| Small Wars Journal

This week, administration officials reacted to the sudden collapse of Muammar al-Qaddafi's rule in Libya with both caution and pride in both the international coalition they helped build and the belief that their method differed from that of their predecessor. Speaking to students at the Naval Postgraduate School, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta described the Libya coalition as "the kind of partnership and alliances that we need to have for the future." Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes declared the Obama administration's intervention in Libya a "contrast to situations when the foreign government is the occupier," referring to the Bush administration's Iraq strategy in 2003.

When Panetta and Rhodes argue for the utility of international alliances, the advantages of having indigenous forces leading internal regime change, and the benefits of burden-sharing, they will attract very few sparring partners. If this is what constitutes the "Libya Model," the model will draw few critics. But since the Libyan revolution is far from over, one would assume the model must also be far from complete. And whatever form it finally takes, it remains to be seen whether its features will transfer to similar crises elsewhere.

The administration asserts that the U.S. military will have no footprint at all inside Libya. But that pledge assumes either a benign ending to Libya's ongoing revolution or that -- should social breakdown in post-Qaddafi Libya occur -- a U.N. peacekeeping force without a U.S. troop component will be able to stabilize the country.

The challenge for Obama will be how he and his team respond should sustained violence, a humanitarian crisis, large refugee flows, or a hostile government begin to emerge in Libya. For example, it was Obama himself who agreed to triple the U.S. troop headcount in Afghanistan. He agreed to these increases because, in his view, a lighter footprint was failing to protect U.S. interests. It is reasonable to hope that the Libyan rebels, as Rhodes surmises, will be better than an occupying army at stabilizing post-Qaddafi Libya. What remains to be seen is whether the United States will avert its eyes if this proves not to be the case.

The administration seemed pleased that it arranged a supporting role for the United States in the Libyan intervention. They believe they can point to this role to show that burden-sharing among alliance members is no longer just a slogan. They were able to limit U.S. military participation to mainly supporting tasks, which put Europe's air forces on the front line. And in contrast to the Bush years, by keeping the United States away from the lead role, political opposition to the intervention was diffused.

Obama may wish to replicate this supporting role for the United States during future crises but it is hard to see where else in the world such conditions would reappear. Britain, France, Italy, and others in Europe perceived critical interests in the Libyan crisis and pushed for action, which the United States eventually supported. Through the NATO alliance, the United States had long military experience with these countries and could thus quickly establish a workable military operation. However, when significant crises occur, say, around the Persian Gulf or in the Asia-Pacific area and critical U.S. interests are at stake, the United States will be less likely to find allies with the same motivation, the same military capabilities, and with the same combat experience to fight alongside its forces. In these cases, the United States will find itself back in the lead, an arrangement its allies have long become used to and likely prefer.

In Libya, the greatest risks for NATO and the United States are just beginning. The Obama team has placed its bets on the rebels and on an alliance structure that has more equitably shared the burden. But the most difficult tests of the Obama team's Libyan Model still lie ahead.

Read more about This Week at War: Hold That Model

US Army's Reading List Published

The Army's Reading List: A Look Into the New Joint Chiefs Chairman by Nate Rawlings at Time Magazine’s Battleland Blog. BLUF:

"This week, Army Chief of Staff [when the list was compiled] General Martin Dempsey published his new professional reading list. At first glance, it doesn't seem like a big story, but it does offer a look into the thinking of the general who will be leading our armed forces in the coming years. Every service has their respective professional development programs, training outside of functional specialties designed to help an officer or non-commissioned officer progress in their career."

White Paper on COIN Instruction

“In my zone, as everywhere in Algeria, the order was to ‘pacify.’ But exactly how? The sad truth was that, in spite of all our past experience, we had no single, oﬃcial doctrine for counterinsurgency warfare.” – David Galula

The quote above is apropos in today’s Counterinsurgency battle in Afghanistan. When one considers the many agencies developing and teaching COIN to Afghan National Security Forces or collecting Lessons Learned on behalf of Coalition Forces, with the intent of impacting positive change via what the British would refer to as a “Lesson Identified”. However, if one looks into this with any sort of idea that there will be a single source of information or reference that can be used as the sole source of COIN “How to” in Afghanistan, he would be sadly disappointed and most likely confused. We do have doctrine, as do coalition partners, and as we do collectively in the Allied Joint Publication. In my opinion, the current doctrine spans the tactical level to the operational level in its spectrum of guidance, but sadly lacks in two areas. Those two areas are the Company or Coy and below, as well as the Brigade to the Governance Level (current gaps in doctrine). This is an issue that must be resolved before the end of this conflict and we are postured as an international force to conquer such a simple task. If we do not, we will find ourselves recreating things like the Afghan Local Police, Ministerial Advisors Course, AfPak Hands Course, Village Stability Operations, etc without a doctrinal framework to lean upon. The doctrine should be expanded and collated into a series of books that spans from “Ground to Governance” that captures COIN best practice in order to enable a more expeditious process to set the conditions for security, establish a security force (both police and army), build a government (local to national Governance Advisors), link that government to the people via addressing the grievances of the population (CERP, Money as a Weapon System) and therefore addressing the prerequisites of insurgency(Stability Operations, C-H-B Ops), while building viable and sustainable institutions (Stability through Civ/Mil partnership and programming, District Stability Framework, Governance Advisors). Finally, this would end in Transition that can be defined and codified in a common language, with agreed upon metrics of success.

