News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Duncan Moore.
1. Destruction of border office unlikely to be last provocation by North Korea
2. As Kim Jong-un turns hostile to South Korea, his sister does the talking
3. Ex-USFK commander says he would increase military pressure on N. Korea
4. U.S. needs to hold military exercises, resolve burden-sharing issue with S. Korea: ex-nat'l security adviser
5. S. Korea's nuclear envoy arrives in U.S. amid N.K. tensions
6. U.S. lawmaker calls for increasing military, sanctions pressure on N. Korea
7. Trump extends existing sanctions on N. Korea for 1 year
8. Kim Jong-Un leaves South Korean leader's peace legacy in ruins
9. What South Korea teaches the world about fighting COVID
10. Moon Jae-In is getting tired of North Korea's growing aggression
11. N.K. leader's personal plane makes rare flight amid heightened tensions: aviation tracker
12. U.S. urges N. Korea to refrain from further counterproductive actions
13. N.K. paper warns next step could go 'far beyond imagination'
14. South Korea sends tanks and troops to DMZ
15. Blue House to Kim's sister: Zip it
16. N. Korean troops seen at empty border guard posts: sources
17. Kim's sister is on the warpath
18. Kim Jong-Un ATTACK: North Korea could 'damage' US election in shocking way
19. Kim Jong-Un shows how little has changed between North and South Korea
20. N. Korea publicizes behind-the-scenes negotiations
21. Crash landing on you and North Korea: representation and reception in the age of K-drama
1. Destruction of Border Office Unlikely to be Last Provocation by North Korea
Radio Free Asia · by Eugene Whong · June 16, 2020
Comments from a host of Koreana and American Korea watchers, including yours truly.
2. As Kim Jong-Un turns hostile to South Korea, his sister does the talking
The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · June 17, 2020
Some useful background on Kim Yo-Jong in this article.
Kim Jong-Un is letting his sister, Kim Yo-Jong, do the heavy lifting and it appears she is enjoying herself. It also looks like Kim Jong-Un is keeping to his "work one day, take a three week holiday schedule."
Yes, this could all be about reinforcing the Paektu bloodline in preparation for succession or perhaps just to sustain current regime legitimacy.
3. Ex-USFK commander says he would increase military pressure on N. Korea
Yonhap News Agency · by Lee Haye-Ah · June 18, 2020
The general is right. But, with all due respect, military pressure alone is insufficient.
I know it is too provocative to call for a "strategic strangulation" campaign as I wrote here in 2016. But what is really necessary is a Plan B or Maximum Pressure 2.0 campaign as we wrote here last December.
There are the two critical assumptions for a Plan B outlined here:
Any effective approach toward North Korea should be based on two new assumptions. The first recognizes that Kim will give up his nuclear program only when he concludes that the cost to him and his regime is too great - that is, when he believes possession of nuclear weapons threatens his survival. But external pressure alone, although important, will almost certainly fail to create the right cost-benefit ratio. It is the threat from the North Korean people that is most likely to cause Kim to give up his nuclear weapons. As former CIA analyst Jung Pak of the Brookings Institution has argued, "Kim fears his people more than he fears the United States. The people are his most proximate threat to the regime." The ROK-U.S. alliance has yet to adopt a strategy with this in mind.
Kim, the DPRK military, and the North Korean elite must be made to recognize that keeping nuclear weapons poses an internal threat to their survival. External threats and actions alone will not suffice, though they are important. In addition, if these actors choose not to relinquish their nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, a maximum pressure 2.0 campaign should threaten to weaken the regime.
The second new assumption is that Kim will continue to employ a strategy based on subversion of South Korea; coercion and extortion of the international community to gain political and economic concessions; and ultimately the use of force to unify the peninsula under the domination of the North, thereby ensuring the survival of the Kim family regime. A key element of his strategy is to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States. Kim's strategy can best be described as a "long con" whereby he extracts as much as possible for the regime while conceding little to nothing and preparing to achieve unification under his control. Kim is pursuing a strategy established long ago by his grandfather and improved by his father.
