| Small Wars Journal

They are the Sopranos of the Afghanistan war, a ruthless crime family that built an empire out of kidnapping, extortion, smuggling, even trucking. They have trafficked in precious gems, stolen lumber and demanded protection money from businesses building roads and schools with American reconstruction funds… And they are accused by American officials of being guns for hire: a proxy force used by the Pakistani intelligence service to carry out grisly, high-profile attacks in Kabul and throughout the country.

Read more about The Sopranos of the Afghan War

A New RMA???

A New RMA???

Chad C. Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq War, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011, 224 pages, $26.95.

If, as the historian Victor Davis Hanson claims, effectiveness in conflicts requires an ability to radically change our forces, or find entirely new competencies, then the study of adaptation within ongoing wars is central to future military success. A Revolution in Military Adaptation provides numerous insights on how U.S. Army units identified and implemented necessary changes in the recent past in Iraq. This effort seeks to understand the process by which the U.S. Army sought out and applied new solutions in the crucible of combat.

The author of this well-crafted scholarship is a former Army officer who now serves with the RAND Corporation. Dr. Chad Serena highlights how unprepared the U.S. Army was for exploiting the military success the United States had achieved with the political conditions that had really been assigned in 2003. Forces designed and trained for quickly destroying Iraq’s military power proved themselves in conventional combat but were equally inept at the post-conflict stability phase. As a result, substantial organizational adaptation was necessary and the army made extensive Service-level changes. Serena argues that this success came in the absence of direction from the senior echelons of the Army and was promoted from tactical units in the field until it resonated belatedly back in the institutional army.

This book joins a number of recent efforts to explore the demands of adaptation at all levels of war. Previous entries include Major Brian Steed’s Piercing the Fog of War, Israeli Colonel Meir Finkel’s On Flexibility, and James Russell’s Innovation, Transformation, and War. (see SWJ 17 May 2011 http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/764-hoffman1.pdf ). Serena’s contribution is comparable to the latter due to the focus on U.S. operations in Iraq, while the former pair take on a broader swath of historical cases. Serena’s research was concurrent with these works but it does leverage Dr. John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, since Serena’s analytical foundation also exploits organizational learning theory. This intellectual lens is more appropriate for exploring adaptation in the midst of combat, given that most research into military innovation has focused on anticipatory change during interwar eras. Even the esteemed military historian Williamson Murray, editor of the well-regarded Military Innovation in the Interwar Period and now a professor of strategy and policy at the Naval War College, admits that his assessments of both military effectiveness and innovation have overlooked the importance of adaptation within an ongoing conflict (see Military Adaptation, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

Serena’s assessment captures critical aspects of organizational adaption, particularly the complex process of learning (and unlearning) and change. Dr. Serena also notes that culture “can either enable or disable organizational capability.” Organizational culture’s impact on accelerating or impeding this learning is given its due, consistent with both Finkel and Williamson Murray’s work.

Serena’s somewhat harsh evaluation about the Army needs to be tempered with the realization that the ability to evolve tactically or operationally can be restricted by either policy or strategic guidance. The Army’s ability to adapt in Iraq early was limited due to countervailing strategic direction from higher authority that either would not admit that there was an incipient insurgency nor would it allow U.S. forces to conduct traditional COIN practices. At least as long as Mr. Rumsfeld ran the Pentagon, the preferred strategy was to minimize U.S. forces and to generally avoid the intense effort at nation building required. Mr. Rumsfeld was abetted in his views by those of American (and largely U.S. Army) military leaders. General Casey’s and General Abizaid’s insistent belief that a light American footprint in Iraq would best suit our interests was hopeful but is largely now seen as enamored with T.E. Lawrence’s injunction to let Arabs find their own approach. Required operational-level adaptation will rarely occur in a timely manner when policy and strategic guidance constrain field commanders.

Serena’s interpretation of events focuses on the tactical component of adaptation via techniques and practices of deployed units, and only touches upon the harder and more time intensive aspect of materiel adaptation or the acquisition of new hardware solutions. This challenge is difficult in the midst of war where time is of the essence and certainly not irrelevant even in insurgencies as shown by the reaction/counter-reaction between improvised explosive devices and a host of technological solutions, including the MRAP. As these receive only passing reference in A Revolution in Military Adaptation, future scholars will have to build on Serena to examine this element of adaptation in greater detail.

