On Christmas Eve 1979, the Soviet Union embarked upon an ill-fated gamble: Seizing upon growing unrest in Afghanistan, the Soviet 40^th Army swept through Kabul, removing Afghanistan's Prime Minister Hafizullah Amir and installing a puppet president, Babrak Kamal. 

The plan, of course, backfired.  Though the operation was only expected to last a few weeks, the Soviets soon found themselves mired by a vicious insurgency, funded by the United States and waged by foreign militants—including a young Osama bin Laden.  After nine years and 14,000 dead, the Soviet Union withdrew in disgrace and dissolved shortly thereafter, its economy in shambles.

As Daveed Gartenstein-Ross asserts in his new book, “Bin Laden’s Legacy:  Why We’re Still Losing the War on Terror”, this narrative is central to the mythos of al-Qaeda. And today, Osama bin Laden’s successors are pursuing the same strategy in their fight against the United States.

"Bin Laden's Legacy" reveals al-Qaeda’s grand strategy in full: for the late Osama bin Laden and his followers, America's economy is its center of gravity.  Thus, al Qaeda seeks to provoke the United States into overextending itself and ruthlessly driving it into debt, just as they believe to have done to the Soviet Union.  In doing so, al-Qaeda has deliberately sought to drive up the costs of war and attack economic targets.  

In fairness, Gartenstein-Ross, a counter-terrorism expert and doctoral candidate from the  Catholic University of America, rightly disputes the simplicity of al-Qaeda’s narrative.  The Soviet economy was wracked by far greater problems than the war in Afghanistan—most notably plummeting oil revenues, a dysfunctional agricultural sector, and a faltering credit rating.  (Not to mention, the role played by Osama bin Laden and his followers during the Soviet-Afghan War was relatively insignificant) Nevertheless, expenditures on the Soviet-Afghan War were significant, and almost certainly hastened the Soviet Union’s demise.

Through various short-sighted political, military and economic policies, asserts the author, the United States plays right into al-Qaeda’s hands.  In its response to 9/11 attacks, the United States has suffered self-inflicted wounds through partisan politics and gross financial indiscipline. 

During the 2002 election, Republican strategists, such as senior Bush advisor Karl Rove, advised candidates to take advantage of the party’s commanding lead on terrorism-related issues, and, in Rove’s words, “focus on the war”.  By repeatedly playing the terrorism card, Gartenstein-Ross asserts, the United States was more easily seduced into war with Iraq, especially after US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld boasted he had “bulletproof” evidence of collaboration between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. 

Of course, the link would prove erroneous, and the Iraq War actually served as a boon to al-Qaeda’s recruiting efforts (though their affiliate, al-Qaeda in Iraq, was eventually dealt a heavy blow during the “Awakening” movement).  Nevertheless, the damage was done:  the Iraq War bled the United States Treasury of trillions of dollars, and hamstrung America’s efforts in Afghanistan. 

America’s bull-headed approach to fighting terror was further exacerbated by government inefficiency, lax oversight and pork-barrel politics, as America’s national security establishment ballooned in size.  A two-year investigation by the Washington Post revealed that 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private contractors were involved in national security, and that over 800,000 Americans held top-secret clearances: more than the entire population of Washington, DC.  Moreover, in the rush to bolster airport security, egregious waste all but inevitable: the cost of hiring additional airport screeners had exceeded initial estimates by a factor of eight.  And of course, pork-barrel politics resulted in millions of dollars being doled out for reasons completely unrelated to combating al-Qaeda.  In one instance, the Kentucky Office of Charitable Gambling received $36,200 to stop al-Qaeda from raising money for their nefarious schemes in Kentucky’s bingo halls.  (A 2007 Congressional report quotes an official stating that “he did not know of terrorists [raising money via bingo], ‘but the potential there, to me, is huge’”.)

In letter from bin Laden to Mullah Mohammed Omar, written a few days before the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom, the al-Qaeda leader felt that the impending military conflict would “impose great long-term economic burdens, leading to further economic collapse, which will force America, God willing, to resort to the former Soviet Union’s only option:  withdrawal from Afghanistan, disintegration, and contraction”.  Bin Laden continued that the upcoming war should “serve a blow to the American economy”, causing investors to “refrain from investing in America or participating in American companies, thus accelerating the fall of the American economy”. 

Of course, America’s economic woes are by no means solely attributable to al-Qaeda—atrocious fiscal policies have contributed far more to the massive Federal deficit amd a shattered credit rating.  Yet, al-Qaeda’s capacity for economic disruption is real.  Gartenstein-Ross quotes former CIA officer Bruce Riedel, who estimated that the total damage from the 9/11 attacks—aimed at the World Trade Center, one of America’s greatest commercial targets—cost the US nearly $2 trillion in property damage and financial disruption.

In recent years, many of al-Qaeda’s plots have been aimed at oil targets, essentially, America’s strategic Achilles heel.   As the largest consumer—and importer—of crude oil, it is no exaggeration to say that the American economy would grind to a halt without constant access to petroleum.  Thus, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other al-Qaeda leaders have long advocated attacking oil fields, refineries and pipelines in order to bring the American economy to its knees.  Indeed, by mid-2008, US forces recorded over 450 attacks on oil targets throughout Iraq, and several foreign security forces have uncovered numerous plots to attack oil fields and refineries throughout the Middle East. 

