Rethinking RPA Applications in Irregular Warfareby Mike "Starbaby" Pietrucha
"For those missions that still require manned missions, we need to think hard about whether we have the right platforms — whether, for example, low-cost, low-tech alternatives exist to do basic reconnaissance and close air support in an environment where we have total control of the skies — aircraft that our partners also can afford".
- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Maxwell AFB, 21 April 2008
Since 1995, the USAF has gone from an organization that had not a single, operational Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) to its name to a service that has fielded several kinds of RPAs in squadron strength. The utility of the RPA has been definitively proven in the ISR mission, and a limited precision attack capability has provided stunning results on the battlefield. However, the success of the RPA should not blind us to the limitations that come along with it. Predators, Reapers and Global Hawks are still aircraft, and like all aircraft, they are not capable of being the best choice for every possible mission that may be necessary. In an Irregular Warfare environment, we run the risk of putting too many eggs in the unmanned basket and blinding ourselves to the capabilities that have been demonstrated worldwide, by aviators, in manned aircraft in almost a century of military service in a variety of conflicts around the world. The question arises: "In Irregular Warfare, what can a manned aircraft do that a RPA cannot?
The USAF currently does not operate manned light attack and has only recently returned to manned tactical reconnaissance in the form of the MC-12W. These two roles are historically, along with airlift, key examples of airpower contributions to IW. A simple analysis of current and potential capabilities of manned and unmanned aircraft in the kind of counterinsurgency fights we find ourselves conducting is instructive.
For comparison purposes, the RPA will be represented by the MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-1 Predator. Similarly, the manned aircraft are represented by two examples. For ISR and C2, the Beech King Air B200 (C-12), currently in operation by all four DoD branches and the Army National Guard. The little brother of the larger King Air 350 that was the baseline for the MC-12W, the B200 is much more widely used for reconnaissance and was produced in much larger numbers at a lower per-unit cost. For light attack, the Beech AT-6B or the Embraer Super Tucano, the latter operational as a COIN aircraft in Colombia and Brazil. The operational environment in this comparison is considered to be equivalent to Colombia, Iraq, Afghanistan and a host of other "Irregular" conflicts worldwide, where the threat to aircraft is limited to small arms, MANPADS and (occasionally) light AAA.
The RPA has a number of advantages. Their endurance is well beyond that of any comparable manned platform, they are economical to operate, and the loss of an aircraft does not entail any danger to the aircrew operating it. Furthermore, the MQ-9 can (potentially) carry a diverse mix of sensors and weapons, making it an extremely versatile platform. But there are associated disadvantages as well. The loss rate of RPAs is very high, which may well offset any economic argument associated with the purchase price (1). USAF MQ-1 require aviation fuel, which is not available at all in most of the world (2). RPA are reliant on both line-of-sight links (for takeoff and landing) and for operations, on control and datalinks that function over the horizon. The fielded sensor kits are generally very limited and in the case of the MQ-1, the RPA is not capable of carrying additional sensor payload.
A light, manned ISR aircraft cannot reasonably compare with RPAs for unrefueled endurance and low fuel consumption, (although there is an advantage in airspeed and therefore a faster response time from scramble) but may well be a more versatile aircraft suitable for a wider range of operations by a larger list of potential operators. The comparative advantages of the manned aircraft in general are significant. They require no bandwidth for control links, can operate in icing and crosswind conditions that will ground most RPAs, and can carry a "rider" from supported ground forces -- a technique being used routinely in Iraq with manned Army and contract ISR. This provides both a C2 overwatch capability and inflight expertise and local knowledge that an RPA cannot reasonably be expected to provide, particularly when the installed sensor field of view is so limited. It is much easier for an inexperienced observer to orient through the canopy than through the very narrow field of view of a camera, and is comparatively easy to pick up a local observer with the relevant ground knowledge. Furthermore, the manned aircraft can operate in an environment where no bandwidth is available for either the control link or the ISR data feed. This becomes particularly important if an onboard sensor develops actionable intelligence -- there is already a man in the loop even if the available communications are limited to basic, voice radio. Manned aircraft can operate in greater numbers, with a quicker response time, than aircraft that require datalink to fly. We can scramble manned aircraft regardless of command-link bandwidth limits, and we can operate them in areas where bands used for control links are congested, restricted, or jammed.
We gain a significant advantage in mission flexibility with manned aircraft. The example aircraft can land, rearm/refuel, and takeoff from austere fields without a control link and recovery team. This allows the use of a wide range of airfields, and allows the aircraft to land, refuel and takeoff in minimum time. The King Air can and does carry developmental payloads, for sensors, electronic attack or communications that cannot currently be engineered to fit into a RPA. Similarly, it can carry flight test engineers for rapid development purposes of the above systems, and specialized crew, such as a WSO/EWO, FAC (A) or instructor pilot.
