| Small Wars Journal

The Document: On 25 July 2011, the National Security Staff released its Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. The report is available at (http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime) and can be accessed as a pdf or in html by using the links provided (1). The contents are as follows:

i. Definition

ii. Letter from President Barack Obama: Executive Summary;

I. Introduction,

II. Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International Security,

III. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Priority Actions;

1. Start at Home: Taking Shared Responsibility for Transnational Organized Crime,

2. Enhance Intelligence and Information Sharing,

3. Protect the Financial System and Strategic Markets against Transnational Organized Crime,

4. Strengthen Interdiction, Investigations, and Prosecutions,

5. Disrupt Drug Trafficking and Its Facilitation of Other Transnational Threats,

6. Build International Capacity, Cooperation, and Partnerships.

Key Statements:

a). The characteristics of transnational organized crime (TOC) may include that— “They attempt to gain influence in government, politics, and commerce through corrupt as well as legitimate means;”

b). “Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. These networks also threaten U.S. interests by forging alliances with corrupt elements of national governments and using the power and influence of those elements to further their criminal activities.”

c). “In January 2010, the United States Government completed a comprehensive review of international organized crime—the first on this topic since 1995. Based on the review and subsequent reporting, the Administration has concluded that, in the intervening years, international—or transnational— organized crime has expanded dramatically in size, scope, and influence and that it poses a significant threat to national and international security.”

Western Hemisphere Overview: “TOC networks—including transnational gangs—have expanded and matured, threatening the security of citizens and the stability of governments throughout the region, with direct security implications for the United States. Central America is a key area of converging threats where illicit trafficking in drugs, people, and weapons—as well as other revenue streams—fuel increased instability. Transnational crime and its accompanying violence are threatening the prosperity of some Central American states and can cost up to eight percent of their gross domestic product, according to the World Bank. The Government of Mexico is waging an historic campaign against transnational criminal organizations, many of which are expanding beyond drug trafficking into human smuggling and trafficking, weapons smuggling, bulk cash smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom. TOC in Mexico makes the U.S. border more vulnerable because it creates and maintains illicit corridors for border crossings that can be employed by other secondary criminal or terrorist actors or organizations. Farther south, Colombia has achieved remarkable success in reducing cocaine production and countering illegal armed groups, such as the FARC, that engage in TOC. Yet, with the decline of these organizations, new groups are emerging such as criminal bands known in Spanish as Bandas Criminales, or Bacrims.”

Analysis: This strategy was released less than three months ago and according to Bob Killebrew “…is in effect a replacement for the now-outdated U.S. strategy to combat terrorism. This is a good first step” (2). While I agree it is a step in the right direction, the threat perceptions underlying it are overly traditionalist—some would even say woefully obsolete— and representative of static 20^th century thinking. I thus have very great concerns regarding the threat assumptions underlying the strategy since, if the baseline assumptions are faulty, then the rest of the strategy that is derived from those assumptions becomes highly suspect (3). Unfortunately, 21^st century ‘street realities’ of the last eleven years taking place in Mexico, in areas of Central America, and in other locales appear in no way to have influenced the threat perceptions underlying the strategy. At best, transnational organized crime is viewed as gaining ‘influence in governmental politics’, ‘forging alliances with corrupt elements of national governments’, and ‘threatening the security of citizens and the stability of governments throughout the region’ (within the context of some Central American states). Such perceptions are indicative of the primacy and immutability of the nation-state as a social and political form of human organization. TOC within this threat context is viewed much like bloated ticks feeding off of host states. They represent parasitical organizations drawing upon illicit, and at times licit, economies to sustain themselves. TOC, such as the Mexican cartels, could thus never criminalize, capture, or kill a host state—or a region or city within it— based on these threat perceptions. The emergence of a ‘criminal-state’ or a ‘new warmaking entity’ or the existence of a ‘criminal insurgency’ taking place within a state simply cannot be accounted for in a strategy derived from these threat perceptions. The governments and citizens of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras should no doubt be comforted by the fact that they are only threatened with issues of stability and no more. While the strategy may serve to perpetuate the legalistic charade of the nation-state’s ‘monopoly on political violence’ and ‘control over its sovereign borders,’ it does a great disservice to the American people and others by not fully recognizing the TOC threat. Criminal-insurgencies are currently raging across Mexico, in areas of Central America, and in other locales (4). Cities and regions have been captured by de facto politicized cartel and gang entities with criminal para-states established by the Zetas, the Sinaloans, and other criminal organizations. This is representative of the blurring of crime and war ‘nightmare scenarios’ which have been debated since the 1990s and have since manifested themselves throughout the globe. Until US governmental threat perceptions mature—especially in strategic documents that outline our national policies— the cartel and gang threats we are now witnessing in the Western Hemisphere will continue to be misunderstood and underestimated.