This assumption requires the United States and South Korea to prepare for the possibility that Kim might refuse to relinquish his weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This assumption is buttressed by a U.S. intelligence estimate maintaining that he is unlikely to denuclearize.28 This cannot be discounted and must be factored into a new strategy.
Here is a summary of a Plan B:
The proposed Plan B strategy consists of five elements: diplomatic, military, cyber, economic and financial sanctions, and information and influence activities.
The diplomatic component focuses on mobilizing the international community to adopt the maximum pressure 2.0 campaign and enforce domestic and international law to stop the regime's illicit activities. Employing the U.S.-ROK strategy working group established in November 2018 will help the alliance prevent South Korean backsliding on the pressure campaign.29 While South Korea describes many of its projects in conjunction with the North as economic engagement activities, they are merely conduits for funds that flow directly to the Kim regime.
The military element rests on the military readiness of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Any reduction in the alliance's combat readiness will reduce Kim's incentive to negotiate and invite North Korean aggression. Accordingly, the United States and South Korea must engage in robust combined training and other military activities. These should include aggressive maritime intercept operations to combat ship-to-ship transfers that facilitate North Korean sanctions evasion and proliferation. Military training and exercises must be conducted without regard to Pyongyang's propaganda. No matter how benign, ROK-U.S. military activities will always receive Northern criticism. Moreover, the suspension or cancellation of military activities has never elicited a good faith response from Pyongyang.
A more aggressive U.S. cyber campaign is necessary to combat the damage and illicit revenue generated by the North's cyber activities. Cyber provides a critical asymmetric capability for the Kim regime. Pyongyang is pursuing new cyber techniques to support its efforts to steal hard and crypto currency and conduct espionage and influence operations. The United States and the international community must counter these threats.
The UN and U.S. sanctions regimes must be expanded and fully enforced, including by targeting non-North Korean entities, banks, and individuals that enable Pyongyang's sanctions evasion activities. This must include enforcement of UN sanctions on North Korean overseas laborers. Likewise, the United States must intensify its scrutiny of North Korea's shipping sector through monitoring and surveillance efforts in areas known for illicit ship-to-ship transfers.30 Sanctions must not be used as a bargaining chip. North Korea must comply with all UN and U.S. sanctions - by denuclearizing, terminating its missile programs, ceasing its illicit activities, and ending its human rights abuses - before they are lifted. Sanctions and enforcement must be incorporated into the diplomatic approach and coordinated with information and influence activities.
Robust information and influence activities must also be part of maximum pressure 2.0. The campaign must separate the Kim family regime from the second-tier leadership and general population. Achieving this goal could generate an internal threat that prompts Kim to give up his nuclear weapons. Providing the North Korean people with more outside information, including information related to the regime's horrific human rights record, would undermine the legitimacy of the Kim regime.
The following five chapters provide a plan policymakers and strategists could implement to protect and advance U.S. interests on the Korean Peninsula. Following his failure at Hanoi, Kim gave an ultimatum to the United States, stating that by the end of 2019, Washington must "adopt a new posture" toward the North if denuclearization negotiations are to continue.31 It is therefore necessary to prepare for what may come next in 2020, while leaving open the possibility that Kim might adopt a less confrontational approach.
Maximum pressure 2.0 rests on a foundation of sustained pressure and military strength. This is necessary even as the United States continues to pursue working level negotiations that give Kim the opportunity to denuclearize. Should he not make the right strategic decision, the United States and its South Korean allies would then have in place the strategy and forces necessary to deter or defeat the North.
4. U.S. needs to hold military exercises, resolve burden-sharing issue with S. Korea: ex-nat'l security adviser
Yonhap News Agency · by Lee Haye-Ah · June 18, 2020
Absolutely. Conduct robust readiness exercises and fix the burden sharing issue immediately. The ROK/US alliance must be strong to deal with north Korea.