Additionally, while Serena’s study of the U.S. Army is balanced it is limited in time and depth. More evidence is necessary to draw conclusive insights about how adaptation best occurs in all forms of war or in military institutions beyond the U.S. Army. The author’s organizational learning theory approach demonstrates mastery of the literature, more so than Steed or Finkel. Like Professor Russell, Serena’s emphasis on bottom up adaption relates principally to tactical level changes within theater, and tends to discount the need for military institutions to quickly assess, validate and incorporate field lessons from operations backwards into home stations, school houses and doctrine. Finkel’s identification of formal lessons learned processes, rapid dissemination, and connectivity to acquisition/industry for material solutions appears warranted and relevant to this inquiry. The author does not completely miss this aspect, commenting that adaptation must ultimately be both “resourced and nourished by higher command authorities.”

The author draws upon his intensive research to reach a number of simple but profound implications, calling for change in training and doctrine to emphasize adaptability, deliberation, thinking and reflexivity. In particular he criticizes the “Cold War combat-centric model of tasks, conditions and standards.” He adds a warning for those who draw upon the past to preserve continuity. “History,” Serena warns, “must serve as a guide to doctrine, but doctrine need not be shackled by past events and old prescriptions.”

The implications drawn in the conclusions of A Revolution in Military Adaptation are spot on. Serena is absolutely right in noting that “the army that will be leaving Iraq in the coming years is not the same army that crossed the Kuwaiti border in 2003.” It is battle-tested, and hardened, and appreciates the need for more than technology to successfully navigate the myriad challenges of the modern battlespace. Institutionalizing the ability to conduct full spectrum operations, in reality not just rhetorically is the Army’s post-war challenge.

This is a serious and thoroughly researched product that adds to the growing literature on American military experience and military adaptation. It is highly recommended for general students of the Iraq conflict and modern warfare, but especially for Command and General Staff Colleges and War Colleges in the United States to properly draw lessons from U.S. operations in Iraq. As Michael Howard insisted many years ago, it is not necessary for the military to pierce the future’s hazy veil and divine the exact character of the next fight. It must merely not it get too badly wrong and then quickly adapt itself to the contingency at hand. Serena’s detailed description of the U.S. Army’s adaptation may not constitute a revolution in military affairs and it was not quick as many would like, but it was remarkable and eventually effective.

NCOs Are the Heart of a Great Army

NCOs Are the Heart of a Great Army - Letter to the Editor, Wall Street Journal, by Adam Kurland. Read it at the link.

The Latest Ugly Truth About Pakistan

The Latest Ugly Truth About Pakistan - New York Times editorial. Bluf:

… Pakistan’s spy agency - Inter-Services Intelligence - played a direct role in supporting insurgents who attacked the American Embassy in Kabul last week, killing 16 people. He also said that with ISI support, the Haqqani network of terrorists planned and conducted an earlier truck bombing on a NATO outpost that killed 5 people and wounded 77 coalition troops, and other recent attacks.

This was a calculated revelation after Admiral Mullen and other top officials made countless pleas and remonstrances to Pakistan trying to get it to sever all support and ties with the Taliban, the Haqqani network and other extremists who are killing American troops and spreading mayhem on both sides of the border.