Notes

All quotes without notes pertain to the White House strategy document.

1. Also see “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the Announcement of the Transnational Organized Crime Strategy”. Justice News. Monday, 25 July 2011, http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110725.html.

2. Col Robert B. Killebrew, U.S. Army (Retired), “Crime & War.” Proceedings. October 2011: 26. This citation contains a note thanking Killebrew’s CNAS colleague Matt Irvine for his initial perception concerning it replacing the U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

3. My concerns are very different than those articulated by the TransBorder Project, a project of the Center for International Policy in Washington, DC. See Tom Barry, “U.S. Drug War Turns to Transnational Combat”. Border Lines. Wednesday, 3 August 2011, http://borderlinesblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/us-drug-war-turns-to-transnational.html.

4. The developed construct is attributed to John P. Sullivan in 2008. Many of his writings on this subject first appeared in Small Wars Journal.

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The ACWG: Khe Sahn 2.0?

The ACWG: Khe Sahn 2.0?

By: Zacchaeus

When one thinks of the Marine Corps fighting in the defense, one can't help to harken back to the Battle of Khe Sahn. In January 1968 Marines from the III Marine Amphibious Force undertook the daunting mission of defending and holding the base complex at Khe Sahn in the Quang Tri Province of South Viet Nam. For nearly six months Marines mounted a gallant defense while suffering heavy losses from a numerically superior North Vietnamese Force. Khe Sahn was an isolated, untenable position that was eventually lost to the enemy but the bravery and tenacity of the Marines who fought and died there will be forever etched in the proud legacy of the United States Marine Corps.

A few weeks ago the Commandant of the Marine Corps launched a detail of 25 Marines on a mission with characteristics similar to Khe Sahn – to defend and hold an untenable position. The 25 Marines of the Amphibious Capabilities Working Group are charged with redefining the Marine Corps Amphibious Mission. While it’s clear the US Military needs amphibious combat capabilities in its portfolio, it’s unclear of how to build and maintain the right amount of amphibious forces in the current fiscal climate.

To make the mission more complex, the group must contend with the results of last year’s Force Structure Review Group. The group’s report called for a Marine Corps reduction from the present 202,000 level to an endstrength of approximately 185,000 active duty Marines. This is larger than the Marine Corps of 2001 and the necessitated growth is attributed to the new Marine Special Operations mission. However, most national security experts call for a much smaller Marine Corps, with one estimate as low as 145,000 from the CATO Institute. This number is similar to the worst case estimate resulting from budget reductions in a recent report for the House Armed Services Committee.

The FSRG did have one very important output that should drive the efforts of the ACWG – it defined the Marine Corps’ “sweet spot” as being a primarily maritime capability between special operations units and conventional army forces. Given this guidance, the current model of amphibious operations needs to be thrown out the window and should not be used as the starting point for this new construct. The current amphibious model is based on the perceived requirement for a two Marine Expeditionary Brigade package that is completely unaffordable.

This group of 25 Marine Field Grade Officers with common backgrounds and perspectives will have a challenge overcoming group think if they don’t bring in innovative thinkers from outside the Marine Corps. Two organizations that should be represented in the discussion are the Navy SEALs and British Royal Marine Commandos – both of these elite forces provide an efficient operational capability in the Maritime Environment with a force less than 10,000 each. The argument will be made that both of these forces provide different capability sets than the current Marine Corps force structure, nevertheless, both forces are expeditionary, lethal and operate effectively in the Maritime environment as well as “any clime or place.”