David Galula is also referenced as the man who put mathematical quantification to the COIN spectrum of warfare when he described it as 80% political and 20% military. However, if we look at the Coalition Force Road to Deployment training continuums of any nation, we will find that we focus most of our efforts on tactical military tasks. Additionally, each of the Coalition nations seeks to collect information, related to those tactical military tasks, via the Lessons Learned process. This is done for the purposes of enhancing that training continuum with hopes to positively influence the fight in as short of a timeframe as can be managed. Currently in Afghanistan there are multiple agencies tasked with compiling and disseminating lessons learned with the hopes that these lessons will improve a process, change a mentality or behavior, or influence training. Many of these groups have their own agendas, mandates, or orders related to their Title 10 type contractual mandates, specific DoD, or service related directives. The COIN Advise and Assist Team works directly for COMISAF, Asymmetric Warfare Group, CALL, MCCLL, are only a few of the US agencies with the same or overlapping tasks or missions. Rarely do they collaborate as a single COIN mind, or share a common set of information requirements to collect upon that are in direct line with NATO mission success as defined by COMISAF.

Further complicating the this issue is the complex nature of the Coalition Force Operating Environment related to the bureaucracy that has been created with respect to Manning, Training, and Equipping the ANSF. This is important because it is directly affected by the COIN doctrine from Ground (the strategic Cpl partner) to Governance (the Ministerial Advisor) and the lack of reference either of these positions in doctrine. There are in country educational opportunities related to COIN dependent upon the mission set of an individual. The COIN Training Center-Afghanistan (CTC-A) has the mission to:

“… reduce insurgent influence through the delivery of regionally focused, timely and relevant “best practice” counterinsurgency training and education that fosters greater unity of effort among all stakeholders IOT facilitate the development of a secure and stable Afghanistan.”

Looking at the mission statement of this single agency, if one knows of the dozens of agencies producing, teaching, and collecting COIN related information, one would quickly find discrepancies. CTC-A cannot fulfill its mission without having full access to the information and full collaboration with all COIN related agencies in order to influence the gradual shifts in its instruction that are necessary to remain regionally focused, timely and relevant and mirror the movement towards transition with its curriculum. This is not an attempt to poke a finger at any single agency, but rather an attempt to highlight the common goals of each of the “COIN” agencies in Afghanistan and to point out that we all violate one of the most simplest of military principles, Unity of Effort. Each agency has its own mandate but it also has a moral obligation to collect, share and capture the information for the future warriors of each of our nations. The fact is that we have only implemented the new COIN Strategy in Afghanistan in 2009, according to General Petraeus. One of areas General Petraeus focused on was Partnering, “Shona ba Shona”, as he would say to mixed audiences (ANSF / CF) of Counterinsurgency Leaders Course students. Yet within the Coalition Force we have agencies that refuse to partner with one another of the common goals of capturing lessons to influence changes in the following: COMISAF Mission Essential Task List, NATO Mission Specific Training Guidance, Joint Doctrine, or individual nation’s doctrinal publications. Moreover there little willingness of some countries to even participate or apply lessons learned due to national caveats or lack of resources.

One possible solution to help solve some of the presented issues is a more direct chain of command and forced collaboration trough mandated agendas with common singularly focused Training Command. If all training institutions and lessons learned agencies were under the same command structure and were mandated to share information for a common goal, efficiencies could be found that would streamline a lesson learned and the time it would take to turn it into a lesson identified where it has an impact on the training continuum or operations in the field. An example of this would be a COIN Center of Excellence, consisting of the current CTC-A instructional staff and partnered with the COIN Advise and Assist Team (CAAT). This agency would house an operational side (CAAT) and a training side (CTC-A). Operationally, the CAAT would develop COIN operational performance and effectiveness metrics to enhance objective evaluation of COIN plans and activities. CTC-A would leverage that information immediately to affect a behavior change through curriculum development either via CLC and collaboration with CONUS COIN centers, or through regional teams that could be leveraged to immediately impact change at the point of impact. This could be accomplished via local ANSF COIN courses conducted by CTC-A Regional Teams (CAAT Partnered), AFPAK hands courses, Ministerial Advisors Courses, and Governance Courses all created and housed within one COIN Center of Excellence.

This type of unity of effort would enable this triumvirate of agencies to capture the most pertinent of COIN lessons in order to affect change in doctrine, promulgate relevant and timely lessons that have immediate impact, and act as an enabler for Commanders to leverage in their bid for mission success. Additionally, having a unity of command would allow this singular command to influence both the NATO training continuums as well as the US training continuums of multiple services by being the single resource for COIN related training, education, and lessons learned in theater. The end result would be a more effective and efficient Training Command that had the ability to immediately impact the conflict from tactical level tactics, techniques, and procedures to the strategic and political level lessons that that will influence Galula’s 80% of the COIN fight. If we do not put our political agendas aside and create real change in the current structure we will miss an opportunity and inevitably repeat or reinvent some of the same mechanisms that we have had to re-create from our counterinsurgent adventures in Iraq.

“If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must change the pear by eating it yourself. If you want to know the theory and methods of revolution, you must take part in revolution. All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience.” -Mao Zedong

The trick to success is to learn from our insurgent brothers, like Mao, and to capture all of the lessons and “how to’s” related to those lessons so that the direct experiences may be shared, have impact, and possibly save lives, money and resources in the next COIN fight.

