This article attempts to explore why deep-seeded emotions cause individuals/groups to disregard the rational actor model that many use to describe the premise of modern Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy and thought. Specifically, understanding how the emotional aspect can help show why FM 3-24[1] and Galula's methodology are great in theory but flawed in execution. My hypothesis is, the U.S. government cannot buy lasting friendships, cannot pay individuals/groups enough money to stop committing acts of terrorism. Rather, it is time to focus less on "winning/controlling hearts and minds" and refocus our attention on understanding and attempting to coerce/influence the existing state, populace, and insurgent groups who seek violence as a means of expression. Rationale: We may be successful to a point in winning some hearts and minds, but still lose the war.

Statement of the Problem

Strategies and tactics are great. These are our ‘blueprints’ for specific courses of action. Supposedly, wars are guided by brilliant thinkers and lead by the brightest and best minds. Hours are spent in the classroom studying what works as well as what does not work. Theories are examined and ripped apart, put back together and a final product is built…PowerPoint’s are constructed with every detail explained. Font, color schemes, maps, and solutions are built into pre-mission briefings. Drills are repeatedly rehearsed so everyone on the mission knows and understands their role. Best case and worst case scenarios are also examined. Rules of engagement are iterated and reiterated. Behaviors and actions are choreographed for the purpose of ‘acting’ as opposed to simply ‘reacting’ during an attack.

The history of counterinsurgency (COIN) is studied and is well defined. The theory works on paper. The big question for this researcher is simply, “Why are we losing the war after we win the hearts and minds of the people?” General Peter J. Schoomaker[2] (2004, FM 3-24) remarked, “This is a game of wits and will. You’ve got to be learning and adapting constantly to survive.” Specifically, training foci seeks to understand the emotional aspect showing why FM 3-24 and Galula's methodology are great in theory. However, as great as theories are, execution is often flawed. This researcher often heard the comment, “Let’s go for a 70% solution.” When conducting a counterinsurgency, 70% solutions leave us with 30% unconvinced. Question, “What percentage of a population does it take to gain the advantage of an insurgent group?”

Consider FM 3-24, 1-159. “COIN is an extremely complex form of warfare. At its core, COIN is a struggle for the population’s support. The protection, welfare, and support of the people are vital to success. Gaining and maintaining that support is a formidable challenge.”  

Background

The word tactic is defined as a device for accomplishing an end. The word strategy is defined as ‘the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war. As a social scientist, I witnessed one key leader engagement (KLE) after another during my time in Iraq. Pleasantries were exchanged and needs were openly discussed. On many occasions our Soldiers were attacked by insurgents in route to these meetings. I listened as offers of support were made by our commanders and funding was agreed upon. All appeared well and friendships were strengthened. Hearts and minds were won, one village elder at a time.

However, as projects were completed and ribbon cutting ceremonies concluded, the indirect fire would begin to spike again. So, more money for projects would be pumped into a province or community. More KLE’s followed. I surmised, local nationals had learned to allow insurgent activity to resume once again, ultimately benefiting from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). The cycle was predictable.

As a social scientist, embedded with numerous brigades and battalions, spanning two deployments in Iraq, I was front row and center which allowed me to observe local national response in direct relation to our efforts of ‘winning hearts and minds’. I sat in meetings as recent as 2010 and 2011 listening to field personnel discussing their “carrot stick” approach to operations within their operational environment. Frustration and often anger was expressed by Lieutenant Colonels, Majors and Captains. One LTC remarked, “I have promised continued support for training the Iraqi Police, funding a local school and have Civil Affairs teams making payments to local contractors for schools, medical clinics and agricultural projects, however IED and IDF attacks continue.”

As I sat in that meeting pondering what I was hearing, I thought, “This is transactional leadership theory gone wrong.” Basically, a transactional leader bargains for an outcome. Leaders offer something of value to the people; the people will accept the offer behaving in a rationale manner ultimately fulfilling the goals of the leader. It is a quid pro quo mindset. The problem with this type of thinking is, it doesn’t always result in a positive outcome. We think, if I do something for you—you will do something for me. In the case of counterinsurgency, we think, “If I build your school, you will no longer attack my convoys. You owe me.” This is predicated on rational thinking. An insurgent’s mindset functions from a different rationale. Their thinking can be described as, “I want what I want at all cost. You build, I will destroy.”

What does it mean to be rational?[3]

Simply stated, a rational person is logical, dispassionate, and capable of satisfying one’s needs by maximizing benefits and minimizing costs. Further, it implies perfect information about the consequences of certain choices.

Often, our Western-thinking, worldview is driven by believing that rational thinking will prevail. The primary problem with our thought process is, our adversary has a different worldview and is focused less on human suffering, essential services and quality of life issues. To the point, the adversary has a completely different desired outcome. It is a clash between ideology and basic worldviews. We can build the schools, health clinics, agricultural programs and support democracy until the sheep come home, but the result will often fail. 

Why is it so difficult?[4]

• Different people have different priorities and goals
• Different people have different calculations of probabilities

Decisions are made in a bureaucratic environment where many actors tend to prefer the status quo. Consequences in foreign policy are difficult to predict. Time is short and events can overtake reality.

Western thought tends to be linier, while many Central Asian and Middle Eastern thinking tends to be cyclical. We start with “a” and go through to “z”. It is logical to our way of thinking and life, but illogical to an insurgent or terrorist. The end justifies the means and time is on the side of the insurgent. We set dates and withdrawal schedules, they have time. With 1000’s of years of history on their side, what are a few more years of waiting to ultimately get what is wanted?

In addition to time being a friend of the adversary, death is viewed differently. Death for a Muslim extremist is the final victory insuring one’s place in paradise. Not only does the adversary create a chaotic and violent event, death carries the perception of martyrdom for the perpetrator and in some instances, status and financial gain for the family of the extremist.

These are foreign to Western thinking, not so for Taliban, Haqqani and Al-Qaeda extremists. Remember, the end justifies the means.

Understanding Social Psychological Processes

Griswold[5] (1994) asserts that the understanding of social psychological processes enhances relationships between visible social characteristics and performance outcomes. The relationship is indicated by the level of understanding and the explanation of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of individuals as influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others.

There is little argument that both Iraq and Afghanistan represent a diverse population of languages and tribal affiliations. Diversity in relation to perception issues, real or imagined, affects the interactions and relationships among people with regard to race, ethnicity, sex, religion, age, physical and mental ability, sexual orientation, work and family status, and weight and appearance. Many of these attributes are in fact visible social characteristics. Differences may be readily apparent resulting from a sense of personal identity and are often associated with historical disparities in treatment, opportunities, and outcomes (Bell & Perry, 2007)[6]. The localization and application of Bell and Perry‘s stated findings as related to Iraq are quite evident as this researcher often heard comments made in reference to Iraqis from Baghdad or southern Iraq‘s Maysan Province.

A Baghdadi Iraqi is assumed to have an education and better lifestyle, while a Maysani is assumed to be illiterate and have a lifestyle in keeping with that of a subservient peasant. The same may also be true in Afghanistan among Pashtuns who make up the largest ethnic group at 42% of the population, followed by Tajiks (27%), Hazaras (9%), Uzbek (9%), Aimaq, Turkmen, Baluch, and other small groups. Each group shares similar identities, but also major differences which set each group apart. These distinctions prevent nationwide unity, but also serve to bind a people within each group by blood and customs. A diverse people will become more fully engaged and therefore more productive when all people with their differences and similarities are acknowledged and included in decision making and problem identification and solving (Miller & Katz, 2002)[7]. The performance outcomes are largely determined by leadership in the country.

Based on the statement of Miller and Katz, I may infer a diverse nation such as Iraq or Afghanistan will become more fully engaged and therefore more productive when all people with their differences and similarities are acknowledged and included in decision making and problem identification and solving. Miller and Katz (2002) report the benefits and outcomes of diversity tolerance begin with education and understanding and claim change can start anywhere, but succeed only when led from the top.

U.S. and Coalition Forces think differently than do their local national military and law enforcement partners. The divide is too great to be bridged in a short period of time. Iraqis and Afghanis understand power. Their culture is built on survival. Armies come and go, locals stay.

Conclusion

This researcher thinks the time has come to focus on winning wars and less time on winning hearts and minds. However, by winning a war, one can win hearts and minds. It is perspective. If building infrastructure, schools, medical clinics and training were good enough, our success would have been realized before now. The transactional leadership model won’t work because someone with a bigger carrot will eventually show up promising even more. The carrots get bigger and the learned response is to wait for the next carrot.

The rational actor model works among the rational, but won’t work among the irrational thinker. Instead of looking for a less irrational actor, our focus should be on winning the war, not simply on hearts and minds. If more money were the answer, it would be simple. More money is obviously not getting the results we want. People must become war weary and want the same things their protectors’ want in order for lasting change to occur. So far, we don’t see complete and total buy in to what we espouse in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let the Soldiers fight…and win. Then, after victory and total surrender is achieved, rebuild.    

