Beyond the Hype: Why Drones Cannot Replace Artillery
The relentless footage emerging from the Ukrainian battlefield, dominated by images of drones striking tanks, disrupting troop movements, and providing crucial reconnaissance, has fueled a narrative, often breathless and uncritical, that unmanned systems are poised to replace conventional artillery. This idea, however, represents a fundamental misreading of the realities of modern warfare.
While drones undeniably offer valuable and evolving capabilities, they are best understood as powerful additions to, rather than substitutes for, the sustained, massive, and versatile firepower required in large-scale combat. A current, somewhat uncritical embrace of drone technology within the U.S. Army, driven by a desire for innovation and a perceived cost-effectiveness, risks diverting attention and resources from the vital modernization of artillery, a critical need for facing potential conflicts with peer or near-peer adversaries. The allure of a “drone-centric” future must be tempered with a clear-eyed assessment of the enduring strengths of traditional fires and the inherent limitations of unmanned aerial systems.
The U.S. Army faces a real and present danger of drawing the wrong conclusions from the ongoing war in Ukraine, and from the broader proliferation of drone technology. The tactical successes achieved with inexpensive commercial drones and first-person view (FPV) systems are undeniably appealing, offering a seemingly low-cost means of achieving disproportionate effects.
However, an overemphasis on these niche capabilities, often touted as revolutionary, could come at the expense of maintaining and improving the artillery that remains the cornerstone of firepower in any major engagement. A careful and historically informed examination of the conflict in Ukraine, coupled with an understanding of the fundamental principles of warfare, reveals a fundamental truth: unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can enhance fire support, improve situational awareness, and provide tactical advantages, but they are not, and won’t be in the foreseeable future, a replacement for the range, volume, destructive power, and all-weather operability of traditional artillery. The focus should be on integrating drones into a comprehensive fires network, not on attempting to substitute them for a proven and essential capability.
Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have demonstrated remarkable adaptability, rapidly fielding large numbers of drones, both short and long-range, commercial and military-grade, to address resource constraints, a largely static front, and the evolving demands of the conflict. However, this isn’t a strategic shift based on superior capability or a harbinger of a new era of warfare, but rather a pragmatic response to circumstance. As many reports open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts, and other respected military analysts indicate, the proliferation of FPV drones largely compensates for critical shortages of artillery shells, particularly on the Ukrainian side, filling a gap rather than offering a fundamentally better solution. While FPV drones have proven effective against armored vehicles and in close-quarters combat, at best, they deliver tactical-level precision comparable to battalion mortars, a far cry from the comprehensive impact of artillery fire. They are a tactical tool, not a strategic game-changer. Furthermore, the reliance on drones has created new vulnerabilities, as both sides have developed increasingly sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities to counter them.
The Limits of Drones in Modern Warfare: A Multifaceted Analysis
Drones excel in specific roles, and their utility is undeniable. They provide invaluable real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, significantly enhancing situational awareness for commanders and troops on the ground. They can strike isolated targets with precision, reducing collateral damage and minimizing the risk to friendly forces. They are effective at harassing enemy units, disrupting logistics, and conducting psychological warfare. Yet, as the Institute for Security and Development Policy and other think tanks have pointed out, UAVs are inherently limited by a number of factors. UAVs are significantly hampered by adverse weather conditions; rain degrades sensor performance and can cause electrical malfunctions, while strong winds can destabilize the aircraft, impacting its ability to maintain flight or accurately deliver payloads. These limitations mean UAV effectiveness is often dramatically reduced, or even negated, during inclement weather, making them unreliable.
UAVs’ payloads also restrict their destructive potential, limiting their ability to inflict significant damage on hardened targets or to suppress enemy fire effectively. Their reliance on radio frequency links makes them vulnerable to jamming, spoofing, cyberattacks, and other forms of electronic warfare—a weakness artillery, particularly when combined with robust communications security measures, doesn’t share.
Moreover, the logistical demands of drone operations—battery charging, spare parts, specialized operator training, and the constant need for counter-electronic warfare measures—create new sustainment challenges that would become overwhelmingly complex and costly in a prolonged, high-intensity conflict. Add in the manning requirements for drone units, observers, and support teams, and that heavy draw off of an already stretched force creates a self-inflicted dilemma on force structure.
Artillery, in contrast, delivers massed fires in all weather conditions, over extended ranges, and with significantly greater explosive effect. Even the most advanced FPV drones, as Euromaidan Press and other sources have highlighted, cannot replicate the broad-area suppression, neutralization, and destruction that a battery of 155mm howitzers can achieve in a matter of minutes. Nor can drones match the psychological impact of sustained artillery bombardment, a long-recognized element of attritional warfare. The notion that swarms of small drones could simply replace guns and rocket systems also ignores the economic realities of scaling up drone warfare, especially when considering enemy countermeasures and layered defenses, as David Hambling of Forbes and other defense analysts have argued. The cost of replacing drones lost in combat, coupled with the expense of maintaining a robust logistical tail, and manning requirements quickly erodes any perceived cost advantage. Furthermore, the vulnerability of drones to electronic warfare and physical destruction creates a significant risk of losing critical ISR assets and disrupting fire support operations.