5. S. Korea's nuclear envoy arrives in U.S. amid N.K. tensions
Yonhap News Agency · by hague@yna.co.kr · June 18, 2020
A good sign for the alliance. The MOFA-DOS strategy working group has its work cut out for it.
6. U.S. lawmaker calls for increasing military, sanctions pressure on N. Korea
Yonhap News Agency · by Lee Haye-Ah · June 18, 2020
Yes it is time for Plan B. But it requires more than military and sanctions pressure.
As far as I can tell, this is the first US government official who has made a substantive statement on what is happening on the Korean peninsula. I have not seen a White, State Department, or DOD Statement. Maybe I have missed it, but I just checked the web sites and did not find anything.
7. Trump extends existing sanctions on N. Korea for 1 year
Yonhap News Agency · by Lee Haye-Ah · June 18, 2020
This is good to see. We will have to see how the regime responds to this on KCNA. I look forward to some of the regime's choice words.
8. Kim Jong-Un leaves South Korean leader's peace legacy in ruins
Bloomberg · by Jon Herskovitz & Jeong-Ho Lee · June 17, 2020
With all due respect to President Moon, it is time to admit the strategic assumptions of the Peace Strategy were wrong. Therefore, it is time for a new strategy.
I give President Moon credit for giving Kim Jong-Un every opportunity to cooperate. But, it is just not in the nature of the Kim family regime to change or give up its seven decades old strategy to dominate the peninsula to ensure regime survival. It is not President Moon's failure. The responsibility lies total on the shoulders of Kim Jong-Un.
9. What South Korea teaches the world about fighting COVID
Forbes · by Doug J. Chung · June 16, 2020
As I have often said, we can learn a lot from South Korea. I saw some reports that showed how all the other countries that have implemented sound public health practices have had a steep decline in COVID 19 cases. The US is the only major country that has maintained a plateau and has not yet experienced a national decline. And countries like South Korea did not execute a lock down, but instead focused on the sound public health practices of testing, isolation/quarantine, tracing/tracking, and treatment.
10. Moon Jae-In is getting tired of North Korea's growing aggression
The National Interest · by Daniel R. DePetris · June 17, 2020
I like the title. I hope it is true and that President Moon wants to shift strategy to a Plan B.
11. N.K. leader's personal plane makes rare flight amid heightened tensions: aviation tracker
Yonhap News Agency · by grace@yna.co.kr · June 17, 2020
Hmmm ... A test flight? Is Kim traveling somewhere? To Wonsan again? Does this mean he is going to watch a missile test on the east coast? (Or maybe he is planning his escape and intends to leave his sister holding the bag? (note: sarcasm)
12. U.S. urges N. Korea to refrain from further counterproductive actions
The Dong-A Ilbo · by lightee@donga.com · June 18, 2020
These are the only statements I have found and seen reported coming out of Washington.
13. N.K. paper warns next step could go 'far beyond imagination'
Yonhap News Agency · by Koh Byong-Joon · June 18, 2020
So let's do some imagining. All the usual suspects: naval battle in the West Sea, island shelling, another submarine torpedo attack against ROK navy warships, a cross MDL firing in the DMZ, missile and rocket tests (and, of course, the red line for President Trump – a nuclear weapons and/or ICBM test). We could see a major cyber attack against the South, the US or other international targets. What if the North has some malware/ransomware that could rapidly infect global computer networks? What about cyber attacks causing stock market crashes? What about bio attacks? The North has seen the global effects of a pandemic. What if it unleashed some kind of bio weapon that would wreak havoc? Then we can see assassinations – perhaps against escapees/defectors in the South. What if it chooses to unleash its sleeper networks in the South? Another obvious one is to destroy one tourist facility per day at Kumgangsan. I am sure the action officers in the ROK/US CFC at INDOPACOM, in DOD, in the IC, and at the NSC are war-gaming out all the contingencies.
14. South Korea sends tanks and troops to DMZ
The National Interest · by Peter Suciu · June 17, 2020
Good decision. This is the right message for South Korea to send because it is an action.