The opinions and commentary in this article do not represent the command view of the Counterinsurgency Training Center-Afghanistan.

Teaching COIN to a (Mostly) Non-Practitioner Audience

The Project

This last spring, I developed and taught a graduate seminar on counter-insurgency for fourteen terminal Masters students at the Patterson School at the University of Kentucky. The course was intended to make my small group of students as familiar as possible with the foundations, practice, and implications of counter-insurgency theory. Most of my students were civilians, although three had served in Iraq and one remained active duty Army. The purpose of this article is to give professors and instructors at both the graduate and undergraduate level a sense of the promise and possibilities of a Counter-Insurgency course. Although this course was geared towards graduate students, many of the readings and units would be appropriate at an undergraduate seminar level, or even in a large undergraduate class. Undergraduates can also manage much of the reading, although in many cases smaller chunks (with less repetition) would be appropriate.

Why teach a graduate or undergraduate COIN class? For me, the answer is obvious; many of my graduate students will go on to work in government, and good counter-insurgency is demanding of all elements of the government. Some of my students have served in the military (some are still serving), and a greater familiarity with the classics of counter-insurgency can only help. On the narrow front, my hope was that they could take this familiarity would help them get jobs, and (more importantly) help them excel at the jobs they got. Knowledge of Roger Trinquier may seem abstract from the point of view of an entry-level position at a government agency, think tank, or NGO, but an understanding of the basics of counter-insurgency theory, while the United States remains engaged in at least two counter-insurgency wars, can only improve job prospects and professional effectiveness. Moreover, my hope was that the counter-insurgency course would prove attractive beyond the group of students pursuing national security majors. If we know anything about counter-insurgency, we know that it fails when there is insufficient cooperation between civilian and military agencies.

But a COIN class can also be worthwhile for undergraduates, and for graduate student uninterested in government careers. It’s worth asking whether the counter-insurgency project is right for the United States in a strategic sense. Understanding with some precision the foundations of counter-insurgency theory, as well as the demands of a well-structured counter-insurgency campaign, is important to thinking about whether and when the United States should undertake counter-insurgency campaigns. Again, some of these considerations may appear to be above the pay grade of entry level government employees. The point, however, is that both the execution of a counter-insurgency campaign and the evaluation of whether a counter-insurgency campaign is sensible are improved if the participants understand what they’re talking about.

The School

The Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce has been training graduate students for foreign policy careers since the 1950s. The program last eighteen months and requires 30 credit hours of coursework. Our students go on to careers in government, in the intelligence community, in think tanks, in NGOs, and in private industry. Roughly thirty-five students matriculate at Patterson each year, majoring in National Security and Intelligence, Diplomacy, Development, and International Commerce.

Unsurprisingly, students at Patterson are more policy-oriented than many graduate students, and better prepared that most undergraduates. A more academically inclined political science or history approach to counter-insurgency theory would use some of the same texts I describe below, but would attempt to frame such texts against an intellectual history background, and evaluate them on the basis of methodological rigor. An undergraduate course would leaven some of the more difficult theoretical readings with concrete, practical accounts that brought theory to life.

The Syllabus

The reading for this course was substantial, including thirteen books or manuals and a number of articles. Most students were also enrolled in my Defense Statecraft course, where FM 3-24 was required reading. As part of the Patterson Summer Reading List, all students were familiar with David Kilcullen’s Accidental Guerrilla. In addition, I expected the students to stay up to date on several counter-insurgency themed blogs, including Small Wars Journal, Danger Room,Threat Matrix, Abu Muqawama, and Democracy Arsenal.

In large part the extensive reading list reflected my preference for offering substantial amounts of material, while giving the students some leeway with respect to how much of it they read closely, and how much they simply familiarized themselves with. In an undergraduate course where ensuring student reading of the material becomes an issue, the reading list would necessarily have to be curtailed. Where possible, I also chose readings that were freely available on the internet, or that could be accessed electronically. Since much of the best work on counter-insurgency is recent, however, students were still expected to purchase several books.

The reading list included a broad survey of post-World War II literature on counter-insurgency theory and practice. We began with Roger Trinquier’s Modern Warfare and David Galula’s Counter-Insurgency Warfare for a grounding in the 20^th century counter-insurgency “classics”. For a theoretical foundation, we read John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife and David Ucko’s The New Counter-Insurgency Era. These books put us firmly in a frame for thinking about counter-insurgency from an organizational perspective, with focus on how organizations became adept (or failed to become adept) at counter-insurgency. Andrew Krepinevich’s The Army and Vietnam, James Russell’s Innovation, Transformation, and War, and Peter Mansoor’s Baghdad at Sunrise built upon this theme, while also providing a degree of subject matter knowledge on Vietnam and Iraq.

The course then shifted to alternative perspectives on insurgency and counter-insurgency, including Antonio Giustozzi’s study of the new Taliban, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, and Thanassis Cambanis’ A Privilege to Die, on post-2006 Hezbollah. We also read Gregory Feiffer’s The Great Gamble, which provided the opportunity to contrast Soviet counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan with American. The course concluded with units on counter-insurgency and airpower, counter-insurgency and journalism, and the future of counter-insurgency in the US military.

The course included some critical approaches to counter-insurgency theory (most notably from Colonel Gian Gentile), although it did not explicitly discuss many of the broad, external critiques of counter-insurgency that have developed over the past few years. My belief was that it was more important to develop a familiarity with COIN theory before applying available critiques. By following the blogs (a key source of information about contemporary developments in the counter-insurgency debate), students were able to get a sense of the controversy associated with COIN, and to become familiar with both internal military and external critiques of the COIN turn.

