| Small Wars Journal

The US Army War College is pleased to announce the latest edition of Parameters (Spring 2011 Vol. 41 No. 1) is now available online. Here’s the lineup:

Lead Article

Twenty Years After the Cold War: A Strategic Survey by Nader Elhefnawy

The Evolution of Strategy

The Regularity of Irregular Warfare by W. Alexander Vacca and Mark Davidson

Assumptions and Grand Strategy by Ben Lombardi

Asymmetric Strategies as Strategies of the Strong by Michael Breen and Joshua A. Geltzer

Just Add Women and Stir? By Sahana Dharmapuri

A New Focus in Professional Military Education

A Critical But Missing Piece: Educating Our Professional Military on the History of Islam by Adam Oler

The General Stanley McChrystal Affair: A Case Study in Civil-Military Relations by Marybeth P. Ulrich

Tackling Threat Finance: A Labor for Hercules or Sisyphus? By Kevin D. Stringer

Commentary & Reply

On "Time for a Strategic and Intellectual Pause in Afghanistan" by Paul Jones II - Raymond A. Millen replies

Military Justice is Alive and Well by Ari Ezra Waldman - William J. Gregor replies

Editor's Shelf

Review Essays

Terrorism by Robert Bateman

The Piracy "Threat" in Perspective by John Patch

Book Reviews

Off the Press

From the Archives

Read more about Parameters Spring 2011 Now Online

LWJ: Bill Ardolino Reports From Afghanistan

US Troops Weather Rockets, Recoilless Rifles, and Grenades in Sabari by Bill Ardolino, Long War Journal. BLUF:

“Before the day was over, six members of a joint US-Afghan patrol sent to investigate the attack would be injured, three seriously enough to be medevaced to a hospital. They were all Americans. The soldiers of an Afghan army unit accompanying them on the search would emerge unscathed.”

