Gambling on Peace: Why the Offensive in Syria Should Inspire Careful Optimism
It is not uncommon to see Western policy decisions attributed to strategic philosophies, and non-Western policies relegated to paroxysms of blind passion. Just as a Western nation can pursue incoherent or ideologically motivated policy, so too can a former al-Qaeda affiliate—at times—pursue rational and stabilizing policy.
After decades of brutal dictatorship, civil war, and instability, coverage of Syria has fallen into a comfortable pattern of raising alarms and issuing warnings. To a certain extent, this is understandable. The safest bet is generally a continuation of the status quo, and it is always wise to develop contingencies for the worst-case scenario. Undoubtedly, the Syrian situation remains precarious. But particularly over the past six months, the situation on the ground in Syria has consistently shown the hallmarks of prudent statecraft and careful de-escalation.
Through the lens of the Global War on Terror, the events of this year seem bleak. A surprise offensive by President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Syrian Transitional Government (STG)—spearheaded by former elements of the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)—interrupted a year-long ceasefire and thwarted an internationally backed handover of territory. HTS is the successor to Jabat al-Nusra, a prominent al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist movement in Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—a Kurdish-led, secular, pro-democracy alliance that has been supported by the United States since its inception in 2015—were routed. The SDF suddenly lost the bulk of the territories painstakingly won over from the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—to a government led by yet another Islamist faction, no less.
This article offers a deeper look at the events of the past six months. It considers the political realities on the ground that had caused the previous peace deal to stall and the situation of the SDF to become unsustainable. It then analyzes the January offensive by the STG and argues that—far from being a spasm of violence—the conflict was carefully managed and quickly de-escalated by all sides. A new status quo now holds, one far more stable than that which preceded it.
Background of the SDF
The SDF is a Kurdish-led group that has been supported by the United States since the early days of American operations against ISIS. The group proved particularly effective in countering ISIS in both conventional and counterinsurgency operations, and is highly integrated with American forces operating in the region. Historically however, the group has had a rocky relationship with other insurgent groups in the region, and with neighboring Türkiye. The Turkish government has long considered the group a terrorist organization due to its close ties to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a movement advocating autonomy for eastern Türkiye’s considerable Kurdish minority population.
These tensions stem from Arab and Turkish hostility towards Kurdish nationalism. To most rebel factions, the Syrian Civil War was a fight to overthrow minority rule by the Alawite Assad family and a battle to determine how the new Sunni majority-led government would be administered (secularly or under Sharia) rather than a forum for minorities to air grievances. To some factions, the Kurdish-led SDF was almost as much an enemy as the Assad government. Turkish influence supported such an attitude at every turn.
The existential threat of ISIS, however, set the stage for broader coalitions to form. Hatred of ISIS’s brutal strain of fundamentalism soon eclipsed fears of Kurdish nationalism. On the battlefield, the SDF—with the support of the United States—proved itself in battle against ISIS and cultivated support from local Arab tribes. This support bolstered the SDF’s legitimacy as a broad, multiethnic coalition, rather than a solely Kurdish group.
Over the course of the anti-ISIS campaign, the SDF took control over Arab majority regions such as the former heartlands of ISIS: Deir Ezzor and Raqqa. Subsequent United States-backed SDF-led counterinsurgency operations relied upon coopting local populations to build popular support against ISIS. The success of these operations was conditional, not only on the martial and administrative ability of the SDF’s Kurdish core, but also on the group’s legitimacy amongst the Arab population in regions without significant Kurdish populations.
End of the Syrian Civil War
With the territorial defeat of ISIS and the fall of the Alawite-led Assad regime in 2024, the raison d’être of the SDF was challenged. Arab fighters were willing to fight against ISIS or the Alawite-led Baathist regime. Some may have been willing to contest a hardline Sunni fundamentalist administration. But the moderate state formation by al-Sharaa’s STG has elicited an almost total collapse of Arab support for the SDF. Sunni Arabs—desperate to begin a process of national reconstruction—largely consider the new government sufficiently legitimate and have defected from the SDF coalition en masse.
This development left the SDF in an unstable and unsustainable position. With the collapse of Arab support for the SDF, continued SDF occupation in Arab-majority regions became destabilizing, rather than stabilizing. Support for insurgent groups in these regions exploded. Counterinsurgency operations require local legitimacy, a battle that Sharaa’s government clearly won. Without the support of local Arabs, the SDF was increasingly viewed as a foreign occupier, rather than a legitimate administration.
Acknowledging that fact, the United States supported the creation of an SDF-STG framework to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian government. This agreement stalled completely for several reasons, however. First, Türkiye starkly opposed any agreement which would allow the SDF military formations to integrate into the Syrian Government as larger units, insisting the groups’ fighters be integrated as individual soldiers. This proposal was a nonstarter for the SDF. Second, the failures of the STG in Druze and Alawite majority areas had resulted in massacres and fighting. This entrenched the Kurds’ unwillingness to turn weapons over to the STG. The Kurdish minority feared they would meet the same fate, if disarmed. Finally, the SDF’s own demands, despite its increasingly weak position, were stubbornly and unrealistically ambitious.
The January Offensive
Following a year of mostly stalled negotiations, the STG escalated its campaign. What was originally intended to be a gradual transition of certain territories from the SDF to the STG became a full-scale offensive and ultimately a rout of the SDF. Facing rapid offensive maneuvers by the STG and mass insurrection by dissatisfied Arabs, the SDF was forced to retreat to its heartlands in the Kurdish-majority regions, relinquishing the bulk of its territory.