Across almost all of the cases of civil war I have encountered, I have found that the key factor leading to the decision to take up arms against ones’ countrymen is not a simple primordial difference such as religion, nor the explosion of built up rage over mistreatment. Neither is it a greedy desire to advance the position of one’s’ own group for the pure sake of gain. Rather, I have observed that the most frequent cause for violence is a perception of insecurity that can only be remedied through mobilisation. This observation is not hard to understand, as the threat of impending destruction must surely be one of the few forces that justifies a course of action bound to bring great suffering to one’s  own people. That is not to say that the discourse surrounding conflict will not be shaped by the aforementioned forces, but rather that few desires (outside of survival) are strong enough to make a broad range of combatants risk their lives and pursue security through the subjugation or elimination of their neighbours.

Drawing on the economic-rationalist school of conflict analysis (spearheaded by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, as well as James Fearon and David Laitin) this risk is amplified in cases of ethnic dominance (where one ethnic group is clearly more numerous, but not so much so that it can automatically consolidate control), economic downturn (when there is little incentive to maintain the status quo), state disintegration (where confidence in the state’s ability to provide protection is low) and the failure of repressive rule (in which opposition groups have been prepared to fight instead of participate politically and violence is seen as a key tenet of state policy).  It is easy to see how these factors may presage civil war by creating conditions where the future is uncertain, but expected to involve chaotic competition and the threat of violence. It must be noted however, that these conditions are not in themselves a cause for violent mobilisation, rather serving to contribute to the security dilemmas that can quickly spiral into civil war.

 In this environment, it is easy to see how the actions of threatened groups may be informed by what Vesna Pešić has called a “fear of the future, lived through the past” – the expectation that their very existence is threatened, and the consequent approval of drastic measures of securitisation – ethnic cleansing, militarisation and war.

I am hesitant to make predictions about a world too complex to fully understand, and as such make no judgement on the likelihood of civil war in Syria. It is enough to note it as a possibility, a potential scenario where many key indicators are present and therefore one that must be countenanced.  What is needed then, if the international community is to try to reduce this possibility, is a way to assuage the fears of those who would otherwise see their interests served through resisting change. This means primarily the Alawi and Sunni elite who continue to support the Ba’athist regime, but should not exclude any group who may perceive a threat in the destabilisation and realignment expected to follow the removal of Syria’s governing power. I mention the Alawi and Sunni elite specifically because it is their support that is crucial to encouraging the fierce repression seen this year, and their fears that make a continuation of the status quo preferable to change. If these fears could be addressed through the creation of an inclusive and stable transitional structure, these powerholders may find themselves free to defect without fear for what the future may hold.  

I believe that the answer lies in a voluntary charter of governance, a concept proposed by Paul Collier for addressing electoral misconduct but equally applicable to stabilisation and conflict prevention. Such a charter would be concrete and enforceable and guarantee the security (economic, physical, religious or otherwise) of Syria’s minorities, particularly the aforementioned elites but equally extended to all who may be threatened by change.  

The content of such a charter would of course be subject to negotiation, but would ideally incorporate key features such as:

• An amnesty for defectors, protecting them against prosecution for crimes committed so long as they agreed to support a productive new order. A form of justice may still be served by a ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ that recognised wrongdoing without excluding potential supporters;
• A firm constitutional commitment to minority rights, laying out principles that would enhance faith in future governments;
• A commitment to genuine and inclusive democracy, allowing threatened groups to raise and mollify fears and guaranteeing fluidity in state policy;
• The banning of political campaigning on sectarian grounds, which could be expected to promote broader-based policies and reduce ethnic or religious particularism. While this might initially seem incompatible with a consociational allocation of power along ethnic lines, in practice it may be quite simple to legislate. Laws that ban exclusionary campaigning and ethnic entrepreneurship need not restrict candidates’ public self-identification, provided they have strong provisions to prevent candidates basing their appeal on confessional favouritism or elitism; 
• The reservation of seats in parliament and the cabinet for minority representatives, ensuring that their voices cannot be drowned out by the democratic weight of the majority;
• The reservation of key roles to discourage the perception of powerlessness – examples may include stipulating that the Vice President, Prime Minister or Chief of Defence Force be drawn from specific minority groups; and
• Legal protection for established business and political elites, guaranteeing their ongoing prosperity and influence, within boundaries laid down by the new state. 

While such a charter may be appealing to minorities, for a majority there must be some further incentive – why, if one group expected to dominate any conflict or democratic competition, would they agree to relinquish even a nominal degree of power? The answer may lie in their own fears.

To secure majority support, such a charter would need to be accompanied by a firm guarantee by the international community that once an acceptable standard of governance was achieved, it would be supported and defended.

Such a guarantee would need to:

• Recognise and respect the sovereignty of the new state;
• Lift sanctions and sponsor economic development; and
• Promise support in the face of internal challenges (allowing, among other things the mopping up of resistant elements, to be carried out within clear boundaries reflective of international standards). Most crucially, a commitment to the continued existence of the new polity in the face of existential threats such as coups and further revolutions, which are bound to be a prime fear for a fledgling democracy.

While significant support in international disputes may be a bridge too far given Syria’s historic relationship with Israel, assistance could still be given in the form of pressure applied to non-compliants outside of the country (those with looted assets stashed overseas, for example).

This is not to say that this path is not without significant challenges. A balance must be achieved between minority security and majority acceptance, but such a balance could surely be reached through negotiation, the careful application of incentives by the international community and negotiations framed in a way that emphasise the very real risks faced by all parties if a workable solution is not found.

Although guaranteed representation is a good start to minority protection, this may be marginalised if minority voices are democratically dominated by the weight of demographics. As such, the preservation of a minority veto power over parliamentary decisions may be in order and could most easily be achieved by a minority quota in cabinet or parliament, the approval of which would be required to sign bills into law. Giving threatened groups a veto power does pose the risk of minority obstruction as a way to hold government to ransom, but this scenario may be less important than it initially seems. The reason for this is that even if given a veto power, minority groups will be highly aware of their relative weakness and the need to compromise. It may simply be that the availability of a veto power is enough to force a parliamentary majority to compromise, allowing enough of a balance of power that all groups may only pass legislation through accommodative politics. 

Perhaps the biggest problem faced in this scenario is the credibility of the international community’s promise to support the sovereignty of the new state. New leaders would be acutely aware of the time-consistency problem exhibited in the international community’s prioritisation of short-term pragmatism, and as such the terms of any support would have to be laid out in a clear and specific fashion. This problem may also be mitigated by the close incorporation of regional powers into the group of security guarantors, who, once a definite schematic for security is agreed upon will have a significant interest in upholding the deal they have agreed to. While the role of the western powers is undeniably vital in validating and developing the new state, they must also recognise the need to broker a deal that includes those powers most closely connected with Syria’s future, and encourages them to invest in a positive future for the country.

Criticism is often levelled at consociationalism for the way that it is said to institutionalise ethnic and religious difference, and judging by similar cases this criticism may be valid. It is hoped that in a successful transition the ban on sectarian campaigning would encourage cross-sectarian support for candidates, and especially those from the majority group. An electoral system that ensures that encourages minorities to vote for candidates from different sects without fear of losing their own representation would foster an environment where there is a significant disadvantage to exclusionary politics, and candidates are encouraged to compete across sectarian boundaries. This would differ from many other consociational democracies such as Lebanon, where candidates only really compete against ethnic kin, and as such become locked in a battle of ethnic outbidding where they compete as to who is most emblematic of their particular sect and moderation is discouraged.

In short, if minority insecurity is to be attacked through institutional design, architects must consider what they would like the political character of threatened minorities to resemble. I suggest that the Lebanese Druze minority (and specifically the Progressive Socialist Party) while not without problems, has highlighted many positive characteristics in the post-war period. Assured of access to parliament and strong support through cohesion that arises from both tradition and threat, the PSP has been free to realign as serves their interests and has historically been a significant player in the balance of parliamentary power. The security and mobility inherent in this position cements the value of the established order and makes the rational benefit of participation versus rejection clear. A similar position is not unfathomable for Syrian minorities – Syria’s minorities (and in particular the Alawi) are large enough to become a significant force in a representative democracy, yet small enough to see the value in group cohesion. As such, any minority bloc in a future Syrian parliament could wield significant power and be an attractive means to safeguard community interests

‘Lebanonisation’ is often used incorrectly as a pejorative, to describe the fragmentation and clannishness that has crippled Lebanese political development. In its proper use however, it denotes the necessity of compromise and accommodation which has been engendered by the Lebanese structural requirement of minority alliance and strategic positioning. Despite Lebanon’s past and ongoing problems, it should be recognised as a country with a rich history of democracy and a political system designed to force cross-sectarian cooperation – something it has succeeded in for a significant proportion of its history. To use a favourite truism, Lebanese democracy is a success of consociational inclusion, except when it isn’t. These problems should not detract from the value of the political structure as a way to include and empower minorities who may otherwise be threatened.