Read more about LWJ: Bill Ardolino Reports From Afghanistan

20 August SWJ Roundup

Afghanistan

Taliban Storm UK Facility in Kabul - WP

Deadly Raid on UK Kabul Compound - BBC

Militants Kill 8 in Raid on British Compound - LAT

2 Car Bombs Lead Off Taliban Siege of British Office - NYT

Nine Dead in Taliban Assault on British Council in Kabul - Reuters

Karzai, ISAF Condemn Attacks on British Compound - AFPS

UK Sorrow over NZ Soldier's Death - BBC

Afghanistan Bus Accident Kills 35 - BBC

Pakistan

Pakistani Media Group Wields Clout - WP

Suicide Bomber Targets Mosque in Northwestern Pakistan - VOA

Dozens Dead After Bomb Explodes in Pakistan Mosque - NYT

Suicide Bomber Kills at Least 40 at NW Mosque - LAT

Dozens Die in Khyber Mosque Blast - BBC

Iraq

US, Iraq to Discuss Extending Troops - WP

Panetta Sees Progress on Keeping Some US Troops in Iraq - Reuters

Panetta: Iraq Agrees to Negotiate Extended US Presence - S&S

Panetta: Iraqis Want Some US Troops to Stay - WP

Turkey Strikes Kurd Rebels in Iraq for Third Night - Reuters

Syria

19 Killed As Syrian Forces Fire on Protesters - VOA

Syria Said to Fire on Protest in Defiance of Global Rebuke - NYT

New Syrian Protests 'Turn Deadly' - BBC

20 Killed in Syria Despite Assad's Pledge to UN - AP

Syrian Forces Kill 34 Despite Assad Pledge - Reuters

Red Cross Hopes for Detainee Access in Weeks - AP

EU Expands Syria Sanctions, Moves Toward Oil Embargo - Reuters

Britain Downplays Likelihood of Ban on Syrian Oil - AP

Libya

Qaddafi’s Hold in Tripoli in Doubt as Rebels Advance - NYT

Rebels Plan for Post-Gaddafi Era - WP

Pressure Mounts to End War Soon - LAT

Rebels Claim Key Cities in Libya - BBC

Libyan Rebels Say They Control Zlitan - VOA

Battle Rages in Cities Outside Besieged Tripoli - Reuters

Rebels Say Gadhafi's ex-No. 2 Defected - AP

Israel / Palestinians

Deadly Violence Flares in Israel - WP

Israel Reports String of Rocket Attacks from Gaza - VOA

Egypt Decries Israeli Attack that Killed 3 Soldiers - LAT

Egypt Recalls Ambassador to Israel Over Shootings - NYT

Egypt Withdraws Envoy in Israel - BBC

Egypt Recalls its Ambassador from Israel - AP

Israel-Gaza Attacks Stoke Tension With Cairo - Reuters

The Mideast Blame Game - WP opinion

Middle East / North Africa

Analysis: Peril and Promise in Twin Syria, Libya Crises - Reuters

Latest Developments in Mideast Unrest - AP

US Department of Defense

Pentagon May Expand Cyber-Security Program - WP

Pentagon Officials Work With OMB on Budget Guidance - AFPS

Panetta: Any Retirement Changes Won’t Affect Serving Military - AFPS

Vets Groups Blast Military Retirement Proposal - S&S

Unmanned Everything on Sale Now at DC Floor Show - S&S

Army: No Known Case of Body Armor Failing - AP

For Marines at PI, a Woman in Charge - WP

Cut Spending on Soldiers? - WP opinion

The Wrong Way to Help Veterans - NYT opinion

United States

Terrorism Report Arrives with a Whimper - WP

United Kingdom

Lockerbie Bomber Release Defended - BBC

UK Police: Rioters Shot at Unarmed Officers - AP

Africa

UNICEF: 300,000 Kids Risk Death in East Africa - AP

Rwanda Genocide Trials Leave a Mixed Legacy - LAT

Turkey PM in Historic Somali Visit - BBC

Sudan to Allow UN Mission to South Kordofan - AP

Gunmen Shoot Dead Nigerian Police - BBC

Zimbabwe Gives Foreign Firms 14-Day Ultimatum - Reuters

Americas

Colombia Negotiator Flees Threats - BBC

Venezuela Rejects US Criticism in Terrorism Report - AP

Asia Pacific

Chinese Leaders Upbeat About US Economic Strength - VOA

Biden Assures China on Investments - WP

N. Korea to Address POW Remains - WP

N. Korea’s Kim Jong-il Begins Russian Trip - BBC

N. Korean Leader in Russia, Will Meet With Medvedev - AP

US Flood Relief for North Korea Broadens - VOA

Japan PM Drops Plan to Visit US for Summit Talks - AP

Indonesia Reduces Sentence for US Sanctioned Terrorist - VOA

Suu Kyi Meets Burmese President - BBC

Europe

Banks are Dimming Europe’s Outlook - WP

Tymoshenko Trial is Test of Democracy in Ukraine - VOA

Germany's Merkel Urges Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue - AP

Norway Extends Isolation of Confessed Killer - AP

Leading Russia Forward - WP opinion

South Asia

Anna Hazare Inspires an Awakening in India - WP

Newly Free, an Activist Urges India to Action - NYT

Read more about 20 August SWJ Roundup

This Week at War: Talking Time in Libya

In my column at Foreign Policy, I discuss how endgame bargaining between Qaddafi and Libya's rebels will likely proceed. I also review Counterstrike, a new book from New York Times reporters Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker.

Time for bargaining in Libya

Libya's rebels seem to finally be closing in on Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi. According to the New York Times, rebels in the west, which used to be the more reliably pro-Qaddafi region of the country, have moved into two towns just west and south of Tripoli. Should the rebels complete the capture of Zawiyah along the road to Tunisia and Gheran to the south, Qaddafi's final redoubt in the capital would be cut off. In a scene harkening back to Stalingrad in early 1943, Qaddafi exhorted his remaining followers to resist from the far end of a scratchy and barely audible landline, exclaiming that "[t]he blood of martyrs is fuel for the battlefield."