24 September SWJ Roundup

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Israel / Palestinians

Abbas Submits Palestinian Statehood Application - VOA

Palestinians Request UN Status; Powers Press for Talks - NYT

Palestinians Seek UN Status; Powers Push to Restart Talks - WP

Mideast Quartet Unveils 11th-Hour Plan for Peace Talks - LAT

Mideast Quartet: Israeli-Palestinian Talks Must Resume - BBC

Abbas' Historic UN Address Swells Palestinian Pride - LAT

Palestinians Rally in West Bank; Clashes Reported - NYT

Palestinians Celebrate UN Statehood Bid - WP

Palestinian Statehood Bid Wins Abbas Respect - AP

Amid Statehood Bid, Tensions Simmer in West Bank - NYT

Arabs Say Palestinian Statehood Bid Long Overdue - Reuters

Abbas UN Speech Seen as Inflammatory in Israel - Reuters

Netanyahu at UN: State Only After Peace With Israel - Haaretz

Israel PM: Peace Impossible Through UN Resolutions - Reuters

Muslim Nations Criticize Israel over Nukes - AP

Peace No Closer as Palestinians Ask UN for State - Reuters analysis

Caution Fills Obama’s Playbook - WP opinion

Afghanistan

Chaotic Scene Marks Burial of Afghan Ex-President and Peacemaker - VOA

Rabbani's Funeral Held in Kabul - BBC

Protests Break Out at Rabbani’s Funeral - LAT

Thousands Gather to Mourn, Bury Rabbani - S&S

US Looks for Links Between Kabul, Mumbai Attacks - Reuters

Military Dogs and Handlers Patrol in Afghanistan - AP

Army Private Gets 7 Years for Murder of Unarmed Teen - LAT

Idaho Soldier Gets 7 Years for Afghan Plot - AP

ISAF Operations Roundup - AFPS

Pakistan

Pakistan Scorns US Scolding on Terrorism - NYT

Pakistan Denies Aiding Insurgents - WP

Pakistan Warns US Accusations May Cost an Ally - LAT

Pakistan Warns US on Kabul Charge - BBC

Pakistan Warns US it Risks Losing an Ally Over Afghan Accusations - VOA

Haqqani Chief: US Will Suffer if It Tries Attack - Reuters

US Outreach to Pakistan Continues Despite Attacks - AP

US Presses Pakistan to Break Ties With Militants - Reuters

US Centcom Chief Visits Pakistan Amid Rift - AP

The Latest Ugly Truth About Pakistan - NYT

Libya

NTC to Announce Libyan Interim Government - VOA

UK Military Think Tank: Libya Campaign Needed Luck - AP

Misurata, Proud of Role in Revolt, Looks to the Future - LAT

Libyan Town’s Residents Face Reprisals - NYT

Gadhafi's Daughter Says Father Is Well, Fighting - AP

Syria

Syrian Forces Kill 11, Protesters Plead for Help - Reuters

Syrian Forces Kill 2, EU Heightens Sanctions - VOA

Turkey 'Seizes Syria Arms Ship' - BBC

Top Syrian Army Officer Mysteriously Reappears - NYT

Syrian Woman 'Dies in Detention' - BBC

Yemen

Yemen President Returns, Calls for Political Truce - VOA

Yemeni Leader Defiantly Returns Home - WP

President Ali Abdullah Saleh Makes Surprise Return - LAT

Yemen President's Return Hikes Fear of Escalation - AP

US Perplexed by Yemeni’s Return - WP

Yemen Protesters Killed in New Attacks - NYT

Yemeni Forces Attack Main Opposition Camp - Reuters

'Sixteen Dead' in Yemen Assault - BBC

Yemen Troops Kills 11 Pro-opposition Soldiers - AP

Iran

Iran Seeking to Build More Nuclear Plants - VOA

Iraq

Freedom Radio, Soundtrack to a War, Goes Quiet - WP

In Postwar Iraq, Housing Still Scarce - WP

Iraqi Police: Bombs Kill 5 in Baghdad - AP

Road Out of Iraq Brings Speed Bumps for US - AP

Middle East / North Africa

Persian Gulf Elections Offer Glimmer of Democracy - VOA

Heavy Security in Bahrain for Parliament Elections - AP

Egypt's Military Ruler Testifies in Mubarak Trial - AP

Latest Developments in Arab World's Unrest - AP

US Department of Defense

Mullen Presents Silver Star to Fallen Sailor’s Widow - AFPS

Greenert Becomes Chief of Naval Operations - AFPS

2 Navy Ships’ New Lease on Life - S&S

Air Force: Buyouts to Trim Civilian Employee Ranks - S&S

Social Media Bridging Gap Between Vets and Treatment - S&S

Govt Opposes Full Back Pay for Discharges Under DADT - S&S

United States

Shutdown Closer as Senate Blocks Spending Bill - NYT

Gloom Grows Amid New Congressional Feud - WP

Wyden Hits Justice Dept. over Patriot Act Surveillance - WP

No Gulf War Record Found for RI Lawmaker - AP

NASA Says Satellite Falls to Earth, but Location a Mystery - NYT

Africa

Images Show 'Massive' Troop Build-Up in Sudan - VOA

Somalis Returned to Famine Areas - BBC

UN Food Chief: HOA Famine Relief Focus on Youngest - AP

Zimbabwe's Mugabe Blasts Western Leaders at UN - VOA

Michael Sata Sworn In as New Zambia President - VOA

Opposition Leader Is Handed Reins in Zambia - NYT

Zambia's New President Sworn In - BBC

China Cautiously Endorses Zambian Poll Results -VOA

Rwanda’s Cynical Gains - WP opinion

Americas

Cuban Minister Leaves a Door Open to American’s Release - NYT

11 More Bodies Found in Veracruz, Mexico - VOA

Mexico: 11 More Bodies in Veracruz as Prosecutors Meet - AP

Ex-Bolivian Anti-Drug Chief Gets US Prison Sentence - Reuters

Bolivian Anti-Drugs Cop Jailed for Cocaine Trafficking - BBC