The similarities between the two countries are significant – potential divisions are rife in Syria, and despite fears of Sunni Arab domination, no one group possesses a great enough majority to dominate a democratic government unless first-past-the-post electoral policies are used. This method of counting has been evaluated extensively and is highly unsuitable for fragmented societies. A better solution is an electoral law that encourages the broadest possible consensus, whether it is preferential voting or a higher threshold for victory. Sunni Muslims make up around 74% of the population, but are divided between ethnic groups. The Alawi may make up as much as 12%, while Christians of varying denominations contribute another  10%. Druze are thought to be around 3%, and Shi’a (both Twelver and Ismaili), as well as miscellaneous confessions comprise the remainder. Ethnically, while the majority are Arabs, an estimated 9% are Kurds with a further 1% comprising Turkmen, Assyrians and Armenians.[1]

For a relatively peaceful transition to a function democracy, a system must be designed that allows each group the perception of security, encouraging them towards the rational observation that their interests will be better served through participation within the new system, rather than opposition to it. It seems clear that given the visible fears of some segments of society, this goal would be best achieved by a system that allocates and guarantees access to the power required for self-preservation and representation free from domination. Based on the above analysis, it seems that the best option is the division of positions of power (both inside and outside the legislature) in a way that grants minorities a veto power, but ensures that it is not in their interests to routinely obstruct the activities of the state.

This can be negotiated through the application of incentives by the international community, as well as stressing the consequences of failing to adequately accommodate threatened minorities. Although  the threat of civil war has been championed most vocally by advocates for the maintenance of the status quo, that same threat can be turned back against the supporters of the regime. If those groups fighting change can be made to see that intransigence may result in a total and chaotic disintegration of order, they may be enticed to an alternative that contains clear provisions for their protection and ongoing prosperity.

I have not discussed the possible need to entice key powerholders with specific terms of support for the new system, but such negotiation would surely need to take place, particularly with regard to elites outside of the government. While in many ways it is appealing to wipe the slate clean and eliminate all traces of the ancien régime, the lessons of past revolutions must be heeded. It is the thesis of this article that it may be better to compromise than clash, and accept some remnants of the old order to ease the transition to a gradualist-progressive system. This should have been a key lesson from Iraq too – instead of remaking the state in an ideal image immediately, perhaps it is preferable to make as few changes as possible, while introducing the means for continuous change and progress. In this way, once the core machinery of democracy is in place the Syrian state will be equipped to move towards its preferred ideal image, in an environment where the potential for opposition is mitigated through an inclusive structural framework.

Such a transition would certainly not be immune from problems, but at this stage it is impossible to identify a scenario that would be. In terms of pure harm minimisation it seems like the most appropriate method to guarantee peace, but the international community must be willing to commit to supporting such a plan, as well as being willing to accept the occasional stutter of democracy as a necessary step in building a functioning and accommodative system.

Moscow’s support of NATO operations in Afghanistan has been, in addition to the New START Treaty, a key pillar of the “reset.”  But as NATO pulls out of Afghanistan, Washington’s need for Russia’s support diminishes and the urgency for filling the gap in relations created by NATO’s withdrawal grows.  However, finding common ground to close this void will be difficult, in great part because Washington’s and Moscow’s interests often diverge.

In addition to Russian reluctance to reduce its nuclear arsenal and the political challenges presented by the United States Senate, New START has, for now, exhausted prospects for deepening relations through further strategic nuclear disarmament.  As of yet, substantive missile defense cooperation appears impracticable and indeed, remains an irritant in relations.  While talks on tactical nuclear weapons reductions are a logical next step, Russia is reluctant to cut its arsenal because they provide artificial assurances against a superior Chinese military.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin has proven to be an unreliable partner on Iran, and relishes in its role as the principal interlocutor between Tehran and the West.  On trade, however, the White House has so far proven unable to secure Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization or to convince the Congress to eliminate the Cold War-era Jackson-Vanik Amendment which leads to counterproductive trade discrimination against Russia.

Concomitantly, Russia appears diametrically opposed with the West on democratic efforts around the globe, in part because the Kremlin fears the influence these movements may have on encouraging similar change at home.  Concerned more with preserving its influence and economic interests, Russia has consistently failed to support, and indeed has subverted, democratic efforts throughout its own backyard, chose not to recognize Libyan rebels until it was clear that Colonel Gaddafi had fled Tripoli and that its lucrative oil contracts could be under threat, and has lambasted international efforts to constrain the murderous regime in Damascus.

At the same time, Afghanistan is rapidly becoming Russia’s problem.  Already battered by the influx of heroine from the Afghan countryside, Moscow worries about how NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan will fuel instability, drug trafficking and radical Islam south of Russia’s border.  Not surprising, Russia has agreed with Dushanbe to extend the deployment of its military base in Tajikistan –which shares a lengthy and porous border with Afghanistan– with the aim of boosting Moscow’s regional influence after the NATO pullout.  Tempted by the heavy handed ban on drugs and the relative stability provided by the Taliban pre-2001, the Kremlin may be inclined to look the other way in the face of a Taliban return in Kabul with the mind of returning to the status quo ante bellum.  This is easier than continuing to cooperate with NATO –who is more than eager to walk away from its costly attempt to create a democratic Afghanistan– and thus further alienate the Taliban and support a continued robust American footprint in Central Asia.

If U.S. and Russian interests increasingly diverge, we risk seeing a return to the characteristically passive aggressive relations that dominated much of the previous decade.  If prevailing forecasts are correct, a return to the Kremlin by the America-weary Vladimir Putin –with whom President Obama has little rapport– will further wedge relations.  Diverging interests will also give room to greater American scrutiny –and in turn Moscow’s anger– of Russia’s “managed democracy” and the Kremlin’s heavy handed methods in the Caucasus, where, in a vicious cycle, those disenchanted with Russia’s increasingly authoritarian government run on corruption and disregard for the rule of law find a growing voice in Islamic fundamentalism.  Rejecting Russian notions of a “sphere of influence,” Washington will also broaden its engagement with other Eurasian states that better suit U.S. objectives, but draw Moscow’s ire for meddling in its self-proclaimed imperial backyard.

In 2009, within a context of enduring conflicts in interests and historical distrust in relations, Presidents Medvedev and Obama “reset” relations by agreeing to disagree on important issues, namely Iran, missile defense and Georgia, as a means to cooperate on issues of common interest, namely Afghanistan and slashing their strategic nuclear arsenals.  Though the Obama-Medvedev Commission then created has achieved results in various areas and fostered a positive environment to improve relations, initiatives that have the potential to transform relations have yet to emerge.

The “reset” urgently needs a new angle, but any such proposal is unlikely to emerge before next year’s U.S. presidential election and hence greater clarity as to whom the Kremlin will be talking with.  Agreement on limiting Russian and NATO conventional forces in Europe is a start, which in turn would facilitate talks on reducing American and Russian tactical nuclear weapons, because if Washington and Moscow can agree that their conventional and nuclear forces do not threaten one another, they will be more inclined to limit them.  Progress, however, will require trade-offs between U.S. and Russian concessions, including the withdrawal of the small number of American tactical weapons remaining in Europe.

At the same time, cooperation on containing China’s rise and growing regional influence has the potential to transform relations beyond the historical pillar of security issues.  Though Washington and Moscow will continue to disagree on important issues, they can agree on leveraging their ties with India and post-Soviet Eurasia, and their increasing mistrust about China, to control the region’s most important actor of the 21st century.  This shared, broad-based and long-term strategy will attenuate perceptions of conflicting U.S.-Russian Eurasia policies, draw Russian attention south and eastward to where it is most needed, provide the assurances necessary to induce Russia to reduce its tactical nuclear arsenal, and set the base for greater cooperation on addressing other shared regional concerns, namely Afghanistan, terrorism and Islamic extremism.

Gian,

Thanks for your insightful questions, and for your careful reading of "A Failure in Generalship."

If I may, I'd like to challenge the underlying premise of your questions. Your focus on strategy after 2009 presumes that Afghanistan was "winnable" at a politically acceptable cost.  I respectfully disagree.

The fiasco in Iraq (2003-2007) and the collapse of the US economy (2008-present) have exhausted the patience of the American people. Regrettably, a rigorous civil-military dialogue did not identify this limitation before the commitment of additional troops.

In Afghanistan, the die is cast.  In Pakistan, state failure looms darkly on the horizon.  It may be too late to change the former, but now is the time to address the latter.

