Journal

A Response to Andrew Bacevich

by Matthew E. Valkovic and Brian M. Burton

Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Numerous commentators in policy community, media, and academia have recently expounded upon the US Army's unusually public debate over the appropriate lessons to draw from the Iraq war to shape the institution for the future. Andrew Bacevich is the latest to lend his distinguished voice to the fray. While we greatly admire and respect Prof. Bacevich and his work, his essay in the October 2008 issue of The Atlantic presented a flawed analysis of this important issue that warrants a response.

Bacevich argues that the Army's perceived current focus on preparing for counterinsurgency has supplanted the Army's traditional conventional war-fighting doctrine and set the military on course for future Iraq-style conflicts that are "protracted, ambiguous, and continuous." On the first point, Bacevich presents Colonel Gian Gentile as a stand-in for his own views. Gentile's concern is that the Army's ability to perform conventional combat operations has seriously deteriorated because soldiers are not conducting training for the fundamentals of military conflict. Its soldiers have become "constabulary" forces charged with the protecting the local populations of failed states and re-building their communities, and in doing so have lost sight of their core mission of fighting and winning the nation's wars.

But even today, with counterinsurgency doctrine supposedly taking over as the Army's organizing principle, the organizational culture of the Army has not really changed. This is not to say that the Army has not learned counterinsurgency and, in addition, it is not to say certain functions of the Army (like the field artillery branch) have not suffered as a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Army today remains very much organized as a conventional force. Newly recruited soldiers, when they go through basic training and receive their advanced individual training are still taught their traditional military occupational specialty. The fire support specialists, formerly known as forward observers, still learn how to call for fire at Fort Sill. The Army school houses fundamentally teach the same things.

Bacevich and Gentile cite the National Training Center at Fort Irwin as a prime example in their lament about the degradation of the Army's combat skills. There's no doubt that conventional force-on-force training is no longer exclusively executed there, what has taken its place is not just counterinsurgency training, but a mix of both - termed "full spectrum operations." Units that rotate through NTC today have provided security to the local population one day and sent a company of mechanized infantry to destroy a platoon of Soviet look-alike BMP infantry fighting vehicles the next. Tank gunnery training and maneuver combat exercises still occupy much of a battalion's pre-deployment time.

The point is that Army, in the midst of waging two counterinsurgency campaigns, is still very much a force concerned with its conventional combat role. The balancing act is hard, but unavoidable. It has to prepare its soldiers to be effective in an irregular operating environment, while -- at the same time - attempting to maintain a high level of proficiency in conventional military missions and tasks. Given this situation, it is unclear what Gentile would propose as a solution. Would he prefer that the Army ignore the wars it is currently involved in to prepare for conventional wars that may or may not happen in the future?

Bacevich's second argument and his deeper fear is that, now that the Army is capable of conducting counterinsurgency and stability operations, the United States will continue to be bogged down in a costly and unnecessary path of interventionism with the pipe-dream purpose of saving the world. It is, Bacevich charges, an "affirmation" of the Long War launched recklessly in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 by President Bush and the "Vulcans" in his war cabinet.

In the course of this critique, Bacevich (like Gentile) seeks to tear down the importance of counterinsurgency, as well as those who have advocated its development within the Army. He uncritically repeats Gentile's dubious assertion that General David Petraeus's successes in Iraq had more to do with buying off the enemy than a change in approach, as if cooptation of foes were not a well-established component of any counterinsurgency. He further conflates Petraeus's and John Nagl's advocacy for adapting the force for irregular warfare with an unquestioning acceptance of the Bush Administration's post 9/11 foreign policy goals. He tars them as "Crusaders" who are wedded to counterinsurgency as the solution to all foreign policy problems, rather than simply as part of a community of innovators who have helped devise more effective ways to prosecute the wars of today. When did striving to fight America's current wars better become the wrong thing to do?

Like Gentile, Bacevich offers much criticism but no alternative solution for America's current predicament. He says the United States must retain "strategic choice." We agree: maintaining a variety of capabilities, both military and civilian, to operate across a range of strategic environments is essential to preserve US national security. But what of Iraq and Afghanistan today? Is America supposed to simply turn its back on those countries and act like the past seven years never happened? Is the Army supposed to go back to preparing only for the conventional wars it wants to fight rather than the irregular ones it actually is fighting? We humbly submit that the answer is no.

Matthew E. Valkovic is a first lieutenant in the US Army currently deploying to Iraq. Brian M. Burton is a research assistant at the Center for a New American Security and a graduate student in Georgetown University's Security Studies Program. The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense or Department of the Army.

Helmand Province, Afghanistan

by Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Small Wars Journal

Counterinsurgency and a Comprehensive Approach (Full PDF Article)

The point of departure of this article will be the situation in Helmand Province as of summer 2008. The article will provide an exclusive focus on comprehensive approach (CA), the complex context of Helmand Province and the international setup there. Fighting an insurgency like the one in Afghanistan is not just a job for the military. Experiences from previous and present insurgencies have shown that a variety of measures including political, economic and developmental play a significant role in gaining progress and success in what can be called state-building. In Afghanistan, the term 'comprehensive approach' has been used to underline the need for a more cross-ministerial interagency approach when fighting the insurgency. A recent report to the US Congress views the importance of CA in the following way "success will never be achieved through military means alone, but through a comprehensive approach that involves all elements of power: military, diplomatic, and economic. Above all, it will require a sustained effort to continue to develop the capacity of the Afghans themselves." In this article the focus will be on local capacity building and the fact that CA by definition involves more than one player, and that one of these is often a military one.

The article will try to go in-depth regarding the current situation in Helmand Province and it will look into the current British approach to the engagement. The article is based on several field researches conducted in Helmand since 2006, with the latest in May 2008 and it is inspired by the earlier contribution to Small Wars Journal by Dr. Daniel Marston on "British Operation in Helmand Afghanistan". The main argument will be that when implementing a fully integrated civil-military counterinsurgency strategy in the context of Helmand Province extensive resources must be identified and allocated in a fast pace. Together with this the rapid deployment of civilian advisors to theatre will be crucial for success in the complexities of counterinsurgency in Helmand Province. In sum, the article is meant to contribute to the constant ongoing debate on Afghanistan, by providing, to some extent, a detailed picture of the situation as of summer 2008.

Counterinsurgency and a Comprehensive Approach (Full PDF Article)

by Major Niel Smith, Small Wars Journal

Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency (Full PDF Article)

In Greek legend, Sisyphus was a king condemned by the gods to roll a huge rock up a hill only to have it roll down again for eternity. Students of counterinsurgency often feel like Sisyphus, as the United States Army continually resists institutionalizing counterinsurgency across the force, only to have to re-learn the lessons at a heavy price later before preparing to discard them again.

About a month ago, I was asked to deliver a short presentation to the Canadian Army on tactical counterinsurgency lessons learned over the past years in Iraq. What initially seemed like an easy task quickly became difficult as I synthesized the complex and varied experiences of US Army units into relevant and concise points transferrable to a foreign army. After a long night, I produced ten observations that reflect enduring lessons from Iraq that would resonate with military audiences. They are:

• Learn from the past.

• Learn to ask understanding questions.

• Data is not understanding.

• Mass all of your resources to achieve the objective.

• Security matters.

• Population control is critical for success.

• Build human infrastructure alongside the physical.

• Understand perceptions matter far more than truth.

• Communicate effectively.

None of these are new, nor are they all inclusive, as significant areas are not covered. They do represent a start point for discussion about counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level.

Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency (Full PDF Article)

by Dr. Daniel Marston, Small Wars Journal

British Operations in Helmand Afghanistan (PDF Article)

I'm going to try to provide an overview of British operations, called HERRICK, in Helmand (HLD) province, Afghanistan, over the last couple of years. The situation in southern Afghanistan (RC South) is widely considered to be worsening, with the Taliban controlling entire districts and launching major attacks. The British, along with the rest of our allies, have faced heavy criticism for their prosecution of the war in the south. I will look at how the British have adapted to changing conditions, and their understanding and application of COIN principles. My assessment is not official in any way, and any errors of fact or interpretation are purely mine. This assessment is drawn from the many conversations which I have been privileged to have with commanders from brigadier down to platoon level on all British operations, as well as from field reports and visits with units.

British Operations in Helmand Afghanistan (PDF Article)

A Study in Irregular Warfare

by William S. McCallister, Small Wars Journal

Sons of Iraq (Full PDF Article)

Iraq's mainly Shia central government appears intent on limiting the power of the U.S. military backed Sons of Iraq (SOI) and its approximately 100,000 armed security volunteers. The SOI has been credited by the Coalition Forces for helping turn the tide against al-Qaeda in Iraq and are as of this writing remains on the U.S. military pay roll in return for providing security in local neighborhoods throughout the country. The Maliki government initially consented to Coalition Forces recommendation to integrate approximately 20% of these fighters, many of which are former insurgents, into the state's security forces and to assist in providing vocational training for the remainder. But the Maliki government has begun to hedge on its promise. The Shia led government views these Sunni fighters as a threat in being and the U.S. sponsored neighborhood watch program itself simply a means for opponents to bide their time and worse, to infiltrate Iraq's fledgling security forces. Fear of lost opportunities and resumption of sectarian violence has been cause for some to call for making U.S. military assistance conditional on the Maliki government keeping its word to the members of the SOI. The premise of this article is not to argue the merits of leveraging Iraq's dependency on U.S. air power, logistic support, intelligence or training to gain concessions. A reengineered U.S. strategy may well be in order in light of the evolving security and political landscape. The intent rather is to provide further cultural and historical depth to the conversation and hopefully a more detailed appreciation of the operational environment to assist in reengineering existing U.S. strategy if required. The rationale of the Maliki government to limit the power of the Sunni auxiliary forces is much more complex and nuanced than causal reasoning would lead us to believe and expresses a unique blend of Iraq's unique culture and historical experience.