We should keep in mind that this kind of action will not provoke an attack from the North. This is a demonstration of strength and resolve and the North will not attack into strength. Rather, they seek to exploit weakness. So when the naysayers say the South Koreans are being provocative, we should respond with the reminder that North Korean forces are postured for offensive operations while the ROK military is postured for defense and this deployment is a defense measure.
15. Blue House to Kim's sister: zip it
Korea JoongAng Daily · by Shim Kyu-Seok · June 17, 2020
I like that short and sweet response: "Zip it." (I wish someone had actually used those exact words). It almost rivals BG McAuliffe at the Battle of the Bulge and his response to the Germans, "Nuts."
But the buried lede is the Minister of Unification announced his resignation. This is not being widely reported yet in the Korean press. I could not even find it on Yonhap. This resignation is a mistake. He should have resigned over his response regarding the escapees/defectors and their balloon launches and his call for a law to ban them. But resigning now because of the North's provocations means the regime will believe the plays from its playbook still work. So we will see more blackmail diplomacy and actions to subvert the ROK government and society and to split the ROK/US alliance (another form of subversion).
16. N. Korean troops seen at empty border guard posts: sources
Yonhap News Agency · by graceoh@yna.co.kr · June 18, 2020
No surprise here.
17. Kim's Sister Is on the Warpath
The Daily Beast · by Donald Kirk · June 18, 2020
You can always count on Donald Kirk for some very pithy writing about North Korea.
Note the concerns in Korea, both with a US response if the North does something and, even if the North does do something, the fear President Trump will still want to reduce US troops.
18. Kim Jong-un ATTACK: North Korea could 'damage' US election in shocking way
Express · by Melanie Kaidan · June 18, 2020
This could be part of the boiling frog - we will see a slow boil of tensions and provocations and, if Kim does not get concessions, he could try to undermine the election.
One thing that we believe we know about Kim Jong-Un is he has been upset with President Trump's use of Kim for his political re-election purposes. He believes that his decision not to test nuclear weapons or an ICBM is a political victory for Trump. Trump is benefiting from Kim's "concessions" (when in fact he is simply complying with UN security Council Resolutions) and is touting a foreign policy "win." Yet Kim Jong-Un has received no corresponding political benefit from Trump and, in fact, is facing tremendous internal pressure, because he has failed to con Trump into giving him sanctions relief. So, yes, perhaps we should be concerned – be very concerned – with Kim trying to affect the November election.
19. Kim Jong-Un shows how little has changed between North and South Korea
The Print · by Jon Herskovitz & Jeong-Ho Lee · June 18, 2020
The fact is Kim Jong-Un has not changed while President Moon gave him every opportunity to demonstrate change (as did President Trump). The answers to these questions illustrate this.
Do we believe that Kim Jong-Un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia-like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
In support of that strategy, do we believe that Kim Jong-Un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide-to-conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
The answers to these questions should guide us to the Plan B strategy to solve the "Korea question" (para 60 of the Armistice) and lead to the only acceptable durable political arrangement: a secure, stable, economically vibrant, non-nuclear Korean peninsula unified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people. In short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
We should never forget: the root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
20. N. Korea publicizes behind-the-scenes negotiations
The Dong-A Ilbo · by tree624@donga.com · June 18, 2020
I do not think most people know how much behind-the-scenes contact there has been over the years between North and South, particularly between the intelligence services. This has been ongoing for decades. Despite Kim Yo-Jong's rhetoric below, I will bet there are, or soon will be, behind-the-scenes discussions.
21. Crash landing on you and North Korea: representation and reception in the age of K-drama
The Asia-Pacific Journal · by Stephen Epstein & Christopher K. Green · June 5, 2020
Now, for something completely different: I have recommended this Netflix K-drama before, and I have noted what I believe is its positive contribution to information and influence activities. This is a long journal article that analyzes the series and provides a lot of background to include the controversies.
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