Suspended Mayor of Colombia Capital Jailed - LAT

Colombia: Bogota Mayor Jailed Pending Trial - BBC

Venezuela Inmates Wield Machineguns, Smoke Cannabis - Reuters

Obama to Meet Honduran Leader at White House - VOA

Haiti President: UN Made Errors But Should Stay - AP

Asia Pacific

N. Korea Says Wants More Talks with US - Reuters

China Questions 5 S. Koreans Detained Near N. Korea Border - NYT

S. Korean Reporters Detained by China Near N. Korea - AP

Farmers in China’s South Riot Over Seizure of Land - NYT

Power Shift in Asia - WP opinion

Europe

US Treasury Secretary Urges Major Shift in Europe - WP

Medvedev Says Putin Will Seek Russian Presidency - NYT

Russia's Medvedev Backs Putin for President - BBC

Medvedev Proposes Putin for President in 2012 - AP

Putin: ‘Bitter Pills’ for Russian Markets - WP

US Likely to Deploy Predator Drones in Turkey - AP

Erdogan: US to Provide Drones to Turkey - Reuters

ETA Prisoners Join Call for Lasting Basque Ceasefire - Reuters

UK: Thousands Gather for Rally Against Extremism - AP

What If There Was No Euro? - WP opinion

South Asia

US Looks for Links Between Kabul, Mumbai Attacks - Reuters

Bangladesh Leader Unfazed by Problems at Home - NYT

Read more about 24 September SWJ Roundup

This Week at War: Let's Talk About China

My Foreign Policy column reviews "A Contest for Supremacy," essential reading on the geo-strategic situation in East Asia. I also explain why the F-16 upgrade deal with Taiwan may create a new problem down the road.

A Contest for Supremacy calls on America's China-watchers to get real

In the preface to A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, Aaron Friedberg, an international relations professor at Princeton, describes how, in the waning months of the Clinton administration, he was hired to review the U.S. intelligence community's assessment of China. The experience, he says, left him deeply troubled about what he saw coming between China and the United States. By contrast, the "China hands" he knew in and out of the U.S. government "seemed to believe that a Sino-American rivalry was either highly unlikely, too terrifying to contemplate, or (presumably because talking about it might increase the odds that it would occur) too dangerous to discuss. Whatever the reason, it was not something that serious people spoke about in polite company."

Like tossing a dead skunk into a garden party, A Contest for Supremacy aims to shake things up among the foreign-policy elite inside the United States. Friedberg presents all of the arguments employed in favor of optimism and complacency regarding the trends facing the United States in East Asia then systemically shoots them down. His book is the most thorough wake-up call yet regarding the security challenges presented by China's rise. It is also a plea to have an honest conversation about the difficult questions facing the United States in Asia.

The book's straightforward organization bolsters Friedberg's arguments. The first four chapters summarize the history of China's dealings with the West and explain the origins of the Middle Kingdom's rivalry with other great powers, including the United States. Thucydides and Bismarck would quickly recognize Friedberg's description of a rising China that has growing interests and that sees that it must take action to defend its position. The unfortunate fact that China's new interests overlap with those of the current dominant power is nothing new in the history of great-power collisions.

The second section of the book discusses China's view of its strategic situation. Friedberg draws extensively from Chinese sources to describe Beijing's view of the United States and the Chinese leadership's conceptions of its long-term interests and probable grand strategy. According to Friedberg, China's leaders view the United States not as a status quo power, but as a revisionist force determined to one day overthrow one-party rule inside China. This argument may come as a surprise to those in the United States who thought a revisionist China was challenging the status quo United States.

Friedberg analyzes why, in addition to its economic potential, China is such a difficult challenge for U.S. policymakers. It has been two centuries, with its struggles against Britain, since the United States faced a strategic adversary that was simultaneously a broad and deep trading and financial partner. Friedberg catalogs the numerous business and academic interests inside the United States that profit from their relationships with China and who seek to downplay the strategic rivalry. Finally there are China's tactics, which emphasize patience and outwardly profess modesty about China's intentions and capabilities. Meanwhile, according to Friedberg, China seeks "to win without fighting" by establishing alternative networks and alliances that will eventually supplant and replace those global institutions created and defended by the United States and its allies.