This paper will address the types of behavior and political relationships shaping the current political and security landscape in Iraq. Included is an introduction to the uniquely Arab institution of neighborhood watch and tribal security. The remainder of the paper discusses the relationship between these organizations and the central government as an expression of irregular warfare. It concludes with some thoughts on the limits of U.S. strategy in shaping and influencing the behavior of Iraq's social networks and tribal politics.

Sons of Iraq (Full PDF Article)

Adapting to the Realities of Modern Counterinsurgency

by Thomas Donnelly and Gary J. Schmitt, Small Wars Journal

Musa Qala (Full PDF Article)

This SWJ article is an excerpt from a forthcoming American Enterprise Institute study on the war in Afghanistan and NATO's future.

The town of Musa Qala is, in many ways, a typical Afghan market town. "I saw no obvious concessions to modern living," reported James Holland of his spring 2008 visit to Musa Qala.

In fact, I was reminded of a picture book of ancient Persia I had as a boy. I suspect the scene would not have appeared unfamiliar to Alexander the Great, who passed through here in 329 B.C. My first sight of Musa Qala was of a gray, sprawling mass that far side of a 200-year wadi [or river bed]. It was raining, the skies were leaden and the concrete and mud-built building appeared monochrome and somber.

The town sits on the Musa Qala River, an often-dry tributary of the Helmand River, the geographic feature -- along with the Highway 1 ring road that ties Afghanistan together and connects the capital, Kabul, to the rest of the country -- which defines Helmand province. It also links the ring road and lowland Helmand to the mountains of central Afghanistan. It is the last stop before the town of Baghran, in the northernmost tip of Helmand and near the border with the rugged Oruzgan and Daikundi provinces, which has been a Taliban redoubt since the initial U.S. invasion.

The town also gives its name to Musa Qala District, but two other factors contribute to it real importance: it is the hometown of the Alizai tribe, Helmand's largest Pashtun group -- though the tribal politics are devilishly complex: the Alizai are comprised of six major clans, but are a sub-tribe of the Noorzai, which is one of the five major tribes that make up the Durrani Pashtuns, one of the two main Pashtun grouping in the Afghan-Pakistan border regions; altogether there may be as many as 400 clans among the Pashtun peoples. Musa Qala is also a crossroads in the opium trade. And these two factors -- tribal politics and the drug trade -- are linked.

Musa Qala (Full PDF Article)

by William F. Owen, Small Wars Journal

The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud (Full PDF Article)

The concept of Manoeuvre Warfare (MW) in its modern form was first advocated in the early 1980s as part of the US military conventional response to perceived Warsaw Pact superiority. It has since become widely accepted as a style of warfare and generic concept of operation. This paper will argue that the community it was intended to serve based its wide acceptance largely on ignorance and a lack of intellectual rigor.

The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud (Full PDF Article)

A New Methodology

by Major Travis (TJ) Lindberg and Dr. David A. Anderson, Small Wars Journal

Prioritizing the Reconstruction of Critical Infrastructure (Full PDF Article)

As of 31 March 2008, total funding for Iraq reconstruction stood at $112.52 billion, with the United States footing $46.3 billion of that amount in appropriated funds. Unfortunately, as decision-makers are well aware, there is no assurance that massive expenditures on critical infrastructure projects within a stability operations environment can ensure long-term stability in an affected country. Thomas Friedman, in his bestseller, The World is Flat, states repeatedly that the best way to ensure long-term stability is through economic integration with the modern world. However, the stability operations and counterinsurgency literature clearly states that before the desirable conditions of economic development and integration into the world economic system can sustain themselves, the host nation (HN) must be able to govern itself effectively and maintain a monopoly on the use of force within its own borders -- neither of which is possible until the most fundamental "Maslow" needs of an affected population, such as physical security and essential services, are met.

Prioritizing the Reconstruction of Critical Infrastructure (Full PDF Article)

From Certain Defeat to Decisive Victory

by Jim White, Small Wars Journal

Oman 1965-1976 (Full PDF Article)

An often-overlooked counterinsurgency campaign of the mid-20th century was the one that raged from 1965-1976 in the Sultanate of Oman. Overshadowed by the larger conflicts that engulfed Southeast Asia, by 1970 a communist-led insurgency in the Southern Omani province of Dhofar (Dhufar) came very close to achieving victory over the British-backed government of the Sultan. However, in a remarkable turnabout grounded in time-tested counterinsurgency 'best practices,' by 1976 the communist insurgency had been defeated and government control restored to this strategically located nation. This paper will describe the causes of the insurgency, the actions of the insurgents and counterinsurgents, and finally, the factors that led to the success of the government and the defeat of the insurgency.

Oman 1965-1976 (Full PDF Article)

Small Wars Journal Interview

by Judah Grunstein

SWJ Interview: General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

General Vincent Desportes is the commander of the French Army's Force Employment Doctrine Center and author of The Likely War (La Guerre Probable, Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris. Also see Judah Grunstein's SWJ review of The Likely War.

Small Wars Journal: You said in your book that before any intervention, the strategic objectives (which are political) must be identified. Given the complexity (multilateral, inter-ministerial) of this kind of operation, which organism would be responsible for that kind of reflection and to identify the objectives?

Gen. Desportes: For one thing, in a lot of ways I'm defining a type of model for an ideal to attain. Now what we know is that in reality, it's something that's extremely difficult to do. And we notice that first we send the force to do something, and often the "end state" is defined after we've sent the force. The flagrant example is Afghanistan: first we sent the force, and afterwards we defined an "end state." So the schema that we should know the end state perfectly before we construct through retroaction the coordination of lines of operation is an ideal schema. So what I'm defining is an ideal schema. What's certain is that in fact governments respond most often in reaction, and in rapid reaction, and so the objectives are often contructed once we've launched the operation. So we're pretty far from the ideal theoretic schema that I proposed.

Now, in France, it's probable (and the Livre Blanc says it) that we're missing a structure of coordination and analysis that can do this sort of thing. When I wrote my book, obviously, the center for crisis coordination (which is foreseen by the Livre Blanc and which is supposed to be part of the Quai d'Orsay) didn't exist. Now, I don't know if that center is functioning, but it's probably that sort of center that reunites the interminsterial expertise that, from the outset of the crisis, allows the formulation of the diplomatic, economic, military and other analyses that allow us to define an "end state" before launching the operation.

SWJ Interview: General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

General Vincent Desportes

The Likely War

by Judah Grunstein, Small Wars Journal

General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

Articulated by Army Field Manual 3-24 and incarnated by Gen. David Petraeus' implementation of the Baghdad Surge, the U.S. Army's freshly minted counterinsurgency tactics are a direct response to the needs of the moment in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With their increasing ascendancy in American military doctrine still the subject of debate, a recent book by General Vincent Desportes, commander of the French Army's Force Employment Doctrine Center, provides a strategic context for the discussion that is all the more interesting for the author's unique perspective as a French strategic thinker well-versed in American strategic culture. Gen. Desportes served for two years at the U.S. Army War College as part of an officer exchange program, as well as for two years as Army Liaison Officer at Fort Monroe in Virginia. That was followed by three years as the military attache at the French Embassy in Washington. His analysis of the evolutions in contemporary warfare and the tactical and strategic adaptations on the part of Western militaries that they necessitate is not yet translated into English. So we've prepared the following extended synopsis, as well as an accompanying interview Gen. Desportes generously accorded us, to make it available to the American COIN community.

In The Likely War (La Guerre Probable, Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris), Desportes argues that the wars for which Western militaries need to prepare will not be symmetric or disymmetric conflicts between state actors. Among the factors making such wars improbable, he lists regional integration, which renders conflict less profitable and more costly, as well as globalization, which he astutely describes as the "inheritor" of Cold War deterrence. What's more, he argues that even conventional war is unlikely to be symmetric, as military logic recommends attacking the weak links (ie. networks and satellites) of an adversary's technical advantages, rather than confronting its strengths head on. (He doesn't mention it, but Chinese military doctrine comes to mind.) More significantly, though, Desportes points to recent campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon to argue that far from being a lesser order of warfare, asymmetric (or irregular) war is nothing other than the inevitable application of war's eternal law: that of bypassing the enemy's strength. "The use of the term asymmetric. . ." he writes, "reflects the refusal to imagine that an adversary worthy of the name might want to fight according to a logic other than our own." (pp. 45-46).