I elaborate on these points below in "ISAF Exist Strategy: Neither International nor an Exit nor a Strategy."

I look forward to discussing these matters further and am grateful to SWJ and its readers for hosting this dialogue.

Best Regards,

Paul

SWJ Editor's Notes:

A Few Questions for Colonel Paul Yingling on Failures in Generalship - Small Wars Journal

A Failure in Generalship - Armed Forces Journal

ISAF Exit Strategy: Neither International nor an Exit nor a Strategy

Colonel Paul Yingling, U.S. Army

Based on remarks delivered at

International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan: 2001-2011-2014, the Roles and Capabilities of South-East Europe Countries

Zagreb, Croatia

October 12, 2011

Willy Brandt famously said of the former German Democratic Republic that it was neither German nor democratic nor a republic.  When I was asked to comment on the exit strategy of the International Security Assistance Force from Afghanistan, I had a similar reaction.  The events of the next three years in Afghanistan cannot properly be described as international, an exit, or a strategy.  The so-called transition to Afghan lead by the end of 2014 is a timetable driven largely by American domestic politics. When this timetable is complete, Afghanistan will still be at war.

Before going further, a few caveats are in order.  First, I want to acknowledge that many countries have contributed blood and treasure to the war in Afghanistan, and that the Afghan people have suffered terribly during decades of nearly constant fighting.  My argument that American domestic politics will drive the events of the next few years should not be interpreted as minimizing the contributions of other ISAF nations or the sacrifices and suffering of the Afghan people.  Second, my argument is predictive, not normative.  I will not describe what should happen in the next few years, but what will.  What will happen in Afghanistan will largely be determined by ISAF’s largest contributing nation - the United States.  As I will demonstrate, we passed up “should” long ago.

My argument consists of three parts.  First, I will describe both the aims of American policy and its underlying rationale.  Second, I will review the competing but deeply flawed ways to achieve these aims – a fully resourced counterinsurgency effort and a more limited counter-terrorism approach.  Finally, I will describe the most likely outcome of events in Afghanistan and Pakistan beyond 2014.

The Aims of Policy

In December 2009, President Obama described both the ends of American policy in Afghanistan and the ways those ends would be achieved:

…to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future. 

To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny al Qaeda a safe-haven. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's Security Forces and government, so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future.

The most striking feature of Obama Administration policy is the treatment of al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Pakistan and Afghanistan as a single and uniquely dangerous threat.  This region is not uniquely dangerous because it is an ungoverned space.  Large regions of Somalia and Yemen also fit this description.  This region is also not uniquely dangerous because the population has ideological sympathy for al Qaeda. Pockets of sympathy for al Qaeda can be found elsewhere, including in the West.  Finally, this region is not uniquely dangerous because it serves as a staging ground for attacks on the West.  Indeed, al Qaeda’s affiliates in the Islamic Magreb and the Arabian Peninsula have in recent years proven more lethal than the core of al Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan.

This region is uniquely dangerous because of the confluence of the two most dangerous phenomena of the 21^st century – radical ideology and nuclear weapons.  Pockets of radical ideology exist throughout the globe and at least nine states have nuclear weapons.  However, only in southern Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan do we find deep sympathy for al Qaeda’s radical ideology less than a day’s drive from the world’s least secure nuclear arsenal.  Moreover, sanctuary in Afghanistan is neither necessary nor sufficient for al Qaeda to achieve its goal of acquiring one or more nuclear weapons for use against the West.  Even if Afghanistan were perfectly stable, the danger of al Qaeda acquiring nuclear weapons in Pakistan would remain.  Even if Afghanistan were to return to civil war or Taliban rule, these conditions alone do not pose a unique threat to the West.  Without the threat of nuclear terrorism, the insurgency in Afghanistan would be no more important to the West than similar threats Yemen or Somalia.

Competing and Equally Flawed Ways to Achieve These Ends

While the ends of American policy in Afghanistan have been remarkably consistent since 2001, the ways to achieve those ends have not. The strategic blunders of the Bush Administration from 2002-2008 are well documented and need no elaboration.  The first opportunity to reassess our strategy in Afghanistan occurred in the Obama Administration’s policy reviews of 2009. During this period, two broad strategies were considered.  The first was a fully resourced counterinsurgency strategy and the second was a more limited counter-terrorism strategy. 

The first approach was based on the tenets of COIN doctrine – protect the population, develop the capabilities of Afghan security forces and most importantly strengthen the legitimacy of the Afghan government by improving its capacity to provide security and other essential services to the population.  This approach would have required ISAF troop levels of approximately 140,000 or an increase of 40,000 over 2009 levels.  Most importantly, changes to future troop levels would be based on battlefield conditions.

This approach would have been a fine idea in 2001, but was politically infeasible by 2009.  Consider an ideal alternative history beginning in 2001.  With broad domestic and international support, a robust U.S.-led military coalition could have toppled the Taliban, captured or killed Osama bin Laden and other key al Qaeda leaders and provided post-conflict security to the Afghan people.  The U.S. military could have reformed its doctrine, organization, equipment and personnel policies to focus on irregular warfare, including the vital task of developing host nation security forces.  A robust civilian component could have assisted in the development of a legitimate Afghan government capable of providing essential services to the population. Skillful diplomacy could have convinced Pakistan that a stable Afghanistan was in its interests.  Enlightened security assistance could have assisted Pakistan in denying sanctuary in its northwest territories and discrediting extremist ideology nationwide.  Even in this ideal alternative history, denying sanctuary and support to al Qaeda and other extremist elements in Afghanistan and Pakistan would have been the work of a generation.

Alas, these events did not come to pass.  The U.S. low-balled troop estimates, allowing bin Laden and other key al Qaeda figures to escape to Pakistan and security within Afghanistan to deteriorate.  The U.S. squandered credibility at home and good will abroad with a disastrous unnecessary war in Iraq. The U.S. military failed to adapt to the challenges of irregular warfare until late 2006, and still does not devote adequate resources to security force development.  The civilian component to this day is unequal to the challenges of assisting in the development of a legitimate Afghan government.  Most importantly of all, elements within the Pakistani government continue to foster chaos in Afghanistan.

Those advocating a robust COIN effort in 2009 behaved as if these events either didn’t happen or don’t matter.  The reality is quite different; a decade’s worth of blunders and misrepresentations has exhausted the patience of the American people.  For nearly a decade, American political elites insisted that our Afghan policy was succeeding.  They did not ask the public to fight the war or pay for it, and did not tell the public of the deterioration in security on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border.  The plausibility of these policies collapsed at approximately the same time as the global economy.  In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, unemployment is the public’s top policy concern. Even more importantly, public trust in the U.S. Government has all but evaporated. Devoting hundreds of billions of dollars into an open-ended conflict in Afghanistan would have been difficult even in 2001.  By 2009, such a policy was politically impossible.

However, the alternative counter-terrorism approach was scarcely better.  This approach called for an increased emphasis on capturing or killing key insurgent and terrorist leaders and accelerating the development of Afghan security forces.  However, this approach is better described as a collection of tactics to disrupt al Qaeda than a strategy to defeat it.  It does not address the corruption and incompetence of the Afghan Government or Pakistan’s explicit support for the Taliban or its tacit support for al Qaeda.  Worst of all, it does nothing to address the political conditions inside Pakistan that fuel the growth of extremist ideology.

The policy that emerged from the Obama Administration’s 2009 debate was worse than either of the alternatives proposed.  It increased troop levels through the summer of 2011, with a transition to Afghan lead set for the end of 2014.  It failed to take into account that al Qaeda was all but gone from Afghanistan, and that the overwhelming majority of those fighting ISAF in Afghanistan were locals with very limited ambitions beyond the country’s borders. Increased troop levels allowed for increased fighting but time limits prevented that fighting from producing enduring political results.  It left largely unchanged the military’s failure to focus on security force assistance and the civilian component’s inability to address the corruption and incompetence of the Karzai Government. It relied on drone strikes to disrupt al Qaeda in Pakistan but did not address the toxic political conditions within Pakistan that make it a danger not only to itself and its neighbors, but much of the world.

Of course, policy makers must set priorities in domestic and foreign affairs and evaluate military advice through the prism of domestic politics.  Effective civil-military dialogue assists in this process by identifying gaps between the ends of policy and the means available to achieve them.  Civilian leaders have the final say in this unequal dialogue, but the product of such dialogue must be a coherent strategy – one that reconciles ends, ways and means.  It’s unclear that such a dialogue took place during the policy reviews of 2009.  If our goal is to end the war and focus on domestic priorities, then no additional forces were needed in Afghanistan.  If our goal is to prevent the Taliban from seizing power in Afghanistan, then time limits on troop commitments undermine our efforts.  If our goal is to defeat al Qaeda, then we’re focusing our resources on the wrong country.