Gartenstein-Ross’ evaluation of al-Qaeda’s strategy, means, and intentions is without equal, as is his analysis of America’s missteps during the War on Terror.  Unfortunately, his final chapter, “How to Survive al-Qaeda”, flies in the face of intractable forces in America's political landscape. 

In fairness, many of his recommendations for American political leaders are sound, and certainly feasible.  Gartenstein-Ross rightly cautions against ill-conceived military adventurism in Libya, champions reforming America’s national security apparatus, and advocates employing behavioral detection officers at airports, rather than ever-more expensive technological screening devices. 

Yet, Gartenstein-Ross falls short of mark on two recommendations.  First, he warns that America must reduce its dependency on foreign oil.  Though a laudable—not to mention, strategically sound—goal, it's nevertheless been a policy objective for every single American president since Richard Nixon.  Second, and perhaps even more whimsical, is Gartenstein-Ross’ exhortation to empower political moderates and ease partisan tensions in America—tensions which, according to the author, obscure real debate, and preclude the difficult choices America must make in solving its economic woes.  Yet, if the recent budget crisis has proven anything, it’s that this goal is still a long way off.  (Even Standard and Poor’s agrees)

Wars require sacrifice on the part of the American people.  If we are to defeat al Qaeda's strategy, we will only do so by making difficult, indeed unpopular, fiscal decisions in the years to come.

Cover price for Daveed Gartenstein-Ross’ “Bin Laden’s Legacy: Why We’re Still Losing the War on Terror” is $25.95 USD, and is available from Amazon.com. 

“One of the most common characteristics of the small wars of the United States is that forces “dribble in” to the countries in which they intervene.”

USMC Small Wars Manual 1940

“No plan ever survives first contact with the enemy.”

Murphy’s Law on Warfare
Helmuth Von Moltke (the Elder)

The plan to upgrade the Small Wars Journal website evolved over the last couple of years. As with all good deliberate planning efforts, once we crossed the line of departure we made contact with the “enemy” we have had to adjust accordingly. The seamless transition envisioned in theory has become, in practice, like the Small Wars Manual quote above. We have found ourselves “dribbling in.”

We apologize for the ups and downs of SWJ of late. We are working to track, correct, and solve the myriad technical problems. We appreciate the helpful bug reports that have helped us shake out some issues faster than we could have on our own. As we have seen in recent years, transitions are easy to discuss and plan for, but complex when it comes to the actual execution.

We understand any impatience, but thanks for your patience and continued support. We will achieve victory in this endeavor, even if we have to just declare it. We will continue to provide a forum for thought provoking articles, engaged discussions on current topics of national importance, and an enhanced website that expands our engagement across the new forms of digital communications.

With Western military might brought to bear against Qaddafi’s forces in Libya, a conflict that seemed destined to end in rebel defeat has largely been equalized. And while the United States moved this past week to formally recognize the Transitional National Council as the “as the legitimate governing authority”[1] in Libya, further possible U.S./NATO support for the rebels loyal to the Council through the provision of arms remains contested amongst American politicians. The U.S. experience in arming the Mujahedeen against Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s, specifically, remains widely referenced to caution against such move.

Congressman Kucinich remarked that “[w]e’ve been in this situation in Afghanistan. One day we help people and the next day they shoot at us. If we are not cautious about military intervention, the blowback is sure to happen in Libya.”[2] On the same topic, Representative Nadler advised that we “[l]ook at what we did in Afghanistan. We armed anti-Soviet forces, and we got the Taliban.”[3] Chairman Rogers of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence made similar allusions, writing, “[w]e don't have to look very far back in history to find examples of the unintended consequences of passing out advanced weapons to a group of fighters we didn't know as well as we should have.”[4]

But should U.S. experience in arming the Mujahedeen serve to inform the situation in Libya that continues to confront policymakers? A lesson from research in cognitive and social psychology suggests that it may not. Frequent reference to U.S. support for the Mujahedeen may be less an outcome of careful historical analysis and more the result of basic intuitive judgmental processes that serve to simplify analysis of complex subject matter but risk introducing biases into the resulting conclusions. Specifically, the representativeness and availability heuristics may well be affecting debate.

Psychologists use the term representativeness to describe bias that occurs when the probability or frequency of some event is judged based on similarities with some other familiar event that does not reflect the actual probability of the event under consideration.[5] An experiment conducted by Harvard professor Max Bazerman demonstrates such tendency. Participants to the study, having been provided with a description of a fictitious MBA graduate from a top-tier university by the name of Mark who is “very interested in the arts and at one time considered a career as a musician,” assigned, on average, a greater likelihood to Mark gaining employment “in the management of the arts” than “with a management consulting firm,” apparently because the former seems to relate more closely to Mark than the latter.[6] Yet, it is simply less probable that Mark or any other similar individual would gain employment in arts management than in management consultancy given the availability of jobs in each field. That is, respondents tended to take little or no account of relevant base rates when assessing the likelihood of Mark gaining employment in within the given occupations and instead allowed their judgments to be swayed by individuating information. Considered differently, there are simply more arts enthusiasts with MBAs in management consultancy than there are in arts management.