After conducting a net assessment of China's and America's hard and soft power, Friedberg concludes with an analysis of the strategic options available to U.S. policymakers. He has little regard for the idea that being firm with China's leaders will merely catalyze an avoidable conflict. For Friedberg, China's rulers are tough and thick-skinned realists whose decisions will benefit from a firm U.S. approach and who, by contrast, could tragically miscalculate if they perceive American vacillation. He recommends reinforcing conventional military deterrence, reaffirming U.S. alliances in Asia, and taking steps to maintain U.S. research and technological advantages. Perhaps most important is Friedberg's plea for U.S. policymakers and citizens to openly discuss the adverse trends facing the United States in East Asia and to reject the idea that merely discussing these issues will create a confrontation.

The fragility of China's internal situation and the cresting in two decades of its demographic advantage do not escape Friedberg's scrutiny. Although Chinese leaders have displayed caution and patience, the window will close on their ability to take advantage of their growing power. With the next decade or so possibly being the most dangerous, there is all the more reason for both U.S. policymakers and the electorate to engage the difficult arguments presented in his book.

Upgrading Taiwan's F-16s avoids a problem now but may create another one later

Obama administration officials no doubt knew that their compromise package of arms sales to Taiwan would end up angering everyone involved with the issue. The White House passed on a proposal this week to sell 66 new F-16 C/D fighter-bombers to Taiwan, an aircraft assembled at Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth, Texas plant. Instead, Taiwan's old fleet of 145 F-16 A/B models will get an extensive upgrade including the latest generation radar, and much improved navigation, electronic warfare, and targeting electronics. Senators John Cornyn (R-Texas) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) are leading a congressional push to pass a bill requiring the administration to sell the new airplanes to Taiwan. For its part, China's Foreign Ministry registered a strong protest at the decision and called in Gary Locke, the U.S. ambassador to Beijing, for a dressing down.

The administration's path was calibrated to avoid the regular ritual of provoking Beijing to cut off military-to-military contacts with the United States. With concerns over China's military buildup rising, U.S. officials have placed a high priority on military exchanges, with the hope of preventing miscalculations. This time around, the gambit may be working with China yet to invoke another suspension. Having left the possibility of an F-16 C/D sale in reserve, Washington gave Beijing an incentive to refrain from blowing up the relationship again. Should Chinese officials opt to escalate, the United States would have little to lose by then approving the sale of the new aircraft.

Lost in the discussion of the F-16s was the decision to supply Taiwan with 96 smart-bomb precision-aiming kits and 64 cluster bomb dispensers. Combined with the navigation, electronic warfare, and bomb-targeting upgrades, this package will significantly improve the offensive strike capability of Taiwan's F-16 fleet.

This offensive strike capability would permit Taiwan to hold at risk important targets in Southeast China. The package thus enhances conventional deterrence and could boost strategic stability across the Taiwan Strait.

But this would require the F-16s to survive a Chinese missile barrage aimed at Taiwan's airfields and then get into the air. As discussed in the Pentagon's latest report on Chinese military power, China's large and ongoing buildup of land attack ballistic and cruise missiles threatens to shut down Taiwan's Air Force before it can take off.

Without a survivable second-strike capability, Taiwan could find itself in a "use it or lose it" dilemma during a crisis. Rather than wait for a Chinese missile barrage to either destroy or ground its Air Force, in extremis Taiwan might find itself compelled to attack pre-emptively in order to make use of its F-16s and in an attempt to minimize the damage it might think it would inevitably suffer.

This is obviously an unstable and undesirable situation. In a previous column, I argued that what Taiwan really needs is its own inventory of mobile and concealable land-attack missiles, a force that could deter a Chinese attack.

Alternatively, Taiwan could acquire strike aircraft that don't require fixed air bases for their operations. The United States is developing just such an airplane for the U.S. Marine Corps, the short-takeoff vertical-landing F-35B Joint Strike Fighter. It should thus come as no surprise that a Taiwanese defense official suggested that if Taiwan can't get the F-16 C/D, maybe it should get the stealthy F-35 instead. An Obama administration official scoffed at the idea: "It's like not getting a Prius and asking for a custom-built Ferrari instead."