A Return to Strategic Thinking After 2014?

Over the next three years, the U.S. and other ISAF nations will continue to withdraw forces from Afghanistan.  This withdrawal will be driven largely by American domestic politics and fiscal constraints.  No matter which political party prevails in the 2012 U.S. elections, the domestic political calculus will be the same: spiraling costs for entitlements and interest on the debt, deep divisions about what mix of spending cuts and tax increases will solve the problem, heavy pressure to cut defense spending and foreign aid, and little political will to continue the war in Afghanistan beyond 2014.  The best case scenario is that ISAF’s transition to Afghan lead will occur according to the timetable ending in 2014.  However, another financial shock in the West or further political dysfunction in Washington could accelerate that timetable appreciably and unpredictably.

The war in Afghanistan will continue to rage long after 2014.  Combined security operations, drone strikes and special operations raids will continue to take their toll on insurgent and terrorist networks until then.  Afghan security forces can continue to fight even without foreign combat troops, but it’s uncertain how the Afghan government will pay for its army and police without substantial external assistance.  Other regional actors such as India and China will continue to jockey for influence in Afghanistan, but are unlikely to assist the Afghan government on the scale required. More importantly, the Afghan government is unlikely to address the incompetence and corruption that makes such assistance necessary.

Pakistan’s future is more difficult to predict.  It could limp along as a failing state indefinitely, or fail suddenly with little warning.  The West knows so little about Pakistan’s internal dynamics that virtually any significant change will come as a surprise.  The safest prediction is one that would eliminate the best case scenario – that Pakistan will develop into a functioning state that will deny sanctuary and support for extremist organizations. 

While the exact timing and extent of state failure in Pakistan is difficult to predict, the consequences of such failure are not.  Partial or total state failure of a nuclear Pakistan would pose a grave threat to the United States.  In such a scenario, the United States would not know who controlled Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.  A nuclear armed al Qaeda, Lashkar e Taiba or another extremist group would be difficult if not impossible to deter.  The nightmare scenario of a nuclear armed terrorist group would be upon us.

When we ask about ISAF exit strategy, we are asking the wrong question.  ISAF’s exit from Afghanistan has much more to do with American domestic politics than coalition strategy. American fiscal constraints and political paralysis set this course in motion long ago and corrective measures are unlikely in the absence of a crisis.  ISAF will transfer the lead for security to Afghan security forces in 2014, on or ahead of the political timetable driving this outcome and with little regard for security conditions. 

However, the crisis of Pakistan as a failed nuclear state looms darkly on the horizon. Those of us charged with strategic thinking need not wait for a crisis to think clearly about this challenge. 

The example of the U.S. military in the 1920s provides a helpful example.  In the aftermath of World War I, military planners recognized that the U.S. lacked the capabilities to defend America’s possessions in the western Pacific.  Led by the Navy, the U.S. held wargames and constructed war plans to understand this challenge and the capabilities necessary to meet it.  Throughout the 1920s, the U.S. military had neither the equipment nor the money nor the manpower to solve this challenge.  Rather than prevent clear strategic thinking, these conditions enabled it.  When war in the Pacific came, the U.S. had already imagined the capabilities necessary for victory – including carrier aviation, amphibious assault, strategic bombing, and close air support for ground forces.  When the crisis came, these ideas needed only money and political will to become reality.

Those of us charged with strategic thinking ought to heed this example.  Imagine a failed Pakistan that results in a terrorist organization acquiring one or more nuclear weapons.  What would our response be in the aftermath of such a crisis?  What intelligence capabilities do we need to locate compromised nuclear materials?  What civil security and law enforcement measures might disrupt or minimize the impacts of such a threat?  What counter-proliferation capabilities are required to seize and render safe compromised nuclear weapons or materials?  Imagine further the capabilities required to avoid such a crisis.  What diplomatic measures might change the Pakistani strategic calculus that lends support to extremism?  What broader engagement with Pakistani civil society might render this troubled country less amenable to radical ideology?  Now imagine still further back to the institutional arrangements that generate national security capabilities.  Do we have the right priorities?  Are we buying the right equipment?  Are we selecting the right leaders?  Are we making the best use of increasingly scarce tax payer dollars?

Too often, what passes for strategic thought in the United States is actually a struggle among self-interested elites seeking political, commercial or bureaucratic advantage.  Such behavior is the privilege of a country that is both rich and safe.  However, a pattern of such behavior is self-correcting: no country that behaves this way will stay rich or safe for long.  Strategic thought will be in high demand in 2014 or upon the collapse of Pakistan, whichever comes first. 

