Prison based Criminal Command and Control in Latin America

Across Latin America, overcrowded prisons have evolved into command hubs for criminal organizations. Douglas Farah of SWJ-El Centro and Pablo Zeballos describe these facilities as centers from which some of the hemisphere’s most violent groups direct operations, generate revenue, and challenge democratic governance. Between 2010 and 2020, the region’s prison population increased by more than 75 percent as judicial corruption, guard intimidation, indefinite pretrial detention, chronic underfunding, and institutional neglect compounded one another. These conditions enabled organizations such as MS-13, Barrio 18, the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC)), and Tren de Aragua to take root behind prison walls. Where the state failed to provide food, credit, protection, or a sense of belonging, gangs filled the void and constructed profitable internal markets for bedding, drugs, weapons, phones, and other commodities. In many facilities, guards secure the perimeter while prisoners administer the interior, an arrangement some governments tolerate because it reduces costs and suppresses visible unrest. Confinement can consequently provide criminal leaders with protection and operational freedom. Ecuador’s “Fito” and Venezuela’s Héctor “Niño” Guerrero commanded networks from prison compounds equipped with soccer fields, swimming pools, luxury accommodations, and unrestricted communications.

Farah and Zeballos warn that United States terrorist designations have increased incarceration without producing corresponding investments in prison capacity. Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Ecuador have responded by pursuing versions of El Salvador’s mega-prison model, despite the political, legal, and social conditions that make President Nayib Bukele’s approach difficult to reproduce elsewhere. The authors call for specialized prison intelligence capable of identifying leadership structures, tracing financial flows, and disrupting communications between incarcerated leaders and external networks. They also recommend limiting pretrial detention to dangerous individuals and credible flight risks, particularly because approximately 43 percent of the region’s prisoners have yet to stand trial. Their conclusion presents us with a fundamental test of state authority. Latin America needs prisons that governments can govern.