The Marine Corps should learn from these smaller forces and focus on Battalion or Squadron sized force packages. 12 (4x3 rotation) Battalions, roughly 12,000 Marines, could form the nucleus of the current Marine Expeditionary Unit Model. Battalions would be supported by robust rotary wing assault support and attack helicopters with unmanned aerial vehicles, logistics, intel and supporting arms deployed as required. Again the Marine Corps could develop 10 times the combat power of the Royal Marine Commandos with under 100,000 Marines. An additional 25,000 Marines could be used to support other Marine Corps centric missions such as Marine Security Forces, Military Police, Combat Engineers, Marine Anti-Terrorism Security Teams and Marine Special Operations. This new approach should place more emphasis on the “no worse enemy” portion of the battle cry and leave the “no better friend” mission for the Marine’s Global Force for Good brethren.

Where could the Marine Corps take reductions?

· Eliminate Fixed Wing Air Craft from the USMC inventory and rely on the Navy for support (it’s time to let go of the legacy of Guadalcanal)

· Eliminate Air Defense (airborne) and Low Altitude Air Defense Missions

· Leverage the Global Information Grid and reduce the deployed command and control footprint

· Shed missions such as Cyberspace, Civil Affairs, domestic Chemical Biological Response and other non-traditional missions that can be accomplished by another service

· Reduce support for COCOMS and conduct all operational planning at MARFORCOM

· Shift tank units and heavy assault capabilities to the reserves

· Restrict active duty personnel from performing inherently civilian work

While it may not have been given as a specified task in the mission statement to the AWCG, at the very heart of the discussion is the Marine Corps' ability to exist as a separate service within the Department of the Navy. This issue is worthy of further debate beyond the scope of this post. Tradition, legendary combat history, marketing slogans and the supposed “will of the American People” will only carry the day so far in the current budget debate. If the Marine Corps attempts to defend the untenable 185,000 end strength and protect unnecessary programs such as its Joint Strike Fight variant and the Osprey, the results will be disastrous.

______________

Zacchaeus was a Greek tax collector hated by his peers for perceived collaboration with the enemy. It is the pseudonym of a retired Marine, working at the Pentagon. He lives in fear for his children, family pet and automobile should his real identity fall into the hands of status quo thinkers in the Marine Corps.

Mexico's "Narco-Refugees": The Looming Challenge for U.S. National Security

by Paul Rexton Kan

Strategic Studies Institute

Since 2006, when Mexican President Felipe Calderon declared war on the drug cartels, there has been a rise in the number of Mexican nationals seeking political asylum in the United States to escape the ongoing drug cartel violence in their home country. Political asylum cases in general are claimed by those who are targeted for their political beliefs or ethnicity in countries that are repressive or are failing. Mexico is neither. Nonetheless, if the health of the Mexican state declines because criminal violence continues, increases, or spreads, U.S. communities will feel an even greater burden on their systems of public safety and public health from "narco-refugees." Given the ever increasing cruelty of the cartels, the question is whether and how the U.S. Government should begin to prepare for what could be a new wave of migrants coming from Mexico. Allowing Mexicans to claim asylum could potentially open a flood gate of migrants to the United States during a time when there is a very contentious national debate over U.S. immigration laws pertaining to illegal immigrants. On the other hand, to deny the claims of asylum seekers and return them to Mexico where they might very well be killed, strikes at the heart of American values of justice and humanitarianism. This monograph focuses on the asylum claims of Mexicans who unwillingly leave Mexico rather than those who willingly enter the United States legally or illegally. To successfully navigate through this complex issue will require a greater level of understanding and vigilance at all levels of the U.S. Government.

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Karzai looks for leverage in Delhi. He should try Beijing, too.

According to the Washington Post and numerous other news outlets, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has given up on talking to the Taliban, which he now asserts is merely a proxy army controlled by the Pakistani government. Under this assumption, Karzai has concluded that he needs to negotiate with the Pakistani leadership in Islamabad, which according to Karzai, “has pursued a double game toward Afghanistan … using terrorism as a means.”

There is nothing new in Karzai’s description of the problem. However, the recent assassination of former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani, who had been heading up a negotiation effort with the Taliban, catalyzed Karzai’s decision to break off talks with the Taliban and to confront Islamabad instead. Karzai may have concluded that he needed to drop (at least for now) attempts at direct reconciliation with the Taliban and to harden his line against Pakistan, if only to avoid a revolt by the former Northern Alliance, non-Pashtun portions of his government.