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Afghanistan

Report: US Deaths in Drone Strike Due to Miscommunication - LAT

Militants Strike US Afghan Base - BBC

Militants Assault US Base in Eastern Afghanistan - AP

Son of NY Bomb Plot Sheik Killed in Afghanistan - AP

First Suicide Bombing in North Afghan Province - Reuters

Afghan Security Forces Learn to Protect, Serve - AFPS

Reserve Family Sparks Afghan Literacy Project - AFPS

Pakistan

US Ramps Up Attacks Against Haqqani Network to ‘Send a Signal’ - WP

US Missiles Kill 6 in Northwestern Pakistan - AP

A New Pakistan Policy: Containment - NYT opinion

Iran

Probe of Alleged Plot Reaches a Chilling Name - WP

Allegations of Plots Added to a History of Hostility - NYT

Iran Denies US Meeting over Plot - BBC

Iran's Supreme Leader Calls US Accusations Meaningless - Reuters

US Says Tehran Denial About Contacts Not Truthful - Reuters

Some US Officials Question Response to Iran Plot - Reuters

US Congress Losing Patience with Iran Policy - WP

Strong' IAEA Report May Pile Pressure on Iran - Reuters

Victims of Iranian ‘Justice’ - WP opinion

Syria

US Envoy to Syria Warns of Civil War - WP

UN Official Calls for Action to Prevent Civil War - LAT

UN Official Urges World to Stand Up for Syrians - NYT

Thousands Protest in Support of Syrian Army Defectors - VOA

Syrian Unrest Deaths 'Hit 3,000' - BBC

Europeans Spar With Russia, China on Syria at UN - Reuters

Libya

US Sending More Contractors to Secure Weapons Stockpile - NYT

US Says Terrorists Seeking Missing Libyan Missiles - AP

US, Allies Taking Urgent Action on Libya Missiles - Reuters

Gunbattles and Explosions Rock Libya's Capital - VOA

Qaddafi-Era Flag Is Said to Have Set Off Gunfire in Tripoli - NYT

Gaddafi 'Loyalists' in Tripoli Gunfight - BBC

Gun Battle Erupts in Libyan Capital - WP

Libya's Fighting Continues in Sirte, Renews in Tripoli - LAT

Yemen

Deadly Protests in Yemen Capital - BBC

Yemen: US Strike Kills Local Al-Qaida Media Chief - AP

Al Qaeda Official Killed in Yemen, Pipeline Blown Up - Reuters

Death Toll From Yemen Air Strikes Rises to 24 - Reuters

Israel / Palestinians

Gaza Set to Embrace Released Prisoners - NYT

Rabin Memorial Defaced in Palestinian Prisoner Release Protest - VOA

In Israel, Swap Touches Old Wounds - NYT

Israel Plans to Build More Housing in East Jerusalem - NYT

UN Says New Israel Settlement Plans 'Unacceptable' - Reuters

Middle East / North Africa

Finland to Host Meeting on Nuke-Free Mideast - AP

Arab Spring Upheaval 'Cost $55bn' - BBC

Oman Prepares to Vote Amid Uncertain Times - VOA

Oman Votes for Advisory Council After Protests - AP

Egypt’s Military Rulers Expand Their Power, Raising Alarms - NYT

2,000 March in Cairo Unity Rally, Anger at Army - Reuters

Islamist Protesters March in Tunisia - LAT

Tunisia Police Teargas Protesters - BBC

Protesters Attack Home of Tunis TV Station Head - AP

US Department of Defense

The American Soldier Dubbed the 'Lawrence of Iraq' - BBC

'Mini-Flail' Robot Could be Used to Detect Mines, IEDs - S&S

Army Suicides Decline for Second Consecutive Month - S&S

Air Force Mulls Change to Deployments - S&S

Military Summit Featuring Gay Troops - S&S

Former Army Chaplain Jailed in Beating of German Civilian - S&S

United States

CIA to Fuse Military Opinions in War Analysis - AP

SEC Issues New Rules on Cyberattacks - WP

United Kingdom

Defence Secretary Liam Fox Quits - BBC

British Defense Minister Resigns - NYT

British Defense Chief Liam Fox Resigns - WP

Britain Defense Minister Resigns - LAT

Questions Remain over Fox Funding - BBC

New Inquiry Into Poisoning Death of a Former KGB Officer - NYT

World

'Occupy' Protests Go Worldwide - BBC

Wall Street Sit-In Protest Goes Global - Reuters

Around the World, Rage Against the Elites - WP opinion

Africa

Obama Sends US Forces to Help in Central Africa - AFPS

Armed US Advisers to Help Fight African Renegade Group - NYT

US Deploys Troops in Pursuit of African Rebels - WSJ

US to Deploy Small Force to Uganda - WP

US Sending Military Advisors to Uganda - LAT

Obama: US Combat Troops to Hunt African Rebel Leader - S&S

US Troops to Aid Uganda Battle - BBC

Obama Sends US Military Advisers to Central Africa - Reuters

Why Set US Troops on Africa Militants? - AP

Vote Tally: Liberian President Short of Outright Majority So Far - VOA

Kidnappings: Kenya to Pursue Militants in Somalia - AP

UNHCR Halts Some Operations After Kenya Kidnapping - Reuters

Somali PM Condemns Refugee Camp Kidnapping - VOA

'Al-Qaeda' Aids Somali Refugees - BBC

ICC chief arrives in Ivory Coast - BBC

Int'l Court Prosecutor Arrives in Ivory Coast - AP

Drugs Agency Seizes Nigerian Comedian at Airport - AP

More Than 18,000 Vie for Congo's 500-Seat Parliament - Reuters

Americas

Mexican President: State Was Left to Drug Cartel - AP

Mexican State 'Left in Hands' of Drug Gang - Reuters

UN to Cut Haiti Peacekeeper Force - BBC

UN Council Approves Withdrawal of Some Haiti Troops - Reuters

Cuban Communists Mull Term Limits - BBC

Cuba Dissident Group Leader Dies - BBC

Cuban Agent Freed in US to Lobby for Fellow Agents - AP

Asia Pacific

Photos From China Offer Scant Clues to a Succession - NYT

China's Elite Open Key Meeting Amid Jockeying - AP

Clinton: China 'Gaming' World Trading System - VOA

China and Vietnam to Strengthen Military Ties - Reuters

Asia Floods Take Heavy Toll on Local Economies - VOA

Europe

Italy: Berlusconi Barely Survives Confidence Vote - NYT

French Voters: ‘None of the Above’ Seems Best - NYT

Germans Condemn Police Use of Spyware - NYT

Macedonia’s FM Urges EU to Declare Greece Bankrupt - VOA

Selective Prosecution in Ukraine - NYT editorial

South Asia

India and Burma Expand Trade Ties - BBC

In my Foreign Policy column I discuss why the U.S. won't do much about the Iranian bomb plot. I also discuss a new report about the future of U.S. ground forces, which bucks the current conventional wisdom.

Why Washington is destined to take the first punch

Residents of Washington, D.C., may have been both disturbed and relieved to hear that U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officers this week skillfully foiled an alleged plot by Iran's Quds Force to blow up the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States while he dined in a local restaurant. Investigators were no doubt assisted by the plot's seeming ineptitude, which involved a used-car salesman from Texas and a paid informant in Mexico who posed as a drug gang member. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton summed up the conclusions many had reached about the bizarre story: "The idea that they would attempt to go to a Mexican drug cartel to solicit murder for hire to kill the Saudi ambassador? Nobody could make that up, right?"

Even so, the U.S. Justice Department did charge Gholam Shakuri, a member of the Quds Force, with a long list of conspiracy offenses and thus connected the Iranian government to the plot. Even though this particular bombing attempt seems amateurish, it should be little comfort that elements of the Iranian intelligence service now seem to have Washington in their cross hairs. Indeed, this week U.S. soldiers in Iraq were targets of the Quds Force; according to the New York Times, on Oct. 12 militants trained by the Quds Force wounded three U.S. troops in a rocket attack in southern Iraq. U.S. policymakers will now be under pressure to find ways to actively prevent or deter future attacks. However, a variety of barriers will prevent the Obama administration from taking any strong action against Iran, at least until a major attack actually succeeds. Washington will thus have to brace for the big first punch.

After the United States levied unilateral sanctions on four Quds Force officials this week, U.S. diplomats fanned out across the world to rally international support for deepening the sanctions against Iran. However, according to the New York Times, the ham-fisted nature of the plot is undercutting the U.S. plea for cooperation. In this case, the Quds Force may ironically be receiving protection from the incompetence it allegedly exhibited in this case -- the plot's seeming implausibility is causing the diplomats' pleas to fall on deaf ears. In addition, memories of the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003 apparently continue to weigh on the international audience that U.S. diplomats are struggling to persuade. Without an attack having actually occurred, with the plot seemingly out of character for the elite Quds Force, and with U.S. intelligence claims now suspect, U.S. diplomats seem unlikely to get cooperation on additional sanctions that would alter the behavior of Iranian policymakers.

What about military retaliation, such as a night of airstrikes against Quds Force targets inside Iran? The purpose would be to correct the impression seemingly held by policymakers in Iran that they don't risk consequences from a bomb attack on Washington. If, on the other hand, the Washington plot was engineered by midlevel "rogues" in the Quds Force, military retaliation would be a signal to top-level Iranian officials that they will be held responsible for their subordinates' actions. My FP colleague Will Inboden noted that in 1993 President Bill Clinton ordered the destruction of Iraq's intelligence headquarters after a failed attempt to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush. The message this time would be that Quds Force operations are no longer risk-free.

However, the Obama administration, with undoubtedly much support from the Pentagon brass, is in no mood right now to start another shooting war. Airstrikes on Quds Force targets would appear to the rest of the world as a severe overreaction to an inept bomb plot, with the aforementioned international skepticism of U.S. intelligence only adding to the doubt. Diplomatically, the United States would be on its back foot from the start. Air strikes were likely never a serious consideration inside the White House.

Pentagon planners will resist having to execute an air operation while they are in the midst of the final withdrawal from Iraq and attempting to manage a fragile situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They also know that a U.S. strike would not be the last move -- Iran's response to the attack would likely affect Saudi Arabia, Israel, Afghanistan, and others. If such an action has to occur, Pentagon planners likely prefer it to happen some other time and under more favorable logistical and diplomatic circumstances.

Deterrence doesn't seem to be working against Iran. Either Iran's top leaders don't fear U.S. retaliation, or they aren't in control of their subordinates -- neither explanation bodes well for deterrence theory. If the U.S. government hopes to dissuade a future Quds Force operation against Washington or some other important target, it will have to make some demonstration that will impress Iranian decision-makers. Until that happens, Washingtonians will have to brace and hope for the best.

Think you don't need boots on the ground? Think again.

In last week's column I discussed how corporate downsizing is coming to the Pentagon, with the Army and Marine Corps, the most labor-intensive of the services, likely to get the most cuts. But before Pentagon budget planners sharpen their red pencils, they will want to read "U.S. Ground Force Capabilities Through 2020," a new report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Lead author Nathan Freier, a senior fellow at CSIS and a retired Army officer, led a large team that prepared a detailed analysis of what U.S. ground forces should be ready for during the remainder of this decade. Freier's report bucks today's conventional wisdom in many ways. His report doesn't recommend how big the Army and Marine Corps should be. But Freier does assert that the Pentagon might be overpreparing its ground forces for some scenarios while leaving other contingencies exposed.

Freier and his team gathered two panels of experts to discuss the future "demand" and "supply" of U.S. and allied ground-combat power. Freier's panels began by describing the various missions ground forces could be called up for and assigning probabilities to those missions. High-probability missions included humanitarian assistance operations, training foreign security forces, short-term raids against threats, and long-term special-operations-led counterterrorism campaigns. Freier's experts judged large opposed stabilization campaigns, such as those waged in Iraq and Afghanistan, or a major combat campaign such as the 1991 Gulf War, as much less likely.

Freier's team then assessed what the troop demands of each case were likely to be, how long each scenario was likely to last (ranging from a few hours for a raid to years for a stabilization mission), and how much strategic warning planners would likely get for each type of crisis. After taking into account scenario probability, size, duration, and warning time, the study team then compared the likely demands for ground forces to the Pentagon's current plans for ground forces over the rest of the decade.

In contrast to conventional wisdom, Freier concluded that the Pentagon may be putting too many resources and training time into preparing for future stabilization and foreign security force assistance operations. By contrast, Pentagon planners may be underestimating the need for rapid response to regional crises, the need for offensive "forcible entry" capability, and the need for armored forces able to maneuver against prepared enemy positions. Freier noted that after planned cutbacks, while U.S. allies will retain some stabilization and foreign assistance capabilities, only the United States will have useful amounts of the high-intensity ground-combat capabilities that he judges the Pentagon is underestimating.

Freier's report makes its recommendation on the capabilities and operational tasks U.S. forces should be able to perform. His report says much less on how large U.S. ground forces should be at the end of the decade. He acknowledges that air and naval challenges in Asia are real and that "large numbers of heavy ground forces are clearly unrealistic in the current context."

