Can the Obama Administration Wind Down the War on Terror?by Zachary Keck
The National Strategy for Counterterrorism that the White House released last week signals the Obama administration's determination to enter into a new phase in America's fight against terrorism, one in which the United States significantly reduces the amount of resources and energy it devotes to the campaign. While strategically prudent- given al-Qaeda's diminished operational capacity, the death of Osama Bin Laden and the Arab Spring's blow to al-Qaeda's ideological appeal- implementing the strategy for winding down the war on terror will be a formidable challenge.
While pledging to remain vigilant in the fight against al-Qaeda, the document essentially lays out a three-pronged approach for reducing the United States commitment to that effort. The first and most straightforward element is redefining the enemy in a more concrete and limited manner. Just as the United States began the Cold War by conflating the Soviet threat with one of communism generally, the Bush administration famously responded to 9/11 by announcing a global campaign against the tactic of terrorism- instead of al-Qaeda proper. Although the Obama administration has tried to rectify the strategic misstep of its predecessor since taking office, nowhere has this been stated more clearly than in the new Counterterrorism (CT) strategy.
Thus, early on the strategy states "we are not at war with the tactic of terrorism or the religion of Islam. We are at war with a specific organization- al-Qaeda (2)." After noting that other terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas continue to pose threats to the country, the administration pledges to "avoid conflating them and al-Qaeda into a single enemy (4)." Lest there be some confusion on the matter, Counterterrorism adviser John Brennan stated in his speech unveiling the new CT strategy that its principal focus: "is the network that poses the most direct and significant threat to the United States, and that is al-Qaeda. We use these terms deliberately."
The second and more difficult element is the administration's goal of shifting a greater share of the burden of fighting al-Qaeda onto other countries. Although the United States has long collaborated in prosecuting the war against al-Qaeda, the new strategy envisions other states taking the lead in their respective regions for the first time.
In the Persian Gulf, for instance, the strategy pledges to, "look chiefly to our partners in the region- Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Yemen, and others- to take the lead, with U.S. support and assistance (14)." Similarly, the "critical point" in Southeast Asia is that the United States will rely on regional states "to bear the responsibility for addressing the challenges posed by terrorists in the region (16)." Only in Africa, where countries have minimal CT capabilities, does the new strategy depict the United States as maintaining most of the burden for the foreseeable future.
Although desirable, buck-passing responsibilities for fighting Al-Qaeda requires other countries to be both —and able to accept the burden. In areas like Europe and Southeast Asia, this assumption is sound; in South Asia, Iraq and the Persian Gulf writ large, it seems overly optimistic. More concerning is that the strategy does not discuss how the United States will respond if the Obama administration's rosy assessments do not come to pass.
The administration's third element for reducing the United States' commitment to the war on terror is narrowing the focus to the U.S. homeland, and lower Americans' expectations about the success they can expect even in this area. Whereas the Bush administration unequivocally vowed to prevent any future attacks against the United States, the Obama administration, while pledging to take every preventive measure possible, admits that periodic low-scale attacks on the homeland will likely remain a fact of life. Building on a Presidential Policy Directive released in May, the new strategy therefore asks the American people to be resilient in the face of these continued attacks, portraying America's ability to sustain and recover from them as a strength that will demoralize al-Qaeda.
Although this may be a necessary dose of realism, getting the American people to accept it is another matter altogether. Long protected by two large bodies of water, it would unprecedented for Americans to accept the inevitability of periodic attacks. Selling this to the public will therefore be the administration's most difficult public relations campaign to date. Given that the administration has often struggled with public relations in the past, there is little reason to think they will be successful in this matter.
In sum, although the administration's determination to wind down the war on terror may be strategically prudent, it will require extraordinary Presidential leadership to see it through. Is President Obama up to the task?
Zachary Keck writes on U.S. Foreign Policy at Examiner.com. His commentary has appeared on the websites of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, World Politics Review and the Diplomat among elsewhere.