Confronting Islamabad will be a waste of effort for Karzai without some leverage. This explains his quick trip this week to Delhi to sign a “strategic partnership agreement” with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, an agreement that includes Indian training for Afghanistan’s police. Singh promised that India would “stand by Afghanistan” after Western troops depart in 2014.

This is a logical step for Karzai, but doesn’t promise to deliver much leverage against Pakistan. India and Afghanistan would have to take much stronger measures to persuade Pakistan to adopt a different policy regarding Afghanistan and its support for the Afghan Taliban. India has its reasons to maintain connections with Afghanistan. But it doesn’t have a good reason under current circumstances to run any significant risks for Karzai’s benefit, which will limit the amount of leverage Karzai is looking for. And until that happens, Pakistan is likely to see even more reason to maintain its current Afghan policy.

Where else might Karzai look for leverage? There is always self-help. If, as Karzai asserts, Afghanistan is under attack from a Pakistani proxy war, a traditional nation-state response would be some form of military retaliation against Pakistan in an attempt to persuade its leaders to change their policy. When it comes to defending its territory against foreign invaders, Afghanistan’s reputation for eventual success is legendary. But retaliation against Pakistan would call for cross-border offensive action. What is Afghanistan’s offensive military capacity? The Afghan battleground is a hothouse of irregular and hybrid warfare techniques. Whether there is any prospect of the Afghan government fashioning these forms of warfare into effective transnational offensive tools is an interesting and unanswered question.

Does Karzai see any role for the United States in his search for leverage? He must have concluded that the current U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan is irrelevant to his need for leverage over Pakistan – indeed, the larger the U.S. force in Afghanistan, the more leverage Pakistan has over the U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen’s eleventh-hour tirade against Pakistan, uttered just days before his retirement, was the clearest sign that the Obama administration finally sees the need to change its approach toward Islamabad. But Karzai can’t hold out much hope that the United States will do much to solve his leverage problem, since the U.S. seems intent on washing its hand of the situation after 2014.

As a last resort, Karzai may look to Beijing. Mineral-hungry China may be interested in Afghanistan’s resources and a shipment route into China that doesn’t have to transit waters controlled by the U.S. and Indian navies. But tapping Afghanistan’s mineral wealth will require good behavior by Pakistan and a settlement to Afghanistan’s civil war. As Pakistan’s last and most powerful friend, China may have the leverage to create these conditions. That such a scenario is long-shot only shows what a difficult spot Karzai is in.

Grafenwoehr Full Spectrum Exercise Tosses COIN

Grafenwoehr Full Spectrum Exercise Tosses COIN by Steven Beardsley, Stars and Stripes. Bluf:

… Known as a full spectrum training environment, the complex, monthlong exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels reshapes a brigade into an expeditionary force and pits it against a conventional force armed with tanks, helicopters and unmanned drones. It’s the first European exercise of its scope in a decade, organizers say…

That scale is set in part by the Army’s full spectrum operations doctrine, updated extensively in 2008. The first update since the June 2001 edition, it was released two years after the Army published its counter-insurgency manual. Much like that doctrine, the update emphasized the importance of stability operations…

If COIN is excluded is it truly “full spectrum” or is this just one phase of future training that will also include COIN and STABOPS?