If Qaddafi's future now looks bleak, it should be no surprise to find him now open to a negotiated end to the war. Indeed, Reuters reported that a U.N. envoy had arrived in Tunisia and was meeting with Libyan government and rebel representatives at an island resort. But both Qaddafi and the rebels denied that they were bargaining. In spite of the denials, the bargaining for Libya may be imminent.

How Wars End, by Dan Reiter, a political science professor at Emory University, provides a useful guide for what we should expect from Libya's endgame. According to Reiter, how a war ends is a function of bargaining: the arrival of additional information -- usually from the battlefield -- that changes each sides' bargaining calculations, and each sides' calculations about the enforceability of a possible settlement. In the case of Libya, shifting battlefield fortunes, combined with uncertainty over Qaddafi's postwar status, have so far made negotiations unworkable and have thus prolonged the war.

Reiter points out that if combatants knew in advance how a war would turn out or if they agreed in advance on the relative military balance, actual fighting would be unnecessary: the two sides could simply skip to the surrender ceremony. But war involves large servings of uncertainty, chance, and miscalculation, which decision-makers on all sides gamble will work in their favor. Libya's war has been especially confusing in all of these dimensions. From the start, there has been deep uncertainty over the loyalty of Qaddafi's followers, the ability of the rebels to organize military units, the utility of NATO's air campaign, and the capacity of all sides to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. With such uncertainty, and with battlefield outcomes swinging back and forth, it is no surprise the conflict has lasted as long as it has without any serious attempts at bargaining. Both sides have felt good reason to believe that their persistence would eventually pay off.

With the war now trending their way, the rebels have an incentive to increase their demands on Qaddafi. Conversely, Qaddafi, if he believes he is losing, has an incentive to cut his demands and make a deal, a plea the rebels likely feel they can ignore for now. If the rebels now believe that their winning streak will accelerate, Reiter would predict that they will further ramp up their settlement demands, a result that would prolong the fighting. If, on the other hand, the rebels had some nagging doubts about another reversal in their battlefield fortunes, perhaps caused by a breakdown within their tribal alliance, they might have an incentive to cut a quick deal with Qaddafi.

Reiter's model of war termination also includes the uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of a peace deal. Qaddafi may think it is rational to fight to the end if he didn't trust that an agreement that included amnesty for him would be honored. Likewise, the rebels may so fear Qaddafi's possible return from exile that they prefer continuing the war until he is dead, rather than settle for his exile.

The rebel capture of Zawiyah and Gheran may have finally provided the information both sides have needed to calculate their odds of success. With that information now in hand, serious bargaining over a settlement may now be possible. But only an end that sees the annihilation of Qaddafi and his followers will be reliably self-enforcing, a grisly outcome that can be avoided. There is now an opportunity for outside institutions and leaders to provide some guarantees that could assure both sides that an agreement involving Qaddafi's removal from power and exile will be enforced. The alternative is a lot more unnecessary killing.

Counterstrike hopes we can deter al Qaeda. Maybe, but the war will still go on

Last week, the Washington Post reported that the U.S. Army had returned to the Pech Valley in Afghanistan's Konar province. In February, after having lost over 100 soldiers there, U.S. commanders pulled all of their troops out of the valley, having declaring it and other hostile terrain such as the Korengal Valley in eastern Afghanistan, no longer strategically significant. Commanders had hoped that the Afghan army detachments they left behind would be able to make a new start with the locals. They also hoped that the U.S. troops redeployed from the valley would be able to perform more productive security tasks elsewhere in the country. But with Taliban cells apparently resprouting, U.S. soldiers have found themselves back in some of Afghanistan's most dangerous places.

It was the need to "mow the lawn" in Wardak province that led to the tragic shootdown on Aug. 6 of a helicopter carrying 30 Navy SEALs and other Americans, plus eight Afghan soldiers. U.S. special operations troops conduct a dozen such raids every night in Afghanistan. U.S. special operators similarly accompany Iraqi counterparts on raids in that country. On any given night, U.S. drones are busy striking targets in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. But nearly a decade after the attacks that started these wars, policymakers in Washington are wondering whether the permanent "endstate" of the War on Terror isn't an end at all, but just an endless future of raids and missile strikes at targets that could pop up anywhere in the world.