General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

The Likely War

by Judah Grunstein

General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

Articulated by Army Field Manual 3-24 and incarnated by Gen. David Petraeus' implementation of the Baghdad Surge, the U.S. Army's freshly minted counterinsurgency tactics are a direct response to the needs of the moment in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With their increasing ascendancy in American military doctrine still the subject of debate, a recent book by General Vincent Desportes, commander of the French Army's Force Employment Doctrine Center, provides a strategic context for the discussion that is all the more interesting for the author's unique perspective as a French strategic thinker well-versed in American strategic culture. Gen. Desportes served for two years at the U.S. Army War College as part of an officer exchange program, as well as for two years as Army Liaison Officer at Fort Monroe in Virginia. That was followed by three years as the military attache at the French Embassy in Washington. His analysis of the evolutions in contemporary warfare and the tactical and strategic adaptations on the part of Western militaries that they necessitate is not yet translated into English. So we've prepared the following extended synopsis, as well as an accompanying interview Gen. Desportes generously accorded us, to make it available to the American COIN community.

In The Likely War (La Guerre Probable, Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris), Desportes argues that the wars for which Western militaries need to prepare will not be symmetric or disymmetric conflicts between state actors. Among the factors making such wars improbable, he lists regional integration, which renders conflict less profitable and more costly, as well as globalization, which he astutely describes as the "inheritor" of Cold War deterrence. What's more, he argues that even conventional war is unlikely to be symmetric, as military logic recommends attacking the weak links (ie. networks and satellites) of an adversary's technical advantages, rather than confronting its strengths head on. (He doesn't mention it, but Chinese military doctrine comes to mind.) More significantly, though, Desportes points to recent campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon to argue that far from being a lesser order of warfare, asymmetric (or irregular) war is nothing other than the inevitable application of war's eternal law: that of bypassing the enemy's strength. "The use of the term asymmetric. . ." he writes, "reflects the refusal to imagine that an adversary worthy of the name might want to fight according to a logic other than our own." (pp. 45-46).

General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

Exploiting Market Behavior as a Form of Irregular Warfare

by William S. McCallister, Small Wars Journal

Corruption in Iraq (Full PDF Article)

The term corruption, when used in a technical sense, is a general concept in which components of an organized and interdependent system are not performing the functions for which they were originally intended, or performing them improperly to the detriment of the system's original purpose. Its original meaning has connotations of being morally wrong in practice and principle. Corruption has evolved into an institution in Iraq. What has been described as a culture of corruption now serves a vital function in the distribution of scare resources. In a sense, corruption has been elevated to a form of irregular warfare as various groups compete for access to influence and limited resources. The study of corruption as a form of irregular warfare therefore will assist in developing suitable anti-corruption strategies and to communicate these strategies within the target audience's cultural frame of reference.

Social, political and personal ideologies differ as to the costs and benefits derived from economic activities and how best to distribute the gains and losses of cumulative market transactions among individuals and groups. How best to distribute these gains and losses reflects the unique cultural, ideological and political sentiments of the society within which economic activities occur.

Ideas as to what constitutes good governance and by extension the use of appropriate economic and market management mechanisms vary. One definition describes good governance as the efficient and effective "delivery of security ... economic, administration, social and political goods and public services, and the institutions through which they are delivered." This definition implies a central role for government in the management of societal resources and a service centric function emphasizing equitable "delivery" and distribution of social services to all its citizens. Not all cultures articulate the role and function of governance in quite the same way.

Corruption in Iraq (Full PDF Article)

by J. Bernhard Compton, Small Wars Journal

Violent Non-State Actors in the Middle Eastern Region (Full PDF Article)

The existing body of quantitative research concerning violent non-state actors is sparse at best. It is characterized by disparate definitions of non-state actor violence, and largely fails to discriminate between insurgency, civil war onsets, and terrorism. It also has conflicting theories and conclusions. Meanwhile, defining legitimacy in Arab governments and its affect on non-state actor violence is also problematic. In this paper I look strictly at non-state actor violence perpetrated by actors originating from Middle Eastern States. I use four separate data sources, including the ITERATE, RPC, World Development Indicators, and Witches Brew Homogeneity datasets to relate such factors as RPC, GDP, National Power, levels of instability, and societal homogeneity to examine the notion of opportunity and cause as factors in the advent of non-state violent actors. I find some support among this data for the notion that correlation exists between legitimacy of governance, societal homogeneity, perceptions of wealth inequality and legitimacy, and number non-state actor terror attacks.

Violent Non-State Actors in the Middle Eastern Region (Full PDF Article)

Analytical Tradecraft and Education as Drivers for Intelligence Reform

by John P. Sullivan, Small Wars Journal

The Frontiers of Global Security Intelligence (Full PDF Article)

Global security intelligence is an emerging need. Changes in technology, societal organization, and the security challenges and arrangements within and among states demand novel approaches and structures to ensure human security. Terrorism, insurgency, and transnational crime challenge traditional security and intelligence structures. In this 'not crime-not war' operational environment, non-state actors, transnational criminal enterprises, gangs, warlords, terrorist and insurgent networks, and private armies intersect with traditional state organs and emerging elements of civil society. New security structures and legal regimes are potentially evolving, yet traditional structures are slow to adapt. This paper will explore the emergence of networked security structures, and new ways to approach intelligence (including the open source intelligence movement, terrorism early warning, and the co-production of intelligence), together with the role of research, analytical tradecraft, and education as potential drivers of intelligence reform.

Globalization, technology, transnational threats, and shifts in societal organization demand new approaches and structures for achieving security and developing intelligence to support operational and policy requirements. As such, global security intelligence is an emerging need. Terrorism, insurgency, and transnational crime are threats that are driving the current and future conflict environment. These individual—and increasingly linked—threats result in a diffuse security environment that is neither crime nor war. Non-state actors: transnational criminal organizations, gangs, warlords, private armies, terrorist and insurgent networks on the dark side and private military or security corporations, global corporations, civil society, NGOs, and evolving state, sub-state, and supra-state institutions on the bright side demand the development of new security and intelligence structures to ensure global stability and human security.ii Networks are an important element of this environment as is the flow of information in real-time through modern digital technology to empower all of the aforementioned actors. This paper discusses the role and evolution of networked intelligence approaches—including open source intelligence (OSINT), terrorism early warning, and the need for co-production of intelligence. In addition, this paper briefly discusses the role of research, analytical tradecraft, and education as drivers of intelligence reform.

The Frontiers of Global Security Intelligence (Full PDF Article)

FM 3-24, Relevant Case Studies or Seductive Analogies?

by Andrew Salamone, Small Wars Journal

Military History and the Drafting of Doctrine (Full PDF Article)

Military professionals value history as a tool for accomplishing objectives ranging from predicting future events and outcomes to developing new strategy and doctrine. Examining individual case studies helps reveal patterns and trends useful in forecasting, while drawing historical analogies between current and prior situations with similar characteristics can reveal "lessons learned," which are often applied to future contingencies. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24) published in December 2006 is an example of the degree to which history can influence the making of present-day military doctrine. The manual is based on the lessons learned from counterinsurgency experiences as far removed as the 1950's. While the consideration of history is undeniably important, so is the need for in depth analysis of the selected case studies and historical analogies from which lessons are drawn. Such analysis ensures similarities are more than superficial and that the lessons we are learning are the correct ones. This paper calls into question the validity of the historical analogies used in FM 3-24 and cautions against the continued reliance on historical case studies that are diminishing in relevance.

As pointed out by Frank Hoffman in his summer 2007 article in Parameters, a careful read of FM 3-24 reveals that the manual is firmly grounded in the classical theories of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Key concepts, historical case studies, and even the list of suggested readings emphasize the experiences and lessons learned during the 1950's and 60's when politically organized Maoist inspired wars of national liberation dominated the security landscape. Sir Robert Thompson's defeat of the insurgent movement in Malaya and David Galula's efforts against insurgency in Algeria are touted as textbook examples for conducting a successful counterinsurgency. Even facets of our own experience in Vietnam are reintroduced and reexamined, in most cases to emphasize what not to do when combating an insurgency.

From a historical perspective, the new manual's focus is understandable. Relatively recent examples of politically organized Maoist-inspired insurgencies achieving victory, most notably in Vietnam, leads us to believe our current enemies could and will adopt a similar approach in order to defeat us today. The existence of a "template" for a counterinsurgent victory, that being the writings of Thompson and Galula, further reinforces the perceived utility in emphasizing identical concepts in current doctrine. Finally, Mao's strategy and tactics for conducting an insurgency with centralized and top down leadership structure, emphasis on maintaining the support of the rural population, and three-phased strategy for achieving victory are familiar and well understood concepts deeply engrained in the U.S. Military's collective experience. Also understood are the tools and methods for combating such strategies and tactics, such as strengthening host nation capabilities through Foreign Internal Defense and winning the "hearts and minds" of the affected population through civic actions and economic development.