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5 October SWJ Roundup

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Afghanistan

With Modern Means, Taliban Bolster Sway in Afghanistan - NYT

India and Afghanistan Sign Pact - WP

Afghanistan Favors India and Denigrates Pakistan - NYT

India, Afghanistan Pledge Cooperation - LAT

Afghanistan Signs Pact with India, Irking Pakistan - AP

Karzai Reassures Pakistan over India 'Strategic Pact' - BBC

In India, Karzai Reaches Out to 'Brother' Pakistan - Reuters

NATO: Haqqani Network Leader Killed in Afghanistan - AP

NATO Says Kills Senior Haqqani Commander - Reuters

10 Years On and Life Grim for Afghans - AP

ISAF Operations Roundup - AFPS

Double Trouble in Afghanistan - WP editorial

Pakistan

Pakistan Appears More Isolated After India-Afghan Pact - Reuters

Pakistan Taliban Play Down Talks - BBC

In Pakistan, a Humanitarian Light Shines - LAT

Gunmen Attack Shiites on Bus in Southwest Pakistan - NYT

Syria

Russia, China Veto UN Resolution on Syria; US, Europe ‘Outraged’ - VOA

UN Resolution on Syria Blocked by Russia and China - NYT

Russia, China Block Syria Resolution - WP

UN Resolution on Syria is Vetoed - BBC

Western Effort to End Assad’s Crackdown Fails - WT

Turkey Says Sanctions on Syria to Go Ahead - AP

Syrian Embassies Accused of Threatening Activists Overseas - VOA

Syria Revokes Week-Old Ban on Imports of Consumer Goods - NYT

US Senate Approves Robert Ford as Ambassador - LAT

Yemen

US-born Qaeda Cleric Awlaki Buried in Yemen - Reuters

Yemeni Troops Shell Anti-Saleh Forces - Reuters

Iraq

US Puts $10 Million Bounty on Iraq al-Qaida Leader - AP

Iraq Denies Legal Immunity to US Troops After 2011 -NYT

Iraqi Leaders Want US Trainers, Reject Immunity - AP

Libya

NTC Launches 'Final Assault' on Gadhafi Stronghold - VOA

Libyan Forces Plan 'Final' Attack on Gaddafi Hometown - Reuters

Sirte Residents Turn Anger on Libya's New Rulers - Reuters

On the Run, Gaddafi Leaves Few Footprints - Reuters

Back to School in Libya, and Struggling to Adjust - NYT

Egypt

Egypt Unclear on Timetable of Power Transfer, US Says - NYT

Panetta Prods Egypt on Democracy - WP

US Defense Secretary Presses Cairo to Lift Security Law - LAT

Egyptian Columnists Protest Military Censorship - AP

Concern for Jailed Egypt Blogger - BBC

In Egypt, a Dreamer’s Lonely Protest - WP

Israel / Palestinians

Mideast 'Quartet' Envoys to Meet on Sunday - Reuters

US Palestinian Aid Block Censured - BBC

Palestinians Seeking Membership in UNESCO - AP

Teachers' Protest Closes Gaza's UN Schools - AP

Israel Bombing Killed Captives in Lebanon - Reuters

Israel Dismisses Deputy Envoy to US Over Media Leak - Reuters

Middle East / North Africa

Clashes in Eastern Saudi Arabia Region - BBC

Bahrain Sentences Pro-Reform Activists to Prison - VOA

Bahrain Jails 27 for Unrest Links - BBC

Al Qaeda / Terrorism

When Leaders Die, Terror Still Thrives - NYT opinion

NATO

NATO Ministers to Discuss Afghanistan, Libya - AP

U.S. Cuts Put Pressure on NATO to Boost Cooperation - Reuters

Panetta: US Military Can't Make Up NATO Shortfalls - AP

US Department of Defense

The American Military and Civilians, Worlds Apart - WP

No 9/11 Trial this Year at Guantanamo War Court - S&S

Army Corps Contracting Fraud Alleged - WP

DOD: $35 M for Families to Leave Japan Following Nuclear Crisis - S&S

United States

Detention of Terror Suspects Blocks Defense Bill - AP

Electrocution Case Against KBR Can be Tried in US Court - S&S

2 Other Somalis Sentenced in Piracy Case - VOA

Jury Sought for Nigerian Held in Bid to Bomb Jet - NYT

Defendant in Underwear Bomb Case has Outburst in Court - LAT

Memo: Holder Told of ‘Fast and Furious’ as Early as July 2010 - WT

Puerto Rico Prodded to Get Tough on Police - NYT

Hint of Deterrence in US Drone-War Strategy - WP opinion

Africa

Somalia: Deadly Bombing in Mogadishu Marks Return of Al-Shabab - VOA

Truck Bomb Kills Dozens in Somalia’s Capital - NYT

Deadly Attack Hits Somali Capital - BBC

Truck Bomb Kills Dozens in Capital of Somalia - AP

Freed Sudanese Slave Testifies to US Congressional Panel - VOA

Rwanda Leader 'Sparked Genocide' - BBC

Uganda LRA Rebel Tracker Unveiled - BBC

Dalai Lama’s Visa Request Is Denied by South Africa - NYT

Dalai Lama Cancels Highly Charged South Africa Trip - Reuters