And this propensity appears to have influenced many of our politicians’ manner of thinking about the Libya conflict. In various ways, the situation in Libya mirrors that of Afghanistan roughly thirty years ago. As in Afghanistan, the United States has interests in but is not a primary party to the conflict, and under-armed and generally ill-trained Muslim insurgents supported by the United States seek to combat a better equipped government military force. Such similarities can tempt us into thinking that Afghanistan’s course in history foretells Libya’s destiny were its rebels also armed.

Yet, U.S. support for insurgent Muslim fighters is not restricted to the Soviet Afghan War. While issues of categorization and government classification of covert operations make pinpointing the precise number of instances in which the United States has supported such movements difficult, since the end of the Second World War, the United States has supported at least a dozen. These actions have included arming Iraqi Sunni Kurds struggling against Saddam Hussein’s regime and, later, Sunni Muslims who formed the country’s Awakening Councils, permitting Iranian arms shipments to Bosnian Muslims in the mid-1990s, and supplying the Northern Alliance with munitions. Without judging the appropriateness of these and similar policies, none resulted in the creation of Taliban-like rule under which jihadists trained freely and plotted attacks against U.S. interests. Viewed according to simple statistics, history simply does not support the notion that extremist organizations tend to be borne out of cases of U.S. support to insurgent Muslim fighters.

But why do politicians appear to think specifically and consistently of the Soviet Afghan conflict when the United States has involved itself in other similar environments, including those referenced above? Here, the availability heuristic proves informative. The availability heuristic refers to the tendency to judge the probability or frequency of an event according to the ease with which a related event springs to mind. While such tendency is at times useful for assessing probability, it can also be affected by factors unrelated to probability, leading, in such circumstances, to predictable biases. Differential media coverage, for instance, which has the effect of making certain types of deaths easier to recall than others, has been shown in studies to cause people to tend to believe mistakenly that homicides occur more frequently than suicides.

Such tendency also appears to account for American politicians’ repeated references to the Soviet Afghan War. Politicians have good reason to think specifically of the U.S. experience in Afghanistan when considering the possibility of arming Libya’s rebels: the terrorist attacks of September 11th focused attention on Afghanistan and the United States’ history there. Recognition that members of Al-Qaeda were amongst the recipients of arms provided during the United States’ covert campaign to drive Soviet forces from Afghanistan does not settle well. The United States’ ongoing struggle in Afghanistan (not to mention the release of the major-motion picture “Charlie Wilson's War” in 2007 and Osama Bin Laden’s recent assassination) serves to ensure that such experience remains vivid.

Yet, when the Libya conflict is considered more carefully, the likelihood of such outcome appears far less certain. Unlike in Afghanistan where Mujahedeen comprised a variety of foreign radical Muslims had travelled to Afghanistan for the specific opportunity to wage Jihad against the Soviet forces, Libya’s rebels consist almost entirely of Libyan nationals with backgrounds in a variety of vocational fields. Their demands for freedom from tyranny and the Libyan Interim National Council’s expressed commitment “to building a free and democratic society and ensuring that supremacy of international humanitarian law and human rights declarations”[7] stand in stark contrast to the Salafist fatwas issued to inspire and direct the Mujahedeen during the Soviet Afghan War. Nor is clear that, in the wake of the September 11^th attacks, the United States, Libya’s neighbors, and other concerned states would allow the conditions to emerge under which Libya might go the way of Afghanistan.

The combined effect of both biases appears to exaggerate the probability that a Salafist model of post-Qaddafi rule emerges in Libya should the United States or NATO arm the rebels. None of this is to suggest that a policy of arming Libya’s rebels is a sound one. Instead, I hope that in highlighting the way in which intuitive cognitive tendencies can lead to biased thinking on the matter, this article serves to reframe debate in a manner that best serves U.S. interests.

The views expressed in this piece are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University or any other U.S. Government entity.