Military History and the Drafting of Doctrine (Full PDF Article)

State of Siege

Mexico's Criminal Insurgency

by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, Small Wars Journal

State of Siege: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency (Full PDF Article)

Mexico is under siege, and the barbarians are dangerously close to breaching the castle walls. Responding to President Felipe Calderon's latest drug crackdown, an army of drug cartels has launched a vicious criminal insurgency against the Mexican state. So far, the conflict has killed over 1,400 Mexicans, 500 of them law enforcement officers. No longer fearing retaliation, cartel gunmen assault soldier and high-ranking federale alike. The criminal threat is not only a threat to public order but to the state. A top-ranking Mexican intelligence official has noted in interview that criminal gangs pose a national security threat to the integrity of the state. Cartels are even trying to take over the Mexican Congress by funding political campaigns, CISEN director Guillero Valdes alleged. Should Mexico's gangs cement their hold further, Mexico could possibly become a criminal-state largely controlled by narco-gangs. This is not just a threat to Mexico, however.

As the intensity of the violence grows, so does the possibility that Tijuana and Juarez's high-intensity street warfare will migrate north. Recent cartel warfare in Arizona indicates that America has become a battleground for drug cartels clashing over territory, putting American citizens and law enforcement at risk. But the northward migration of cartel warfare is not the worst consequence of Mexico's criminal insurgency. A lawless Mexico will be a perfect staging ground for terrorists seeking to operate in North America. American policymakers must act to protect our southern flank.

State of Siege: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency (Full PDF Article)

by Norman Ricklefs, Small Wars Journal

Fourteen Rules for Advisors in Iraq (Full PDF Article)

These thoughts were initially penned on my way to RnR, while stuck at Baghdad International Airport for three days waiting for the mother of all dust storms to end. At the time, by chance, I was handed a photocopy of T.E. Lawrence's "27 Articles" -- and while reading it was impressed by how useful the information still was for those working in an Arab cultural environment. I thought that this would have helped me prepare for my work in the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, and wondered if I could put together something similar to help those who come to Iraq to work as advisors. Inspired by Lawrence and, especially, the work of Gertrude Bell, I've written the following points, which bring together my experiences of working with Iraqis over two deployments since 2005. It is not intended to advance the notion of cultural determinism -- many of the individuals you meet in Iraq will defy many of the examples below, as individuals do in all cultures -- but it is intended to provide examples of some of the chief cultural differences between Iraqi and Coalition culture and thus a few jumping off points for the advisor as his begins his work in an Iraqi Government office, a Provincial Reconstruction Team or Military Transition Team.

There are numerous sources that you can read before you deploy but the starting point (especially for US personnel) should be FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. I've provided some suggested starting points for FM 3-24 at the end of the paper.

As the Coalition presence in Iraq increasingly moves away from a warfighting role, the advisory role will become more important, and I hope that the points below will add to the section in FM 3-24 which deals with advisors in the context of building host-nation security forces (especially chapter 6).

I hope also that the points below will also be relevant and useful, at least in part, to those serving in Afghanistan, though it is focused on Iraq.

Fourteen Rules for Advisors in Iraq (Full PDF Article)

Lessons from the U.S. Experience

by Bruce Gregory, Small Wars Journal

Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons from the U.S. Experience (Full PDF Article)

Calls to build greater civilian capacity in national security are well founded, and public diplomacy is high on the list of essential capabilities that must be strengthened. U.S. public diplomacy's principles and methods are rooted in 20th century models of communication, governance, and armed conflict, which contribute to an inability to learn from recent experience and foster real change. This article defines public diplomacy, describes forces shaping the context of 21st century public diplomacy, and identifies five lessons from recent experience that point the way to change: abandon message influence dominance; drop the war on terror narrative; leverage knowledge, skills, and creativity in civil society; emphasize net-centric actors and actions; rethink government broadcasting and adapt to new media.

Ask most strategists today about national security reform and one answer is assured: strengthen civilian capabilities to meet 21st century challenges and relieve an overburdened military. High on the list of capabilities to be strengthened is what variously is called public diplomacy, strategic communication, and "winning the war of ideas." The Defense Department's 2008 National Defense Strategy laments that the U.S. is unable to communicate to the world what it stands for as a society. The State Department calls for new public diplomacy approaches and getting the "war of ideas right" in the battle against today's terrorist threat. Seven years after 9/11, the nation's leaders agree. Public diplomacy is crucial to national security and must be improved.

These calls for change sound strikingly familiar. The 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy also urged "effective public diplomacy" -- "a different and more comprehensive approach" in "a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism." Lawmakers, cabinet secretaries, and the 9/11 Commission were in early agreement on the same diagnosis, inadequate public diplomacy in an ideological struggle, and the same solution, transform tools designed for a different era and use them more effectively.

Why then has there been no real change? It's not that U.S. leaders lack for advice. Experts in and out of government wrote more than thirty reports on public diplomacy during the past seven years. Failure to turn report recommendations into business plans and action is part of the answer. But much of the challenge lies in learning from experience.

What is public diplomacy? What can be learned? And how might it change for the better?

Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons from the U.S. Experience (Full PDF Article)

by LTC Raymond Millen, Small Wars Journal

Thinking Small: Applying Hobbes to Counterinsurgency (Full Article PDF)

Perhaps the most bandied about premise in counterinsurgency strategy is the need to win the hearts and minds of the affected population. In abstract, both the insurgents and counterinsurgents vie for the allegiance of the people through social, economic, and political incentives. Yet, this premise begs the question: if the rectitude of hearts and minds is indisputable, why does it have such a poor record of success? The lackluster results of its application are certainly not from a lack of effort and resources. Here lies the rub. The aforementioned incentives are founded on a tacit assumption that people have a choice in the matter. If they don't, what eclipses hearts and minds?

In his book, Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes contends that the pursuit of self-preservation dominates human behavior first and foremost. The covenant between the citizen and the government centers on security, not only at the macro-level (e.g., sovereignty of the state) but also the micro-level (e.g., sovereignty of local governance). People created society and surrendered some individual sovereignty in exchange for the collective good of security. It is within this province that citizens are able to pursue happiness and societal progress. Hence, this covenant is founded on a tacit security agreement between the citizen and the government.

Insurgents understand and seek to shatter the covenant by creating the conditions of insecurity as a means of gaining control of the population in their area of operation. Subversion of government authority through terrorist acts, selected assassinations of officials, murder and threats perpetrated on the populace, and general mayhem ultimately results in the intimidation of the populace and hence its acquiescence to insurgent activities. With the individual's faith in and allegiance to the government in question, the government's task of reasserting its authority and regaining the confidence of the people becomes infinitely more difficult.

All this is not to say that the present understanding of hearts and minds is unimportant, it is, but its application must be sequenced properly. Or stated another way, the attainment of security must be the first stage of hearts and minds. Without a solid foundation of security, the other incentives will crumble on a bed of sand. The challenge lies in the ways and means of achieving these ends.

In view of Hobbes' contention that self-preservation dominates human behavior, this article addresses the operational and tactical calculus for the prosecution of a counterinsurgency strategy: 1) the centrality of local communities in the conflict; 2) the methodology for securing local communities; 3) restoring the covenant between the government and the people; and 4) enhancing the covenant. Success for any counterinsurgency hinges on three factors: understanding the plight of the people caught in the vise of an insurgency; acknowledging that insurgents derive their strength from population centers; and denying insurgents access to local communities. In short, counterinsurgency strategy should focus on creating security spheres for every community (e.g., city, town, village, or hamlet) as the first step in restoring local societies. For the U.S. military, pursuit of this calculus carries significant political-military implications.

Thinking Small: Applying Hobbes to Counterinsurgency (Full Article PDF)

A Survey of Christian Political Thought on the Justification of Warfare

by Keith Gomes, Small Wars Journal

An Intellectual Genealogy of the Just War (Full Article PDF)

This paper will briefly outline the development of the just war doctrine, with special emphasis on the developments in Christian thought which ultimately influenced modern international legal documents . Numerous legal documents, such as the Geneva Conventions (1864-1948) contain within them references to just war. More recent attempts to codify the just war include the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty entitled Responsibility to Protect. In examining the development of Christian thought with respect to war, I will illustrate the link between developments within Christian philosophy, the precepts of the Bible, and ultimately, the eventual universalisation of certain elements of Christian morality through the intermediary of natural law.

The need for just war criteria represents the efforts of Western cultures to regulate and restrict violence by establishing rules which specify the situations in which war can be legitimately used as a tool in international statecraft, as well as by setting out rules which govern ethical conduct during combat. However, today these regulations and restrictions are not confined to only Western cultures but, because of developments in international law and the establishment of international organisations such as the UN, this once Western narrative is seen to have universal relevancy, and to a large extent, universal appeal and applicability. While this paper will focus mainly on the rules dealing with the decision to go to war, both sets of rules arise from the same intellectual narrative which recognises recourse to violence not as the preferential modus operandi for dealing with disputes, but the exception. Both sets of rules trace their genealogy to developments in Christian thought, and understanding this genealogy is important, not only for academics, but for military strategists and foreign policy planners alike, since it highlights that these rules are never static because the rationale for these rules is situated in various historical contexts, and interpretations vary depending on the prevailing socio-political atmosphere. This, therefore, always leaves open the possibility that at the very least, the interpretations of these rules can be modified, or at the most, that the rules themselves ought to be more closely scrutinised, given that Christianity itself is constantly evolving and reinventing itself to retain contemporary social, political and ethical applicability.