We also read two novels; Sadie Jones Small Wars, an account of the Cyprus conflict from the British perspective, and the Karl Marlantes opus Matterhorn. The former touched on issues of torture, detainee treatment, and civilian casualties, while the latter conveyed the experience of infantry combat in the Vietnam War. The inclusion of novels depends largely on taste and audience; a more academically inclined graduate audience may find them of limited use, while undergraduates will probably enjoy a break from the theory and history.

The Guests

We were fortunate enough to have the connections and resources to bring in five guest speakers, including Colonel James Crider, Colonel Peter Mansoor (retired), Mr. Will Marshall, an analyst at NASIC, and Spencer Ackerman of Wired magazine’s Danger Room blog. Also, Brigadier General H.R. McMaster was able to join the class by conference call. The guest list was heavily weighted towards practitioners and relatively sympathetic observers. In part this was accidental; Major General Charles Dunlap (retired) was invited, but couldn’t make it because of a scheduling conflict. I strongly considered trying to find a former insurgent of some stripe in the Lexington area, but wasn’t able to devote sufficient resources to finding and vetting any potential speakers in the time allotted for the course.

Circumstances differ, but many departments may lack the resources and good fortune to have access to as many excellent speakers. Nevertheless, I found the experience of having speakers invaluable, and I would encourage instructors to make an effort to contact local veterans associations or campus ROTC in order to find individuals with experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, or even Vietnam. I was also fortunate enough to be able to draw on the experience of veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan among my own students.

The Class

The course took place over fifteen weeks, including thirteen two and a half hour seminar section as well as the odd beer drinking sessions. Each class opened with a student presentation on the week’s reading, with topic restrictions interpreted liberally. On days where guest speakers were available, the presentation was on hold until the guest had spoken and gone through a question and answer session. In all cases, the student presentation was intended to set the terms for discussion of the topic of the day. As needed, I would interject with commentary about the material, or to steer the discussion back towards the topic at hand.

For graduate or senior undergraduate courses, the seminar approach should work well. It depends on a relatively low number of students, most of whom have the capability and interest to do most of the reading. In larger undergraduate courses the lecture format would be more appropriate, as summarizing the readings and placing them in context would become particularly appropriate. Because of the richness of the literature, however, counter-insurgency theory is especially well suited to a discussion/question and answer format.

The Film Series

I accompanied the course with a optional series of films about insurgency and counter-insurgency. Patterson normally runs spring and fall film series, usually four films each. This semester, the films included the COIN themed The Wind the Shakes the Barley, The Battle of Algiers, and both halves of Stephen Soderbergh’s Che. With the exception of Battle of Algiers, these films present counter-insurgency warfare primarily from the view of the insurgent, rather than the counter-insurgent. Few films involving insurgencies discuss COIN in sophisticated terms, although Battle of Algiers is again an exception. However, counter-insurgency depends on an understanding of the development and practice of insurgency, and especially on an appreciation of the relationship between the insurgent and the population. All of these films opened a window onto that relationship. Even Che, an overlong and terribly boring pair of films, was productive in that it forced a comparison between insurgent success in Cuba and failure in Bolivia.

I had the advantage of being able to screen films in a separate evening series, and thus didn’t need to use much class time. In a graduate or undergraduate course without such luxury, I would recommend keeping Battle of Algiers, which has become a counter-insurgency artifact in and of itself. In the era of Netflix, it has also become easy to assign films as homework, keeping valuable class time for discussion.

Major paper product

For evaluation, I asked the student to write three 6-8 page short research papers. I did not give a final exam, although in an undergraduate course a written final would have been appropriate. As would be expected of professionally oriented graduate students, the class produced some fantastic papers. These included Mao's Success or Chiang's Failure: Why the Nationalists Failed to Conduct a Successful Counterinsurgency in China, From Peacekeeping to Counterinsurgency in Africa, Birth of an Insurgency: The Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland and the Founding of the Provisional IRA, Alternative Roles for Airpower in Counterinsurgency, The Long War in Guatemala: How the US tried to Implement Regime Change on the Cheap and Lost Long Term Control, Regional Insurgency Susceptibility Analysis: Central Asia, and Boring But Necessary: Why Logistics May Determine the Success of COIN Operations.

As this list suggests, the students took advantage of wide latitude in formulating and writing their papers. Four papers in particular stood out. Patrick Davey wrote Moffing the Kick: Why the Galactic Empire Failed to Conduct Effective Counter-Insurgency Against the Rebellion, arguing that Imperial shortcomings in the Star Wars franchise were the result of a series of poor doctrinal choices. Rather than develop methods of fighting a series of low-level planetary insurgencies, the Empire remained wedded to outdated tactics of the Clone War era. A more appropriate subtitle might have run “Clones Don’t Do COIN.” Taking advantage of the recent “zombie turn” in foreign policy literature, Nick Paden drew parallels between counter-insurgency and counter-zombie doctrine, noting that improper doctrine towards the beginning of a conflict can lay the seeds of disaster later on. Tyler Scott’s India's Prolonged Struggle for Control of the Naxalites closely examined the roots of the Naxalite struggle, and critiqued the Indian Army for not facilitating the learning culture necessary for good COIN. Captain Andrew Betson (US Army) wrote The British Experience in Contemporary COIN, focusing on the aptitude of the modern British Army for organizational learning in counter-insurgency contexts. Captain Betson developed this paper into an article that will be published this summer in Armed Force Journal.