Afghanistan

Former CIA Director: Afghanistan Needs US Troops - AP

NATO Airstrike Kills Insurgents Who Caused Helicopter Crash - AFPS

Airstrike Kills Insurgents Who Shot Down US Helicopter - S&S

Taliban Militants Who Shot Down US Helicopter Killed in Airstrike - VOA

US Says Strike Killed Taliban Who Downed Copter - NYT

US Forces Kill Taliban Who Downed Helicopter - WP

US Kills Taliban who Downed SEALs' Helicopter - LAT

US Says Taliban Who Shot at US Helicopter Dead - BBC

Officials Plan to Release Chinook Casualties’ Names - AFPS

ISAF: Five Service Members Killed in Afghanistan - VOA

Bombs Kill 6 NATO Soldiers in Afghanistan - LAT

Five NATO Troops Killed by Roadside Bomb - BBC

Karzai Annuls Afghan Court Reviewing 2010 Polls - NYT

ISAF Operations Roundup - AFPS

Pakistan

Female Bombers Hit Pakistan Police at Blast Site  - AP

Pakistan Twin Blasts Kill Seven - BBC

Woman Bomber, Roadside Bomb Kill Seven in NW - Reuters

Iraq

US Must Not Let Hezbollah Killer Escape Justice - WP editorial

Syria

UN Security Council Hears ‘Chilling’ Briefing on Syrian Crisis - VOA

12 Killed in Syria; International Community Denounces Violence  - VOA

Support for Assad Government Shows Signs of Weakening - NYT

US to Call for Assad’s Departure - WP

US Hits Syria with New Sanctions - BBC

British Official: Syrian Offensive ‘Brutal, Unwarranted - VOA

Chilling Video of Tanks in Hama - NYT

Syrian Troops Storm Town Near Turkish Border - AP

Syria's Crackdown Hits Ally Hezbollah's Image - AP

Stopping Syria’s Slaughter Starts with Obama - WP editorial

Middle East / North Africa

In Israel Protests, a Surprise Arab-inspired Taste - AP

Israel to OK 4,300 New Flats in East Jerusalem - AP

Lebanese Bomb Blast 'Kills Two' - BBC

Bomb Explodes North of Beirut; 1 Killed - AP

Syria's Crackdown Hits Ally Hezbollah's Image - AP

Saleh to Look at Restarting Yemeni Peace Plan - Reuters

Yemen General Wants Talks but Ready to 'Break Necks' - Reuters

Libya Denies Gadhafi's Son Dead - VOA

US Pro-democracy Effort Rubs Many in Egypt Wrong Way - LAT

US Troubled by Rising anti-Americanism in Egypt - AP

US Department of Defense

US Soldier Gets Life for Slaying Sergeants in Iraq - AP

'Ouija Board' Being Phased Out on Navy Carriers - S&S

United States

Markets Erase Gains, Dow Loses 519 Points - VOA

US Lawmakers Announce Budget Committee Choices - VOA

Financial Turmoil Evokes Comparison to 2008 Crisis - NYT

Peter King Queries Bin Laden Film White House Access - BBC

United Kingdom

PM Declares 'Fightback' Against Rioters, Approves Water Cannons - VOA

Cameron to Spell Out UK Riot Plans - BBC

Britain Turns to Reckoning With Rioters - NYT

Cameron: ‘We Will Not Put Up With This’ - WP

London Police Raiding Houses Over UK Riots - AP

British Police Out in Force as Violence Subsides - AP

British Riots Test PM Cameron's Mettle - Reuters

Britain's Rioters: Young, Poor and Disillusioned - AP

Militants Urge British Rioters to Topple System - AP

Ahmadinejad Urges UN to React on Britain Riot - AP

UK Tells Iran Happy to Talk Human Rights - Reuters

Africa

Aid Officials: Not the Time to Cut U.S. Food Aid - Reuters

US Relies on Contractors in Somalia Conflict - NYT

UN: More Somalis Seeking Refuge from Famine in Kenya - VOA

UN: Somalia Militants Weakened, Could Regroup - Reuters

Civil War Legacy Part of Liberia's Presidential Campaign - VOA

Uganda Police Fire Rubber Bullets at Protesters - AP

Gbagbo Son Charged in Ivory Coast - BBC

Americas

Colombia Arrests Key Mexico Cartel 'Money Launderer' - BBC

Police Cells Fill as Venezuela Halts Prison Intake - AP

Asia Pacific

China Test-drives First Aircraft Carrier - WP

China Begins Sea Trials of Its First Aircraft Carrier - NYT

China's First Aircraft Carrier Begins Sea Trials - AP

Chinese Media Minimizes Military Value of Aircraft Carrier - VOA

Taiwan Hails Missile as 'Aircraft Carrier Killer' - AP

China Releases Dissident Blogger, With Conditions - NYT

New Shelling Reported in Disputed Korean Waters -VOA

Koreas Exchange Fire in Yellow Sea - WP

South Korea Returns Fire After Shots From North - NYT

North Korea Disputes South's Artillery Claim - AP

Philippines Acts on MILF Infighting - BBC

Indonesia Nets Bali Bombs Suspect - BBC

Bali Bombing Suspect Extradited to Indonesia - AP

France Blasts Vietnam for Jailing Citizen for Blog - AP

Burma Govt Appoints Team to Spread Information - AP

Europe

European Markets Rally Day After Major Drop - WP

South Asia

India's Parliament Stalls as Major Issues Await - AP

Spin Machine by Major William B. Taylor, Armed Forces Journal. BLUF:

“The coalition is desperate to demonstrate success in any form in order to generate momentum for continued political and economic support for the war. After 10 years of war and little to show for it, the military wants to prove that it can still “win.” Unfortunately, because the military is the junior partner to the civilian leadership in civil-military relations, it has little choice but to approach missions with a can-do attitude and to spin events positively. The alternative of pessimism would be unthinkable.”

Update: Also see Ghost in the Spin Machine by Carl Prine at Line of Departure. BLUF:

... Taylor’s “Spin Machine” wasn’t published in Joint Forces Quarterly or any of the military’s periodicals.  Instead, it appeared in Gannett’s Armed Forces Journal and so far seems to have barely elicited a chirp across the blogosphere.

That’s a shame, because Taylor’s often eloquent argument is equal parts Paul Yingling (another AFJ alum ) , Gian Gentile (ibid ) , H.R. McMaster and Gregory Daddis , part of a crucial and continuing tradition of sharp criticism directed at the highest levels of the Army bureaucracy by its junior intellectuals...