An Intellectual Genealogy of the Just War (Full Article PDF)

The Integration of Special Operation Forces and USAID in Afghanistan

by Sloan Mann, Small Wars Journal

Taking Interagency Stability Operations to a New Level (Full Article PDF)

The publication of FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency) was a major step in the evolution of military thinking about unconventional warfare. It provides a useful guide to military commanders, soldiers, and civilians as they face a determined enemy interwoven within foreign cultures in Iraq and Afghanistan. It further recognizes that the military cannot counter insurgency alone. This multi-dimensional form of warfare requires the advice, expertise, and resources of civilian agencies that can focus on the political, social, and developmental aspects necessary to undermine support for insurgents.

Despite there being an entire chapter dedicated to the integration of civilian and military activities in the COIN manual, it does not address how to work with and integrate civilian agencies. Different organizational cultures, values, and sensitivities to risk create challenges to integration. Misunderstandings about methods of operation, timelines, and authorities can create friction. Managing expectations and working with idiosyncratic personalities, on both the military and civilian sides, can create frustration. Fully integrating military and civilian agencies down to the tactical level, however, can enhance operational effects and speed the process of creating stability in COIN operations.

In Afghanistan, USAID and Special Operation Forces are working together in a successful interagency model to address the myriad of challenges posed by a growing insurgency. USAID representatives working with SOF are integrating principles of development in creative ways with COIN principles to develop appropriate interventions in select communities. This paper will examine USAID's relationship with CJSOTF-A, describe a successful interagency process for selecting strategic communities, and cover best practices associated with interagency operations. Examples of holistic planning and joint operations in insecure areas will highlight what can be achieved when expertise and combined resources are brought to bear in a COIN environment.

Sloan Mann of the United States Agency for International Development is a Development Advisor to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force -- Afghanistan.

Taking Interagency Stability Operations to a New Level (Full Article PDF)

The Challenge of Countering Insurgency in Afghanistan in 2007

by Colonel John Frewen, Small Wars Journal

Contested Nation Building (Full Article PDF)

In a military sense, 2007 was the coalition's year in Afghanistan. The coalition defeated the Taliban tactically at every turn, forcing them to resort to indiscriminate attacks with explosives and suicide bombers — tactics which risk alienating the local population. The Taliban's much-vaunted 'Spring offensive' failed to materialise and they suffered substantial losses, including the death of key leaders such as Mullah Dadullah by coalition actions. They lost freedom of action in former sanctuaries such as the Upper Garesh and Chora valleys, and had Musa Qala — a town the Taliban vowed they would never surrender — seized from them as the 2007 fighting season drew to a close. While international media reports have played up the headline-grabbing "coalition's deadliest year", only one side of the ledger has been considered. The increase in coalition fatalities from 191 in 2006 to 232 in 2007 also points to a heightened engagement with the enemy that has produced good results. Throughout last year the Taliban saw support from sanctuaries in Pakistan erode, and a better-trained and more capable Afghan Army played a leading role in the assault on Musa Qala. By military standards 2007 was an awful year for the Taliban. Yet their resolve and influence persists, and more must be done through non-military means to achieve peace for Afghanistan.

Colonel John Frewen is a career infantryman who has served in 1 RAR, 2 RAR and the School of Infantry. In 2003, as CO 2 RAR, he led the initial regional military intervention force to re-establish law and order in the Solomon Islands. Other operational service includes Rwanda and, in 2007, Afghanistan. In 2006 he was the Military Assistant to the Chief of Army. He has been posted with the armies of New Zealand and the United States and holds a Masters of Defence Studies from UNSW. Colonel Frewen is currently the Director Military Strategic Commitments in the Australian Defence Headquarters.

This article was originally published in the Australian Army Journal and is posted here with permission of the author.

Contested Nation Building (Full Article PDF)

by Matt Armstrong, Small Wars Journal

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The question asked repeatedly since 9/11 is how can a guy in cave out propagandize the country that created public relations and the Internet? An obscure group in 1998, Al-Qaeda increased their influence and reach with words, images, and actions. The United States responded with showcases of Americana that, not surprisingly, failed to resonate with the target audiences: our enemies' base, moderates, "swing voters", and even our friends and allies. Ignoring the importance of linking policy with the psychology of information to persuade and dissuade, American public diplomacy and strategic communication increasingly became an irrelevant whisper and beauty contest in stark contrast to the adversary's propaganda of words and deeds. In the war of ideas, the United States is largely unarmed and has accordingly fallen in global influence and stature, increasing vulnerabilities not only in the military domain, but in economic, financial, and diplomatic realms too.

Sixty years ago, the elements of America's national power -- diplomacy, information, military, and economics -- were retooled with the National Security Act of 1947 and the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. The former has received significant attention over the years and is currently the subject of an intense project to recommend updates. In contrast, the latter, a direct response to the global ideological threat posed by Communist propaganda, has been variously ignored, glossed over, or been subject to revisionism. Smith-Mundt was a largely successful bipartisan effort, establishing the foundation for the informational and cultural and educational engagement that became known as "public diplomacy."

While today is unlike yesterday, it is worthwhile to look back on the purpose of Smith-Mundt and the debates surrounding the dissemination prohibition that has taken on mythical proportions. The modern interpretation of Smith-Mundt has given rise to an imaginary information environment bifurcated by a uniquely American "iron fence" separating the American media environment from the rest of the world. In 1948, the prohibition was a minor hurdle as the requirements for information and cultural and educational exchanges were debated.

However, modern analysis of Smith-Mundt tends to be informed by modern perceptions in disregard of the historical record. The prohibition was not intended to be prophylactic for sensitive American eyes and ears, but to be a non-compete agreement to protect private media. It was also to protect the Government from itself in the form of censoring the State Department, whose loyalties were suspect to many Congressmen.

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by Paul Smyth, Small Wars Journal

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On 10 July 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported a political agent in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as stating that the Pakistan-Afghanistan border had been 'completely sealed' to criminals. Unfortunately, the reality of the situation along the forbidding 2430km border is rather different, and the 24 coalition casualties suffered in the insurgent attack against a joint US/Afghan outpost in Eastern Afghanistan on 13 July, clearly illustrated the severe consequences of instability in the border zone. Unsurprisingly, when speaking about security in the border region at a Pentagon press briefing on 16 July, Admiral Michael Mullen (Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff) said 'we can and must do better'. While this sound-bite has more application in Washington, Islamabad and other capitals than in-theatre, he was right, and with the significance of the border area indubitably set to increase, his public sentiment is a timely catalyst to consider the 'border problem' in a little more detail.

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by Kurt Amend, Small Wars Journal

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The recent resurgence of interest in insurgency and counterinsurgency has revealed a deficit in material written by and for the diplomat, the actor ostensibly responsible for the political component of a counterinsurgency campaign. Classical theorists stress that progress along the political track is essential for ultimate success. Recent commentary, in shedding new light on the characteristics of modern insurgencies, reaffirms this principle. To make political headway the diplomat-counterinsurgent needs to develop a strategic narrative, build a political strategy around the narrative, acquire expertise, become a catalyst for political change, and maximize contact with the local population. In doing so, he will make important contributions to and help accelerate success in a counterinsurgency campaign.

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One Airman's Assessment of the Airman's Assessment

by LtCol Buck Elton, Small Wars Journal

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The traditional, often bitter inter-service battle for resources has been taken to a new level in a senior Air Force officer's recent assault on service doctrine. In late December, 2007, Air University published a 111-page monograph written by Air Force Deputy Judge Advocate Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. entitled Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airman's Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine. The study analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army and Marine tactical doctrine as the joint solution and offers an Airman's perspective to deliver "fresh" alternatives for joint counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine development. This heavily referenced monograph (438 end notes) relentlessly attacks the Army and Marine Corps doctrine for its almost exclusively ground-centric perspective and failure to reconcile the full potential of today's airpower capabilities. Although General Dunlap discusses several interesting ideas regarding how the Airman's perspective can help shape joint COIN doctrine, his undue criticisms of Army philosophies, conventional approaches and dogmatic mindset distract from his argument and recommendations. Readers will likely focus exclusively on the unwarranted and erratically referenced land-power condemnations and accuse the Air Force of advocating a COIN solution that involves Airmen or airpower for their own sake, which the author half-heartedly adds as an imperative at the end of the essay. This Airman's assessment of "an Airman's Assessment" will provide an alternative perspective of Field Manual 3-24 and offer counter arguments to many of the monograph's criticisms.

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Observations from Joint Urban Warrior 2008

by Dennis Burket, Small Wars Journal

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Joint Urban Warrior 2008 (JUW 08) was a United States Marine Corps (USMC) and United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) cosponsored seminar wargame that was designed to objectively observe and capture operational insights during a forces drawdown from an Irregular Warfare operation/environment. Participants were presented with an "OIF-like" scenario and asked to drawdown current US and Coalition forces to an "advisory organization" in two years. Using the JUW 08 scenario, participants created many visualization tools to help them describe what a two-year drawdown of forces/event-driven transition would look like from their viewpoint. This paper discusses a doctrine-based visualization tool developed during JUW 08 that both military and non-military participants found to be especially useful. This particular model was successful because it allowed participants to look at transition from the viewpoint of a tactical commander, or from the "Bottom Up."