After Action Report

The course evaluations were generally positive, although some students believed that the topic merited less than a full semester long course. One student wrote that the major points of the course could have been made in a two week seminar. Most students, however, were enthusiastic about the course. I also received numerous requests to teach the course again in the future, although the nature of the Patterson program will probably preclude this for some time.

There is no doubt that this was a demanding course from an instructional point of view. Prior to the course I had not read many of the books I assigned, meaning that the workload fell heavily on myself as well as the students. In addition to the guest speakers, the students included three veterans of the Iraq War, and one former contractor who had worked in Afghanistan. Keeping up with my students, therefore, was also a demanding task.

Nevertheless, I believe that the course was professionally productive for me and educationally productive for the students. As long as modern COIN doctrine remains a vital theory in the US military, and as long as the United States remains committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, both graduates and undergraduates will benefit from a study of its precepts. With luck, teachers can use this article as a tool in developing their own counter-insurgency courses.

Book Review: Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State

Book Review: Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State

Edited by Maleeha Lodhi.

Published by Columbia University Press, New York. 328 pages, 2011.

Reviewed by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein

Maleeha Lodhi was Pakistan’s Ambassador from 1993 to 1996 and again from 1999 to 2002, she also served as Pakistan’s Ambassador to the Court of Saint James from 2003 to 2008. She has combined a career of public service to Pakistan and education of not only Pakistanis but Americans studying Pakistan and the region. Her latest book collects seventeen Pakistani intellectuals, economists, political thinkers, and military affairs experts to discuss the future of their country. The book is opportune, as relations between the United States and Pakistan remains tense after the killing of Usama Bin Laden in Abottabad, Pakistan. Ayeha Jalal, who teaches at Tufts University, opens with a chapter on how Pakistan’s past influences the present, she begins by quoting a Washington Times article that referred to Pakistan and Paranoidistan, she then unpackages the perceptions of distrust and merges them with history and context. She argues that Pakistanis cannot develop a historical consciousness without a credible history. Jalal also discusses the devaluing of history for ideological reasons.

Dr. Akbar Ahmed who teaches at American University in Washington D.C. wrote a thoughtful piece entitled, “Why Jinnah Matters,” it is time for more Americans to appreciate that there were two visions of Pakistan upon its founding in 1947, that Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder, a secular nation that accommodates diverse Islamic and non-Islamic beliefs by not holding any religion above the state and those like Abu al-Al’a Al-Mawdudi who envision a Pakistan that lives up to Islamic values, and attempts to impose an interpretation of Islamic values on other Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Ahmed distills Jinnah’s speeches and reminds readers of the course Pakistan may have taken if Jinnah had not died a year into Pakistan’s independence.

Amb. Lodhi, who edited the book, has a chapter that is highly critical of Pakistan’s civil service and the need for reform as it is currently incapable of delivering governance. She discusses how Pakistan’s different political parties represent dynastic families, such as the Pakistan’s People’s Party being the purview of the Bhutto dynasty, and Nawaz Sherief dominating the Muslim League. You have politics of feudalism and clientelist politics in which tribes expect rewards for political support, and religious leaders expect to be compensated for their backing. The book continues with chapters on the Pakistani Army by Shuja Nawaz and Saeed Shafqat, it is an army attempting to shift from conventional tactics to counter-insurgency, and the 2009 decision to confront the Talibinization of Pakistan as the country’s chief threat. Chapters explore nuclear policy, economic reform to include the absolute need for balanced tax policies, and the challenge of education spending as a percentage of Gross National Product. This is a thought provoking book for those interested in Pakistan specifically, and region generally. It is the voice of experienced Pakistanis and those of Pakistani origin who have thought deeply of the national policies of Pakistan.

Commander Aboul-Enein wishes to thank the Blackwell Library at Salisbury University for providing a quiet place to write this review.

An Opportunity in Somalia

It appears that al Shabaab, the al Qaeda affiliated militia that controlled large portions of Somalia, is withdrawing its fighters from the capital, Mogadishu, and that the Somali Army and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have succeeded in their months-long campaign to reclaim the capital. al Shabaab’s withdrawal, whether a strategic choice or an act of necessity, provides an opportunity for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), AMISOM, and the international community to reengage the Somali people, and in spite of significant odds, reverse the tide of chaos.

Sometimes described as an African Taliban, al Shabaab, “the youth” in Arabic, emerged from the ashes of the ruling Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2007 as a militia driven by Somali nationalism and Salafi ideology. They initially brought welcome security, but with it, a strict interpretation of Islam, and enforced severe adherence with harsh punishments. Its leaders declared support for al Qaeda, harbored and cooperated with its leadership, and accepted foreign fighters to execute jihad in the Horn of Africa. The group has adopted the insurgent and terrorist tactics of jihadists worldwide, including assassinations, suicide bombings, and improvised explosive devices. They are credited with the World Cup suicide bombing in neighboring Uganda, and may have trained Islamic fighters from neighboring Nigeria on suicide bombing techniques.[1] American citizens have appeared in al Shabaab’s ranks, including a sizable contingent of Somali-American youths from Minnesota, but the group has not yet directed attacks in the United States (US).