From the ISAF Website:  

ISAF Joint Command - Afghanistan

2011-08-S-025 
For Immediate Release

KABUL, Afghanistan (Aug. 10, 2011) – Coalition forces killed the Taliban insurgents involved with the recent downing of the CH-47 helicopter, with a precision airstrike in Chak district, Wardak province, yesterday.

The strike killed Taliban leader Mullah Mohibullah and the insurgent who fired the shot associated with the Aug. 6 downing of the CH-47 helicopter, which resulted in the deaths of 38 Afghan and coalition service members.

Mullah Mohibullah was a key facilitator in an insurgent attack cell led by Din Mohammad, a Taliban leader killed in a previous Special Operations mission. As a leader in Mohammad’s network in Tangi valley, Mohibullah had as many as 12 Taliban fighters under his command, including potential suicide bombers.

On the night of the crash, the inbound CH-47 carried Special Operations Forces intended to pursue insurgents from Mohammad’s network that were fleeing an engagement in which six militants had already been killed. While it has not been determined if enemy fire was the sole reason for the helicopter crash, it did take fire from several insurgent locations on its approach.

After an exhaustive manhunt, Special Operations forces located Mullah Mohibullah and the shooter after receiving multiple intelligence leads and tips from local citizens. The two men were attempting to flee the country in order to avoid capture.

The security force located and followed the insurgents to a wooded area in Chak district. After ensuring no civilians were in the area, the force called for the airstrike which resulted in the deaths of the Mullah Mohibullah, the shooter, and several of their Taliban associates.

The security force assesses no civilians were harmed during the strike.

Military professionals maintain many common misconceptions about Information Operations (IO), but perhaps the most frustrating for IO Officers is the idea that IO is a non-kinetic discipline.  As a professional tanker who found himself the 1^st Marine Division IO Officer in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, I was particularly disconcerted by the pervasive belief that my purview did not entail killing the enemy or destroying his assets.  By the second or third Operational Planning Team in which, mid-planning, the team leader would turn to me and ask for the “non-kinetic” perspective, I had vowed to change that perception among my colleagues.  What follows are the two Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) that I found to be the most effective argument for use of the Physical Destruction(PD) IO Supporting Capability to achieve effects in the Information Environment.

Synchronization of PD and Key Leader Engagements (KLE):  “To increase local national support for ISAF and GIRoA” is no doubt a near universal objective for military forces operating in Afghanistan.   Radio-in-a-box broadcasts, handbills, engagement and the use of Civil Military Operations (CMO) are all common tools the IO Officer is called upon to coordinate and synchronize in order to influence local nationals (and fence sitting key leaders in particular) toward this end.   However, the marked effect that can be achieved when these tools are combined with the well timed and targeted application of force is often overlooked in this synthesis.

Often undecided or uncommitted key leaders remain so because of illicit ties to the insurgency, the narcotics trade, or a combination of both.  Such individuals have the money and influence to be either positive or negative actors within the Area of Operations (AO), but choose instead to be neither - a choice that military commanders seeking timely results cannot afford.   Three specific components are necessary to move a targeted individual away from indecision and toward the desired endstate: motivation to support GIRoA, motivation not to support the insurgency (as the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive), and a sense of urgency to make the decision.   Information Operations are normally very good at the former, but typically don’t play a particularly active role in planning operations that accomplish the latter two goals.  IO Officers should be aware, and commanders and planners briefed, on the ability of PD to achieve these objectives in the Information Environment.  Once intelligence has identified the network within which a fence-sitting individual operates, the IO Officer should be ready with specific processes and recommendations for the Targeting Process, Key Leader Engagement Cell, CMO, FOPs and COPs:

1.  KLE Strategy:  The tone of engagement should highlight the benefits or “carrot” of cooperation with ISAF forces, while making thinly veiled references to the “stick.”   We always found Afghans to be skilled orators, negotiators and bargainers who are fully capable of understanding their position based on unstated implications, but whose pride and the necessity to save face with constituents never allowed them to respond to direct threats.  A key consideration while using this technique is the necessity that leaders ensure their interpreter is sufficiently skilled and adequately briefed to accurately convey tone, not merely meaning.  Following this initial engagement, both the carrot and the stick will be reinforced with other carefully synchronized operations.

2.  Civil Military Operations:  A primary benefit of Civil Military Operations is the influence commanders can achieve with targeted projects.  Once engagement begins with the targeted key leader and projects have been agreed upon, they should begin at once, demonstrating that ISAF has the ability to immediately act upon stated agreements.

3.  Physical Destruction:  Engagement, CMO projects, and exploitation of subsequent successes using IO capabilities are SOP for most commands, but the IO officer’s involvement seldom goes further.  However, taking the next step and synergizing these operations with kinetic efforts is essential to achieving timely results.   A particular engagement should be carefully timed so that it is closely followed by SOF or conventional forces conducting a strike targeting the key leader’s known associate, his bed down location or weapon cache.  This is the stick that proves ISAF is as fully and imminently capable of meting out repercussions for non-compliance as it is rewarding cooperation.  Like the CMO project, the successful strike should be exploited via patrol and PSYOP talking points as well as radio broadcasts.  Another meeting with the key leader should closely follow the strike. Talking points within the subsequent engagement don’t necessarily have to mention the strike: the targeted key leader will assuredly be aware of the operation and understand its implications.  This engagement strategy can be repeated if necessary, but typically need not be.  The circumstances that identified this engagement sequence as a successful and replicable TTP occurred after I was in country just a short while:

A Bn Commander had spent weeks engaging a small network of powerful local elders with known Taliban and narcotic ties, and was moving - albeit very slowly - to an agreement in which the elders would agree to eradicate their poppy fields and “influence” local fighters to cease attacks and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) emplacements in exchange for CMO projects and other assurances.  Talks had been stalling when, in a completely unrelated operation in a neighboring AO, SOF coordinated a successful Hellfire strike on a truck containing 5-6 known insurgents.  It was soon determined that one of the passengers in the truck had been an elder from the group with which the  Bn Commander had been working.  Initial impressions were that his death would seriously degrade relations with the elders and possibly even end negotiations.  The Bn commander, his IO officer, PSYOP Officer, and other planners came up with a solution that was so successful that it would become a TTP: he was matter of fact and unapologetic.  In the next meeting, when the subject of the elder’s death was raised, the Bn commander simply stated that the vehicle had been full of insurgents and narcotics traffickers, and the strike is simply what happens to individuals who engage in illicit activities.  No threats, just cold and to the point as only a Marine LtCol can be.  The point was well taken, and an agreement was reached shortly thereafter.

As the Pashtun proverb goes: “A Pashtun is not at peace unless he is at war.”  Afghans, and Pashtuns particularly, have historically been warriors; they respect strength and force. The elders may have prolonged peace talks indefinitely; making money from the drug trade and keeping upper level Taliban placated with complicit (at least) support of the insurgency, all the while pursuing any benefit they could from ISAF and GIROA’s efforts to influence them with projects.  It took the threat of violence, the show of force, the “stick,” to truly move negotiations forward.  This successful outcome was a benefit in itself, but the big gain was the revelation of a TTP that is seldom considered within the realm of Information Operations.  Instead of the aforementioned conditions resulting from an accidental strike on a key leader’s illicit associate, why not carefully coordinate the strike with engagement and CMO projects for maximum impact? This is what we did, it worked over and over again, and it should be a part of every IO Officer’s toolkit.

Removal of Negative Influencers from the Battlespace:  Beneficial CMO projects, ongoing relationship building and engagement, and even increased general security are all severely limited in their ability to influence local nationals if there is a threat, even a mere perceived threat, of violent repercussion (often labeled Murder and Intimidation [M&I]) from enemy forces.   For many Afghans life is a daily, violent struggle for existence.  In this context it is very easy to see why even the very substantial benefits of working with ISAF pale in comparison with the very real possibility that one may have his head removed later that night. Taliban M&I practitioners consistently and successfully leverage this fear with both real and fabricated incidents of M&I, significantly degrading the ability of ISAF forces to accomplish objectives in the Information Environment.   

In Southern Afghanistan, where personal interaction is still the primary means of communication, the enemy found that the most effective TTP was for insurgents to make retaliatory threats on a face to face basis - or at the very least with a night letter signed by an individual that the targeted local national knows.  Although this TTP was very successful in creating an intimidating mystique around the particular insurgent, it also created an interesting side effect: local nationals didn’t fear a vague threat of violence or concept of retaliation; instead, they had a face for their fears – the person they directly associated with M&I threats.  Consequently, commanders, CMO/IO officers and others whose mission required establishing relationships with local nations and Key Leaders often found that these relationships would undergo a dramatic positive transformation following the removal of individuals directly associated with M&I - even in the absence of overall security gains in the area.  In other words, it wasn’t general security gains that made local nationals feel safe; it was the removal of the specific individual they feared the most.  Targeted removal of these individuals should be an ongoing objective for IO officers, and something IO officers are constantly advocating for during their participation in the Targeting Cycle.

Intel officers, targeteers and planners are accustomed to identifying networks of narcotic traffickers, weapons traffickers and IED builders or facilitators.   In addition to these familiar targets and networks, however, IO Officers and their intelligence support cell will also find that the insurgency’s structure contains a network of fighters whose focus is on influencing the Information Environment.   M&I activities can include everything from beheadings and detention at torture facilities to a known insurgent foot soldier standing menacingly in the back of a local shura (village council), and in Helmand the entire spectrum regularly appeared in operational and intelligence reporting.  Careful analysis of this reporting over the long term revealed that, much like an IED network, these activities were planned and conducted by the same individuals – almost like an IO/PSYOP cell.  Identification and exploitation of these M&I networks should be a stated goal of IO officers and their targeting cell.  Of course efforts to deliberately target every individual performing M&I would not only be an overwhelming task, but would also prove to be an ineffectual game of “whack a mole” as new foot soldiers are endlessly recruited or imported.  Instead, an M&I network can be targeted using the same nodal methodology used to dismantle an IED network. 

Targeting the leadership and planning nodes of an M&I network has a two fold benefit.  Primarily, the removal of leadership causes the network to fall apart as planning, coordination, and accountability are disrupted.  We often saw a significant reduction in M&I (and corresponding increase in positive atmospherics) for weeks or even months after the removal of a planner as the network struggled to reconstitute itself.  The second effect is harder to measure than simply counting and comparing the number of M&I incidents before and after a strike, but will often prove to be no less impactful.  This is the emotional effect on local nationals and key leaders created by ridding them of an oppressive presence in their community – an effect that is compounded by the prestige of the upper level insurgent.  The careful and deliberate self vilification that originally made the insurgent so effective as an M&I personality also make his removal a particularly powerful influence tool for ISAF forces – the enemy is undone by his own tactic, and our exploitation of this tactic using PD.