The primary observation from using the "bottom up" approach was that functions were being transitioned to host nation or non-governmental organizations. From this key insight, participants developed several other insights. First, it was established that it is the timing of when functions are to be transitioned that should determine the future form (organization) of US forces; not the other way around. Second, an event-driven transition in an uncertain environment will require commanders to retain specific functions and capabilities to mitigate risks. And, third, by listing a function as transitioned on a chart doesn't necessarily indicate a completed action. In many instances some form of "overwatch" will be needed until a "good enough" point is reached by the organization to which the function is transitioned.

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by BG Huba Wass de Czege, US Army, Retired, Small Wars Journal

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We are in a period of unprecedented and rapid change, and this realization should make us skeptics of wisdoms revealed as recently as a decade and a half ago when the problems the military faced were very different. Paradigms that might have seemed sensible then confuse more than clarify today.

In the years just prior to September 11, 2001, a new American Way of War emerged to replace Cold War paradigms -- those underlying unthinking ways of thinking embedded in our doctrines. The April 2000 Defense Planning Guidance tasked U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to develop "... new Joint warfighting concepts and capabilities that will improve the ability of future Joint force commanders to rapidly and decisively conduct particularly challenging and important operational missions, such as ... coercing an adversary to undertake certain actions or denying the adversary the ability to coerce or attack its neighbors ..." The object of these operations were to be rogue states such as Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Panama were or had been. What emerged was dubbed the "Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)" concept. It rested on four pillars. An Air Force and Navy capable of controlling air, space, and sea domains from which to coerce enemies with a hail of precise air and naval missile power; increasingly more capable special operating forces to penetrate enemy territory and provide targets; and a new core capability called "Information Operations" to "influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decisionmaking, while protecting our own." In this "domain," as in the others, the term most used in the late 1990's to describe the product of American technological superiority was not just superiority, but dominance. RDO asserted that leveraging these asymmetric superiorities in the air, space, naval, and information domains would not only conserve scarce ground forces and reduce casualties, but they would also achieve rapid and decisive results. As we saw versions of RDO applied in Kosovo in 2000, in Afghanistan in 2002, and in Iraq in 2003, it became clear to most professionals that this new paradigm oversimplified complexities then not well understood. In fact the chief failing of RDO was an utter lack of respect for the difficulty of what it set out to do: either to achieve relevant dominance in any sense; or to coerce any determined adversary to undertake any actions what-so-ever. Even denying an adversary the ability to coerce or attack its neighbors has to be approached with humility today. However, thinking about the Information Operations component of this package has been most resistant to revision, especially two prized and related tenets. One is that "the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities" is the best way to gain the maximum benefit of so-called IO core, supporting, and related capabilities. Another is that when these capabilities are thus integrated, an independent IO "logical line of operations" can influence the behaviors of adversaries and the publics that support them with so-called "information effects" alone. This is an amateurish outlook, and not shared by all IO practitioners, especially those who have been in the trenches, and working closely with the Brigade Combat Teams most involved in the real challenges of trying to "influence" the behaviors of real people under stress. While progress is being made on other fronts of "Defense Transformation," IO is stuck in a late 20th Century time warp. Future Shock author Alvin Toffler, in a passage from a 1996 book, makes this relevant point: "The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn." In this case a Pentagon bureaucracy, the tyranny of a slow-to- change, lowest-common-denominator and top-down-biased Joint Doctrine, plus engrained habits of thought stand in the way of learning, unlearning, and relearning.

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by Farook Ahmed and Oubai Shahbandar, Small Wars Journal

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The Surge of US military forces in Iraq has delivered a tremendous level of success in providing security to areas of Iraq that were previously under insurgent control. In order to build on these successes in the future, the United States would greatly benefit from force multipliers that can help promote security and foster political reconciliation as the extra troops provided by the Surge withdraw.

A cheap and effective way to augment the Soldiers on the ground is to defeat radical extremist groups' ideologies and continue to win over the Iraqi population. The first step in developing this capability will be for the United States to establish a strategic framework that provides a central role for information operations (IO). These operations are analogous to a political campaign; they revolve around putting together and conveying a coherent message that convinces people to be sympathetic to one group and oppose that group's adversary. In Iraq and in the broader war against violent Jihadism, the United States not only needs the power to act, but also the power to influence how its actions are interpreted.

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The Cost of a Redundant State Media Strategy

by Adam Hammond, Small Wars Journal

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Former British PM Margaret Thatcher once said Democratic nations must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend.

Her choice of terminology reflects the traditional use of State media strategy to maintain popular support by de-legitimizing the causes of insurgent groups. This very strategy was employed by France during the unsuccessful Battle of Algiers, and continues today in the Coalition "War on Terror" despite radical changes in the nature of what many continue to refer to as "terrorism".

The world is in fact in the midst of a global insurgency, a worldwide revolutionary war the likes of which it has never before seen. The results of outdated strategy and its inherent terminology are of no small consequence. They range from operational planning problems at the tactical level, to a fundamental misalignment at the strategic level between the "Three Pillars of Counter-Insurgency": Governments, Security Agencies, and Economic actors. Until this misalignment is addressed, it will be impossible to effectively counter global insurgent activity in a sustainable fashion.

What is required with respect to both international and domestic matters is therefore nothing short of a wholesale re-think of government media strategy and the very terminology used to describe "terrorists" and "terrorism".

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Two Imperfect Recruitment Models

by Clinton Watts, Small Wars Journal

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Currently, debate focuses on two models of foreign fighter recruitment and transit to theaters of open conflict. The first model is one of top-down recruitment where al-Qa'ida recruits young men and coordinates their travel to an operational theater. The second model suggests the opposite where young men recruit themselves and find their way to open theaters of conflict joining a global Jihadi movement inspired but not necessarily led by al-Qa'ida.

Both models assign a role to the Internet in this process. The first model (top-down) holds that militant propaganda on the Internet makes young men susceptible to recruiters. The second model (bottom-up) holds that the Internet not only radicalizes young men, but also helps them find a way to travel to open theaters of conflict.

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by Colonel Devendra Pratap Pandey, Indian Army, Small Wars Journal

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In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, then Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) of the Pakistan Army, orchestrated a major intrusion into an unoccupied but strategically sensitive complex of Kargil along the northern border of India. The Kargil intrusion was an operation of strategic importance conducted by Pakistan to provide a much required momentum to its weakening proxy war in the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), a state of India. Pakistan had waged an irregular war, in J&K, for a decade, exploiting religious similarities to incite secessionist activities, by actively supporting, financing, and training insurgents, while exporting foreign radicals and so called jihadist elements across the borders. This latest aggression across the border by the Pakistan Army was another attempt to redeem its prestige after the defeats of 1947-48, 1965, and 1971. The 1998-99 act of intrusion was of even greater significance because it was enacted during a political peace process when the then Indian Prime Minister was visiting Pakistan on invitation. The surprise intrusion, along a stretch of the border that had historically remained peaceful due to the terrain difficulties, was a spark in an already charged regional tinderbox.

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Counterinsurgency and Capacity Building in the Pacific

by Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Small Wars Journal

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It is sometimes said that "Small is beautiful." That does not imply that small is simple or easy. Two ongoing Pacific region contingencies - one in Solomon Islands, the other in the Southern Philippines and neither with over 500 military personnel on a typical day - provide many lessons for those conducting, planning, or studying counterinsurgency (COIN) and capacity building undertakings regardless of size. Those lessons validate many drawn from historical events of the past. Others reflect challenges more characteristic of insurgency in its evolving, twenty-first-century form. Though the soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and civilians of nations participating in the two operations have seen considerable progress, those individuals share a common realization that success during such operations is a never a given. The outsider complementing previous triumphs is ever reminded that any thoughts of success apply only to actions "so far." This unwillingness to presume seems another trait shared with predecessors of ages past. Success, it seems, is a description that only historians should feel comfortable applying to a counterinsurgency.

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by Carl J. Ciovacco, Small Wars Journal

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Since its inception, al Qaeda's treatment of noncombatant immunity has migrated from full observance to complete disregard. In just over a decade, al Qaeda transitioned from basing entire operations on the inviolable nature of noncombatant immunity to specifically targeting noncombatants. From 1991 until 2002, al Qaeda evolved through five distinct phases in its observance of noncombatant immunity. These phases transition from Phase One's complete respect for noncombatants to Phase Five's intentional targeting of millions of noncombatants with weapons of mass destruction. More recently, however, al Qaeda appears to be taking stock of the harm that targeting noncombatants is having on its cause. This paper will provide a phased analysis of how al Qaeda's provision of noncombatant immunity disintegrated over time and why it may be returning today. This progression of thought and action concerning noncombatants serves as a roadmap by which to understand how and why al Qaeda made these ideological leaps.

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Complex operations require complex mental models.

A Battle-proven Model from an Experiment in Afghan Indigenous Chaplain Training

by Chaplain (CPT) Eric A. Eliason, Small Wars Journal

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As new Afghan and Iraqi armies come online in their deeply religious countries, their soldiers will naturally begin to seek chaplain support. Religious leadership in Islamic countries is much more valued and enjoys far more influence than in the West. So the issue of training Iraqi and Afghan chaplaincies is orders of magnitude more important than might be the case for other Armies—particularly in a conflict that has such complex religious dimensions.