AMISOM fields 9,000 soldiers, with an additional 3,000 planned for deployment, and proposals for up to 20,000 troops in discussions.[2] The African Union (AU) should be commended and encouraged for AMISOM and its aggressive and dangerous work. The international community has called for humanitarian aid to combat the severe famine that imperils millions of Somalis, but the world should likewise support AMISOM and its mission. The US deployed its forces to Somalia in late 1992 to force the delivery of aid, and the humanitarian action crept to combat which ended with the well-publicized Battle of the Black Sea in Mogadishu in 1993 that left 18 Americans dead. In the fight’s aftermath, the US withdrew from Somalia, and within a few years, the rest of the world followed suit.

In 2006, the US supported and encouraged an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia to expel the ICU, but when Ethiopia withdrew its forces in 2009, American support shifted to the AU troops preventing another vacuum. The US has targeted al Shabaab and al Qaeda leaders with airstrikes, but has understandably resisted deploying ground forces to aid the TFG. Instead, the US has funded and trained AU and Somali Army forces in neighboring countries. The US should not be expected to deploy forces now, but it can continue, and should increase, its support to the AU and the Somali Army. The Somali people will likely not accept a long-term foreign presence, even from AU member states, so it is essential that the Somali Army and security forces are a priority. Just as the US has built and mentored the Iraqi Army and Afghan National Army, the AU can shepherd and support the Somali forces as they grow and mature. That said; this will be a long term mission and commitment.

AMISOM lacks the intelligence, logistics, and firepower assets that American, NATO, or international forces could provide at this time of need.[3] NATO forces are stretched by deployments to Afghanistan and Libya, and western economies suffer from debt and uncertainty, but the international community must prioritize its commitments and support Somalia. Another opportunity cannot be missed. The US intends to provide $105 million in aid for humanitarian assistance, and the international community should follow America’s lead and commit to recovery in Somalia. This aid will likely focus on foods, supplies, medicine, and the like, but world leaders should consider focusing a portion of these funds on Somali security and capability. Much like in the early 1990’s, aid delivery has already turned to violence, and there is no guarantee it will reach those in need without a fight.

Al Shabaab appears to be in retreat, but it is not defeated, and will likely continue its campaign against the TFG and AMISOM with assassinations, terrorism, and suicide attacks. It may even export the fight to the neighboring AU states to target their politicians and populace. Somalia has not had a functioning and permanent national government in decades, and the effects of chaos and war will not recede overnight. Recovery and rebuilding will take years, and will rely on unprecedented honesty, performance, and competence from the TFG and its politicians. al Shabaab revealed its true face when it denied humanitarian aid to its people, and while some of its members do care for Somalia, others focus on jihad.

AMISOM must seize this opportunity in Mogadishu and enable the nascent TFG and Somali Army to deliver aid to the Somali people. The battle is not over, but the TFG has a real opportunity to act and establish legitimacy. The world will support Somalia with humanitarian aid, but it should also support and expand AMISOM and TFG capability. Security has been a pipe dream in Somalia, but the future for millions of suffering Somalis demands the world try again.

[1] Fisher, Jonah. “Are Nigeria’s Boko Haram getting foreign backing?” BBC News. 21 June 2011. Web. 07 August 2011.

[2] Diarra, Boubacar Gaoussou. “We’re Winning in Somalia.” Foreign Policy. 26 July 2011. Web. 05 August 2011.

[3] Ibid.

