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NATO’s Theory of Victory Problem

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11.20.2026 at 06:00am
NATO’s Theory of Victory Problem Image

Abstract

NATO’s recent command reshuffle gives European officers more senior posts but leaves Washington in practical control of the Alliance’s warfighting hierarchy and the theory of victory it is built around. Eastern-flank Allies have begun building fortifications around a positional reading of a Russian contingency, while France and Germany remain structured for an expeditionary and maneuverist one. The result is an operational architecture that has quietly answered, unevenly, the very question institutional reform debates are still arguing over.


Introduction

As Europeans are still reeling from transatlantic strains, epitomized by the standoff over Greenland, NATO’s internal structure is being actively contested. Convinced that the United States will scale back its military involvement on the continent, European governments have pushed to secure more senior posts across NATO’s command structure. Yet merely assigning more European officers to headquarters has done little to resolve the core problem of agreeing on a unified Allied theory of victory for a conflict with Russia. In essence, a theory of victory is “a causal story about how to defeat an adversary”, outlining the conditions under which an enemy will accept defeat and how military action can create those conditions.

Additionally, reforming NATO’s command structure doesn’t address divergence in Allied threat perceptions, with geography not only determining a country’s sense of threat, but also shaping how it expects the war to be fought. Representative of these tensions was a recent closed-door panel discussion in Brussels, where a former senior NATO general—questioned on the viability of a maneuverist approach based on speed and dislocation amid the attritional realities of Ukraine—expressed firm confidence in existing war plans and the Alliance’s capacity to adapt on the battlefield. Whether members on the northern and eastern flanks, who sit closest to the Russian threat, share that confidence is the more salient question. The response expressed confidence in existing war plans and allied capacity to learn on the job. Whether members on the northern and eastern flanks (geographically closer to Russia) share that confidence is the more salient question. Changes in NATO’s own operational architecture could offer some pertinent answers.

Command vs. Strategy

Last February, NATO announced that the Allies had agreed on a new distribution of senior officer responsibility across the NATO Command Structure, in which European Allies will play a more prominent role in the Alliance’s military leadership. While the effort was lauded as a substantial step towards European strategic autonomy, the change itself does not imply a shift in strategy or war planning on its own. As the chair of the Military Committee had already been held by Europeans for most of NATO’s existence, the expected agenda-setting power proved more limited than hoped. The Americans assert their status as primus inter pares (first among equals) through the position of SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), retaining practical control of the actual warfighting hierarchy.

Moreover, the same announcement that rotates command of the Alliance’s three Joint Force Commands among the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and Poland quietly executes an opposite shift just one paragraph down: the United States will now lead all three theater component commands, retaining Allied Land and Air Commands while newly taking over Allied Maritime Command.

This quiet consolidation of command posts contrasts sharply with a much more visible public signal. Between late 2025 and 2026, the Pentagon downgraded its parallel service commands in Europe (Air Forces Europe-Africa and Army Europe-Africa) from four-star to three-star billets, framing the move as part of a broader reduction in general officer positions. Yet while these billet reductions and an impending force posture review outwardly suggest a retrenching American posture, Washington’s grip on NATO’s operational component commands ensures it retains decisive control over how the Alliance would actually wage a war.

Meanwhile, efforts to revamp European defense are stuck between symbolic command reshuffles and broad debates over NATO reform, such as building a European pillar, creating an EU army, or expanding the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). This institutional focus has come at the expense of a realistic assessment of potential war scenarios and the military strategies Europeans can actually execute. Without that strategic foundation, elevating European officers to new command posts amounts to little more than political posturing.

Theories of War and Victory

A maneuverist theory of victory depends on dislocating the enemy’s ability to fight through speed, movement and surprise. By leading Allied air, naval, and ground theater commands, the United States can orchestrate all three domains simultaneously, executing the speed, movement, and joint coordination that the American way of war demands.

Despite changes in the character of warfare visible in Ukraine, epitomized by the omnipresence of drone warfare, a maneuverist approach could remain viable in a Russian contingency, provided the Alliance is backed by American enablers. While modern intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance have made the battlefield more visible at the tactical level, visibility does not equal operational transparency. Pervasive sensor coverage reveals equipment movements, but it cannot pierce an adversary’s operational intent, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s cross-border incursions in Kursk and its ongoing Operation Vivaldi. Nor has armor been rendered obsolete; rather, its role in maneuver warfare has adapted. Instead of massed, exposed formations, mobile protected firepower retains its value when tightly synchronized with electronic warfare, drone screens, and suppressive fires to exploit localized vulnerabilities. It is within this contested operational logic that the maneuverist assumptions of Western European capitals must be understood.