Ukraine and Russia: A Unique Case Study — Circumstance, Not Revolution
The reliance on drones by Ukraine and Russia doesn’t necessarily predict the future of warfare for well-equipped, industrialized militaries. It’s a reflection of their specific circumstances; adaptation born of necessity, resource constraints, and the unique characteristics of the conflict. Drone strikes address tactical needs, achieving limited effects when traditional artillery is unavailable or when precise targeting is required. They enhance reconnaissance and target acquisition, allowing for more efficient use of dwindling artillery resources. However, neither side has abandoned conventional indirect fire. In fact, both are actively working to rebuild their artillery capabilities even as they deploy drones extensively. The Ukrainian plea for more artillery shells from Western allies underscores the continued importance of conventional fires. Drones are a temporary fix, a stopgap measure, not a replacement. Recognizing this distinction is crucial for American military planners. The conflict has also highlighted the importance of counter-drone technology, with both sides investing heavily in electronic warfare systems and physical defenses to mitigate the threat posed by UAVs.
A Potential Drift Towards Amateurism and Fragmentation in the U.S. Army
Currently, it seems that nearly every U.S. Army unit is experimenting with commercially available drones, often without a clearly defined operational purpose or a comprehensive integration plan. The focus appears to be on simply having drones, rather than on leveraging them to achieve decisive battlefield effects. This trend carries the risk of creating a misleading impression of progress, numerous units duplicating efforts, and pursuing minor tactical gains without contributing to a comprehensive fires modernization strategy. The lack of centralized control and standardization could lead to interoperability issues and hinder the effective use of drones in joint operations. This decentralized approach also risks fostering a fragmented, amateur drone culture that consumes valuable time and resources while simultaneously weakening critical artillery capabilities; its lethality, mass, and resilience. Technology adoption without thoughtful doctrinal integration doesn’t lead to innovation; it leads to divergence, a luxury the U.S. military cannot afford in a conflict with a peer adversary like China or Russia. The Army needs a clear, overarching strategy for integrating drones into its fires network, with clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and training requirements.
Charting a Course for the Future: A Balanced Approach to Fires Modernization
The U.S. Army should embrace drone technology, but not at the expense of artillery. It must resist the allure of the “next big thing” and instead pursue a deliberate, disciplined, and balanced fires modernization plan. This requires several key steps:
- Prioritize Artillery Modernization: Programs like the Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA), which significantly increases the range and lethality of existing howitzers, and the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), which provides a long-range, surface-to-surface missile capability, must remain central to our modernization efforts. These programs represent a significant investment in the future of conventional fires and are essential for maintaining a credible deterrent. Drones should complement these systems, not supplant them.
- Integrate, Don’t Substitute: Small drones should be integrated into fire support cells and battalion fire planning processes as reconnaissance assets and tools for striking point targets, but not as replacements for traditional gun and rocket systems. They should be used to enhance targeting accuracy, provide real-time battle damage assessment, and extend the reach of artillery fires.
- Maintain Mass Fires Capability: Precision is valuable, but the ability to deliver massed fires at scale remains essential in major combat operations. Drones will never replicate the overwhelming suppression and deep interdiction effects of artillery. The ability to saturate an enemy position with high-explosive rounds remains a critical capability for breaking enemy defenses and achieving decisive breakthroughs.
Conclusion: A Synthesis of Old and New
Drones are a valuable addition to the modern battlefield, but they are tools, not harbingers of a revolution in military affairs. The lessons from Ukraine demonstrate that UAVs can augment and expand traditional fires, particularly in situations characterized by shortages and static fighting. However, they cannot and should not be viewed as substitutes for the artillery and rocket forces that are fundamental to operational maneuver and ultimate victory in large-scale warfare. The future of fires lies not in replacing proven capabilities with unproven technologies, but in integrating them to create a more versatile, resilient, and effective fire support network.
The U.S. Army must learn the right lessons from this conflict and from its own experimentation with drone technology. Enthusiasm for new technologies must be tempered with a realistic understanding of their limitations, a respect for the enduring principles of warfare, and a commitment to maintaining a balanced and comprehensive fires capability. Otherwise, we risk developing a fires force optimized for niche threats, but woefully unprepared for the massed, high-intensity combat that future conflicts with peer adversaries will inevitably demand. The key is not to choose between drones and artillery, but to leverage the strengths of both to create a fires force that is capable of dominating the battlefield in the 21st century and beyond.
(Disclaimer: The views represented in this articles are the authors and do not represent those of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, nor any other government agency.)