Read more about An Opportunity in Somalia

26 August SWJ Roundup

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Libya

The Rise and Fall of Libyan Leader Gaddafi - WP

Kadafi Remains Elusive, Defiant as Fighting Continues - LAT

Underground, Gaddafis Were Ready - WP

Rebels Target Gaddafi’s Last Strongholds - WP

Documents Show Gaddafi Tried to Halt NATO - Reuters

UN Releases $1.5 Billion in Frozen Qaddafi Assets - NYT

US Says UN OKs Deal to Release Libyan Funds - AP

Libya Rebel Official Aims for Oil Export in 2-3 Months - Reuters

Anxieties Compete With Exuberance - NYT

Libyan Rebels Move Cabinet to Tripoli - VOA

Libya Rebels' Government Moving to Tripoli - AP

UN Calls for Restraint in Libya - BBC

Diplomats Meet in Turkey to Discuss Libya's Future - VOA

Libyan Opposition Wants to Quit Fighting, Start Building - VOA

Inside Libyan Hospital, Proof of a Revolt’s Costs - NYT

Amnesty: Both Sides in Libya Mistreating Prisoners - AP

Is the Bar too High for Libya? - WP opinion

Tripoli, the Morning After - NYT opinion

Moammar Kadafi's Inner 'I' - LAT opinion

Syria

Prominent Syrian Cartoonist Attacked, Beaten - VOA

Political Cartoonist Brutally Beaten - NYT

Famed Syrian Cartoonist 'Beaten' - BBC

Syrian Gunmen Break Artist's Hands as 'Warning' - AP

Syrian Forces Kill 8, Protesters Hail Libya - Reuters

Afghanistan

Calm in the Midst of Chaos: A Medevac Crew - S&S

DOD Employee Arrested for Bribery Linked to Contracts - AP

Eastern Afghanistan Improves, Commander Reports - AFPS

Karzai, Allen Condemn Paktia Province Attack - AFPS

Pakistan

Pakistan Police: Kidnapped American Not Freed - WP

Confusion Over 'Rescue' of US Man in Pakistan - BBC

Nine Dead in Pakistan Hotel Blast - BBC

Bomb in Tricycle Kills 11 in Bazaar - AP

Pakistan Says Suspected US Drone Down Near Border - AP

Iraq

Iraq: How Not to Overthrow a Dictator - AP

Bomb Attacks in Iraq Kill 15 People - WP

Attacks Across Iraq Kill 14, Wound Dozens - Reuters

Police Targeted in Iraq Violence - BBC

Israel / Palestinians

Israeli Airstrikes Kill 10 in Gaza - VOA

Israeli Strikes in Retaliation Kill 9 Gazans - NYT

5 Killed in Gaza as Rockets Hit Israel Despite Truce - BBC

Gaza Militants Call Another Truce With Israel - AP

El Salvador Recognizes Palestine as Independent State - Reuters

Middle East / North Africa

Airstrike Kills 8 Suspected Militants in Yemen - VOA

Three Rockets Hit Area Near Kuwait-Iraq Border - Reuters

Latest Developments in Arab World's Unrest - AP

Al Qaeda

Former bin Laden Hunter Bets on al-Qaeda’s Survival - WP

US Department of Defense

Hospital Consolidation Going Smoothly, Commander Says - AFPS

United States

New Mexico: Raid Shakes Town on Edge of Extinction - NYT

Cheney: 'No Regrets' about Waterboarding Suspects - AP

Eastern US Braces for Hurricane Irene - VOA

East Coast Battens Down for Arrival of Hurricane Irene - NYT

US Charges Oregon Man in Mosque Burning - VOA

CIA. Demands Cuts in Book About 9/11 and Terror Fight - NYT

National Security at What Cost? - WP opinion

Africa

African Leaders Hold Delayed Famine Fundraiser - VOA

Few African Leaders Show Up for Famine Summit - LAT

South Sudan Police Assault UN Human Rights Director - Reuters

Nigeria Corruption Body 'Failing' - BBC

Rwanda's Orphanage Free Plan Leaves Children Fearful - VOA

Challenge in the Congo - WP opinion

Americas

US Widens Role in Mexican Fight - NYT

Mexico Gunmen Torch Casino, Killing 40 - LAT

N. Mexico Casino Attack Leaves at Least 40 Dead - WP

Mexico Casino Attack Kills Dozens - BBC

Death Toll Rises to 53 in Attack on Mexico Casino - AP

Abducted Mexico Journalist Killed - BBC

Mexican Court Confirms Ex-Tijuana Mayor's Release - AP

Mexican State Nabs 2 for Tweeting Violence Rumors - AP

Landless Worker Leader Shot to Death in Brazil - AP

Chileans Brace for More Education Reform Strikes - VOA

Violence Mars 2nd Day of Chile's Nationwide Strike - AP

Asia Pacific

Chinese Vanish Cyberwar Video that Caused Stir - WP

China Denounces US Report, Defends Military Upgrade - Reuters

China Issues Protest Over US Report on Military - AP

Taiwan Court Overturns Former Leader's Conviction - AP

Japan's Prime Minister Steps Down - LAT

Japan's Prime Minister Kan Quits - BBC

Japan’s Prime Minister Announces Intention to Resign - NYT

6 Killed, 1 Wounded in Thailand's Violent South - AP

Burmese Wary of ‘Democracy,’ After Decades of Oppression - NYT

New Tibet Boss Does Not Mention Dalai Lama - AP

Europe

Does Europe Need a Joint Credit Card? - WP

In Britain, a Meeting on Limiting Social Media - NYT

A Not-Quite Nation Happy in Russia’s Embrace - NYT

Russia Grounds Rockets after Loss - BBC

Turkish FM to Visit Kosovo, Bosnia - VOA

South Asia

India's PM Urges Anti-Corruption Activist to End Fast - VOA

India Seeks Deal to End a Hunger Strike - NYT

In India, a New Offer to Protesters - WP

India to Hold anti-Graft Debate - BBC

'Militants Killed Kashmir Cleric'- BBC

Sri Lanka 'Scraps' Emergency Laws - BBC

Read more about 26 August SWJ Roundup

Daydreaming in Afghanistan

The recent attack on the British Council in Kabul by the Taliban shows that, apart from military tactics, there is an urgent requirement in the West to reconsider the political objectives in Afghanistan. Interestingly, “neutrality” has become the latest keyword resonating in Western discourse vis-à-vis the war torn country.[1] In her testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was quoted saying that the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) model of power realignment is most suitable for Afghanistan after the drawdown of coalition forces by 2014.[2] In fact, the Western powers have initiated a massive diplomatic surge to make this happen. It is fairly well known that a “neutral” Afghanistan is in the interest of not only the regional powers and the international community but also the people of Afghanistan. Despite its necessity, however, the prevailing geopolitics of South Asia and the domestic politics of Afghanistan make the Congress of Vienna model and a neutral Afghanistan too utopian a dream to be achieved anytime soon.

To start with, the Congress of Vienna model per se and the characteristics of a neutral country as explicated in the Hague Convention of 1907 are not feasible in the South Asian context, and particularly not in the case of Afghanistan. The Congress of Vienna came about after the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte, in which different European powers i.e. Austria, Russia, Prussia and the Great Britain, massively reshaped the borders of Europe to maintain peace and stability. The key characteristic of this Congress was the internal resolve among these powers to put an end to conflict using whatever mechanisms available, of course, after a lot of diplomatic trapeze. Plus, with the fall of France, they didn’t have to worry about a strong adversary opposing them in any significant way.

