Does the End of the SDF End Turkey’s Syria Problem?
Abstract
This analysis examines whether the dissolution and integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state has solved Turkey’s security problem in Syria. It argues that the outcome depends less on the formal dissolution of the SDF than on whether Damascus can establish real military and political control over former SDF cadres. If former command networks and organizational influence remain intact in state institutions, integration may transform rather than eliminate Turkey’s security problem. Formal integration may also change how Ankara manages this problem, as security disputes that once centered on a non-state actor increasingly become matters to be addressed with Damascus.
Background and Central Argument
The fall of the Ba’athist regime on December 8, 2024, also put on the agenda the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces—a Kurdish-led alliance of rebel groups opposing the government of Bashar al-Assad—into the new central government. The framework for that process had already been established by an agreement signed between SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and President Ahmed al-Sharaa on March 10, 2025.
Government military pressure that had begun in Aleppo in January 2026 later spread across northeastern Syria. As the SDF lost territory and military strength, talks on integration with Damascus accelerated. Cognizant of Kurdish leverage rapidly disintegrating, Abdi announced on August 25, 2026, that the process of integrating SDF forces into the Syrian Army had been completed. Abdi declared that the SDF had completed its mission as an independent military force and thus must be dissolved.
Consequently, institutions, border crossings, gas and oil fields, airports, and prisons in the region began to be transferred to the Syrian state. For Damascus, this transfer also has an important economic dimension. Regaining control over northeastern oil and gas fields, border crossings, and other state assets provides the new government with badly needed resources as it faces severe economic pressures and the costs of postwar reconstruction. For Turkey, this is also a significant result. Syrian Kurdish integration seemingly aligns with the “one state, one army” approach it has defended for years. However, the disappearance of the SDF as an independent organizational structure does not mean that Ankara’s security concerns have disappeared with it.
This analysis maintains that the dissolution of the SDF should represent a significant strategic gain for Turkey, but argues that whether the security problem has actually been solved depends less on the announcement of dissolution than on the nature of the integration process.
Turkey’s Security Perspective
Since the fall of the Assad regime, Turkey has been one of the strongest advocates of the “one state, one army” approach in Syria. Turkey has not limited itself to providing political support for this objective, having also developed concrete cooperation with the new Syrian government in security, diplomacy, and institutional reconstruction. Motivating Ankara’s approach is its decades-long conflict is with the PKK, whose armed campaign sought secession for the country’s Kurdish-majority southeast. Turkey’s longstanding view of the YPG, the military core of the SDF, has been that the militia is a security threat closely connected to the PKK.
This history helps explain why Ankara has tended to view the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish armed structure across the Syrian border through the lens of its own domestic security and territorial integrity. Abdi’s statement that “the peace process in Turkey could also have a positive impact on resolving the Kurdish issue in Syria” can also be understood in this context. With these considerations in mind, Turkey has openly stated its support for the integration of the SDF into the Syrian government.
The key distinction here is between disarmament and integration. The prospect of many former SDF and YPG fighters continuing to serve as armed personnel within the Syrian army and security institutions shifts the focus of the debate from the existence of the organization to the nature of its integration. One of the most significant examples is the new government’s appointment of Sipan Hamo, formerly a senior military figure in the SDF, as deputy minister of defense responsible for the Eastern Region (roughly corresponding to the former territory of Rojava). Hamo’s case is particularly notable from Ankara’s perspective. He had previously been placed in the red category of Turkey’s “Wanted for Terrorism” list but was removed from the list following his appointment.
In addition to Hamo, other former SDF commanders, including Jiya Kobani, have also been incorporated into the structure of the new Syrian army. Kobani now serves as the deputy commander of the 60th Division, a unit that previously fought against the SDF in Aleppo and the surrounding area. Alongside these senior commanders, some reports suggest that around 10,000 former SDF fighters have been incorporated into the transformed military and security apparatus.