Americas

Mexico Police Held in Drugs Probe - BBC

Mexico Nabs 9 Escaped Inmates at Cartel Camp - AP

Haiti Appoints New Prime Minister - BBC

Haiti's Long Wait for PM Ends With 3rd Pick - AP

Asia Pacific

Fed Chief: Undervalued Chinese Currency Harms US Recovery - VOA

Rogers Slams China on Cyber-Espionage - WP

US Lawmakers Demand Action over China Cyber Attacks - LAT

Lawmaker Calls Out Beijing on Internet ‘Trade War’ - WT

US Lawmaker Slams China for Cyber Spying - AP

Russia Reveals China 'Spy' Arrest - BBC

US Senate’s Bill on Tariffs Angers China -NYT

China Moves to Rein in Microblogs - WP

DOD Official Cites Importance of Stability in Taiwan Strait - AFPS

North Korea Rejects Preconditions for Nuclear Talks - AFP

N. Korea Wants Back 2 Citizens Found in South Waters - AP

Malaysia Frees 125 Suspects in Security Law Repeal - AP

Thailand Flood Deaths Exceed 200 - BBC

Philippine Police Capture Suspected Beheader - AP

The Wrong Way to Deal With China - NYT editorial

In Myanmar, Seize the Moment - NYT opinion

Europe

Europe Wavers on Terms of Second Greek Bailout - VOA

Greece Hit by New General Strike - BBC

Greek Workers Strike to Protest Austerity Program - NYT

Greek Terrorist Trial Postponed Due to Strike - AP

Italy's Credit Rating is Slashed - BBC

Russia Declares Close to Joining the World Trade Organization - NYT

Putin Aide Woos Russia's Middle-Class Voters - Reuters

Russia Reveals China 'Spy' Arrest - BBC

In Polish Election, a Rivalry Deepened by Tragedy - AP

Turkey Detains 140 in Inquiry on Kurds - NYT

South Asia

India Police Make 'Gandhi Gaffe' - BBC

Ceasefire by West Bengal Maoists - BBC

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Cut the Army, Forget Counterinsurgency (Updated)

Obama’s Favorite Think Tank: Cut the Army, Forget Counterinsurgency by Spencer Ackerman, Wired’s Danger Room. Bluf:

The Obama administration’s favorite defense think tank was once a hothouse of counterinsurgency theory. But now that the government is trying to crawl out of its massive debt, the Center for a New American Security is less about big ground conflicts and more about how to shrink the defense budget. First on the chopping block, according to its forthcoming blueprint for defense cuts: counterinsurgency. Next: the Army and Marines who wage it.

“Extended counterinsurgency operations” are passe once the U.S. draws down in Afghanistan, says Nora Bensahel, a defense expert at CNAS, as the think tank is ubiquitously known in Washington. “We’re judging that a less-likely scenario.” …

More on Hard Choices: Responsible Defense in the Age of Austerity from the Center for a New American Security:

The Budget Control Act of 2011 has set the government on a path to dramatically reduce spending over the next decade, and a congressional "super committee" is now seeking to trim spending by more than $1 trillion beyond the cuts already enacted this year. As additional cuts are made, we must ask: How can the United States responsibly and effectively maximize its security in this era of growing fiscal austerity?

Authored by Center for a New American Security (CNAS) experts LTG David W. Barno, USA (Ret.), Dr. Nora Bensahel and Travis Sharp, the forthcoming report Hard Choices: Responsible Defense in an Age of Austerity answers this question and highlights the implications of tough budget cuts on America's military capabilities. Hard Choices outlines four budget cut scenarios and evaluates possible trade-offs among force structure, end strength, procurement and overhead. Barno, Bensahel and Sharp also offer several potential reforms to military pay and benefits.

On October 7, 2011, CNAS will release Hard Choices at an event featuring a discussion with the report authors and leading defense and budget experts Gordon Adams, Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center, and Tom Donnelly, Resident Fellow and Director of the Center for Defense Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. RSVP online here.

Copies of Hard Choices: Responsible Defense in an Age of Austerity will be available at the event on October 7 and a light breakfast will be served.

Update: Hard Choices: Responsible Defense in an Age of Austerity is now posted at CNAS.

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