Now compare this with what exists on the ground in Afghanistan given the regional powers that are expected to sit across the table include India, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, China, and the US. Firstly, India and Pakistan are nowhere near to sorting their differences anytime soon. While Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently visited Afghanistan and announced a strategic partnership with Afghanistan, Pakistan has its own interests and insecurities to look after in the Pashtun hinterland on its western frontier, as it simultaneously attempts to gain “strategic depth” against India. Secondly, the Afghans have little trust in Pakistan as well as the US and its Western allies. This is not surprising given the history of tense relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the territorial dispute over the Durand Line among other issues. That the Afghans are generally wary of foreigners on their land is almost a cliché to mention. The unending attacks by NATO forces that have killed many civilians have emerged as a serious irritant in the already strained relationship between the government of Hamid Karzai and the coalition forces. Not surprisingly, President Karzai warned NATO that it risked being seen as an “occupying force” in Afghanistan if it continues with the lethal attacks that lead to excessive civilian casualties.

Adding on to these regional complexities is the opacity of China’s actions and intentions in the war torn country. While on one hand it is consolidating its economic presence in Afghanistan aggressively, it maintains an uncanny silence on the political front, and is more than happy to see the Americans bear the brunt of providing security. The US on the other hand seems to have its own agenda to maintain strategic presence in the region even after 2014 and is trying hard to build a strategic agreement with the Afghans. Adding on to the list of contentions is the standoff between Tehran and Washington as well as deteriorating relations between India and Iran. Tensions between Tehran and New Delhi got aggravated after the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), under US pressure, decided to call off the use of Asian Clearing Union (ACU) currency swap system to pay Iran for its crude. Given the geographic importance of Iran for India to access Afghanistan, this controversy is a major spoiler for India’s Afghan policy. All the powers involved in Afghanistan, thus, have conflicting interests and lack what was central to the Congress of Vienna model i.e. political will to solve the problem.

However, let’s be optimistic and say that these countries will show diplomatic maturity and agree upon turning Afghanistan into a “neutral” zone, on paper at least. They have already agreed to an Afghan-led reconciliation process, even if it was under pressure from the West. The question then is whether the domestic politics of Afghanistan allow such neutrality to sustain? As it is well known, the national reconciliation process and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are not in the best of their health. Some indicators of a weak security apparatus were the attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and the assassination of Ahmed Wali Karzai, younger brother of President Hamid Karzai, allegedly by the Taliban, on 12 July 2011 in his home in Kandahar. The younger Karzai's assassination was swiftly followed by the killing of Kandhahar's Mayor, Ghulam Haidar Hamidi. Moreover, there have been a series of attacks by these insurgents that go unnoticed in the wider spiral of violence.

There are currently 2,00,000 Afghan soldiers coupled with 1,50,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan. Despite such a heavy troop presence, according to a report released in June 2011 by the International Crisis Group titled “Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland,”[3] the insurgent groups have made tremendous strides in encircling Kabul and are running shadow governments in the region. The three main insurgent groups i.e. the Taliban, the Haqqani Network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami, have strong presence in provinces south of Kabul i.e. Logar, Wardak, Ghazni, as well as those in the north i.e. Parwan, Kapisa and Laghman. The Haqqani network has also displayed capacity to keep Kabul psychologically terrorised by its sporadic attacks on high-value targets in coordination with the Taliban and the Hizb-e-Islami. The stronghold of these groups is more intensive in southern provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz and Uruzgan. Also, according to reports, the number of NATO forces is inadequate to counter these insurgent groups in central-eastern regions, and civilian casualties resulting from US Special Operation’s night raids and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) air strikes have only contributed in stoking support for the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

Even the image of the Karzai government is not very healthy among Afghans. In addition to the rampant corruption in the financial sector of Afghanistan, which is primarily being used by the Afghan elite for personal benefits, the government has done little to strengthen its political base. The government’s campaign of harassment and intimidation of local Pashtun communities in wake of counter-terrorism, high levels of unemployment, and the breaking down of social structures like the tribal hierarchies (during Soviet invasion), which resulted in pushing youth into the insurgency, plays an important role in pushing people into the hands of Taliban. Moreover, the government has broken many promises of providing amnesty to people and return the land and property lost during the conflict. It has not even been able to solve water and land disputes that have been going on over generations, and push people into insurgency as it provides them with the power of the gun to solve family disputes. These issues get channelised into the larger national political spectrum and, in the border areas, even spill into the neighbouring countries such as Pakistan (in its Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces) or the central Asian republics. In essence, making it difficult for these countries to remain politically inactive even at the micro level.

In this situation, even if external forces agree not to make Afghanistan a battleground for their rivalries, they have strong interests in not having the Taliban in power once NATO forces leave. Given the current scenario, although the probability of a Taliban takeover of Kabul is remote, the possibility of insurgents consolidating their power base remains very high. Therefore, given these regional geopolitical constraints and domestic compulsions not only do the prospects of a neutral Afghanistan and the Congress of Vienna model remain bleak, it is too early to predict what shape the Afghan endgame might take.

[1] Dombey, Daniel & Green, Mathew (2011) “US aims to turn Afghanistan into neutral zone,” Financial Times, June 27

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/de0bcfc8-a0ff-11e0-adae-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1VZ0z4Cit

[2] http://www.victorianweb.org/history/forpol/vienna.html

[3] http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.aspx