This scale of integration raises a more practical question: how much of the Kurds’ old command structure and influence can they preserve inside the Syrian state? If integration is tantamount to concealing the SDF within state institutions under a different name, this could create a serious security problem for Turkey. But if the former units are really brought under the central chain of command and heavy weapons come under state control, Turkey’s security issues could be significantly reduced.
Integration and Turkey’s Changing Security Environment
The integration of the SDF into the Syrian state has not been limited to the military sphere. The political dimension of integration is also important for Ankara. The appointment of Abdi as a presidential adviser by al-Sharaa in August 2026 further supports this point. This appointment demonstrates that, even as the SDF’s independent political-military structure disappears, its former leadership may yet exert considerable influence over the political decision-making mechanisms of the new Syrian state. Whether this develops into a security concern for Ankara will depend on the extent to which Abdi and other former SDF elites are able to act as an independent political bloc in the state and exert pressure over majority-Kurdish areas in southeastern Turkey.
At this point, two scenarios emerge for Turkey. In the first scenario, the integrated SDF units come fully under the control of Damascus and the SDF’s armed autonomy effectively comes to an end. In this scenario, instead of facing a U.S.-backed, semi-autonomous actor with its own military structure on its border, Turkey would face a centralized Syrian state with which it could deal directly on security matters. This would align with the main objective of Ankara’s “one state, one army” policy.
In the second scenario, however, SDF units retain their loyalty to their former commanders, while the Syrian government has only limited influence over their appointments and operations. So, Turkey could find itself facing semi-autonomous SDF forces operating within the state in this scenario.
Formal integration also changes the diplomatic and legal setting in which any future Turkish use of force would occur. Turkey has previously justified operations in Syria through self-defense, including by invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter. Integration does not by itself prevent Turkey from invoking self-defense as a response to a concrete security issue, but it may change the status of the actors being targeted. If former SDF personnel become members of the Syrian Armed Forces, future Turkish strikes could no longer be explained only as operations against a non-state armed group. They could also raise more direct questions about Syrian sovereignty and Ankara’s relations with Damascus, particularly if the Syrian government does not consent to such action.
This would also change how Turkey manages its security concerns. If Damascus establishes real control over former SDF units, Ankara would face a state-to-state security issue rather than an autonomous non-state actor. This could reduce the political space for unilateral action while increasing the importance of intelligence cooperation, border-security coordination, Syrian action against individuals Turkey considers threatening, and other forms of bilateral security management. The January 2026 fighting in Aleppo has already offered an indication of this scenario, when Turkey stressed that operations against the SDF were being carried out by the Syrian Arab Army and stated that Ankara could provide support if requested by Damascus. Successful integration could therefore shift greater responsibility for addressing Turkey’s security concerns from direct Turkish intervention to the Syrian state. The same process also raises another question about Turkey’s military presence in areas shaped by its cross-border operations since 2016. Ankara has made clear that the SDF’s dissolution alone does not mean a sudden Turkish withdrawal, stating that its forces will remain until the security threats it faces are eliminated. Yet if Damascus restores effective authority in northern Syria and becomes capable of preventing armed groups from threatening Turkey’s border, Ankara may eventually have to reconsider how its military presence fits with the “one state, one army” principle and the sovereignty of the centralized Syrian state it supports. The future of these areas could therefore become part of a broader Turkey-Syria security arrangement rather than remain a separate military question.
Conclusion
Turkey faces a conundrum: while the integration of the SDF into the Syrian state weakens its independent military structure, the same process may allow former SDF elites to gain political and military influence within the state and preserve their organizational ties. For Turkey, what matters now is not whether the SDF continues to exist in name, but whether Damascus can exercise genuine military and political control over former SDF cadres. If integration dismantles the independent armed structure, Ankara will have achieved an important security objective. But, if former command networks and political influence are preserved within the new state institutions, the dissolution of the SDF may have simply transformed—rather than solved—Turkey’s decades-long security problem.