Counterstrike, a new book by New York Times reporters Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, reviews the past decade of counterterrorism improvisation by the U.S. government and attempts to forecast where the war against terrorists will go. Schmitt and Shanker discuss the hope of many that deterrence, the theory of retaliation that successfully prevented catastrophe during the Cold War, offers a chance of eventually returning the United States to something closer to peace as opposed to unending low-level war.

The authors review the game plan the U.S. government has fitfully created since 2001. Counterstrike allocates chapters to how the government improved cooperation among its many intelligence agencies (including at dusty forward operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan), the attempts to counter al Qaeda's message and brand in the Islamic world, the growing threat of cyberterrorism, and how policymakers have dealt with an obstreperous Pakistan. Perhaps most unnerving is the book's discussion of homegrown radicalization, which threatens to circumvent the noteworthy improvements in border security that have likely prevented another mass-casualty attack in the United States. Counterstrike takes readers into the discussions inside government that led to the multi-faceted strategy now employed against al Qaeda and its affiliates.

But Schmitt and Shanker return frequently to deterrence and the hope that it could someday save the United States from a future of endless war. Deterrence advocates acknowledge that, unlike the Soviet leadership during the Cold War, the religious fanatics that constitute al Qaeda's top leadership are likely undeterrable. So are the low-level suicide bombers at the far end of al Qaeda's chain of command. In addition, al Qaeda holds no territory or assets that U.S. planners can put at risk in exchange for compliant behavior.

However, the argument goes, there is a broad range of al Qaeda middlemen, donors, bankers, buyers, shippers, and couriers -- usually middle-class family men waging jihad on a part-time basis -- who very likely do have something to live for and are thus deterrable. Without the middlemen, al Qaeda can't function. Deterrence advocates imply that the public takedown of some of these middlemen would serve as a warning to others and thus deter them from getting involved in al Qaeda's business.

Regrettably, this approach won't let the United States escape from the seemingly endless war just yet. Nuclear deterrence worked because Soviet leaders knew the United States had bombs and missiles that worked -- during the Cold War, the U.S. frequently and ostentatiously tested both. In order to intimidate al Qaeda's middlemen, the United States will have to occasionally, perhaps frequently, conduct the spectacular and lethal raids and missile strikes that will remind the middlemen what they risk.

Second, during the Cold War, U.S. planners knew where the Soviet targets were and the Soviets knew they had no way to stop the United States from striking them. Al Qaeda's middlemen, by contrast, hope to remain covert. In Counterstrike, Schmitt and Shanker discuss several amazing intelligence troves -- long Rolodexes of al Qaeda operatives -- that have been seized during U.S. raids, including the one on Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad.

It took raiding to get those Rolodexes of middlemen and it will take more raiding to get more like them in the future. And it will take even more raiding and more missile strikes to keep the middlemen deterred. It may be possible to deter terror networks, as Counterstrike suggests. But it also means the low-level war will have to go on.

Read more about This Week at War: Talking Time in Libya

Lessons for Libya: Law Enforcement from Day Zero

See if this sounds familiar. The West determines that a long detested regime has committed unacceptable acts that require intervention. Not wishing a full-scale engagement, the international community authorizes support for a local rebellion, which it facilitates through various military and clandestine means. The rebellion achieves popular status in the Western imagination largely through its opposition to the hated regime rather than an orientation towards particular ideals. Most will recognize, of course, that this describes the current situation in Libya. But few may remember that it is also precisely what occurred in Afghanistan following September 11, when a very small team of special operations forces enabled the Northern Alliance to retake the country from the Taliban. So how about the rest of the story?