Instead of scoffing, White House officials should instead think about what is required to prop up strategic stability in the southwest Pacific. With China's military spending galloping higher and the Pentagon's about to crash, the United States will need all the help from its allies it can get. In addition, simply repeating past practices without taking account of the dramatically changed circumstances over the Taiwan Strait could make things less rather than more stable. Policymakers on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue would benefit from assessing the Taiwan situation with a clean sheet of paper.

Syria: The revolution will be weaponised

Syria: The revolution will be weaponised by Nir Rosen, Al Jazeera. BLUF. Abu Omar was a senior coordinator in the country's six-month-old uprising and was involved in opposition activities since 2007. He lamented that to date, the revolution had only succeeded in costing the lives of three thousand people. "After Libya, many people said it was a mistake to have a peaceful revolution and if they had done it like the Libyans they would be free by now," he said.

Special Operations Leaders Outline Budget Concerns

By Karen Parrish

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Sept. 22, 2011 – Success in special operations missions rests, in part, on critical enabling capabilities the Army, Navy and Air Force provide, the nation’s civilian and military special operations chiefs told Congress today.

Michael D. Lumpkin, acting assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, and Navy Adm. William H. McRaven, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, discussed future special operations needs in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.

“As we enter an era of constrained defense budgets, we must not repeat the mistakes that led to degraded [special operations forces] capabilities throughout the 1970s,” Lumpkin said.

Lumpkin quoted five “SOF truths” drawn from a 1987 report written for the committee: humans are more important than hardware, quality is better than quantity, special operations forces cannot be mass produced, competent special operations forces cannot be created after emergencies occur, and most special operations require non-SOF assistance.

“Our experiences have validated [these] truths,” he said.

It has taken a decade to “grow” special operations capabilities from 33,000 to nearly 58,000 service members, Lumpkin noted, and the need for enabling, regular forces has been commensurate.

“We know that the team approach in [the Department of Defense], the interagency, and with international partners carries the day,” he said.

After the ongoing transfer of security lead in Afghanistan is complete in 2014, an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 SOF troops still will be deployed, Lumpkin said.

As DOD conducts a strategy-based spending review to prepare for a range of possible future budget cuts, he said, “The key that we’re really looking at [is] … as the services look at reductions that may impact them, they have a direct impact on us.”

SOF draws its members from the regular forces and so relies on them as a talent pool, Lumpkin said, and special operators also depend on support from regular forces to complete their missions.

“While we do have the need for organic combat support and combat service support, we do rely heavily on the general-purpose forces,” he said. “So we’re looking very closely to see what the budget impacts [will be] on them, which will, in turn, influence and impact us.”

McRaven echoed Lumpkin’s sentiments, saying, “I think within [DOD], they understand the value that SOF brings to the current fight and the future fight. Our real concern … is the impact on the services. As the services have to potentially cut key enablers, that’s going to affect us.”

Socom is one of DOD’s nine unified combatant commands, but with some unique responsibilities, McRaven noted.

Socom trains and equips its forces, but also synchronizes planning for global operations against terrorist networks, coordinating with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the geographic combatant commands and appropriate government agencies, the admiral said.

“These authorities have effectively prepared and equipped our force to meet the demands of the last decade, and to be postured appropriately for future challenges,” he added.

Socom provides “rapid, global options to meet a broad set of complex and dynamic challenges,” the admiral said.

SOF has doubled its forces, tripled its budget and met a quadrupled mission demand over the last ten years, he said.

“With an annual budget of $10.5 billion, U.S. SOCOM comprises only 1.6 percent of the Department of Defense-proposed FY12 budget, and put simply, provides a tremendous return on the nation’s investment,” McRaven said.

All special operators are trained to perform both direct and indirect roles, he said.

McRaven defined direct action as “precision, highly kinetic strike force” missions. Indirect operations focused on advising, training and assisting other nations’ forces, he added.

The two approaches are mutually supportive, the admiral said, with the strike capability providing space and time for indirect efforts to work.

McRaven said his two priorities as Socom commander are first, to win the current fight and maintain the health of the force; and second, to expand SOF’s capabilities by working with the combatant commands and interagency and allied special operations partners to establish a global SOF network able to react more rapidly and effectively to enemy action.

“I believe special operations forces have never been more valuable to our nation and to our allies,” he said. “You have my promise that we will continue to fight as long and as hard as you need us to in order to protect this great nation and the principles we hold so dear.”