Ground force totals are undoubtedly headed much lower. Freier and his team only ask that planners take a hard look at what those soldiers should be ready for. According to Freier, the current conventional wisdom they are preparing for may be dangerously wrong.

General-turned-Spy-Chief Gives Military Greater Role in CIA Analysis of Afghan War by Kimberly Dozier, Associated Press.

David Petraeus, the former general who led the Afghanistan war and now heads the CIA, has ordered his intelligence analysts to give greater weight to the opinions of troops in the fight... CIA analysts now will consult with battlefield commanders earlier in the process as they help create elements of a National Intelligence Estimate on the course of the war…

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Afghanistan

On a Remote Afghan Mountain, a Test of US Plans - NYT

Afghan Helicopter Mission Defended - WP

ISAF Operations Summary - AFPS

Afghan Students Rally Against Pakistan - AP

Pakistan

US Drone Strike Kills Haqqani Insider - WP

Top Haqqani Commander Killed in Pakistan Drone Strike - BBC

Suspected US Drones 'Kill 10 Militants' in Pakistan - BBC

Intelligence Links Iran to Saudi Diplomat’s Murder in Karachi - WP

Iran

Obama Warns Iran Must Pay for 'Reckless Behavior' - VOA

Obama Says Facts Support Accusation of Iranian Plot - NYT

Obama Vows to Hold Iran Accountable - WP

US Considers Sanctions on Iran's Central Bank - LAT

Obama Says Iran to Face Toughest Possible Sanctions - Reuters

Obama Blames Plot to Kill Saudi Diplomat on Iran - AP

Obama Censures Iran over 'Plot' - BBC

US Eyeing New Sanctions Against Iran - VOA

US Eyes Iran's Central Bank as Sanctions Target - Reuters

US Believes Khamenei Aware of Assassination Plot - S&S

Iran Scoffs at US Account of Alleged Assassination Plot - NYT

Drugs and Terror Mix in Case - WSJ

Ambassador Plot Casts Light on Iran's Strike Force - AP

Syria

Activists: Clashes in Syria Kill at Least 13 - VOA

Clashes in Syrian Uprising Leave at Least 14 Dead - NYT

Clashes in Syria 'Leave 19 Dead' - BBC

Twenty Killed in Syrian Clashes, EU Sanctions Bank - Reuters

Man Charged in US for Spying on Syrian Protesters - Reuters

Libya

US Launches Effort to Track Down Gaddafi Missiles - WP

Libya Revolutionaries Have Surt in Stranglehold - LAT

Amnesty Urges Libya to Tackle 'Stain' of Detainee Abuse - BBC

Islamic Hard-liners Vandalize Sufi Shrines in Tripoli - AP

Iraq

Militants Aided by Iran Fired at GI’s in Iraq, Officials Say - NYT

New Security Steps in Iraq Withdrawal - WP

After Attack, Neighborhood Bounces Back to Normalcy - NYT

Bomb Blasts Hit Iraq's Sadr City - BBC

Twin Explosions in Baghdad Kill 15 People - AP

Two Bombings Kill 16 in Baghdad Shi'ite District - Reuters

Turkey Urges Iraq to Crackdown on Kurdish Rebels - AP

Israel / Palestinians

Israel-Palestinian Swap Due in Sinai Next Week - Reuters

Palestinian Prisoners in Trade May be Deported - AP

Clinton: Arafat Changed Mind on Peace Deal - AP

Israel Does Not Stand Alone - WP opinion

Israel Gives In to Terrorists - WT opinion

Egypt

Egypt’s Arrests of Smugglers Show Threat of Libya Arms - NYT

Egypt Military Takes over Inquiry of Coptic Unrest - AP

Egypt Promises to Address Coptic Christians’ Concerns - NYT

Young, Tech-savvy Islamists Try to Project New Image - LAT

Imprisoned Egyptian Blogger's Hunger Strike Fights Military Rule - VOA

Egypt’s Failing Army - NYT editorial

Middle East / North Africa

US Arms Deal to Bahrain Faces Resistance - WP

Saudi Claims Alleged Iranian Plotter Orchestrated Bahrain Unrest - NYT

An Ominous Message from Tunisia - WP

US Department of Defense

Amid a World of Threats, Panetta Laments Pending Budget Axe - S&S

Panetta Assails Plan for US Military Cuts - Reuters

Panetta: Doubling Cuts Would Force Irresponsible Budgeting - AFPS

Dempsey: Partnerships, Innovation Crucial for Future Force - AFPS

Drone Computer Virus Nothing to Worry About, Air Force Says - NYT

United States

Lawmakers Suggest Treating Drug Cartels as Terror Organizations - WT

Three US Muslims Convicted in Terrorism Case - LAT

Occupy Wall Street Braces for Showdown - LAT

Feds Can't Say 'Our Soldiers' in Mass. Terror Case - AP

Judge Tosses Iraq Vet's Lawsuit over 'Hurt Locker' - AP

America the Overcommitted - NYT opinion

Ending Hypocrisy of Terrorist Designation - WT opinion

Africa

Gunmen Kidnap 2 European Aid Workers in Kenya - NYT

Spanish MSF Doctors Seized Near Kenya-Somali Border - BBC

Gunmen Kidnap 2 Aid Workers in Kenya; Link to Somalia - WP

2 Spanish Aid Workers Seized in Kenya Refugee Camp - AP

Kenya Hunts Spanish Pair's Captors - BBC

Liberia's Ellen Johnson Sirleaf Likely to Face Run-off - BBC

Liberia's Johnson-Sirleaf Leads on Early Vote Count - Reuters

Ex-Warlord Becomes Kingmaker in Liberia Ballot - AP

In Sudan, the 'Voice of the Antonov' Sows Terror - Reuters

Uganda Ministers Deny Corruption - BBC

Discontent Simmers as Uganda’s Economy Staggers - NYT

Americas

Panetta Warns of Retreat in Africa Due to Budget Cuts - WT

SOUTCOM, Partners Fight Transnational Crime - AFPS

Mexico Arrests Key Leader of Zetas Gang - LAT

Mexican Army Captures Drug Cartel Lieutenant - AP

Arrest over Mexico Casino Attack - BBC

Mexico Steps Up Security as Host of Pan Am Games - LAT

Casino Arrests Stir Scandal in Mexico - WSJ

Ex-Cartel House Converted Into Kids Club in Mexico - AP

Venezuela: Chavez Proposes Shooting Down Drug Planes - AP

Colombia's President Santos Hails US Trade Deal Vote - BBC

2nd Ex-Guatemala General Detained in Genocide Case - AP

Haiti Gov't Links to Old Regime Prompt Scrutiny - AP

Haiti Leader Determined to Revived Disbanded Army - AP

Asia Pacific

US Welcomes South Korean President on State Visit - VOA

South Korean President Hails Trade Deal, US Partnership - WT

Obama Hails South Korea Trade Deal as Win for Both - AP

The Enduring US-Korean Alliance - WT opinion

Radiation Hotspots Found in Japan - WP

China's Export Growth Eases Amid Global Turmoil - NYT

As Thai Floods Spread, Experts Blame Officials, Not Rain - NYT

Bangkok Rushes to Dig Canals to Prevent Flooding - AP

Thai PM Confident Bangkok Will Escape Worst of Floods - Reuters

Burma Political Prisoner Releases 'Not Enough' - BBC

Call for All Burma Political Inmates to Be Freed - AP

Greenpeace Director Denied Entry to Indonesia - AP

Europe

Slovakia Ratifies Eurozone Fund - BBC

Slovakia Approves European Rescue Fund - NYT

Slovakia Approves Bailout Fund - WP

New Downgrade for Spain's Credit Rating - BBC

G20 Meeting to Discuss Eurozone - BBC

Berlin Firebomb Alert: 4th Day Device Found on Train Line - BBC

Young Russian Scientists Rally Against Bureaucracy - WP

Russia: Putin's Presidency Bid Fails to Boost Party's Ratings - Reuters

New Charges Possible Against Former Ukraine PM - NYT

Ukraine's Yulia Tymoshenko Faces Embezzlement Inquiry - BBC

Concerns Grow About Authoritarianism in Macedonia - NYT

Belarus KGB Gets Tough New Powers as Anger Grows - AP

Mladic to Have One War Crimes Trials, Not Two - Reuters

Saudi-backed Religious Tolerance Center Opens in Vienna - AP

South Asia

Burmese President Visits India as Ties Between Neighbors Deepen - VOA

Squeezed Out in India, Students Turn to US - NYT

India: Seized Car Bomb 'Targeted Delhi' - BBC

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Afghanistan

Report Finds No Wrongdoing in Copter Crash - NYT

US Report: RPG Downed Chinook in Afghanistan - AP

Probe Finds No US Fault in Afghan Chopper Crash - Reuters