During the early stages between the overthrow of the prior regime, and the full institutionalization of new, legitimate authorities, a “transition gap” arises. Nascent institutions are susceptible to capture by nefarious actors. Some local elites invest not in strengthening those institutions, but in padding their own coffers and flexing the muscle of their new empowerment. Others who might wish to stay honest find themselves without international support, and must make compromises with threatening actors who initiated the race to the bottom. The rights of local citizens are increasingly violated in the process, and the government fails to deliver the essential public services those citizens demand. Over time, the much-heralded transition loses legitimacy. Unfortunately, this darker postlude resembles the trajectory of Afghanistan following the overthrow of the Taliban; but Libya need not follow the same story line.

To avoid a similar outcome, the international community must use leverage points to ensure the creation and operation of honest law enforcement institutions that apply the law equally to all citizens, no matter how powerful they may be. By acting to build strong law enforcement early, the international community can fill the transition gap and avoid key pitfalls of Afghanistan.

First, the international community must recognize and utilize its leverage points. The Libyan Transitional National Council, which leads the rebellion and will be responsible for the transition to peace, is currently lobbying for the U.S. and other countries to transfer billions of frozen dollars that the Qaddafi regime holds abroad.

As I have argued in several articles regarding Afghanistan, there is a serious risk that injecting funds without proper oversight and controls can enrich illicit actors who utilize the funds to build their own criminal networks and prey upon their own citizens. The likelihood for such challenges is greatest where internal factions will be prone to violent competition once the rebellion no longer has Qaddafi as a common enemy. The recent assassination of the rebel’s top military commander, Gen. Abdul Fattah Younes, and the internal tribal rivalries that have surfaced as a result, are key warning signs that international officials must heed in facilitating financial support.

Second, the international community must also provide support to the Transitional Council to ensure the adequate establishment and operation of law enforcement institutions that can prevent, investigate, and punish crime. The focus should be on building a robust police force with adequate investigatory capacity, shielding competent prosecutors from political influence, and enshrining a similarly independent judiciary that fairly administers the law.

One primary issue to address will be the capacities and reliability of the local security services. Remembering the vacuum following the disbandment of the Iraqi National Army, the international community will have to work carefully with the Transitional National Council to determine the reliability of individuals, to deal properly with those individuals too closely tied to the Qaddafi regime to be trustworthy, and to reorient to the new administration those capable of serving loyally.

Moreover, the prosecutorial organs of the state must be able to conduct their jobs independent of executive influence. In Afghanistan, publicized examples indicate substantial interference by high level officials with a number of critical investigations. The international community should support an adequate level of prosecutorial independence in whatever structure the Transitional National Council develops for enforcement of Libyan laws.

Adequate pay and security must also be provided for law enforcement and judges. Though Afghanistan is racked with budget problems that an oil-rich Libya is unlikely to confront, an adequate and transparent pay structure must be established early on to avoid corruption in the future. In addition, security must be sufficient to ensure that powerful actors cannot threaten judges in a way that compromises judicial administration.

Finally, and perhaps most critical, no Libyan can be above the law. A special unit should be trained from the initial phases of stabilization to investigate and offer evidence for the prosecution of high level corruption of the sort that has crippled the Afghan government. The Transitional Council’s ability to bring Younes’s assassins to justice will be an excellent test-case for their seriousness in fairly administering justice. Responsibility must be attributed all the way up the chain, with adequate prosecution and punishment of culpable parties. The common perception in Afghanistan that the warlords who solidified their power during the transition gap enjoy absolute impunity from the law is perhaps the single greatest factor that undermines that government’s legitimacy and our own mission to stabilize the nation.

The Transitional National Council is on the verge of cutting off Qaddafi’s key supply lines, a strategic move that brings them substantially closer to victory. In order to support the most effective transition possible – and ensure the legitimacy of a future Libyan government – the international community and the Council must make plans now to prevent, investigate, and punish malfeasance when the dust finally settles. The Council has already shown an interest in doing so. The international community must now capitalize on that interest by properly planning for the transition.

This Op-Ed builds on the original extended article, Closing the Transition Gap: The Rule of Law Imperative in Stabilization Environments, Kauffman Foundation, August 2011.