This need for indigenous chaplains presents a thorny challenge to coalition efforts. If we take a role in setting up indigenous chaplaincies, the risk is serious for giving offense or appearing to meddle in religious affairs not our own and hereby set back our own efforts. However, if we are not involved in fostering chaplaincies for these new armies, then a wily enemy will surely find a way to infiltrate their radical religious leaders and ideas into the armies we are training and co-opt them to subversive ends.

So, we find ourselves on the horns of a dilemma that will not go away and will likely get worse if we do nothing. As to how we might find our way through this difficult issue, I offer in this article lessons learned from an experiment in indigenous chaplain training that took place in Afghanistan in 2004. I believe that refined and expanded, it might serve as a model for future projects to be undertaken on a larger scale that will help ensure the Afghan and Iraqi security forces remain protectors of liberty and not devolve into enemies of it.

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by LTC Gregory A. Grimes, Small Wars Journal

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Hap Arnold had it right: give the enemy time to recuperate and your efforts are wasted; relentless engagement crushes an enemy's morale and will to fight. General Arnold recognized the value of persistence in attack, but in his day persistence meant persistence in effort, keeping up the fight day in and day out. Despite a commander's best efforts the fight could be interrupted by bad weather preventing movement of friendly forces, by the logistical demands of feeding, resting and re-arming men, or by terrain that granted cover or concealment to an enemy. Lulls between engagements were often measured in days, sometimes weeks. The bombing raids of Germany during World War II were considered 'persistent' even though the bombings were only daily at best, leaving many hours of respite for the enemy between attacks. The applicability of persistence is changing now as technological advancements have bridged the previously unavoidable gaps. The apex tool for commanders, true persistent offensive engagement, is now possible. This paper therefore argues for persistence as the 10th Principle of War.

What makes true persistence now achievable? The answer lies in the appearance of a new system on the battlefield, the armed Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). UAS's provide an unprecedented capability to match continuous target tracking with offensive strike capability. The key achievement of UAS's, the step that makes true persistence possible, is the removal of the human pilot from the engagement loop. Humans still control the process but are no longer integral to its execution. In the past, persistence meant persistence in effort; it now means persistence in engagement. Military strategists have long recognized the human pilot as the limiting principle of aerial platforms. The need for life support systems and the physiological limits of human endurance inherently limit piloted platforms. And in the arena of large force-on-force engagements the logistical demands of feeding, resting and re-arming men are a constraint; as necessary as they are unavoidable. The modern commander now has an asset to bridge those engagement gaps. Armed UAS's provide the critical tool to fill the inevitable gaps in human-on-human warfare.

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Cuba's Operation Carlotta, 1975

by Russ Stayanoff, Small Wars Journal

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On December 2, 2005, Cuba's aging Fidel Castro addressed his nation's armed forces in his last personally delivered Revolutionary Armed Forces Day speech in Havana. The speech commemorated the 30th anniversary of the Cuban army's Angolan intervention. The speech was the archetypal "Castronic" socialist diatribe long-time Fidel watchers have come to expect. However, during this speech Fidel, for the first time, shed some light on the history of the secret deployment of 36,000 Cuban troops, sent in 1975, to defend the newly declared independent Marxist government of Angola. "Never before," declared Fidel, "had a Third World country acted to support another people in armed conflict beyond its geographical neighborhood." The Cuban leader declared that contemporary historical assessments of the region consistently omit the contributions of the Cuban expeditionary forces. Castro called the contributions of the Cuban army "decisive in consolidating Angola's independence and achieving the independence of Namibia."

What was Operation Carlotta and, more importantly, what will be its legacy to a people soon to have their history re-examined in the post-Castro era? What are the assessments of those who fought this bloody war some 30 years later? Pragmatic Cuban veterans consider the long official silence concerning Operation Carlotta an admission of failure in another of Fidel's many botched programs of "Leninist internationalism." Yet, others regard participation in Fidel's African adventures, a patriotic duty proudly performed. A retired Cuban military doctor explained, "Well, you have to give credit to Fidel, he was one to back his words with deeds, and the deed was our presence in Angola. Most were quite proud to have participated. Remember, that at the time, the South Africans were a nasty bunch that never merited a lot of international sympathy."

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by Andrew C. Pavord, Small Wars Journal

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Since 9/11 the armed forces of the United States have paid a steep price to acquire proficiency in counterinsurgency operations. After going through a painful learning process the Army and Marines published the now acclaimed counterinsurgency manual and implemented a new approach in Iraq that is delivering impressive results. It is now a logical time to consider how to redesign combat units to reflect these lessons and prepare for the small wars of the future.

This article will argue that counterinsurgency brigades should be added to the U.S. Army's force structure. Lacking forces specially trained and equipped for counterinsurgency, the Army has fought the war on terror with conventional units adapted to counterinsurgency operations. For most units, the transition from conventional organization and tactics to the very different and challenging tasks of counterinsurgency was traumatic. The costs of poor organization for counterinsurgency, in terms of battlefield mistakes and the misallocation of resources, were substantial. To provide the optimal force for fighting insurgencies the Army should develop Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) that are specifically organized, equipped, and trained for the complex challenges of counterinsurgency operations.

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by Emmet McElhatton, Small Wars Journal

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Some analysts of Indonesian affairs have tried to rebut "the conventional wisdom that Indonesia is simply a violent society" and reject "arguments that locate the origins of violence in cultural characteristics that highlight the irrationality of the Indonesian crowd", asserting instead that military and political elites, predominantly Javanese by implication, use this convenient cultural epithet to mask their role in the instigation, manipulation and coordination of politically expedient violence. Of course all national or ethnic cultures have violent facets, a reflection of both their humanity and their will to survive the depredations of other cultures -- even that most civilised of cultures, the Melians of Thucydides', defended themselves heroically when crunch, in the form of Athens, came calling. This accepted, then Indonesians should not be singled out with a "more violent" tag any more than other comparable societies. Also a reading of all but the most partisan histories of post-war Indonesia demonstrate clearly that the many violent episodes that blot the collective memory are a series of power struggles between opposing elites with the common denominator an Indonesian Army unrestrained in its willingness to use extreme violence to maintain its notion of order.

Acknowledging this, we need also note that there are some aspects to Indonesian social, and particularly martial, culture that do indicate a different approach to violence and its utilisation than the strategic culture of, for example, New Zealand would countenance. For the purposes of this brief survey I will consider the notion of Javanese culture as the dominant force in Indonesian strategic culture and then examine this through a consideration of Indonesian guerrilla warfare theory.

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Maras in Central America

National Security Implications of Gang Activity South of the Border

by COL Terry Saltsman and LTC Ben Welch III, Small Wars Journal

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The strategic nature of conflict and violence, in addition to the definition of insurgent, is in a state of rapid change in both the defense and intelligence community. In the post September 11, 2001 world the United States is compelled to take a 360 degree view of the world in its efforts to "observe, orient, decide and act" against potential threats to vital national interests.

The challenge facing today's defense establishment is an asymmetrical enemy that most Western militaries are ill equipped to challenge and defeat in a manner that is acceptable to the civilian population. If Iraq has taught us anything it is that even the best publicly supported military plan can turn sour, and that support can wane, if the operation morphs into a perceived tar pit. It is imperative that the public's discernment of the events that will lead to ultimate victory be molded in an honest and realistic manner. This is increasingly essential in our pursuit of terrorists.

In the months following the unthinkable acts of 9/11, many terrorism experts specializing in violent conflict began to ponder the expanded dimensions of the new face of terror as it might apply toward the United States. Soon after, when President Bush introduced the American public to the "War Against Terrorism," many of these same individuals turned their attention on the obvious avenues of Middle Eastern and Islamic Fundamentalist centric terrorism.

In the past several years the United States has pursued the "War Against Terrorism" on a number of fronts. In one, fighting in a conventional manner, territory has been the central issue with military forces seeking and then taking control of entire countries (Afghanistan and Iraq). In another scenario, Special Operation cells have worked with the military forces of concerned regimes in order to restrict the use of territory by terrorists seeking to establish training camps in countries such as Algeria and Mali.

With so many issues confronting the National Security interests of the United States it is easy to overlook one particular unprotected, and often ignored, flank -- the maras (gangs) of Latin America.

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by CPT Nils French, Small Wars Journal

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Insurgency has historically presented a significant security challenge and will continue to do so into the foreseeable future. Insurgents typically choose to operate from within a population and for this reason it is the human element that has had and will continue to have the most considerable impact on their operations and the operations that counter them. In The Tipping Point, bestselling author Malcolm Gladwell combines research from several disciplines to give incredible insight into the unusual and counterintuitive principles of the human element. He does this by exploring social epidemics; occasions where ideas, messages, and behaviors spread like viruses. The principles of social epidemics can be applied to business growth, crime rates, fashion trends, and other social phenomena. Because of the common human element, the concepts are equally applicable in an insurgency setting. It is universally acknowledged that insurgents work to spread their ideas and messages and promote certain behaviors within a population. Those wishing to counter them must do the same. Three principles can be employed in concert to ensure such efforts see results. First, the proper environment must be established and maintained. Second, the manner in which information is presented must be very carefully tuned to the population. And third, the right people must be carefully selected to spread the information. Precise requirements that address the peculiarities of human behavior, none of them obvious or intuitive, are given for each method and explained. This paper will show how these principles relate to counterinsurgency. Each principle will be placed in the context of insurgency and ideas and recommendations will be presented that are immediately relevant to contemporary security challenges.