From a light attack standpoint, the disparity is even more pronounced. The MQ-1 can carry a pair of AGM-114 Hellfire, but is more commonly seen with one. The MQ-9 has a much higher ordnance load than the MQ-1, comparable to either Super Tucano or AT-6B. However, the MQ-9 crew has much poorer situational awareness than the manned aircraft (3), with no rocket capability and no gun. It remains a comparatively limited aircraft (4), capable of performing reconnaissance and attack missions under favorable conditions from a few bases supported by a huge infrastructure backbone.
With respect to the AT6B / Super Tucano example, the aircraft can perform a wide range of functions, including basic and advanced flight training for partner air forces, which the RPA cannot. The attack aircraft can strafe - employing the most commonly utilized, near-precision, low-CD attack method employed by USAF, USN and USMC TACAIR. As shown by the A1E in Vietnam, the aircraft can potentially provide emergency CASEVAC or CSAR pickup from austere fields and roadways. From a threat standpoint, tried and true tactics can help make the aircraft more survivable than a comparable RPA, as the manned aircraft carries personnel who can gain SA from looking out the window and can operate by element, allowing one aircraft to provide overwatch while the other rolls in. This becomes particularly important for CSAR, CASEVAC or attack operations in an environment where there are heavy-caliber guns or MANPADS.
No credible low-altitude capability exists for RPAs, especially in mountainous terrain, denying them the ability to perform low-altitude escort (particularly RESCORT) missions, nor can they reasonably operate under the weather. For a similar cost to MQ-9, light attack aircraft can operate reliably from more locations, under worse conditions, conducting more mission types. Critically important for integration with ground forces are that locally based aviation units will have a much better, personal, working relationship with their supported ground forces than a unit half a world away. A crew you can plan with and brief face-to-face, even if only occasionally, is a member of the team -- a crew on the other end of the phone line is mere tech support.
For light attack, fueling remains easy; rearming a little less so. However, any US / NATO military airfield that has fuel will have linked .50 caliber ammunition for the gun. Similarly, any airfield that operates Army attack aviation can also be expected to have 2.75 inch rockets; both guns and rockets can be reloaded by the crew. Given significant investment, the light attack can operate from many more airfields, simultaneously, than the medium-altitude RPA.
Finally, at the end of the day, the vast majority of IW missions should and must be conducted by partner air forces. Secretary Gates urged consideration of "a conceptual hundred-wing air force of allies and partners". Neither the MQ-1 nor the MQ-9 can reasonably be transferred to less capable air forces that will provide the majority of the 100-wing force. Most Partner Nations (PNs) lack the communications architecture, aviation background, and export clearances to consider these larger RPAs -- and cannot afford the mishap rate. Manned aircraft can be transferred to partner air forces that cannot operate an advanced UAS and may very well serve as the foundation upon which a more capable air force is built. Our partners cannot do without them, and if we are to take the lead in developing other nations' airpower capabilities, we cannot do without them either.
The RPA has proven to be extremely useful, but these aircraft have inherent limitations posed by their small size, lack of crew, basing limitations, and the technological limits of their control mechanism. We do not employ RPAs as a substitute for airlift aircraft or high-performance fighters because they are not suited for these roles. It may well be that in the kind of irregular wars that we have been fighting, and expect to fight over the long term, that RPAs are not the sole aircraft that the USAF should be employing. Effective application of airpower capabilities is not solely a matter of considering the aircraft, and no one aircraft type is a one-size-fits-all. However, building both reconnaissance and attack capabilities using off the shelf COTS capabilities would seem a wise investment for the future and a welcome addition to a lopsided airpower portfolio.
Lt Col Michael "Starbaby" Pietrucha is a USAF Reserve Officer with 156 combat missions in the F-4G and F-15E and two ground combat deployments (one each in Iraq and Afghanistan) in the company of US Army infantry, military police and combat engineers. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or any element thereof.
Endnotes
1. The 10-year average for RPA (MQ-1/4/9) Class A mishaps (up to May 2010) was 8 aircraft lost per 100,000 flight hours. In 2002, seven years after the first Operational MQ-1 squadron stood up, the MQ-1's mishap rate remained at a staggering 39.62. As a function of flying hours, both MQ-1 and MQ-9 have a historical mishap rate that exceeds the F-16, with the MQ-1's lifetime mishap rate at roughly 1.4 times that of the F-16. However, given the long endurance of the RPAs versus the F-16, the loss rate per sortie is much higher than any manned aircraft in the inventory. Source: "Human Factors in Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)", 10 May 2010, HQ AFSC/SEHI.
2. The Army's MQ-1C has a different engine which will run on heavy (diesel/jet-A/JP-8) fuel.
3. The lack of SA evident in RPA operations conducted over intercontinental distances is poorly understood but is nevertheless a glaring disadvantage for RPAs compared with manned aircraft. See the transcripts released by USAF and published under "Anatomy of an Afghan War Tragedy", http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/10/world/la-fg-afghanistan-drone-20110410.
4. ...but one with a mishap rate lower than the MQ-1 or F-16 at comparable points in fleet total flying time.