Assuming that maneuver warfare remains viable solely through continued American backing carries a distinct operational risk. Olivier Schmitt identifies a scenario in which the Alliance retains an American SACEUR alongside reduced, but real, U.S. support as the most politically comfortable option for Europe. This arrangement nudges European capitals to continue importing American military concepts: adopting U.S. operational doctrines, joint targeting frameworks, and high-tempo maneuver designs without having to field the massive sovereign capabilities needed to sustain them. Yet this comfort leaves Europeans critically dependent on American enablers and vulnerable should that support wane. Despite transatlantic frictions, the continuity of Washington’s security guarantee risks lulling Europeans into a state of doctrinal entrapment: building force structures around a way of war they cannot independently sustain in high-intensity combat.

Because Washington retains SACEUR and leads all three theater component commands, NATO war plans are naturally structured around Multi-Domain Operations, a doctrine designed entirely around U.S. strategic capabilities. Decades of joint training, standard operating procedures, and institutional socialization have reinforced European adherence to this template. Yet should Washington withdraw or withhold its critical enablers, the Alliance’s theory of victory would survive, as Schmitt and his colleagues observe, “in form, if not always in substance”. NATO would remain organized for a swift, decisive maneuver campaign while possessing the force structure only for a protracted, grinding war. Freedman’s short-war fallacy suggests which will prevail: plans built around swift victory tend to end in the prolonged wars they were meant to avoid.

Some Allies have already drawn that conclusion. More pessimistic about American backing, or simply sitting much closer to the Russian threat, they place a potential Russian contingency on the positional and attritional side of the spectrum of warfare. The Ukrainian battlefield, increasingly shaped by what Michael Horowitz calls “precise mass,” together with the geography of the Suwałki Gap and the Kaliningrad exclave, gives eastern Allies reason to doubt that Allied forces could maneuver freely in the Russian rear areas. Underlying this is a further calculus that owes less to doctrine than to political geography: for a Pole or a Balt, positional defense is not merely a preference for the tactical advantages of holding ground but a rejection of the alternative, ceding their own towns and villages to a Russian advance in the hope of retaking them later, and risking that each one becomes another Bucha. Ukraine has made that risk concrete rather than theoretical, and states with a land border to defend have drawn the harder lesson from it. Polish civilian and military officials interviewed for a 2025 Ifri  (French Institute for International Relations) study describe a revision of Poland’s plans after Russia’s advances in Ukraine and the massacre at Bucha, away from an elastic defense that traded ground for time and toward a forward defense meant to keep Russian forces, and similar atrocities, off national soil; the same logic has become predominant in the Baltic states. This refusal to trade territory for time extends beyond rhetoric and into force design, manifesting in national force structures that line up unevenly across the eastern flank.

Where Doctrine Meets the Order of Battle

Force structures are where these premises meet reality, and the most basic fact they reveal is that current war plans still assume American forces already stationed in Europe as a planning baseline. A Bruegel report published last year noted that NATO planners, assume that in a Russian attack on a European NATO country the 100,000 US troops already in Europe would be rapidly joined by up to 200,000 more, concentrated in armored units suited to the East European battlefield. The politics of drawdown remain unresolved: having removed an Army brigade from Romania, the US is nonetheless adding manpower in Poland, Lithuania and Estonia. Although much can change in a year, escaping the NATO Force Model’s deep dependence on US troops seems unlikely.

Whether prompted by doubts about Washington or by the Russian threat itself, Allies on the eastern flank have begun adjusting their force structures as though that baseline may not hold. The Polish armed forces count roughly 220,000 personnel excluding reservists, about 155,000 of them professionals, against a target of 500,000 by 2039: 250,000 operational, 50,000 territorial and 200,000 reservists. Officials counted only about 2,000 active reservists in 2024. Its hardware is similarly outsized: 476 tanks against 215 for France, 213 for the UK and 209 for Germany. Further north, Finland can mobilize a wartime force of roughly 280,000 thanks to its conscription system and total-defense model. When comparing artillery pieces, Finland’s more than 1,500 outnumber France’s 92. A clear caveat to these comparisons: neither the Polish nor the Finnish armed forces are full-spectrum forces, and both have made deliberate strategic trade-offs in their force design according to their own reading of a Russian contingency.

Consistent with those choices, fortifying the borderlands is a common theme across the eastern flank. Poland’s East Shield project covers 700 km of its borders with Kaliningrad and Belarus, and Estonia has launched procurement of 600 modular bunkers under the joint Baltic Defense Line. Officials describe the line as designed to defend from “the first meter of national territory,” a departure from earlier thinking that tolerated trading Baltic territory for time. The most striking step, though, was the coordinated withdrawal of the Baltic states, Finland and Poland from the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines. In a joint statement announcing the move, the defense ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland said threats from Russia and Belarus had “significantly increased” since they signed the treaty; the withdrawals were completed between December 2025 and February 2026, making large-scale mine use legally possible and fitting a positional defense doctrine.