Conclusion:  Presented here are only two examples of the targeted application of force to achieve effects in the Information Environment, and is by no means an exhaustive discussion of the subject, or even of the PD TTPs that became SOP for 1^st Marine Division.  Instead it is intended as a foundation for professional creativity and discourse among IO professionals and the staffs that they support.  PD is an IO supporting capability for a reason.  While planning engagements, targeting efforts, or simple daily patrols, commanders and IO professionals should never lose cognizance of Physical Destruction’s influence potential.  Marines and Soldiers are warriors: our mission is to seek out and destroy the enemy by all means possible, a fact that should never be forgotten – even while planning Information Operations.

Afghanistan

Panetta Urges Continuing Mission to Emphasize Resolve - AFPS

With Sadness, Dignity, Obama Honors the Fallen – AP

Same Ritual, a Changed President - WP

Army General to Lead Chinook Crash Investigation – AFPS

SEALs Killed on Copter Lived in Secrecy - LAT

ISAF Operations Roundup – AFPS

The Taliban are Here. Does it Matter? – FP opinion

Pakistan

Suspected U.S. Drone Strike Kills 20 in Pakistan -VOA

US Drone Strike Kills 20 Militants in NW Pakistan - AP

Iraq

Oil-rich Basra Worries About Neighbors – WP

Syria

Bloodshed Backfiring on Govt at Home, Abroad - WP

Assad Target of War Crimes Investigation – LAT

Turkish Minister and Other Envoys Press Syrian Leader – NYT

Turkey Warns Assad 'Patience Running Out' - TT

Turkey, Syria Discuss Steps to End Violence - AP

US Calls for Increased Economic Pressure, Sanctions on Syria - VOA

International Pressure on Syria Grows - AP

US to Tell Assad that He Must Go - AP

Assad Defiant on Syria Crackdown - BBC

Libya

Rifts Exposed in Libya's Rebel Ranks - VOA

Libyan Rebels Try to Impose Control – AP

EU Sanctions Target Two More Libyan Entities – Reuters

Libya Rebels to Hand Over Govt Secrets - TT

Libya Says NATO Raid Kills Dozens - BBC

Middle East / North Africa

In Tumult, New Hope for Palestinian Cause – NYT

Lebanon, Israel Not Seeking Conflict Over Sea Border - Reuters

Al Jazeera Changes Plan to Rerun Documentary – NYT

Saleh Vows Return to Yemen, US Urges Stay Away - Reuters

Al-Qaida Leader: US Hijacking Egypt's Revolution – AP

Latest Developments in Arab World's Unrest - AP

US Department of Defense

Counterterrorism on a Budget - WP

McRaven: US Special Ops Forces Unmatched in World - AFPS

Olson: Demand Will Increase for Special Ops Forces - AFPS

Mach 20 Missile Ready for Ultimate Test - DR

AWOL Soldier Indicted in Fort Hood Bomb Plot - AP

United States

Stocks Rally as Fed Pledges Low Rates - WP

Combat Veterans Help World Trade Center Rise Again – USAT

3 Arrested in Fake Bomb Found at Phoenix Airport - AP

United Kingdom

Cameron Deploys 10,000 More Officers to Riots – NYT

Anarchy Spreads Across England on 4th Night of Riots - TT

As London Cleans Up from Riots, Residents Fume  - LAT

Trouble Erupts in English Cities - BBC

Police Calm London, but Riots Flare Across UK – AP

UK Police Vow to Get Tough as Tactics Questioned - Reuters

British Cities Clear Up After Looting, London Quiet - Reuters

Social Media Used to Spread Britain's Riots – AP

Baseball Bats, Police Batons Online Sales Boom in UK - Reuters

London Riots ‘Did Not Come from Nowhere’ – WP

Riots Put Spotlight on Troubled, Unemployed Youths - NYT

What’s Behind Britain’s Riots – WP editorial

World

Red Cross: Rise in Violence Against Medics in Warzones - BBC

Africa

World Food Program Accelerates Horn of Africa Aid - VOA

Somali Gov't Offers Amnesty to Insurgents in Mogadishu - VOA

Somalia Offers Amnesty to Militants - WP

More Somali Peacekeepers 'Needed' – BBC

Kenya Burdened by Famine Refugees; Rape Attacks Up - AP

Charges Against Ugandan Opposition Leader Are Dropped - NYT

Americas

Mexico-Bound Immigrants Face Scrutiny at Border - NYT

Mexican Court Blocks Extradition of Alleged Narco - AP

Mexico: Anti-Technology Group Sent College Bomb - AP

Venezuela Jail Officials Charged - BBC

Brazil Deputy Minister Arrested - BBC

Brazil Police Arrest 33 at Tourism Ministry - AP

Chile Students Clash in Santiago – BBC

Major Protests Erupt Against Chile's Pinera - Reuters

Asia Pacific

China's First Aircraft Carrier 'Starts Sea Trial' - BBC

China Launches Sea Trials of its First Carrier - AP

N. Korea Assassination Plot Targets South’s Defense Minister – VOA

N. Korea Plot to Kill S. Korea Defense Minister – AFP

US and N. Korea May Discuss Recovering American Remains - NYT

Filipino Muslim Rebels Clash over Land; 6 Killed - AP

Vietnamese Dissident on Trial for Subversion – VOA

Asian Stocks Up as US Holds Rates - BBC

Europe

Moscow To NATO: Do Not Extend Missile Shield  - DN

Germany at Center of Storm as Stock Markets Dive - AP

South Asia

War Tribunal Starts Work in Bangladesh – BBC

Unusual Summer of Political Calm in Kashmir - NYT

Police Carry out Kashmir Army and Police Arrests – BBC

India's Parliament Stalls Over Corruption Scandals - AP

Three Die in India Land Protest - BBC

Lesson of Afghanistan Crash Is Not to Rush for Exit by Mark Moyar, Bloomberg. BLUF:

“The destruction of a single helicopter tells us nothing about who is winning the war. The larger history of the Tangi Valley, on the other hand, provides valuable insights into the challenges we now face in Afghanistan. Far from demonstrating the advisability of rapid retrenchment, it shows that withdrawing troops from counterinsurgency missions means forfeiting earlier gains…”

There is a popular narrative regarding Somalia that no successful humanitarian operation can be conducted there. Like all narratives, this one exists to tell a complex story in simple terms; as with most narratives, the Somali version holds a mixture of fact combined with myth.  The reality is that in 1993, the worst famine in Somali history was ended by a muscular humanitarian relief operation that ended the crisis in four months. Subsequent events overshadowed the success; but the truth be told - hundreds of thousands of lives were saved.

Narratives can be useful, but they become dangerous when serious journalists buy into the mythic portions and their stories become part of the debate. This is the case in a Washington Post article on 20 July of this year that stated - “In 1992, hundreds of thousands of Somalis starved to death, prompting a U.S.-led peacekeeping force to intervene. Within months, the force was engaged in an intense operation to uproot Somali warlords. It eventually withdrew after 18 American soldiers were killed in a battle the following year, an incident portrayed in the book and movie “Black Hawk Down.”

The statement is simply wrong, and this kind of sloppy reporting only muddies the debate.

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE lasted from 9 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. The U.N. sanctioned, U.S. led operation succeeded through a deft combination of negotiations and intimidation, to protect the delivery of millions of tons of food and other relief supplies. By April the famine crisis was over, and the U.S. turned over operations in Somalia to the United Nations.

Black Hawk Down, formally known as the Battle of the Black Sea Market, occurred nearly four months later on 3 October, 1993. It was the climax of OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE, the U.N. mission to restore governance to Somalia. It did indeed fail, and American led forces evacuated the U.N. Staff and Peacekeeping force in early 1995.

Today, the problem is similar. The Somali famine if the early nineties was bad, but there were adequate relief supplies available among the U.N. and private aid organizations. The disaster was caused by the actions of Somali clan militias that were hijacking the supplies and using them for their own gain.

The Americans succeeded in RESTORE HOPE through a combination of skilled negotiations and overwhelming, if very precise, firepower. Its success was not rocket science. I was involved in the planning for RESTORE HOPE and involved in the fighting in CONTINUE HOPE that led to the Blackhawk Down disaster. I can assure the reader that they were two very different operations.

In RESTORE HOPE, the U.S.-led coalition sent a simple message to the clan leaders using public diplomacy and skilled negotiations led by Ambassador Robert Oakley, an old Africa hand much respected by the Somalis. The ground rules were clear. Anyone impeding the relief effort by armed force was going to die. The clans agreed to this. When rouge elements within any given clan violated the rules, they got evaporated. However, in the Somali cultural tradition, once the shooting stopped, Oakley and his Marine Corps counterparts would sit down with the clan leaders involved, and explains why it happened and what could be done to prevent a recurrence. The mission was simple; “stop the dying and set conditions so it won’t start again after we leave”.

Unfortunately, the CONTINUE HOPE follow-on mission was more open-ended. It started out to be a peacekeeping mission, but a theory evolved that only the re-imposition of a stable central government could prevent future humanitarian disasters. The sentiment, while noble, was poorly thought out. The U.N. lacked the resources and the will for such a long term undertaking. To make matters worse, the U.N. planners failed to include the powerful Somali clans as part of the process and ignored the cultural nuances associated with conducting operations in Somalia.

The Somali narrative that grew out of CONTINUE HOPE is wrong, but it persists and it has done much damage. It paralyzed the Clinton administration from taking strong actions to prevent the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia. The situation in Somalia today is similar to that of 1992. Today, the al Qaeda franchise al Shabab has replaced the clans as the source of the crisis as their fighters are blocking aid eforts. We don’t need an American led force to protect the aid. An African Union led force backed up by attack helicopters and fighter bombers from any neighboring Gulf State could ensure aid shipments, but blind adherence to the narrative is not helping the debate.

Gary Anderson, a retired Marine infantry colonel,  is an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Relations, and has contributed chapters to two academic studies of the Somalia interventions.