American analysis of this event has been tinged with an understandable bitterness. The SDF is a close partner of the United States. Americans, particularly those emotionally invested in the US’ history in the region, are generally sympathetic to the SDF’s goals of pluralistic democracy. The Kurdish struggle as the world’s largest stateless nation is often a huge draw for foreign support. The US sees the SDF as a lynchpin against ISIS and understandably fear that the weakening of the SDF position may herald a resurgence for ISIS.
The reality, however, is more complicated than a simple act of betrayal by a former al-Qaeda affiliate. Neither is it another notch in the tally of Kurdish groups the US has left holding the bag after a shift in the political winds. Rather than being a paroxysm of violence founded on frustration—or ethnic resentment—the STG’s January offensive was a carefully calibrated maneuver to shift the political situation by changing the realities on the ground.
Using War to Bring About a Better Peace
The STG balanced its offensive with policies designed to invite reconciliation rather than long-term conflict. As the offensive began, al-Sharaa announced protections for Kurdish language rights and declared efforts to restore Kurdish citizenship that had been major Kurdish goals for decades. The STG pushed the SDF out of Arab majority areas but did not pursue the group into Kurdish majority areas where they would have faced stubborn resistance. Both groups, with US mediation, kept lines of communication open resulting in a rapid ceasefire and a new integration agreement within weeks.
al-Sharaa faced internal pressure from hardline elements and external pressures from Türkiye to deal a decisive blow to the SDF. Yet he continuously signaled restraint, refused to push into Kurdish-majority areas, and made concessions during the conflict. He went against Türkiye’s wishes, and accept the SDF’s integration into the Syrian military as whole units. By avoiding a harsh peace arrangement and making significant concessions while in a position of strength, he was able to effect a constructive peace arrangement, avoiding grievances that could lead to a future conflict.
On the opposing side, SDF commander-in-chief Mazloum Abdi had consistently supported negotiated integration with the Syrian government. Political considerations within the SDF, however, had caused the process to stall. Hardline elements were reluctant to yield ground that had been won at extreme cost during the grueling anti-ISIS campaign. Rather than feeding into voices that confronted the STG offensive with calls for open warfare, Abdi navigated the situation adeptly, making realistic concessions necessary to achieving a politically palatable integration deal.
U.S. Central Command and State Department officials, including Special Envoy Tom Barrack, were integral to stabilizing the situation. They reinforced redlines with both groups and supported communication and de-escalation. The US used a carrot-and-stick approach to pressure both sides into supporting a deal that balanced the acceptance of the SDF’s major aspirations with the ultimate goal of a unified and centralized Syrian state. Without this pressure, both the SDF and the STG may have struggled to push through otherwise politically difficult compromises.
Subsequent Events and Integration
The post-January offensive status quo has been a period of constructive dialogue and steady process towards integration. In early May, for example, the STG issued identification paperwork to those effected by a 1962 edict that proclaimed tens of thousands of Syrian Kurds as foreigners, prohibiting them and their descendants from being legally recognized as citizens. The edict also made them unable to vote, own property, or work for the government. In late May, elections were successfully held in the former SDF-controlled regions. Alongside the ongoing integration of SDF bureaucrats, fighters, and internal security forces into the Syrian government these developments have created the most constructive moment in at least decades.
Undoubtedly, many significant pitfalls remain. Most notably, the legislative body of the STG has still not held its first meeting, and the section of seats to be allocated by the Syrian president remain unassigned. The government has missed its own April deadline to hold the first legislative assembly and now faces rising pressures from within Syrian civil society. There is a logic behind the government’s concern that an assembly lacking representation from the Suwayda province will be used to further justify Druze resistance to the new Syrian administration. However, the STG risks a dangerous challenge to its legitimacy—and the significant progress made thus far—if no legislative assembly is held within the upcoming months.
Syria’s current situation is highly unstable. There is deep-rooted mistrust between both sides. Arabs and Kurds are mutually skeptical, and quick to make claims of foul play. Small-scale protests and flares of outrage on local social media are a weekly—if not daily—occurrence. Internal opponents to both al-Sharaa and Abdi could exploit these sentiments and proclaim moderate voices as capitulating to the enemy. A single unforeseen misstep by either side may derail the project. For now, despite the treacherous shoals, the leaking Syrian ship sails on.
Conclusions
“Peace in our time.” The “end of history.” “Mission accomplished.” Each of these . They cannot yet be applied to Syria.
But while peace is a delicate and ephemeral thing, it is similarly dangerous to presage doom at every turn. Contingencies should be developed for disaster, but opportunities for stabilization and progress must be identified and carefully cultivated.
The January 2026 offensive was not an outburst of emotion. Rather, it was a premeditated and calculated gamble. The STG was conscious of the risks of escalation. Its offensive was thus limited in nature, to avoid prolonged violence or the renewal of an insurgency. The offensive dislodged an unsustainable status quo and shifted the situation towards a more constructive equilibrium.
Prior to the offensive there had been little movement towards integration. Sporadic skirmishes were fought between both sides. Grievances mounted. The constant potential for a flashpoint that would ignite a wider conflict hung over the heads of all factions. Rendered bargaining chips, Kurdish citizenship and ethnic rights remained suspended for over a year. Reconstruction and rapprochement could not truly begin because the situation of the Syrian Civil War persisted.
Following the offensive, and the subsequent peace deal, the situation in Syria has broadly improved. Elections have been held in the north and east. Syrian Kurds have received citizenship paperwork, ending decades of being foreigners in their own homeland. With most of the nation now unified, the process of reconstruction has been able to begin in earnest. While the danger of renewed instability and conflict still looms— and must be carefully considered—the past six months ought to be viewed as a period of significant progress. A reunified and stable Syria may yet be on the way.