These developments toward positional and attritional warfare by eastern-flank Allies line up closely with NATO’s own recent reforms of its operational architecture. Of particular relevance is the air-land axis underpinning the Joint Operations Area-Centre (JOA-C), which the IISS’s (International Institute for Strategic Studies) Ruben Stewart describes as NATO’s clearest air-land front: it stretches from Estonia to Hungary, covering the Baltic states, Germany, Poland and the reinforcement corridors linking western Europe to the eastern flank.

Rather than a dynamic maneuver force, NATO’s regional corps alignment reflects an architecture built around positional, attritional defense—dictated by frontline allies like Poland, Finland, Germany, and the Baltic states, whose postures prioritize land forces and static fortifications. Under this sector-based design, regional commands, spanning the 1st German-Netherlands Corps in the north, Poland’s 2nd Corps, and U.S. V Corps Forward, coordinated from Wiesbaden, are tied to rigid national axes. Yet this arrangement creates dangerous operational seams. By tethering ground formations to static sectors, it turns the Suwałki Gap into an acute single point of failure: allied corps deployed in the Baltic states must draw sustainment through a narrow corridor that Russia could sever in the opening hours of a conflict, isolating the Baltic states and southern Finland.

That shared premise, seams and all, throws the Alliance’s military heavyweights in Western Europe into sharper relief. Under NATO’s force model, the French 1st Army Corps sits among SACEUR’s strategic reserves, outside the forward line. Getting it there would not be simple: Brig. Gen. Fabrice Feola, who commands France’s military transport coordination center, said in late 2025 that approvals for cross-border military convoys were taking “tens of days” against an EU target of five, and that a major eastern deployment would put French forces in direct competition for road and rail capacity with American reinforcements landing on the Atlantic coast, the very reinforcements this section opened with. Stewart’s report adds a further caution: delays, cuts, or political constraints on American enablers before European capacity is ready would produce platform shortfalls and integration problems across the theatre, dynamics that could push the strategic reserves toward consuming enablers the forward corps already lack.

This tension, and the hard force-structure choices it forces, is also playing out in the Bundeswehr. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led Germany’s defense establishment to immediately question the viability of its small, high-end expeditionary force. Germany intends to scale up its mass in line with its own reading of a Russian contingency, but it is falling short of the recruitment it needs to do so. Per Pistorius’s own numbers, given in a letter to lawmakers, the defense ministry aims to enroll 20,000 recruits in the new voluntary service this year, plus another 13,500 through other channels. Analysts, however, believe Germany needs 60,000 to 70,000 new recruits a year to reach its goal of raising troop numbers from 184,000 to about 260,000 and tripling reservists to 200,000 by 2035.

The eastern flank has already supplied its own answer to the question the general answered with confidence: which theory of war NATO is actually built to fight. But an answer at the level of doctrine is not the same as an answer at the level of readiness, and this map shows both at once. Washington hedges rather than commits: maneuverist in the command levers it retains, territorial in the corps it has actually forward-deployed at Poznań. Poland, the Baltics and Finland have matched declaration to structure, however incompletely, building mass, fortification and treaty exits in the same direction their doctrine points. Further from the front, France and Germany remain caught between declaratory ambition and operational reality. A French corps held in reserve offers little utility if it cannot reach the Suwałki Gap before Russian forces close it, just as Germany’s promised mass army remains confined to legal frameworks and budget allocations long before it materializes in barracks. What emerges is an operational architecture that has settled, at the level of geography and command charts, on a positional and attritional theory of victory, while several of the Alliance’s own members remain resourced, staffed or postured for something else entirely.

Conclusion

If facts on the ground have already locked NATO into an attritional posture, debates over formal Alliance doctrine are settling an argument that is already over. Institutional inertia is expected in military bureaucracies. More striking is the persistent “say-do gap” among Western Europe’s military heavyweights, whose force generation and procurement consistently lag behind their heightened crisis rhetoric.

This exposes the central fragility of NATO’s posture. While the Alliance’s American-dominated command architecture remains designed around rapid, high-end maneuver, Europe’s operational reality cannot yet support it. Frontline allies are scaling up positional defenses, but those projects have not reached maturity yet; meanwhile, France’s deployable corps remains unready for rapid transit, and Germany continues to miss its recruitment targets. Until Europe aligns its resources with its operational ambitions, the Alliance risks entering a major contingency caught between an American maneuverist command structure it cannot execute and an attritional reality it has neglected to resource.

About The Author

  • Milo Vinikas

    Milo Vinikas is a security & defense analyst with dual master's degrees in intelligence and national security studies at Leiden University and international relations and diplomacy at the University of Antwerp. He has conducted professional research at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, with a focus on European security, defense and strategic competition. He writes on irregular & hybrid warfare, European defense and intelligence affairs.

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