UN Extends Mandate of NATO-led Force in Afghanistan - VOA

Tracking Supplies Sent to Afghanistan Remains Problematic - S&S

Every NATO Kill-Capture Mission Detailed and Visualized - TG

ISAF Operations Roundup - AFPS

Pakistan

US Envoy in Pakistan as Suspected Drone Kills Haqqani Aide - Reuters

Deadly 'Drone Attack' in Pakistan - BBC

US Missile Kills Haqqani 'Coordinator' in Pakistan - AP

Pakistanis Wonder What More They Can Do in War on Militancy - Reuters

Iran

Alleged Assassination Plot Heightens Iran-Saudi Tension - LAT

US Talks Tough to Iran, but Holds Off on Harsher Moves - NYT

An Uncharacteristically Clumsy Plot - WP

US Challenged to Explain Accusations of Iran Plot - NYT

Obama Pressed to Get Tough on Iran for Terror Plot - WT

Clinton: Iranian Assassination Plot a 'Dangerous Escalation' - VOA

Iranian Leader Thought to Have OK'd Plot - LAT

Alleged Iran Plot May Have Violated UN Treaty - Reuters

Iran Rejects US Claims of Saudi Plot - VOA

Iran Airline Hit by US Sanctions - BBC

Iranians Puzzled over Alleged Plot - WP

Unlikely Turn for a Suspect in a Terror Plot - NYT

Plot Suspect Recalled as Upbeat about Finances - WP

The Threat from Iran - WP editorial

The Charges Against Iran - NYT editorial

The Keystone Iranians - WP opinion

Tehran’s Foes, Unfairly Maligned - NYT opinion

Iraq

Iraq Says it's Asked for 5,000 US Trainers, Awaits Reply - McClatchy

US: No Decision Yet on Troop Levels in Iraq - AP

Iraq Drawdown Continues as Partnership Takes Shape - AFPS

US Forces Have Met All Obligations in Iraq, General Says - AFPS

Series of Baghdad Bombings Kill at Least 25 - VOA

Insurgents Attack Security Forces Across Baghdad - NYT

25 Killed in Slew of Attacks Targeting Iraq Police - AP

An Embrace of the US, Spun and Mixed by Iraqis - NYT

Israel / Palestinians

Prisoner Swap Could Come Next Week - WP

Israel, Hamas Both Benefit from Prisoner Swap - VOA

Prisoner Swap Deal Losing its Luster for Both Sides - LAT

Prisoner Trade May Reshape Politics in Region - NYT

Mid-East Prisoner Swap Welcomed - BBC

Inside Israeli Desert, Standoff Over Land - AP

Syria

Va. Man Accused of Surveilling anti-Assad Protests for Syria - WP

Syrian-American Arrested on Charges of Spying for Damascus - NYT

Virginian Held on Charges of Surveilling Foes of Assad - WT

US Man 'Spied for Syrian Agency' - BBC

Syrians Rally in Support of Assad - NYT

Preventing a Syrian Civil War - NYT opinion

Libya

Libya's NTC Says Control of Sirte is Near - VOA

Libya Fighters Say Capture of Sirte Is Near - NYT

Gaddafi's Sirte Forces 'Cornered' - BBC

Libya Official: No Confirmation Gadhafi Son Caught - AP

Confusion over Gaddafi Son's Fate - BBC

Islamic Hard-Liners Attack Rival Shrines in Libya - AP

Egypt

Smuggled Libyan Weapons Flood into Egypt - WP

Egyptian Military Defends Handling of Deadly Copt Protest - VOA

Egypt Military Says Soldiers Didn't Intentionally Kill Copts - LAT

Egyptian Generals Plead for Understanding - NYT

Egyptian Army Defends Protest Action - BBC

Egypt’s Tower of Babel - WT opinion

Middle East / North Africa

A Blogger at Arab Spring's Genesis - NYT

Al-Qaida Leader Urges Algerian Overthrow; Calls for an Islamic Libya - VOA

Bahrain Opposition Says Will Keep Protesting - Reuters

Swiss Say Trying to Release Dictators' Stashed Loot - Reuters

US Department of Defense

Panetta Says Difficult Pentagon Cuts are Coming - Reuters

Army Secretary Says Cuts Might Be ‘Catastrophic’ - Bloomberg

US Army May Cancel Programs to Trim Budget - Reuters

Panetta: Services Must Work Jointly on Budget ‘Storms’ - AFPS

Panetta Provides Firsthand Account of Overseas Trip - AFPS

Panetta to Visit Asia Later this Month - AP

Inside the Ring - WT

United States

Obama Gains Victory on Free-trade Agreements - WP

Congress Ends 5-Year Standoff on Trade Deals in Rare Accord - NYT

Amb. Nominee Wants Normal Trade Status for Russia - WP

Export Changes Raise Proliferation Worries - WT

At the Border, on the Night Watch - NYT

US Issues Worldwide Travel Warning - VOA

Nigerian Man Pleads Guilty in 'Underwear Bomb' Plot - VOA

'Underwear Bomber' Pleads Guilty in Airline Plot - LAT

'Underpants Bomber' Pleads Guilty - BBC

Viktor Bout Arms Dealing Trial Begins in New York - BBC

Russian on Trial in Arms Case - WP

AG Holder Documents Subpoenaed in “Fast and Furious” Probe - WT

House Panel Subpoenas Failed Gun Sting Documents - Reuters

A News Story Is Growing With ‘Occupy’ Protests - NYT

Wall Street Protests: A Long American Tradition - LAT opinion

Gunwalker is Only the Tip of a Scandal Iceberg - WT opinion

Africa

Liberia Election Count Under Way - VOA

Liberia to Release First Election Results - Reuters

Cameroon's Presidential Vote Tally Challenged - VOA

Accused Uganda Ministers Resign - BBC

Americas

Deadly Storm Hits Central America - BBC

Mexico: Gulf Cartel's Accountant Found Shot Dead - AP

Venezuela: Chavez Opponent Launches Presidential Campaign - AP

Some Violence as Colombian Students Protest - AP

Haiti's President Meets With 'Baby Doc,' Aristide - AP

Haiti President Talks Reconciliation With Ex-Leaders - Reuters

Haiti Gov't Links to Old Regime Prompt Scrutiny - AP

Asia Pacific

S. Korea to Review Status of Forces Agreement with US - S&S

US Passes South Korea Trade Deal - BBC

S. Korean State Visit Highlights Bond Between 2 Leaders - NYT

Obama, S. Korea's Lee to Talk Trade, N. Korea Strategy - Reuters

South Korea Critical to America’s Future - WT editorial

South Korea Defies the Odds - WP opinion

Tending a Small Patch of Capitalism in N. Korea - NYT

Study: Heavy-Handed Repression of Tibetan Area in China - NYT

China Activist Charged With Subversion Languishes - AP

Burma Frees Dozens of Political Prisoners - BBC

Burma Begins to Release Some of Its Political Prisoners - NYT

Burma Frees Fewer Prisoners than Expected - LAT

Burma Releases Dissidents, Keeps Many Locked Up - AP

Burma Opposition Wants All Political Detainees Freed - Reuters

UN Investigator Wants More Freed in Burma - Reuters

Indonesia Sentences Jihadist to 8 Years - AP

Europe

EU Chief Unveils Crisis 'Roadmap' - BBC

EU Speeds Up Capital Rules for Big Banks - AP

Slovakia Reaches Deal on Bailout - WP

Slovakia Deal Revives Hope on Fund to Save Euro - NYT

Slovak Parties Reach Deal on Euro Rescue Fund - Reuters

EU Commission Urges Europe to Act on Greece - Reuters

Serbian EU Bid Moves Step Forward - BBC

Serbia Wins Qualified EU Invite, Turkey Criticized - Reuters

Ukrainian Opposition Leader “to Be Freed Soon” - NYT

Poland: 19 Held in Probe Launched After Norway Killings - AP

South Asia

Encephalitis Kills 400 in India - BBC

India Policeman Cleared of Reporter’s Murder - BBC

India Lawyer Beaten 'for Kashmir Views' - BBC

Bhutan’s Modern ‘Dragon King’ Weds Longtime Girlfriend - WP

The U.S. Central Command investigation into the Aug. 6, 2011, CH-47 crash in Wardak Province, Afghanistan, is complete. The investigation confirmed that the primary cause of the accident was an insurgent-fired rocket propelled grenade strike to the aft rotor blade as the helicopter approached its combat landing zone. The investigation determined that operational planning and execution were consistent with previous missions, and that the forces and capabilities were appropriate given the agility required to maintain pressure on insurgent networks. There was no evidence of a pre-planned ambush. An unclassified executive summary of the investigation is available on the CENTCOM website.