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by MAJ Aaron Bazin, Small Wars Journal

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If strategy is difficult, it is only because those who ponder and execute strategy have made it that way. In an attempt to kill enemies in unclear ways, the strategic use of force has become muddled. Today, the lexicon of American strategic thought has become a mix of technologically enabled micromanagement, restrictions that ensure a healthy dose of gridlock, and constant political "blame-storming". With a Nostradamus-like mix of art, science, and conjecture, modern strategy is lukewarm at best. To the soldier, the use of force is simple, kill, if you have to, so you can come back home alive in 15 months. Why is the use of force so complicated to strategic thinkers?

Strategy must be translated through the levels of theater-strategic, operational, and countless other bureaucratic filters to be understood by American Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen. Strategy must be one thing; simple. It must be so, not only to communicate to the military what to do, but tell the American people what the military is doing (that ever-important part of Clausewitz's secondary trinity) and finally, to make the enemy understand that until they capitulate all they will experience is death, political failure, and economic ruin. Strategy should be a situationally applied tool that uses violence and the other elements of national power to adjust an international actor's behavior so that it falls into concert with international norms.

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By CPT Justin Gorkowski, Small Wars Journal

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In the battle for the support of the population, it is not the capture of the Zarqawis or the Bin Ladens that will defeat the insurgency in Iraq. Nor is it the cordon and search of the villages that have had their doors kicked in by every coalition force rotation over the past four years. The solutions are much more complex and much further out of the conventional mindset. The current threat is extremely unique, making it impossible to use a stenciled approach in applying large scale solutions developed in other insurgencies throughout history. What we can do is take the knowledge, experience and tools we possess, and immerse ourselves in the current situation, developing new methods and tools that are effective in defeating a known threat. One staple in an insurgency is the role of the population, and counterinsurgents must apply that knowledge to all actions and inactions. A method that effectively gains popular support in one geographic area may actually be counter-productive in another due to fundamental differences in the ways of life. Many factors contribute to the way people think and feel. Counterinsurgents cannot fully develop techniques that will affect thought and emotion unless they are immersed in the situation. Counterinsurgents need small unit leaders with the mental capacity and agility to think on their own to develop solutions not found in field manuals. They must be adaptive and continually reexamine the insurgent and population to be most successful in developing methods that are effective in defeat.

This article does not attempt to provide a solution to fight the insurgency in Iraq. It does provide insight on successful methods that can be applied to the current situation. An insurgency's success is fundamentally based on its level of popular support. The counterinsurgent's success is therefore intertwined with the limitation of the insurgent support base. Critical to the attainment of popular support for counterinsurgents is the presence of non-lethal effects. Non-lethal effects can simply be defined as the results of all actions that are not designed to kill. Primary contributors are civil affairs, public affairs, information operations, and psychological operations. Efforts must focus on effecting how people think and how counterinsurgent actions or inactions affect those thoughts.

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Techniques for the Conventional Rifle Platoon, in Layman's Terms

by Captain Craig Coppock, Small Wars Journal

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There are many books, manuals, and articles that define strategies and principles for counterinsurgency (COIN) success. No one author is completely right and no one is completely wrong; they all have great information and tools to add to your arsenal. This document is not a complete lesson on counterinsurgency theory and strategy, but is rather a collection of counter-insurgent and counter-guerrilla techniques that the author believes are relevant to the current fight in Iraq. This paper is written with an intended primary audience of Rifleman through Platoon Leader, though the information is applicable to company-level leadership as well. Remember that these are only techniques learned by one Infantry platoon in a specific place (central Iraq) at a specific time (June '06 to Sept '07). The decision to adopt and implement these techniques is entirely yours. However, using techniques specifically aimed at counter-insurgency and counter-guerilla warfare is critical to supporting your Commander's greater strategy. While it is true that every AO is different, the overarching COIN principles will apply anywhere. You just have to figure out the finer tactical means of employing them; and that is where this paper will help you out.

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by Paul Smyth

Small Wars Journal Magazine

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The recent Iraqi military operation in Basra has generated much speculation in media and commentary circles, but without access to classified sources it is extremely difficult to accurately judge what has been happening in Basra and why. Even attempts to draw on Iraqi sources or anonymous quotes from within the Coalition do not eradicate confused or contradictory reporting. Hence, some commentators will claim that the targets of the Iraqi security clampdown in Basra are the criminal and Iranian sponsored 'Special Groups' that plague the city, while others will equally assert that it is the militia followers of Moqtada Al Sadr which are being attacked in order to weaken his power base ahead of provincial elections.

Whether the subject in view is the motive behind the operation, its timing and conduct, the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the militias, the role of Iran or the relative effect the operation is having on the standing of the various protagonists, there is no consensus of opinion which reigns supreme.

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by Stephen Phillips

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In the summer of 2003, IED attacks in Iraq increased dramatically with the emerging insurgency. A group of intelligence, law enforcement, and explosive experts responded, forming the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell -- CEXC.

After removal of the Hussein regime an IED insurgency began led by al--Zarqawi and the remnants of the Al Ghafiqi Project, IED assassins from Iraq's former intelligence body -- the Mukbarat. This marked a dramatic increase in IED incidents in the summer of 2003. As one of JSOC's EOD assets, DiGuardo was sent into the fray to respond. He arrived in Baghdad with the intention of developing counter-IED CONOPS and TTPs. Shortly after arriving, DiGuardo found a group already working to address the IED problem. It was a conglomeration of British and American, civilian and military, EOD technicians and intelligence analysts. Though from different backgrounds, each member possessed the imagination and foresight to realize that a counter-IED effort would take the fight to the terrorists. Beyond realizing the need, these men each had the initiative to address it. They formed a cell, not unlike that of their nemeses.

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Nothing follows.

An Ongoing Case Study in Militia Based Insurgency

by CPT Michael Comstock

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Shi'a militias fought for, and in many cases, won significant territory in Baghdad's southwestern districts of West Rasheed by seizing neighborhoods of mixed sectarian composition, cleansing them of "undesirables," consolidating their gains to fund future expansion, and utilizing explosively formed penetrators (EFP) to target US forces. Being able to effectively identify this type of activity before it has progressed too far is essential. In these contested areas, the primary militia in question is the notorious Jaesh al'Mahdi (JAM), a Shi'a paramilitary organization affiliated with the junior cleric Moqtada al'Sadr. There are, however, several other militias operating in Baghdad; two noteworthy examples are the Shi'a Badr Corps and the Sunni dominated Al'Qaeda in Iraq. Over the course of Iraq's regime change transformation since 2003, Shi'a militias have been continuously working to capture the prize of Iraq: control of Baghdad.

This paper seeks to focus on a handful of West Rasheed's districts creating a microcosm case study that emphasizes how a militia operates in an insurgency. Through the benefit of hindsight, extensive open source reporting and a variety of personal experiences, these militia activities will be highlighted and examined.

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The Break Point: AQIZ Establishes the ISI in Zaganiyah

by CPT James Few

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Upon my arrival in Iraq in August 2006, Zaganiyah appeared to be a potentially shining example of democratization; a relatively peaceful, heterogeneous mixture of Sunnis and Shias, a robust security force consisting of both local police and Iraqi Army (ISF), and an adequate government representation in both the local Nahiya (County) and Diyala Provisional Councils (GOI). Furthermore, population samples indicated thriving economic metrics, moderate religious leaders, and marginal but improving essential services (A/5-73 Recon Operational Summary, August 2006).

Yet, in the shadows of this overtly optimistic US perspective, a storm of epic proportions brewed as tribal and sectarian differences clashed outside of the Coalition Forces' (CF) purview. By March 2007 Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ), through a series of tactical political and military moves, consolidated control of Zaganiyah governing under the auspices of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), a shadow government created as an alternative solution to the US-backed Shia government of Prime Minister Maliki.

AQIZ established its zone of control, effectively killing or displacing 5,000 Shia residents, dissolving the Iraqi Government presence, instituting an Islamic government, and implementing Shar'iah law.

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What Foreign Fighter Data Reveals About the Future of Terrorism

by Clinton Watts

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Recent information on foreign fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan provides an updated picture of future terrorist threats to Western interests. Based on newly-released detainee data from Guantanamo and foreign fighter records captured in Iraq, we can now more precisely identify trends in al-Qa'ida recruiting. Although the data tells us little about fighting inside Iraq and Afghanistan, it reveals a great deal about the modern Sunni mujahid who fights as a volunteer in Middle East conflicts.

In addition to informing the profile of al-Qa'ida's foot soldiers, the data suggests alternative techniques for countering the organization and its foreign fighter recruits in North Africa and the Middle East. This study, which will be released serially, examines the asymmetric nature of foreign fighter recruitment, the utility of smuggling networks for counterterrorism, varying motivations for martyrdom, and trends for future terrorism analysis with the drawdown of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan.

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