power is not simply of a repressive character.

Foucault explains that power is productive rather than just negative, and creates knowledge, institutions, routines, and even shapes human subjects and identities. Starlink exercises this kind of productive power in Ukraine insofar as its network helps constitute the operational environment upon which much of Ukraine’s visibility, live aerial reconnaissance, and frontline drone feeds rely. This network, or rather, access to this network, is quite literally shaping what Ukrainian operatives can know during the war, and subsequently shaping how they can act upon that knowledge. In Foucauldian terms, then, Starlink’s significance lies not just in what it enables Ukraine to do, but in the fact that control over the network helps define the field of possible action within which Ukrainian forces operate. This is not to suggest that every form of power exercised through Starlink is Foucauldian in character. Those who control access to the network can also exercise a more direct and hierarchical form of power by restricting or conditioning its use. Foucault is useful here because his framework helps explain the less visible form of power that exists even before any such coercive intervention occurs. Yet Foucault helps explain how control over Starlink’s network constitutes a form of power more effectively than he explains why that power relationship is so structurally asymmetric, or why Ukraine cannot easily escape it. Dependency theory offers a useful complementary framework to help fill in those gaps.

Dependency, Networks, and Chokepoint Power

Dependency theorists split the global economy between dominant, core states and subordinate, peripheral states. Peripheral countries export low-value raw materials and agricultural goods to the core, while importing high-value manufactured products, draining local capital and restricting industrial growth. Since, according to Raúl Prebisch’s hypothesis, the terms of trade for primary commodities tend to deteriorate relative to manufactured goods over time, commodity-dependent, peripheral economies become trapped in a persistent trading disadvantage. Because Starlink is not itself a state, and because the relationship between Starlink and Ukraine is not one that revolves around trade, there are aspects of this case study that dependency theories cannot, and were not intended to, encapsulate. What dependency theory can help us to understand, however, is that dependency is structural, not simply a lack of capability. A capability deficit can, at least in principle, be overcome by acquiring or developing the missing resource; structural dependence persists when an actor’s ability to exercise capabilities it already possesses remains conditioned by a relationship it cannot readily exit. Ukraine’s reliance on Starlink is analogous in this narrower sense. Ukraine possesses substantial indigenous military and technological capabilities, yet there is presently no ready-made alternative low earth orbit (LEO) network capable of replacing Starlink at comparable scale and performance for frontline use, leaving some critical Ukrainian operations dependent upon an externally controlled network. Once such dependence becomes concentrated around a critical network node, structural reliance can become usable leverage.

Networks are not always neutral conduits for sharing and cooperation. Sometimes, those who exercise unusual influence within a given network, or occupy a node of central importance within that network, can weaponize that importance to coerce or manipulate other actors who depend upon that network significantly or asymmetrically. Farrell and Newman identify two mechanisms through which states and other actors can exploit their positions within networks. One of these two mechanisms is what they refer to as “the panopticon effect,” where control over central nodes provides privileged access to information. The second is the chokepoint effect, which allows actors to restrict or deny the flow of information through a network. Both are relevant to the relationship between Starlink and Ukraine, although the chokepoint effect is more readily apparent in the evidence available so far. There have been at least two reported instances in which decisions made by those controlling Starlink or Starshield directly constrained Ukrainian military operations. In 2022, Elon Musk reportedly ordered Starlink service disabled over parts of Ukrainian-held territory during a counteroffensive. More recently, in 2026, a restriction on Starshield connectivity affected Ukrainian drones traveling above 100 miles per hour. These episodes do not by themselves establish that network restrictions were consistently employed as instruments of coercion, but they do demonstrate the underlying capacity of those controlling the network to convert Ukraine’s dependence into operational leverage. If Ukraine’s structural dependence stems from the fact that critical operational knowledge must pass through an externally controlled chokepoint, then reducing that vulnerability requires more than acquiring additional military capabilities. It requires greater sovereign control over the infrastructure through which that knowledge becomes accessible and actionable.

The Pursuit of Epistemic Sovereignty

If epistemic delegation refers to the externalization of key informational functions on which military decision-making depends, and epistemic dependence refers to the structural reliance that emerges when those functions become embedded in systems an actor cannot readily replace or control, then perhaps what Ukraine seeks through its Stetman initiative and pursuit of an independent LEO constellation can be referred to as a search for digital and epistemic sovereignty. In April 2026, at the EU-Ukraine Business Summit in Brussels, a strategic partnership between Ukrainian satellite communications company Stetman and Denmark’s GomSpace was announced. In July 2026, more details regarding this partnership emerged, and we now know that its primary objective is to develop an approximately $1.1 billion, 360-satellite LEO constellation designed to provide electronic-warfare-resistant satellite communications and reduce Ukraine’s dependence on external providers like SpaceX’s Starlink. At the initial signing of the agreement between Stetman and GomSpace, Stetman’s late founder, Dmytro Stetsenko, explicitly framed the joint venture as a necessity for “long-term independence” and building a “sovereign capability.” Sovereignty of what, exactly? Of course, the infrastructure to be developed is tangible, but what would be the purpose of such infrastructure, and what does sovereignty over that infrastructure really mean? Seen in these terms, the sovereignty Stetman seeks is not simply ownership of satellites, but sovereign control over the channels through which battlefield information is transmitted, accessed, and rendered actionable; in other words, a measure of epistemic sovereignty. Recent developments suggest that this pursuit extends beyond the Stetman initiative alone. In October 2026, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence signed a Letter of Intent with ICEYE and Nokia to explore the development of sovereign satellite communications, with President Volodymyr Zelensky explicitly emphasizing the importance of relying upon capabilities that Ukraine itself can control. That same month, Ukrainian company HIMERA and GomSpace placed OBRIA NANO, the first test satellite for a planned independent Ukrainian communications network, into operation. Together, these efforts suggest that reducing dependence upon externally controlled communications infrastructure is becoming a broader strategic objective rather than the sole ambition of a single Ukrainian company.

On the other hand, Russia’s parallel development of Rassvet, a domestic LEO broadband constellation intended as an alternative to Starlink, points toward the same strategic logic from the opposite direction. Moscow, too, appears to recognize that battlefield autonomy increasingly depends upon controlling the communications networks upon which command, data transmission, and increasingly remotely operated systems depend.

Power Before the Trigger: Toward Epistemic Blocs

Recent developments regarding Starlink in Ukraine reinforce a fact that remains relevant in International Relations Theory and in any other intellectual discipline concerned with the subject of power: power can stem not just from one’s ability to harm, kill, or coerce somebody else. Power can also derive from one’s ability to shape what others can see, what others can know, and, subsequently, what choices others can make based on what they can know and what they can see. Ukraine, through its Stetman initiative, and Russia, through its development of Rassvet, demonstrate that they recognize the strategic, and perhaps even existential, value of owning and controlling the means, platforms, and networks that shape and determine what their states and armed forces can know and see on and off the battlefield. As states become more deeply embedded in digital infrastructures, and as increasingly consequential technologies for communication, sensing, targeting, and decision-making continue to proliferate, the strategic importance of controlling the networks through which knowledge is produced, transmitted, and accessed will likely become increasingly difficult to ignore. If that logic continues to spread, the international system may come to be organized not only around military alliances, economic blocs, or spheres of influence, but around increasingly distinct epistemic blocs defined by control over the infrastructures through which states perceive, interpret, and act upon the world.